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The reduction in marginal search costs of obtaining pricing information from electronic marketplaces through the implementation of the internet results in a downward pressure for the price of merchandise. Consumer's also have the ability to undertake comparisons of homogenous products amongst competing electronic vendors, allowing them to purchase products which maximizes their consumption utility. This is another factor contributing to the reduction in consumer search costs. The marginal search cost of obtaining quality information available to consumers has conjunctionally decreased, resulting in a decrease in price sensitivity.

Electronic marketplaces have hindered the ability of electronic merchants to implement hidden costs such as transport and handling costs to obscure quoted prices. Commodity markets will evolve to display characteristics of the classical ideal of a Walrasian auctioneer as a result of electronic marketplaces as consumers have costless access to retailer pricing information and are fully informed. The competitive price taking equilibrium is a result of fully informed buyers as described within the classical market model. In oligopolistic markets, this equilibrium point represents Bertrand's zero profit equilibria. The effects of these Electronic marketplaces will translate to commodity markets by inciting price competition amongst retailers and shifting power to the consumers though the reduction in market power of the vendors.

Price obfuscation is a strategy online retailers are implementing to derive further profits within electronic marketplaces and position themselves to regain market power. Obfuscation strategies within the classical search theory models represents consumers who are not fully informed simultaneously within the competitive a market through incremental increases in search costs, allowing firms to generate additional profits. Strategies include the development of products requiring additional purchases, or add-ons, which have large unadvertised mark ups. The use of a loss-leader approach is also implemented by online vendors to establish additional profits through the use of purposeful website and advertisement design to lure consumers purchasing cheaper inferior goods to upgrade and purchase superior goods for higher prices.

The second obfuscation mechanism we discussed is the adoption of a loss- leader or add-on pricing scheme: damaged goods are listed on the search en- gine at low prices and websites are designed to convince customers attracted by the low prices to upgrade to a higher quality