User:SANIKA FYCS/sandbox

{{sanika navsare}

communication

My purpose is to criticize understanding of communication and to replace it with a different version.But before I begin I would like to make some remarks about the scientific context in which this change is to be accomplished. I can begin from an uncontested fact. The well-known distinction between psychology and sociology, and a hundred years of specialized research, have led to the understandin that psychical and social systems can no longer be integrated. No researcher can survey the entire body of knowledge in either of these disciplines. However, this much is clear - in both cases we are concerned with systems that possess highly complex structures and whose dynamics, for any observer, are opaque and incapable of being regulated. Nevertheless, there are always concepts and theories that ignore this or try to screen it out systematically. In sociology the concepts of action and communication belong tthe residue of such an attempt. Normally they are employed in reference to a subject. This means that they assume an author, characterized as an individual or subject to whom the action or communication can be attributed. Therefore the concepts of “subject” and “individual” function as empty formulas for an, in itself, highly complex state of affairs falling within the domain of psychology and no longer concerning sociology. If one challenges this interpretation - and that iwhat I intend to do - then one usually encounters the objection that ultimately it is persons, individuals, or subjects who act or communicate. Othe contrary, I would like to maintain that only communication can communicate and that only within such a network of communication is what we understand as action created. My second preliminary remark concerns the interesting recent developments in general systems theory or the cybernetics of self-referential systems that earlier were found under the title of self-organization but are currently under the title of autopoiesis. The present state of research itself is incomplete and controversial. But an epistemologically satisfactory reformulation of the theoretical means of investigation - encompassing biology , psychology, and sociology- is clearly visible. Those who prefer a multileveled architecture can, in this case, observe a reformulation of theory that occurs on several different levels at the and that also calls into question the distinction of levels that logic suggests. Contrary to the basic assumptions of the philosophical tradition,