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Here, the right of an individual to exclude others from accessing or using a resource results in the underutilisation of a resource. The lack of synergy between use rights and exclusion rights causes a net welfare loss, as the individuals exercising their right to exclude do not completely internalise the cost of excluding others.

Based on the non-conformity between use and exclusion rights, Parisi, Schultz and Depoorter (2002) have presented two cases to model the anticommons tragedy: simultaneous and sequential. The simultaneous case is where multiple individuals exercise their exclusion rights simultaneously as well as individually on the same level of the value chain. For example, multiple co-owners with veto rights on a shared resource. The sequential case is where exclusion rights are exercised in successive order on different levels of the value chain. For example, entities on a hierarchy exercising their veto power on a proposal.

The Greek government-debt crisis demonstrates the tragedy of the anticommons in the political economy. Sixteen countries in the Eurozone agreed to contribute to the bailout program. Here, coordination is dependent on the availability of information. Given that there is no information asymmetry and knowledge is shared between each country, this means the agreement of the bailout plan is enforceable and executable. However, each donor country failed to coordinate and carried out their own separate plans. This competitiveness and non-cooperative approach of the Eurozone countries resulted in a coordination fail and exacerbated Greece’s government debt crisis.