User:Sailingsmooth5/Georgian-Ossetian Crisis of 2004

The Georgian-Ossetian Crisis of 2004 was a brief armed conflict between Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which had declared independence from Georgia in the early 1990s. The conflict began on August 19, 2004, when Georgian forces launched an operation to regain control of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali.

The conflict was sparked by a series of incidents, including a bomb attack on a convoy of Georgian peacekeepers, clashes between Georgian police and Ossetian militias, and the killing of a Georgian policeman. Georgian forces quickly captured several villages around Tskhinvali, but they were met with heavy resistance from Ossetian forces and Russian peacekeepers stationed in the region.

The fighting continued for several days, with both sides suffering casualties and extensive damage to the city of Tskhinvali. The conflict was eventually resolved through a ceasefire agreement, which called for both sides to withdraw their forces and establish a joint peacekeeping force.

The conflict was a precursor to the much larger and more destructive 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which saw Russia intervene on behalf of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Overview
The 2004 Georgian-Ossetian crisis was a period of heightened tension and military conflict between Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia in 2004. The conflict arose after the newly-elected Georgian government under President Mikheil Saakashvili announced its intention to regain control over the separatist regions of Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia, which had been de facto independent since the early 1990s.

On May 31, 2004, the Georgian government sent its internal troops and heavy military equipment into the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, where only Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian peacekeeping forces and local law enforcement officials were allowed to be present. The move was considered a violation of previously signed agreements, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Georgia condemned it as such.

From July onwards, there were regular shelling incidents in the South Ossetian territory, targeting the town of Tskhinvali, Ossetian and Georgian villages with small arms, artillery, and mortars. President Saakashvili accused Russia of enabling the separatist authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to resist any attempts by Georgia to assert its control over the regions.

As a result, diplomatic tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated. Georgia turned to international organizations, accusing Moscow of supporting "separatist" regimes and demanded the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia.

Following a series of battles and skirmishes, in which both Georgian forces and Ossetian armed groups suffered dozens of casualties, both sides began to sue for peace. On November 5, 2004, during talks between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity, an agreement on the demilitarization of the conflict zone was signed. Although the agreement was seen as a positive step towards resolving the conflict, tensions between Georgia and the separatist regions continued to simmer and ultimately led to a larger-scale conflict in 2008.

Aftermath of 1991–1992 South Ossetia War: 1992–2003
In the early 1990s, Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia were embroiled in a conflict that lasted for several years. However, in 1992, Russia and Georgia signed the Dagomys Agreements, which outlined the principles for resolving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. These agreements were significant because they marked the end of the first Georgian-Ossetian War of 1991-1992.

Following the signing of the Dagomys Agreements, a ceasefire was declared on July 14th, and Mixed Peacekeeping Forces (MPF) were deployed to the conflict zone to separate the opposing sides. The MPF consisted of three battalions: Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian.

The Dagomys Agreements also called for the creation of a joint body to regulate the conflict - the Joint Control Commission (JCC), composed of representatives from the four parties: Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. Additionally, the OSCE established a monitoring mission in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.

After the Dagomys Agreements were signed, South Ossetia effectively became an independent state. In 1993, the Republic of South Ossetia adopted its constitution, solidifying its status as a self-governing entity.

In 1995, with the mediation of Russia and the OSCE, negotiations began between the Georgian and Ossetian sides to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. On May 16th, 1996, the "Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust" was signed in Moscow.

Refugees began returning to the conflict zone; however, the process was hindered by the region's severe economic situation. Georgia accused the South Ossetian leadership of turning the region into a hub for smuggling, which deprived Georgia of a significant portion of its revenue. On the other hand, the profits from smuggling allegedly supported the separatist regime. The region also saw a surge in criminal activity, including abductions, drug trafficking, and illegal arms trading.

The Saakashvili Era
The situation between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again in early 2004 after the new leadership of Georgia, which came to power in November 2003 as a result of the so-called Rose Revolution, declared its intention to restore the country's territorial integrity and regain control over separatist regions - Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia.

In foreign policy, the Georgian leadership pursued an active pro-European integration course, which allowed Saakashvili to claim significant financial and material assistance from the West, including assistance in rapidly increasing military potential. This led to an increase in tension between the Georgian authorities and the rebellious former autonomies. In May 2004, on the wave of the successful resolution of the Adjara problem, the Georgian leadership turned to the situation in South Ossetia. Saakashvili offered humanitarian assistance to the Ossetian and Georgian population of the region and promised to provide it with broad autonomy.

On May 31, the Georgian side transferred units of its internal troops and heavy military equipment to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, where only Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian peacekeeping forces and local law enforcement officials were allowed to be present. The OSCE mission in Georgia stated that this was "a gross violation of previously signed agreements". According to the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, as reported by the RIA Novosti news agency, 350 servicemen were introduced into the conflict zone, according to the Ossetian side - 800 people. The official reason for the introduction of Georgian troops and heavy equipment into the conflict zone was the fight against smuggling.

Georgian Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze said in a live broadcast on Georgian television that "if obstacles are encountered in the execution of this operation and the introduction of internal troops into the conflict zone by peacekeepers and resistance is shown, we will be forced to use weapons." Georgian Prosecutor General Irakli Okruashvili (in June 2004, he was appointed head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) stated: "The times when Georgia respected Russian peacekeepers are over".

In mid-June, the Georgian police closed the Ergneti market, which was located on the border between South Ossetia and Georgia and was a major hub for smuggling. This action was perceived by the Ossetian side as a threat to their economic interests and led to a further escalation of tensions.

Following this, Georgian authorities began restoring bypass roads east of Tskhinvali towards the Georgian-populated Liakhvi Gorge and organized patrolling there. On July 7th, Georgian peacekeepers detained a Russian convoy, which led to increased tension between Moscow and Tbilisi. The next day, the South Ossetian police detained and disarmed a unit of Georgian peacekeepers.

This led to additional Georgian troops being introduced into the conflict zone. As a result, the shelling of the city of Tskhinvali, Ossetian and Georgian villages intensified from small arms, howitzers, and mortars. Against this background, Mikheil Saakashvili made several sharp statements accusing Russia of aiding the authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, who do not want to resolve their relationship with Georgia.

The relationship between Tbilisi and Moscow was further aggravated by the resolution passed by the Russian State Duma in support of South Ossetia. Offers of assistance in the event of a Georgian attack were received by South Ossetia from Abkhazia, Transdniester, and North Ossetia. Hundreds of Russian volunteers went to the troubled South Ossetian region in relation to the ongoing onset of hostilities.

August 9-11
On August 9, Georgian Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze and State Minister for Conflict Resolution Georgy Khaindrava arrived in Moscow. The declared purpose of the visit is to relieve tension in relations, explain to Russian officials Tbilisi's position on the situation in South Ossetia, and offer their own ways to resolve the conflict. Giorgi Baramidze urged Russia not to support Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the conflict with Georgia.

From a formal point of view, the Russian-Georgian talks were about the revival of military cooperation: Georgia declared its readiness to buy military equipment from Russia and accept its help in creating a national air defense system. The parties agreed to restore the system of training Georgian military personnel in Russian universities, agreed on issues of control over man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. The talks, however, did not relieve tensions between the parties.

Literally the day before, Mikhail Saakashvili and his ministers announced their claims against Russia. The main one is the violation of the country's maritime and air space, the continuation of economic, trade, financial and transport relations with Abkhazia. In addition, Russia was accused of allowing the movement of illegal goods and armed groups through the Roki tunnel (on the Transcaucasian highway connecting North and South Ossetia), carrying out intelligence activities on the territory of Georgian autonomies, and conducting military training for residents of Tskhinvali at a base in Vladikavkaz ( North Ossetia). As another violation of sovereignty by Georgia, the granting of Russian citizenship to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was considered.

On the night of August 7-8, the first mortar shelling of Tskhinvali and Ossetian villages took place. The next night, mortars, grenade launchers and machine guns were fired from both sides, and Russian peacekeepers were accused of joining the skirmish on the Ossetian side and using howitzers to fire.

While Giorgi Baramidze, a participant in the Georgian-Abkhazian war who was considered one of President Saakashvili's closest associates, was negotiating in Moscow, Saakashvili himself flew on a working visit to Crimea to meet with Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko. The situation around South Ossetia and the possible participation of Kyiv in its settlement were discussed here. Saakashvili asked Ukraine to act as a mediator in resolving the aggravated Russian-Georgian relations and to send Ukrainian peacekeepers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in addition to the Russian ones.

At the talks in Moscow on August 11, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of all armed formations from the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, with the exception of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peacekeepers.

August 11-12
On the night of August 11-12, even more intense skirmishes between Georgian and Ossetian formations take place. Georgia reported the deaths of three of its soldiers, while South Ossetia reported damages to over 50 buildings, power transmission lines, and dozens of civilians injured. The situation escalated beyond a simple armed provocation, with battles occurring for the dominant heights around Tskhinvali and the bypass road from the inner regions of Georgia to Georgian villages in South Ossetia. The control of these heights played a crucial role in the conflict in the 1990s and would do so again in the current crisis.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement warning that the situation in South Ossetia could quickly spiral out of control and called for an end to the fighting. It also dispatched high-ranking officials to Georgia to prevent the conflict from escalating into a full-scale war.

On August 12th, additional internal troops of Georgia moved towards the area between South Ossetia and Imereti from the city of Kutaisi. Both sides sought control over the bypass road around Tskhinvali from the inner regions of Georgia towards the nine Georgian villages in the Liakhvi Gorge of South Ossetia. While Georgian forces controlled the road, the Georgian enclave ensured safety, stable supply, and independence from Tskhinvali. However, the road connecting Tskhinvali with Vladikavkaz was blocked in the area of the Georgian village of Tamarasheni and was practically unusable.

In Tbilisi, Saakashvili called for preventing external forces from dragging Georgia into a large-scale armed conflict on its territory. He also stated that Georgia's goal was to prevent ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in South Ossetia and the resumption of smuggling from Russia through South Ossetia to Georgia. Georgian parliamentarians declared the need to deploy peacekeepers from other countries, in addition to Russia, to the conflict zone. The Prime Minister of Turkey announced his willingness to participate in the process of "internationalizing peacekeeping forces" in Georgia. NATO, meanwhile, had not yet officially declared its position on the conflict in South Ossetia.

August 13-14
Following this, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Valery Loshchinin and Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Lev Mironov begin to travel to Tbilisi. By evening they are arrive in Tskhinvali. On August 13, a Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting was held in Tskhinvali to resolve the conflict. The JCC agreed to a ceasefire and discussed a plan to separate the opposing forces and ensure the safety of civilians.

However, on the same day, a car carrying Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was fired upon from the South Ossetian side, and another vehicle carrying the Georgian Parliament's Chairperson, Nino Burjanadze, was denied entry into the conflict zone. Burjanadze accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to fulfill their obligations to ensure the safety of civilians and called for an international peacekeeping force to replace the Russian peacekeepers.

The Georgian parliament demanded the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the conflict zone. Meanwhile, both Georgian and South Ossetian sides reported casualties resulting from the conflict.

On August 14-15, a ceasefire agreement was reached between Georgia and South Ossetia, with Russia as a mediator. The agreement was signed by Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity, but Zhvania was unable to travel to Tskhinvali to sign the document in person. The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities starting from midnight on August 15, the withdrawal of all Georgian armed forces from South Ossetia, except for peacekeeping troops, and the simultaneous withdrawal of South Ossetian militia. The agreement also provided for the establishment of new observation posts in populated areas along the confrontation line to enhance trust between the parties.

Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili reiterated his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, stating that Georgia's leadership and people wanted to restore the unity of the country but only through peaceful means.

August 15-17
In August 2004, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict intensified once again with both sides accusing each other of violating the ceasefire agreement. On August 15, a joint reconnaissance mission was conducted to identify the location of illegal armed groups. However, within a few hours of the agreement being signed, both sides began accusing each other of breaching the agreement and resumed shelling. There were reports of casualties on both sides, and both sides blamed each other for the provocations.

On the night of August 16, fierce fighting broke out in South Ossetia in the area of the bypass road from the Georgian internal regions to the Georgian villages in the Liakhvi Gorge. According to Georgian sources, the Ossetian formations constantly shelled the bypass road at night from Sarabuk, an Ossetian village near the road, using machine guns, mortars, and grenade launchers. There were casualties on both sides, and the ceasefire agreement reached the day before was essentially broken. This was the first time that both sides had officially confirmed the use of howitzers during the conflict.

On August 16, the Georgian Defense Minister, Georgy Baramidze, claimed that Russian Cossack units and so-called volunteers from the North Caucasus republics were infiltrating South Ossetia from Russia with ease. These groups were mainly concentrated around the Ossetian villages of Sarabuk and Dmenisi and were shelling the positions of Georgian internal troops in the conflict zone. According to the minister, these mercenaries did not obey the leader of South Ossetia, Kokoyty, and were acting according to their own plans. It was these groups that had been shelling the positions of Georgian internal troops in the conflict zone for several nights in a row.

Observers were concerned that the illegal armed groups could play a decisive destabilizing role in the ongoing confrontation. Despite the ceasefire agreement, both sides continued to blame each other for the escalating violence, and the involvement of external actors, such as Russian Cossacks and volunteers, only served to further complicate the situation.

On August 17, 2004, representatives from both sides of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict claimed that there was a "third force" in the region that was provoking the escalation of the armed conflict between them. Units from the Georgian and South Ossetian defense ministries were ordered to start a joint operation against non-controlled formations and to destroy them on the spot. However, in Tbilisi, the "third force" was considered to be a group of mercenaries from the North Caucasus, while in Tskhinvali, non-governmental units of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs were seen as the main threat. Peacekeeping battalions would not participate in operations to eliminate illegal armed formations.

The Committee on International Affairs of the Georgian Parliament demanded the denunciation of the Dagomys Agreements of 1992, on the basis of which trilateral peacekeeping forces are present in South Ossetia.

On August 17, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania met with the co-chairs of the Joint Control Commission. The meeting decided that as of August 17, the territory of South Ossetia would be declared a demilitarized zone and the parties would unblock the roads linking nine Georgian villages in the region with the rest of Georgia. All armed formations, except for three peacekeeping battalions, Georgian police, and Ossetian militia, would be withdrawn from the conflict zone.

Later on the same evening of August 17, shootings resumed on the bypass road around Tskhinvali. According to Georgian military experts, Georgian troops on the bypass road were attacked not by Ossetian formations, but by Russian special forces, as such units specialized in night battles using night vision devices.

Georgian Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze stated that after the night shelling, there could be no talk of withdrawing Georgian troops from the conflict zone, indicating a deteriorating situation and a willingness to continue hostilities.

August 18
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili called for an emergency conference on the conflict's resolution, urging the governments of the UK, Germany, and France, the UN Secretary-General, and the OSCE leadership to take part. Saakashvili also proposed expanding the OSCE mission in the conflict zone, allowing them to monitor the Roki Tunnel, a critical route for transportation.

Meanwhile, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili traveled to Vienna to participate in a meeting of the OSCE's Permanent Council. She discussed the current situation in the Tskhinvali region and Georgia's proposal for resolving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

On August 18th, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized Saakashvili's proposal for an international conference on South Ossetia. Lavrov argued that such forums are usually called when there is no mechanism in place to address the situation, but there is already a Joint Control Commission and peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone.

In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin canceled his planned visit to Georgia. Putin criticized Georgia's decision to abolish its autonomous regions, which he viewed as the root cause of the conflict. According to Putin, the root cause of the current conflicts on Georgian territory was the “stupid decision” to liquidate autonomous entities: “Russia is ready to make its contribution to the settlement and restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia, but is not going to take on unusual functions and act on one side. We are ready to play the role of a mediator and guarantor of agreements that can be reached if there is goodwill.”

August 19-22
On August 19th, the South Ossetian Committee for Information and Press reported that three civilians, including a child, were killed in the shelling of Tskhinvali. On the same day, a Georgian unit attempted to capture the Tliakana Heights controlled by South Ossetian militias near Tskhinvali. The Georgian forces were successful in capturing the heights, but later retreated and handed over control to peacekeepers. This episode became known as the Battle of Tliakana Heights.

Also on August 19th, the OSCE Secretariat released a statement in which it said that OSCE member states would carefully study the proposal of the Georgian Foreign Minister to convene an international conference. The current OSCE Chairman, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, was closely monitoring the situation, maintaining regular contacts with the Georgian authorities and the foreign ministers of other countries on the issue, and had already invited representatives of all parties interested in a peaceful settlement to Sofia for a high-level political dialogue.

On August 20th, Georgian Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze announced that Georgian troops were withdrawing from the conflict zone, but promised to continue the political offensive against the Ossetian side, with the involvement of the international community. The Ossetians confirmed the withdrawal of about 200 Georgian troops from the conflict zone but argued that the number of troops withdrawn was insignificant.

The commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Major General Svyatoslav Nabzdorov, noted that the withdrawal of Georgian troops allowed for the deployment of joint checkpoints of the peacekeepers and OSCE observers in the conflict zone. All strategic heights occupied by the Georgians were handed over to the peacekeepers, and the JPF had already set up additional posts there.

On August 22nd, Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov allegedly proposed sending 5,000 Chechen peacekeepers from formations under his control to the conflict zone in an interview with a Georgian television station, claiming that he had been asked to do so by South Ossetian representatives. Although this information was later denied, it caused an extremely negative reaction both among Georgian parliamentarians, who are unlikely to forget the participation of Chechens in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, and among foreign representatives of the Chechen diaspora.

August 23-24
The Georgian government initiated a so-called "humanitarian assault" on South Ossetia by transporting goods under the guise of "food" into Georgian and Ossetian villages. The Ossetian government agreed to allow these goods to pass through Tskhinvali to the villages of Liakhvskoe Gorge. The Georgian government also announced its readiness to begin the reconstruction of the structures damaged during the shelling of Tskhinvali and nearby settlements.

On August 23, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili posthumously awarded orders to Georgian military personnel who died in South Ossetia. According to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 178 members of Georgian armed formations were killed in the recent fighting.

After the withdrawal of armed formations from the conflict zone, there were no more shootings. The Saakashvili administration stated that South Ossetia might take advantage of the new situation and block some villages. Therefore, Georgian parliamentarians are heading to the villages of South Ossetia to monitor the situation.

The European Union's special representative for the South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie, arrived in Tbilisi to familiarize himself with the situation in South Ossetia and study the issue of possible EU participation in its settlement. Upon arrival, he met with Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vladimir Chkhikvishvili.

On August 23, maneuvers of the 58th Army began at the Sernovodsk training ground in North Ossetia. At the same time, exercises of the Russian peacekeeping contingent unfolded in Western Georgia and Abkhazia, and joint Armenian-Russian exercises were held in Armenia. Despite the concern of the Georgian parliament, Moscow stated that this was in no way connected with the situation in South Ossetia.

On August 24, in an interview with the French newspaper "Liberation," Mikhail Saakashvili accused Russia of direct military intervention in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and stated that Georgia was very close to war with Russia. This is the first time that Saakashvili made such bold and direct accusations, as previously, only lower-ranking Georgian politicians had done so. By insinuating that the conflict was the result of a Russian intervention, Saakashvili hinted to the international community that it was not about an ethnic conflict but about the aggression of strong Russia against its weak southern neighbor.

August 24-27
In the midst of the 2004 Georgian-Ossetian crisis, tensions between Russia and Georgia escalated as protests erupted outside their respective embassies in Tbilisi. On August 24th, the Russian consulate in Tbilisi suspended the issuance of entry visas to Russia due to ongoing protests. Local individuals used laser beams and computer technology to create messages condemning Russia's policies towards Georgia on the façade of the building, but local authorities did not respond to the Russian embassy's appeals.

Three days later, on August 27th, Russia and Georgia exchanged strong statements in response to the protests outside their respective embassies. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it would not conduct any negotiations with Tbilisi while the anti-Russian protests continued outside the Russian embassy. Russia accused the Georgian authorities of violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which obliges the host country to provide proper conditions for the operation of diplomatic missions.

The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Tbilisi, Armenian Ambassador Georgy Kostanyan, at the request of the Russian side, conveyed the consolidated position of the diplomatic corps to the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the actions of the authorities violated the universally recognized principles of the state's relationship with accredited diplomatic missions. He received assurances from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the protests would be terminated.

Meanwhile, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili made his second statement of the week, declaring that "the enemy must know that in the event of aggression, it will not only face the army but the entire nation." In response, an anonymous source in the Russian presidential administration stated that "it's time for the President of Georgia to wake up and stop calling for war. A united Georgia is in Russia's interest. If the President of Georgia were a visionary politician, he could count on Russia's assistance in unifying Georgian territories - of course, taking into account the interests of the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If we wanted to destroy Georgia, we would simply cut off the gas."

End of August
On August 30th, the two sides reached an agreement to withdraw their troops and allow peacekeepers to monitor the situation. From then till the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, relations between Georgia and South Ossetia remained relatively peaceful. However, tensions remained high; in one incident the Ossetian side attempted to use an excavator to dig up a bypass road that connects Georgian villages in South Ossetia to the rest of Georgia, while simultaneously expanding its own bypass road connecting Tskhinvali and Vladikavkaz to bypass Georgian villages.

On August 31st, the first serious incident since the end of armed conflict occurred when Ossetian special forces seized a Georgian villager but were forced to release him in exchange for a group of South Ossetian residents.

On September 1st, Russian State Duma deputies, led by the leader of the Rodina faction, Dmitry Rogozin, arrived in Tskhinvali. Rogozin stated that the State Duma could not remain neutral in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, as most residents of the latter state are Russian citizens. He added that the conflict could only be resolved politically, and the most important thing was the right of the Ossetian people to reunite.

In response, Zviad Dzidziguri, a member of the Georgian parliament and leader of the party "Union of National Forces of Georgia-Conservatives," announced the collection of signatures of deputies in support of the annulment of the Russian-Georgian Dagomys agreements. This motion failed, though the agreements became practically obsolete due to the deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. In 2019, the Russian government officially declared the agreements to be "frozen."

Continued Russo-Ossetian Tensions
In 2004, the Georgian-Ossetian crisis was reignited following the Beslan terrorist attack in September of that year. While the attack had initially overshadowed the tensions between Russia and Georgia, these issues slowly resurfaced, particularly as Georgia was unwilling to compromise.

In early September, Major General Svyatoslav Nabzdorov handed over command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in South Ossetia to Major General Marat Kulakhmetov, who had previously commanded the 19th Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Vladikavkaz. Official Tbilisi had sought to replace Nabzdorov but was slow to approve the new commander.

As a "welcome" to Kulakhmetov, Tbilisi held a military parade in Gori on September 12 to mark the anniversary of the creation of Georgia's internal troops. About 4,000 military personnel, several dozen units of armored vehicles, and helicopters participated in the parade. Georgian Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili told the soldiers that "enemies of Georgia" were located just 20 kilometers away and that they were the ones who could destroy them.

On September 16, it was announced that the Georgian Interior Ministry's internal troops would be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, leaving only the internal troops' special forces under the Interior Ministry's command. Over the course of the same month, Georgian citizens faced difficulties crossing the land border with Russia. Immediately after the Beslan attack, Russian border guards unilaterally closed the Upper Lars checkpoint in North Ossetia for Georgian citizens.

On November 5, during negotiations between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and de facto President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity, an agreement on the demilitarization of the conflict zone was signed. In December 2004, Georgy Baramidze was replaced as Minister of Defense by close ally of Saakashvili's "National Movement", former Prosecutor General and Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili.

Lasting Impact
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 2004 left a deep impact on the region. While the conflict was relatively short-lived, its aftermath and legacy continue to shape the geopolitics of the South Caucasus today. It has contributed to the ongoing instability in the region, with South Ossetia ultimately declaring independence from Georgia in 2008 and Russia recognizing its independence. The conflict also had a significant impact on the economies of both Georgia and South Ossetia, with trade routes disrupted and infrastructure damaged.

The conflict has also had political implications, with the Georgian government coming under scrutiny for its handling of the situation and accusations of human rights violations. The conflict has been a contentious issue in Georgian politics, with some politicians advocating for a more conciliatory approach towards the breakaway republics, while others take a hardline stance.

Meanwhile, the Russian government has also come under fire for allegedly furthering tensions in Georgia and "bullying" its southern neighbor. These allegations and scrutiny would further increase following the onset of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.