User:Sam Blacketer/Handling contradictions

and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.
 * valign="top"| Complaint by Director of Public Prosecutions.
 * 7. After the conviction complain was made by the Director of Public Prosecutions that there was evidence from which it could be inferred that Major Braybrook had been protected by senior officers, and that the officers who had investigated the conduct of Major Braybrook, whether by reason of instructions to adopt an attitude favourable to Major Braybrook or not, had failed to prosecute their inquiries with vigour or efficiency. The Court directed their attention to these allegations in considering the matters included in their terms of reference.
 * valign="top"| Organisation of Prisoners of War Directorate.
 * 8. It is necessary to appreciate the structure of the Directorate of Prisoners of War. A full account of the administration of internees and Prisoners of War may be found in the memorandum of Colonel Robertson (Vol. I page 2.) and in the evidence of General Hunter and Colonel Coates. The relevant facts may however be summarised as follows:-
 * valign="top"| Organisation of Prisoners of War Directorate.
 * 8. It is necessary to appreciate the structure of the Directorate of Prisoners of War. A full account of the administration of internees and Prisoners of War may be found in the memorandum of Colonel Robertson (Vol. I page 2.) and in the evidence of General Hunter and Colonel Coates. The relevant facts may however be summarised as follows:-

(a) For the first nine months of the war such administration was the responsibility of A.G.3 (P.W.) Colonel, then Major Coates was a D.A.A.G. in this branch from December 1939.

(b) On 7th June 1940 the Prisoners of War Directorate was formed directly under the Adjutant General and Major-General Sir Alan Hunter became Director of Prisoners of War. The Directorate was organised in three branches, namely: Inspector Lieutenant-General Sir O. Borrett.

(c) Colonel Coates remained D.A.A.G., P.W.2. until 9th July 1940 and was A.D.P.W. with the grading of A.A.G., but charged with the control of P.W.2 until 10th August 1940. Thereafter he was responsible for the administration of all three branches.

(d) Captain Rosser-James was brought in from civil life and joined P.W.2 and a Staff Lieutenant on 24th June 1940 and shortly after promoted.

(e) Major then Captain Gilkes came to the Directorate from Huyton Prisoners of War Camp as an attached officer about 1st October 1940. His subsequent duties are dealt with in detail hereafter.

(f) The sub-branch specially charged with the supervision of internees' finances and property was known as P.W.2(c) up to the end of October 1940 and thereafter as P.W.1 (x).
 * valign="top"| Governing Instructions as to Internees' Money and Property.
 * 9. The general orders for dealing with internees' money and property were first contained in the orders for internment camps dated 26th September 1938 and then set out in A.C.I. 515 of 1940 dated 25th April 1940 (Ex.30)
 * valign="top"| Transfer of Internment Camps to Home Office.
 * 10. On 18th July it was decided by the Home Policy Committee of the War Cabinet that the internal management, though not the safeguarding of the internment camps should be transferred from the Secretary of State for War to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. In order to implement this decision it was agreed that the Home Office should take over responsibility for the internal administration of internment camps as from the 4th/5th August 1940. War Office U.P.Ts.dated 31st July and 1st August 1940 laid down (inter alia) that Colonel Robertson should be transferred to the Home Office as military liaison officer, that camp records must be completed up to date by midnight 4th/5th August, that canteens must then be closed, that old bank accounts must be closed, and new accounts opene, that all cash had to be paid into existing accounts, that each internee must sign the balance of his account card, that a nominal roll of internees' credit balances at the material date must be prepared and totalled, and that a cheque for the total of such nominal roll must be drawn in the old account and paid into the new. A further nominal roll of foreign currency securities and other forms of money had also to be prepared. P.W.2(c) was to be kept informed of various of these steps.
 * valign="top"| Transfer of Internment Camps to Home Office.
 * 10. On 18th July it was decided by the Home Policy Committee of the War Cabinet that the internal management, though not the safeguarding of the internment camps should be transferred from the Secretary of State for War to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. In order to implement this decision it was agreed that the Home Office should take over responsibility for the internal administration of internment camps as from the 4th/5th August 1940. War Office U.P.Ts.dated 31st July and 1st August 1940 laid down (inter alia) that Colonel Robertson should be transferred to the Home Office as military liaison officer, that camp records must be completed up to date by midnight 4th/5th August, that canteens must then be closed, that old bank accounts must be closed, and new accounts opene, that all cash had to be paid into existing accounts, that each internee must sign the balance of his account card, that a nominal roll of internees' credit balances at the material date must be prepared and totalled, and that a cheque for the total of such nominal roll must be drawn in the old account and paid into the new. A further nominal roll of foreign currency securities and other forms of money had also to be prepared. P.W.2(c) was to be kept informed of various of these steps.

Unfortunately these admirable instructions, which, however, left the question of effects to be covered by further instructions, were not sent to Warth Mills Camp of which Major Braybrook was commandant, as it was intended that this camp should cease to be an internment camp and after reconditioning became a Prisoners of War Camp.
 * valign="top"| Major Braybrook's position.
 * 11. The position therefore with regard to Major Braybrook was that he had impounded large sums of money and quantities of other property and valuables from internees at Kempton Park and Warth Mills. The total amount of money was stated to be between fifty and sixty thousand pounds. We are unable to state the extent or value of the other property but both were substantial.
 * 11. The position therefore with regard to Major Braybrook was that he had impounded large sums of money and quantities of other property and valuables from internees at Kempton Park and Warth Mills. The total amount of money was stated to be between fifty and sixty thousand pounds. We are unable to state the extent or value of the other property but both were substantial.

12. It was strongly urged before us and we have no reason to doubt that the conditions in which Major Braybrook received internees into both Kempton Park and Warth Mills camp were of the utmost difficulty. At Kempton Park the daily intake of internees at the commencement of the general internment was very large and the staff very small. At Warth Mills there was the additional difficulty that nominal rolls of internees' finances did not reach the camp until the internees concerned had in fact departed.
 * valign="top"| Captain Mawson's letter.
 * 13. The conditions at Warth Mills Camp were so bad that they profoundly disturbed Captain G.H. Mawson, Royal Corps of Signals, one of the officers who was serving there in July 1940. This officer, acting, we are satisfied, in the belief that he was fulfilling his duty and with the knowledge of Major Braybrook, on 19th July 1940 wrote to the Under Secretary of State, War Office, P.W.1, Hobart House protesting against the conditions. Paragraph 9 of the protest is as follows:-
 * 13. The conditions at Warth Mills Camp were so bad that they profoundly disturbed Captain G.H. Mawson, Royal Corps of Signals, one of the officers who was serving there in July 1940. This officer, acting, we are satisfied, in the belief that he was fulfilling his duty and with the knowledge of Major Braybrook, on 19th July 1940 wrote to the Under Secretary of State, War Office, P.W.1, Hobart House protesting against the conditions. Paragraph 9 of the protest is as follows:-


 * "9. There is no adequate arrangement for the listing, filing, and storing of these wholesale confiscations, to ensure against loss and confusion of ownership. No receipts are given, even for money, and claims for mistakes cannot be verified. Hundreds of articles are already unidentifiable."

There could be no clearer statement of the cause of the trouble of the next few months. This letter was received by Lieutenant-colonel Chandler who properly spoke to Colonel Robertson regarding it. It was, according to Lieutenant-colonel Chandler's note, decided to take no action. Although we appreciate that a great part of the letter dealt with the physical conditions of a camp which was about to be closed and improved, it must be regretted that the existing and potential troubles so clearly envisaged by the letter were not realised by Colonel Robertson and that Captain Mawson's request for an interview disregarded. The effect that the camp administration had on Captain Mawson's mind can be judged from his discussion on the subject with General Borrett some four months later which we deal with in its chronological position.
 * valign="top"| Action by P.W.D.
 * 14. Although difficulties existed in other camps it was known to P.W.D. that Major Braybrook was in a special position at the time of the change-over from the War Office to the Home Office on 4/5th August 1940. He had had exceptional difficulties with his large and sudden intakes of internees both at Kempton Park and Warth Mills Camps. There had been no official check to ensure that matters had been cleared up as there would have been if he had been ordered to comply with the U.P.Ts regarding handing over. Such a situation admittedly demanded special and immediate action. The action taken was to sent Major Braybrook to Windlestone in Durham, a small Prisoners of War camp, where it was hoped that he would have time to retun to the proper quarters the impounded money and other property in his custody. The only additional action was that Captain Rosser-James was told by Colonel Coates to keep an eye on camp accounts generally. In our opinion such action was not by itself sufficient. An officer should at once have been detailed and if necessary sent down to Windlestone to discover the extent of Major Braybrook's financial commitments, to determine the amount of internees' property in his possession and to supervise the distribution. Apart from the fact that Captain Cooke dealt with correspondence regarding internees' claims for property, no officer seems at this stage to have been charged with the duty of assisting Major Braybrook in the difficulty in which he was known to be.
 * valign="top"| Major Ferguson.
 * 15. During August Major (then Captain) Ferguson was employed in P.W.2. After careful consideration we accept this officer's evidence and reject that of Colonel Coates and Captain Rosser-James where there is a conflict. We find that about the middle of August Major Ferguson told Colonel Coates that in his view Braybrook was a rogue or "wrong-un". He did not hesitate to say the same in writing on his written notes with regard to currencies. He also gave Captain Rosser-James three reasons orally for holding such a belief. These statements by Major Ferguson failed to impress Colonel Coates or Captain Rosser-James. Finally, when he was about to leave to become assistant military liaison officer at the Home Office Major Ferguson was told by Colonel Coates that he must not say anything there of what he had heard regarding Major Braybrook at Hobart House.
 * valign="top"| Home Office suspicion.
 * 16. In the meantime by the end of August or the beginning of September, Mr. Plumb of Department B3 of the Home Office which deals with internees had begun to think that the delays of Major Braybrook in dealing with internees' claims had a sinister significance. These fears were known to P.W.D. but were not shared by them, and this, in our opinion, is probably the origin of the differences of outlook which developed between the two departments. On the other hand it must be remembered that in July and August Major Braybrook had distributed approximately £40,000. Despite this we feel that when a month had passed from the change-over it was time that further action should be taken to investigate what Major Braybrook was doing. Captain Rosser-James should have represented the matter to his superior officer and asked for assistance so that someone could have dealt specifically with Major Braybrook's position. He did not do so.
 * valign="top"| Sir John Moylan's correspondence.
 * 17. On the 19th September Sir John Moylan, who was in charge of the Department B3 of the Home Office already referred to, sent a personal letter to General Hunter, asking for information with regard to the personal papers and documents of identity of internees who had passed through Warth Mills Camp. (See Volume II pages 38 to 45) The information was required to deal with a proposed question of Lord Davies in the House of Lords. The letter suggested that enquiry was needed into Major Braybrook's treatment of internees' documents. From his reply of 30th September, General Hunter seems to have resented the manner and style of this approach, but to have endeavoured to answer Sir John's points by a memorandum prepared by Colonel Coates and revised by himself, and also by sending a statement from Major Braybrook which he said had been substantiated by Braybrook on a visit to London specially made in order to explain the position. We have been unable to discover in what terms or to whom this substantiation was made. General Hunter's reply, moreover, does not fully answer the points raised in that it makes no reference to internees' property.
 * 16. In the meantime by the end of August or the beginning of September, Mr. Plumb of Department B3 of the Home Office which deals with internees had begun to think that the delays of Major Braybrook in dealing with internees' claims had a sinister significance. These fears were known to P.W.D. but were not shared by them, and this, in our opinion, is probably the origin of the differences of outlook which developed between the two departments. On the other hand it must be remembered that in July and August Major Braybrook had distributed approximately £40,000. Despite this we feel that when a month had passed from the change-over it was time that further action should be taken to investigate what Major Braybrook was doing. Captain Rosser-James should have represented the matter to his superior officer and asked for assistance so that someone could have dealt specifically with Major Braybrook's position. He did not do so.
 * valign="top"| Sir John Moylan's correspondence.
 * 17. On the 19th September Sir John Moylan, who was in charge of the Department B3 of the Home Office already referred to, sent a personal letter to General Hunter, asking for information with regard to the personal papers and documents of identity of internees who had passed through Warth Mills Camp. (See Volume II pages 38 to 45) The information was required to deal with a proposed question of Lord Davies in the House of Lords. The letter suggested that enquiry was needed into Major Braybrook's treatment of internees' documents. From his reply of 30th September, General Hunter seems to have resented the manner and style of this approach, but to have endeavoured to answer Sir John's points by a memorandum prepared by Colonel Coates and revised by himself, and also by sending a statement from Major Braybrook which he said had been substantiated by Braybrook on a visit to London specially made in order to explain the position. We have been unable to discover in what terms or to whom this substantiation was made. General Hunter's reply, moreover, does not fully answer the points raised in that it makes no reference to internees' property.
 * 17. On the 19th September Sir John Moylan, who was in charge of the Department B3 of the Home Office already referred to, sent a personal letter to General Hunter, asking for information with regard to the personal papers and documents of identity of internees who had passed through Warth Mills Camp. (See Volume II pages 38 to 45) The information was required to deal with a proposed question of Lord Davies in the House of Lords. The letter suggested that enquiry was needed into Major Braybrook's treatment of internees' documents. From his reply of 30th September, General Hunter seems to have resented the manner and style of this approach, but to have endeavoured to answer Sir John's points by a memorandum prepared by Colonel Coates and revised by himself, and also by sending a statement from Major Braybrook which he said had been substantiated by Braybrook on a visit to London specially made in order to explain the position. We have been unable to discover in what terms or to whom this substantiation was made. General Hunter's reply, moreover, does not fully answer the points raised in that it makes no reference to internees' property.

18. The first stage in the Moylan-Hunter correspondence had however the result of causing Captain Gilkes who on the 1st October was brought to the directorate as an attached officer to be sent to Windlestone to assist Major Braybrook with the distribution of the sterling funds in his possession. Before his return to the Army Captain Gilkes had been a director of a company and further had been trained as a chartered accountant although he disclaims any deep knowledge of the practice of that profession. He went to Windlestone and, in spite of the fact that owing to illness on Major Braybrook's part, he had only one day with the latter, produced an admirable report on the position of the internees' sterling (See Volume VI page 41 and Exhibit 41). This report made quite clear that Major Braybrook had no books of prime entry, that his bank accounts were no check on what he had impounded as he had been in the habit of using such money received for current expenditure before banking it and that records of any kind were very scanty. Major Gilkes agreed when examined by the Court that such a situation would provide a dishonest man with the opportunity of fraud and would require careful attention, but asserted that Major Braybrook had impressed him as an honest man.

19. On receipt of this report Captain Rosser-James on 14th October 1940 summarised it in a minute to Colonel Coates which also suggested the instructions for Major Gilkes' further actions which were adopted (See Volume VI page 41) It is remarkable that these instructions contained no reference to the investigation of the position regarding property or valuables especially in view of the fact that no previous instruction had been issued to Major Braybrook in that regard. It is even more remarkable that no such reference was inserted after Sir John Moylan's second letter of 25th October when he pressed for a further enquiry into that very point under threat of going to his Secretary of State, and General Hunter's reply of 27th October in which he promised that the enquiry would be pursued as soon as Major Braybrook returned to duty after his illness. Major Braybrook was in fact off duty from 4th October to 16th November 1940 and Major Gilkes was unable to continue with his work of assistance until 18th November.
 * valign="top"| New Factors.
 * 20. By the middle of November three matters of importance had occurred.
 * 20. By the middle of November three matters of importance had occurred.

(a) General Hunter had emphasised his promise of enquiry in his letter of November (See Volume XI page 35).

(b) Captain Mawson had sometime in November had a conversation with General Borrett in which he had told him of the fraudulent practices of Braybrook at Warth Mills in regard to internees' money and a rug. General Borrett denies that he was told of the former but we are of the opinion that his recollection on this point is at fault. He certainly did not pass on any information as to it. It is common ground that General Borret did mention to Colonel Coates some matter of a missing rug but Colonel Coates merely told him that Braybrook's affairs were being investigated.

(c) About the 8th November Sir John Moylan instructed Colonel Robertson to tell General Hunter confidentially that Major Braybrook had been convicted in 1935 of the fraudulent use of insurance stamps and fined £50. There is considerable doubt as to the exact terms in which this information was conveyed to General Hunter and then passed on by him to Colonel Coates, Captain Rosser-James and Major Gilkes. We consider that all these oficers appreciated that the conviction was one which reflected on Major Braybrook's honesty. It is common ground that General Hunter told his subordinates to be on the look out. In our opinion Colonel Coates should have been put very much on enquiry by these three facts. A definite and stringent investigation should have been ensured and should certainly have included foreign currency, effects and valuables in addition to sterling. Officers should have been warned that any statement depending on Major Braybrook's word alone should be approached with the very greatest reserve.

21. While endeavouring to avoid the error of being wise after the event, it is difficult to appreciate why these factors coupled with others which emerged from the routine correspondence with regard to claims which passed between Department B3 of the Home Office and the P.W.D. did not lead to a more critical attitude on the part of the Directorate at this time towards Major Braybrook. Mr. Plumb had written a pointed letter on the 1st October which drew a heated response from Colonel Coates who at the same time admitted the need for the attention of three chartered accountants to Major Braybrook's affairs which he stated was being given. Thereafter several important letters were written by the Home Office, some to General Hunter himself. We do not think it would be justifiable to say that there was a blind acceptance of Major Braybrook's explanations except in routine matters. Even at this stage there was nevertheless a failure to appreciate the importance of the question of property and valuables, important though it was to secure the distribution of sterling.

22. Concurrently with the assistance being rendered by Captain Gilkes to Major Braybrook in the disbursement and clearing up of the sterling position, P.W.1 (x) was engaged in apportioning to its rightful owners a considerable amount of foreign currency which had been collected off fifty seven internees at Kempton Park in May, and had been deposited by Major Braybrook with Colonel Coates on 30th May 1940. No detail of this foreign currency had been received from Braybrook till 12th July 1940 after it had been called for by Colonel Coates. When received the detail did not tally with the actual total of foreign currencies which had been handed over. The position was further complicated by the fact that claims had been made by 30 of these internees, known as the Fleischer Group, which did not agree with the detail that Braybrook had sent in nor, in certain cases, with what they were known to have had in their possession when they were transferred to Kempton Park from Pentonville. In certain cases they claimed that golden sovereigns had been impounded from them by Braybrook and that no receipts had been given.

Considerable correspondence on the subject of these claims was received from the Home Office. The nature of the claims undoubtedly contributed to the Home Office suspicions regarding Braybrook's integrity. This case should also have aroused suspicions in the directorate owing to the discrepancy between the list forwarded by Braybrook and the currency actually in possession. The dilatoriness on the part of the War Office in disposing of these currencies and claims, and the procedure adopted by P.W.1 (x) in regard thereto, was the subject of strong protest, amounting almost to censure, on the part of the Home Office in the persons of Mr. Plumb and Mr. Fisher. In fact the position has not yet been finally cleared.
 * valign="top"| The Interim Report.
 * 23. The general attitude of the Directorate at this time is well illustrated by the Interim Report of Captain Rosser-James dated 25th November 1940 on internees sterling made after a personal visit to Windlestone, and the letter of 29th November 1940 with which it was forwarded to Colonel Robertson (See Volume III page 9). That report records that another £3,500 had been distributed since Major Gilkes reported at the beginning of October, and that some £4,000 still remained in Major Braybrook's hands. It further contains an explanation of Major Braybrook's difficulties. It does not of course touch on the question as to whether it was sound administration to allow for nearly four months after the change-over of 5th August, large sums to be left in Major Braybrook's custody or whether any further steps were necessary in regard to property or valuables. Except as evidence that the distribution had not ceased, it is difficult to appreciate the value of this report or the terms of satisfaction with which it was greeted in Colonel Coates' letter of 29th November 1940 to the Home Office. In our opinion it was the responsibility of Colonel Coates to see that not only was distribution proceeding properly, but that an adequate reply was forthcoming to the points raised in Sir John Moylan's second letter of 25th October 1940 to which an answer had been promised in General Hunter's letter of 27th October 1940 (See Volume II pages 42 and 44). In fact no such answer was ever given.
 * 23. The general attitude of the Directorate at this time is well illustrated by the Interim Report of Captain Rosser-James dated 25th November 1940 on internees sterling made after a personal visit to Windlestone, and the letter of 29th November 1940 with which it was forwarded to Colonel Robertson (See Volume III page 9). That report records that another £3,500 had been distributed since Major Gilkes reported at the beginning of October, and that some £4,000 still remained in Major Braybrook's hands. It further contains an explanation of Major Braybrook's difficulties. It does not of course touch on the question as to whether it was sound administration to allow for nearly four months after the change-over of 5th August, large sums to be left in Major Braybrook's custody or whether any further steps were necessary in regard to property or valuables. Except as evidence that the distribution had not ceased, it is difficult to appreciate the value of this report or the terms of satisfaction with which it was greeted in Colonel Coates' letter of 29th November 1940 to the Home Office. In our opinion it was the responsibility of Colonel Coates to see that not only was distribution proceeding properly, but that an adequate reply was forthcoming to the points raised in Sir John Moylan's second letter of 25th October 1940 to which an answer had been promised in General Hunter's letter of 27th October 1940 (See Volume II pages 42 and 44). In fact no such answer was ever given.

24. In December Major Gilkes accompanied Major Braybrook to the Isle of Man where they inspected account cards and such other records as there were, interviewed internees and proceeded with the distribution on the spot. In view of the course already followed, this was a reasonable step at this juncture and of course had been laid down in Major Gilkes' written instructions of 14th October 1940. (See Volume VI page 41). We do not criticise the way in which the duty was performed by Major Gilkes.
 * valign="top"| The "Final Report.
 * 25. About 12th February 1941 Major Gilkes produced a report (referred to in Court as the Final Report) on the distribution up to 31st January 1941 of sterling held by Major Braybrook (Exhibit 32). This report purported to state that the distribution had been effected save for the following matters:-
 * 25. About 12th February 1941 Major Gilkes produced a report (referred to in Court as the Final Report) on the distribution up to 31st January 1941 of sterling held by Major Braybrook (Exhibit 32). This report purported to state that the distribution had been effected save for the following matters:-

(a) Claims for the Isle of Man amounting to £339. 10. 3. which had been rejected or reserved for further enquiry.

(b) A reservation of £544. 14. 11. to meet claims from overseas with the possibility that these might be larger.

(c) A warning that the canteen position was obscure and that a report should be obtained from the officer in charge. Major Braybrook was retaining £78. canteen profits against monies owed to him.

(d) A statement that there were two sums of £65. and £194. 14. 1. claimed by Major Braybrook as money advanced by him to internees and paid for canteen necessaries respectively.

(e) Attention was drawn to the fact that Major Braybrook claimed that he had advanced £729 of his own money in cash in order to send forward money to pay claims. Thus while prima facie there appeared to be a surplus of £350. in one bank account and a payment of £140. from that account to another, in reality the position was that the money taken from internees was too little by £239. [i.e. £729 minus(£350 plus £140)] to meet their claims, (which even so were not complete) together with Major Braybrook's claim.

In spite of these matters the report on the whole expressed satisfaction with the position and also with the conduct of Major Braybrook and the assistance which he had given. A long statement by Braybrook in explanation of and excuse for the position was attached to the report.

Major Gilkes did not, however, in the report make any recommendation as to any payment to Major Braybrook from public funds.

26. Captain Rosser-James attached to the report a memorandum (see Exhibit 32) which became important in a later episode. It contains two curious points. In the first place Captain Rosser-James states that Major Braybrook had informed him that he (Braybrook) had handed over all internees' effects to the proper quarter. We find it difficult to understand the value attached by Capatain Rosser-James to this unsupported statement. (See Volume X. pages 11 and 12). Secondly Captain Rosser-James concludes by a statement which in spite of his explanation appears to us to point clearly to supporting Major Braybrook's claim for a repayment out of public funds of money stated by him advanced from his own pocket.

27. The report was passed to General Hunter on 18th February 1941 together with a letter dated the previous day signed by Major Braybrook which contains a proposal for (inter alia) the handing over the balances by Major Braybrook and the repayment to Major Braybrook of the sums of £65 and £194. 14. 1. above mentioned, and also a claim that the £729 should also be repaid to him if necessary out of public funds. (See Exhibit 32A). General Hunter approved of the scheme with the exception of the payment of any portion of the £729. out of public funds, and also approved of a letter to Major Braybrook dated 19th February 1941 signed by Lieutenant-colonel Chandler explaining this decision. A cheque for £259. 14. 1. (i.e. £65 plus £194. 14. 1.) was sent to Major Braybrook but stopped on his arrest.

28. Here we would draw attention to action taken by the P.W.D. in regard to disposal of the "Final Report."

Colonel Coates states that on the 24th February he went to consult C.2. as to what action, if any, should by taken by P.W.D. on the facts disclosed by the Report, in view of the fact that criminal proceedings were impending against Braybrook, and in particular whether D.P.S. should be asked to institute a Court of Inquiry. He further states that he was informed by C.2. (Mr. Smith) that they had been in communication with the Director of Public Prosecutions and all further action would be taken by the police, none being required from P.W.D.

Such is the explanation offered for the failure subsequently complained of to show the Report to Chief Inspector Bridger.

Mr. Smith on the other hand gives an entirely different version. He states that the question put to him by Colonel Coates was whether it would be proper to disclose documents in connection with Braybrook to the police, and that his reply was that there was no objection. It is common ground that several weeks later Mr. Smith received a visit from Captain Rosser-James who put to him the question whether Braybrook's Report might be given to the police and was told that there was no objection. Apart from the fact that the question which Colonel Coates states he put to Mr. Smith is not one which it is within the sphere of C.2. to answer, we consider that the evidence of Mr. Smith in connection with this incident is more reliable than that of Colonel Coates.
 * valign="top"| Appointment of Major Braybrook to Prees Heath.
 * 29. In the meantime at a meeting of the departmental Selection Board on 9th January 1941 of which there are no minutes Major Braybrook had been selected to be commandant of Prees Heath Prisoners of War camp. General Hunter has informed us that this appointment was "tentative" in view of the fact that a further report was awaited. On 19th January 1941 i.e. the day after General Hunter had approved the above report, orders were issued that Major Braybrook should take over the command of Prees Heath on 3rd March 1941. This step was taken apparently to have Major Braybrook in an appointment on which he would not lose his majority but would have little opportunity of getting into another financial muddle, pending the reference of the report of February 1941 to D.P.S. for consideration of a Court of Inquiry. It is difficult to understand why such orders came to be issued in view of the various facts regarding Major Braybrook and his work which, as this report shows, were then known to the members of the Selection Board which normally consisted of General Hunter, General Borrett, Colonel Robertson and Colonel Coates with Lieutenant-colonel Chandler as Secretary.
 * valign="top"| Arrest of Major Braybrook.
 * 30. On 21st February, Chief Inspector Bridger of the Criminal Investigation Department as we have said above, having obtained a search warrant, searched Major Braybrook's house and found a quantity of British sovereigns and foreign currencies. He arrested Major Braybrook on the same day. Later on that day Major Braybrook was released on bail. The police informed P.W.D. about the arrest on Saturday 22nd February 1941. A telegram was sent on that day ordering Major Braybrook to report to General Borrett on Monday 24th February and not to proceed to Prees Heath. Major Braybrook reported on that Monday and was duly suspended. There was evidence of a discussion between Mr. Newsam of the Home Office and General Hunter as to whether the latter would undertake that while the charges were pending Major Braybrook would not be employed in any capacity concerned with internees. General Hunter after consideration gave this undertaking.
 * valign="top"| Chief Inspector Bridger's complaints.
 * 31. On 25th February 1941 Chief Inspector Bridger paid the first of his visits to General Hunter. As a result of these visits he made a number of complaints against the Officers of the Directorate (See Volume I page 26 et seq and pages 39 and 40) We have summarise these complaints and out findings thereon as follows:-
 * valign="top"| Chief Inspector Bridger's complaints.
 * 31. On 25th February 1941 Chief Inspector Bridger paid the first of his visits to General Hunter. As a result of these visits he made a number of complaints against the Officers of the Directorate (See Volume I page 26 et seq and pages 39 and 40) We have summarise these complaints and out findings thereon as follows:-
 * 31. On 25th February 1941 Chief Inspector Bridger paid the first of his visits to General Hunter. As a result of these visits he made a number of complaints against the Officers of the Directorate (See Volume I page 26 et seq and pages 39 and 40) We have summarise these complaints and out findings thereon as follows:-

(i) Alleged inconsistent views by General Hunter as to propriety of purchase of a typewriter from an internee by a camp commandant.

Chief Inspector Bridger says that on one occasion General Hunter said that this was wrong while on another he said that it might be proper. We attach no importance to this episode or any blame to General Hunter.

(ii) Alleged delay by Captain Rosser-James and Colonel Coates in finding a copy of Captain Rosser-James' minute of 18th February 1941.

The Court does not think that there was any ulterior motive in the delay. There was some genuine misunderstanding as to which document was required.

(iii) Alleged lack of co-operation by Captain Rosser-James in endeavouring to trace the ownership of the property found in Major Braybrook's house.

Captain Rosser-James maintains that as no list of property found at Braybrook's house was left with him, he was unable to co-operate. Chief Inspector Bridger states that he did leave such a list with Captain Rosser-James. The Court finds that such a list was left with D.P.W. but is not satisfied that it reached Captain Rosser-James' hands. Nevertheless the Court are satisfied that the contents thereof were in fact communicated to Captain Rosser-James and that he did not co-operate with Chief Inspector Bridger as he should have done

(iv) The alleged failure of Captain Rosser-James to mention the fact that there were claimants for gold sovereigns among the internees.

The Court find that this complaint is proved against Captain Rosser-James. No such complaint was made or proved against Major Gilkes.

(v) The alleged failure of Captain Rosser-James to find anything suspicious in the crediting of £97. 5. on Bauer's card in respect of 98 gold sovereigns.

The Court find that this complain has not been established.

(vi) The alleged acceptance of Captain Rosser-James of the fact that 100 gold sovereigns were shown to be entered on Fleischer's card when in fact they were not.

The Court find that this complaint has not been established.

(vii) That Captain Rosser-James and Captain Gilkes suppressed information with regard to the crediting of Major Braybrook with a sum of £259 when asked by Chief Inspector Bridger about a sum of £254.

The Court feel that the opportunity for misunderstanding was so easy that no adverse finding can be based on the evidence.

(viii) The alleged failure by the Directorate to disclose to Chief Inspector Bridger the result of its investigations into Major Braybrook's affairs.

In the opinion of the Court Colonel Coates intentionally withheld the report of Major Gilkes of February 1941 from Chief Inspector Bridger and from the Home Office. We do not find that General Hunter was a party to this suppression. Major Gilkes and Captain Rosser-James in this matter were merely acting under orders.

We consider that when Colonel Coates was asked about it by Colonel Robertson on 4th April 1941 (See Volume I page 11, Volume II page 24, Volume XI page 31) his reply was a deliberate evasion.

(ix) That Captain Rosser-James and Major Gilkes should have discovered further bank accounts in Braybrook's name and consequently the misappopriation of internees' money.

The Court were impressed with Major Gilkes' explanation that as receipts from internees were used for current payments before being banked, the bank accounts had not much interest for him in determining the amount to be distributed. The Court find, however, that Major Gilkes, in pursuance of his instructions to "expedite the distribution" ought to have looked at the Sunbury No. 1 account which was an internee account to see if the payments out threw any light on the amount to be distributed and so have discovered the existence of a No. 2 account.

As regards Captain Rosser-James we consider that ordinary prudence dictated that Major Braybrook's claim that he had paid £729. of his own money in cash into an account in order to make a payment for internees ought to have been checked up to the hilt, which it was not, although this would not necessarily have led to the discovery of other accounts. Very little examination would have shown that there was no payment into any account which is consistent with Major Braybrook's strange story.

(x) The Court consider that there is nothing in the complaint with regard to the ownership of canteen profits (See Volume I pages 32 and 35).
 * valign="top"| Mr. Lawson Walton.
 * 32. Most of the matters dealt with in the memorandum of Mr. Lawson Walton, who gave evidence in support of the complaints of the D.P.P. referred to in paragraph 7 above, have already been discussed and therefore we refrain from going through it in detail. The statements (See Volume II page 34. No. 7 and page 35 No. 8) with regard to the instructions alleged to have been given to Major Braybrook after knowledge of his arrest and also with regard to the alleged failure to suspend did not, on examination, turn out to be correct. We do not think that there is substance in the grounds given for the complaint with regard to Captain Rosser-James that he was a hesitant and unsatisfactory witness.
 * 32. Most of the matters dealt with in the memorandum of Mr. Lawson Walton, who gave evidence in support of the complaints of the D.P.P. referred to in paragraph 7 above, have already been discussed and therefore we refrain from going through it in detail. The statements (See Volume II page 34. No. 7 and page 35 No. 8) with regard to the instructions alleged to have been given to Major Braybrook after knowledge of his arrest and also with regard to the alleged failure to suspend did not, on examination, turn out to be correct. We do not think that there is substance in the grounds given for the complaint with regard to Captain Rosser-James that he was a hesitant and unsatisfactory witness.

The following matters which he stated to summarise his additional complaints do however in the opinion of the Court require special consideration:-

(i) The retaining of Braybrook in his official position after the knowledge of the claims brought against him and his previous conviction had been brought to the notice of General Hunter in November 1940.

We think that it would have been wiser for General Hunter to have brought Major Braybrook's employment to a conclusion after November 1940.

(ii) The refusal to appoint a military Court of Inquiry between September 1940 and February 1941.

We accept General Hunter's view that at the beginning of the period he had not sufficient information to ask for a Court of Inquiry. He should have initiated investigations which should have dealt also with property including foreign currency. As regards the latter part of the period, investigations were in fact proceeding but were based on unsuitable instructions which omitted reference to property or foreign currency. Proper investigation within a short time would have provided sufficient data to justify a Court of Inquiry.

(iii) The acceptance by the Directorate from Major Braybrook of small quantities of jewellery after pressure had been brought to bear by internees on their legal advisers without enquiry as to the manner in which and the place from which the jewellery had been recovered.

We do not consider that this has been made out as a charge of general application. We reiterate what has already been said about the failure of the Directorate to institute proper investigations into Major Braybrook's treatment of effects.

(iv) That Major Braybrook was protected by senior officers.

We do not think that General Hunter had any intention of protecting Braybrook. Colonel Coates' conduct, which had the result of protecting Braybrook, was in our view designed merely to protect the Department against what he considered undue interference and later against any suggestion that it had been inefficient or unwary.

(v) That the investigating officers, whether or not instructed to adopt an attitude favourable to Major Braybrook, failed to prosecute their enquiries with vigour or efficiency.

The investigating officers were not instructed to adopt an attitude favourable to Braybrook. The withholding of the final report had the result of protecting Braybrook in that it impeded the investigations of the police.

Except as regards his investigation of the banking accounts we do not criticise the vigour or efficiency of Major Gilkes.

With regard to Captain Rosser-James we have pointed out in dealing with the complaints of Chief Inspector Bridger the limited range of subjects as to which we think criticism might legitimately be directed.

33. Certain further complaints were made in evidence by Sir J. Moylan and we find in regard to them as follows:-

(i) That the tone of General Hunter's reply dated 30th September 1940 to Sir J. Moylan was unfortunate (See Volume II page 40).

(ii) It was unfortunate that General Hunter did not ensure that any adequate action was taken to meet the various points adduced in Sir J. Moylan's letter of 25th October 1940.

(iii) In view of the later evidence of Captain Walters no criticism can properly be based on the Tannenbaum and Links cases.

34. We summarise as follows our view of the conduct of each of the officers whose name is set out below in the investigation of the conduct of Major Braybrook when employed under the Director of Prisoners of War:-

35. We appreciate that the strictures which we have made above as to the conduct of certain officers concerned in this case are severe. They have necessarily been made in relation to what may be called an absolute standard of conduct and efficiency, and from the point of view of wisdom after the event, which makes criticism so easy, and justification on the part of the officers concerned so difficult. Incidents which to us made a connected story were, when they occurred, interspersed among an infinite variety of other matters.

We also consider it only right and proper, and indeed vitally necessary, that full account should be taken of the circumstances during the period under review. These circumstances were of extreme difficulty. The Directorate itself was of very recent formation, and had little or no time to settle down before it was assailed by a throng of pressing events consequent on the invasion of the Low Countries and the hurried decisions as to wholesale internment, for which no previous provision existed in the War Office. There is also the fact that this immature and hard pressed Directorate was required, in conjunction with another government department, to operate a system of dual control of internment camps. This would present difficulties at any time, but in the circumstances described these difficulties were much increased. Not only had arrangements to be made to receive internees in large numbers at very short notice, but these internees could not remain in one place. On the contrary, the question very soon arose of sending them overseas and such movements were on a large scale. When casualties occurred in the process (as for example the "Arandora Star"), and when releases began to be numerous, additional complications arose. Internees could not be dealt with in bulk - every case required individual treatment - very often not confined to the internee himself but including his friends and relations. Pressing enquiries in Parliament and in the Press had to be satisfied while all this was going on.

We are impressed with the fact that the growth of the work always greatly exceeded the capacity of the Directorate to keep pace with it by increase of staff in numbers and still more in knowledge and experience, a fact which we are of the opinion was being constantly represented by General Hunter. Every officer in the Directorate was forced to work for excessive periods at a stretch and there were breakdowns in consequence. We believe that every officer was doing his best to cope with the situation confronting him. Nor was the work free from external handicaps unknown in peace time. During a great part of the period in question the "Battle of Britain" was going on and it was necessary sometimes three or four times a day to descend from the fifth floor to the refuge in the basement where work was impossible.

During the whole period there was likewise the responsibility for our own prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy; their numbers had considerably increased as a result of the events of May and June 1940. Their interests vis a vis those of the internees were naturally given first consideration, and this entailed much correspondence and co-operation with many other government departments and outside organisations.

We do not suggest that the actions of the officers concerned are to be excused but it is essential that they should be viewed against the background of the very considerable achievement of the Prisoners of War Directorate in respect of its vital tasks, an achievement which has not, perhaps, been fully appreciated by the Home Office.

Finally, we would stress our finding that no motive existed in the minds of any of the officers of the Prisoner of War Directorate more sinister than a desire to protect the Directorate. Their faults and omissions were in our opinion largely due to an unwarranted feeling of resentment against what was considered excessive curiosity on the part of the Home Office into the settlement of the claims of internees prior to August 4/5th. They felt, wrongly as we have found yet sincerely, that such curiosity was superfluous when the responsibility for that settlement had been expressly reserved to the Prisoners of War Directorate by agreement between the two government departments concerned.

36. We desire to record our indebtedness to our secretary for his work in the preparation of the ground for our enquiry, his skill and tact in placing the evidence before us and his assistance in the preparation of our report.|}


 * RH Carrington
 * Lieut. General
 * President
 * L H K Finch.
 * Major-General.
 * Frank Drew.
 * Colonel.
 * D P Maxwell Fyfe
 * Major
 * Deputy Judge Advocate Staff

28th August 1941

A P P E N D I X  I.

LIST OF WITNESSES.


 * Colonel W.R.D. Robertson.
 * Lieutenant-colonel H.E. Chandler.
 * Mr. W. H. Bridger.
 * Captain G.H. Mawson.
 * Mr. Lawson Walton.
 * Sir John Moylan.
 * Lieutenant-General Sir Oswald Borrett.
 * Major A.J.L. Ferguson.
 * Mr. C.J. Plumb.
 * Major General Sir Alan Hunter.
 * Colonel N. Coates.
 * Mr. F.A. Newsam.
 * Major C.A. Gilkes.
 * Captain Rosser-James.
 * Captain R. Walters.
 * Mr. H.E. Smith.
 * Major F.A. Cooke.

A P P E N D I X  II.

LIST OF EXHIBITS.