User:SandyGeorgia/Chavez sources

Work in progress, still grossly unfinished, need to add BBC, NYT and others

Selective quotes from reliable sources are included to demonstrate issues missing or not given due weight in Hugo Chavez and other Chavez/Venezuela-related articles. Hence, these quotes are "cherrypicked" for demonstration purposes only; if the sources are used to expand the article, full context and balance will need to be added.

Text from older versions of the article is included to show how much critical commentary has gone missing, and how biased the current article is (although some of the text may be outdated).

Contrast the sourcing in the older text with the claims made on Chavez talk about why the content was deleted.


 * BBC profile of Chavez
 * New York Times profile of Chavez " He nationalized electrical companies, asserted government control over oil projects in the Orinoco forests and withdrew from the International Monetary Fund. He also cracked down on television stations that had been critical of him, and proposed a referendum on constitutional changes that would centralize power in the presidency and remove term limits for the post. That referendum was rejected by voters in December 2007. It was Mr. Chavez's first major electoral defeat in the nine years of his presidency. In state and municipal elections in November 2008, Mr. Chávez's supporters suffered defeat in several important races, with the opposition retaining power in oil-rich Zulia, the country’s most populous state, and winning a crucial contest in Caracas, the capital. Despite the inroads made by the opposition, followers of Mr. Chávez still control the Supreme Court, the National Assembly, the federal bureaucracy and every state company."

Book sources

 * Hugo Chávez: The Definitive Biography of Venezuela's Controversial President; Venezuela: Hugo Chávez's Revolution; Hugo Chávez: A Test for Foreign Policy
 * The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela
 * The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela, by Brian A. Nelson
 * The King of Venezuela, New York Times book reviews

In 2006 and 2008 versions of articles
The most significant of the sources used in the older version is: the remainder provide background that may have gone missing.
 * (Everything, broad overview as of 2006.)
 * Press
 * Cronyism, brother's app't to Secretary Ministry was Ambassador to Cuba, consolidation of power.
 * Politicization of Venezuela, consolidation of power, cronyism. El Universal reports that critics say his appointment "exacerbates the lack of professionalism and the politicization of Venezuelan diplomacy" and "reinforces the fact that the legislative branch of the Venezuelan government 'is just an extension of the executive power'." Former Venezuelan ambassador to the United Nations Milos Alcalay said "Maduro ... has no experience at all in foreign affairs and is to take office as a kind of secretary to President Hugo Chávez. He just lacks the useful training in domestic and foreign policy to project his image."  Alcalay said an experienced Minister was needed "to bring an end to the growing radical stance of Venezuelan President."
 * Oil strike.
 * Cronyism: The head of the Venezuelan Internationalists' Association described the August 2006 appointment of Nicolás Maduro to Foreign Minister as "choosing officials lacking any training at all," saying "the current government thinks that there is no need to have much knowledge, studies, any experience in international affairs or negotiation ability."
 * Available at latinamericanstudies.com, Retrieved on 2010-02-07. Chávez invited former dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, who was living in exile in Spain, to Venezuela to attend Chávez's inauguration.  The Associated Press reported that the move "provoked an outcry among older Venezuelans who remembered the brutal side of his dictatorship" and political repression.
 * Consolidation of power; Fidel Castro, Moammar Gaddhafi and Saddam Hussein; control of judiciary, oil strike, largest public demonstration ever, "Then came the massacre. Chávez ordered to activate the Ávila anti-riot plan to stop the crowd. He bet everything on the Armed Forces, and he happened to lose. Only a few military officers remained loyal, frustrating his auto-coup plot. Twelve hours later, the most powerful man in Venezuela submissively surrendered to those who until then were his subordinates."; National Guard and attacks and shootings; stacking of the CNE by TSJ; general strike.
 * (Originally published as "Bruised but unbowed; Venezuela's foreign policy.") Remain in power for 25 years; foreign policy Peru.
 * (Originally published as "Bruised but unbowed; Venezuela's foreign policy.") Remain in power for 25 years; foreign policy Peru.
 * (Originally published as "Bruised but unbowed; Venezuela's foreign policy.") Remain in power for 25 years; foreign policy Peru.


 * Government and human rights orgs
 * Police brutality, judiciary, freedom of expression, human rights.
 * "Coup", judiciary, Carlos Ortega, Patricia Poleo, Leopoldo Lopez, press freedom, Globovision, RCTV, Venevision, cadenas, violence against journalists, Sumate, CTV, right of assembly during marches, PDVSA, "military officers illegally detained" (first find-- ha!-- now let's the fast claims that the State Dept is biased and primary sources can't be used!), labor.
 * Electoral and democratic processes, labour, human rights, judiciary, repression.
 * Judiciary, electoral process, civil society, press.
 * "Egged on by the president’s forceful comments, his supporters - many of them grouped in so-called "Bolivarian Circles" - repeatedly threatened, manhandled or beat up journalists trying to cover events in the field." "The TV stations tried to broadcast the president’s speech and the opposition street protest simultaneously, by splitting their screens, but the authorities responded by having their broadcast signals cut off." "The government used its powers under article 192 of the telecommunications law to requisition all radio and TV stations to broadcast its own addresses about 30 times on 8 and 9 April for an average of 15 to 20 minutes each time. Vice-President Diosdado Cabello said this was necessary to "defend the right of Venezuelans to accurate news." The government used these powers during an opposition general strike that was getting extensive coverage by the privately-owned news media. To sidestep the requirement, the TV channels began during the day of 9 April to broadcast their own news at the same time as the government addresses by splitting their screens." Interesting analysis of coup events and press involvement, from both sides.  Patricia Poleo, details of threats on reporters.
 * Democracy, judiciary, political discrimination, media, organized labor, civil society.
 * Democracy, judiciary, political discrimination, media, organized labor, civil society.

Chavismo, Bolivarian revolution

 * Venezuela's president wants to marshal the forces of anti-imperialism, The Economist 2009-09-15 "THE mountains and jungles of South America are not ideal terrain for tank warfare. So it is hard to envisage what role Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, has in mind for the dozens of Russian tanks on his latest military shopping list.…"
 * Venezuela's dubious education reforms, The Economist 2009-08-20 "THE first time Hugo Chávez made a serious attempt to reshape the Venezuelan education system, the resulting political battle contributed to the coup that in 2002 briefly ousted him from the presidency. A new education law, shoved through parliament on the night of August 13th after minimal debate, already has the opposition talking of civil disobedience.…"
 * Statism in Venezuela, The Economist, 2009-03-12 "HARD on the heels of winning a referendum to abolish term limits last month, Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, is trying to fend off economic worries by taking on the private sector, especially companies in the politically sensitive food and farming industries."
 * Curbing Venezuela's trade unions, The Economist, 2009-05-07 "HIS government espouses “21st-century socialism” and claims to stand for the working class. Yet Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, has never been a fan of his country’s trade unions.… "
 * Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, The Economist, 2009-02-05 "SQUEEZED between the millionaires’ row around the Country Club and the leafy gentility of La Florida, a middle-class neighbourhood, Chapellín is a blemish many of its neighbours would like to see bulldozed. Ten years ago, when Hugo Chávez took office as president of Venezuela, the residents of this Caracas slum would crowd around the gates of the nearby headquarters of Radio Nacional each Sunday.… "
 * Hugo Chávez's wasted years, The Economist, 2009-02-05 "THIS ought to be a time of triumph for Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s self-proclaimed “21st-century socialist”. As he marks ten years in power this week, what he calls “savage capitalism” is wounded and seemingly at bay while his would-be nemesis, George Bush, has departed the White House.… "
 * The problems of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, The Economist, 2008-12-30 "DURING a turbulent decade in power, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, has been greatly helped by his own remarkable ability to inspire loyalty among ordinary Venezuelans on the one hand, and the sharp rise in the price of oil, the country’s only significant export, on the other. But the world price of oil has fallen from a peak of $147 last July to $40.… "

(From old article) Farmers have protested about the lack of a consistent policy addressing prices, smuggling, insecurity and crime.

Consolidation of power in the executive

 * Purging Loyalists, Chávez Tightens His Inner Circle, New York Times, Feb 16 2010


 * Venezuela's drift to authoritarianism: Wolf sheds fleece, The Economist, 2010-01-28.
 * It was the latest in a series of recent moves that have placed Mr Chávez’s elected regime within a hair’s breadth of dictatorship.
 * Now, opinion polls are showing unprecedented levels of discontent over crime, inflation, and power and water shortages. There were big anti-government protests in Caracas, the capital, after RCTV was shut off, which were countered by the government’s more modest rally.
 * In one recent poll 66% said they did not want him to continue in office when his present term ends in three years.
 * If the September elections were run according to the constitution, which mandates proportional representation, Mr Chávez would surely lose his strong parliamentary majority. But a new electoral law allows the largest single group to sweep the board. The government-dominated electoral authority redrew constituency boundaries this month, with the effect of minimising potential opposition gains.
 * He no longer pays lip-service to the separation of powers, which in practice disappeared some time ago. The head of the Supreme Court, Luisa Estella Morales, said last month that such niceties merely “weaken the state”.
 * He told Parliament to change the law on expropriations and seized a French-controlled supermarket chain to add to the government’s new retail conglomerate, Comerso.
 * ... there are signs of tension within the regime itself. On January 25th the vice-president, Ramón Carrizález, resigned, along with his wife, the environment minister. He cited personal reasons, but that a close ally, the minister of public banking, also quit (over unexplained “health problems”) set tongues wagging.


 * Romero, Simon. Chávez Seizes Assets of Oil Contractors,  The New York Times, 2009-05-08 "The move points to a greater concentration of power by Mr. Chávez, who is busily exerting sway over important industries and political institutions during the economic crisis. In recent weeks, his government has also hounded top rivals, stripping the mayor of Caracas of financing for the city budget while forcing the mayor of Maracaibo to seek asylum in Peru after he was confronted with corruption charges. ... Zulia is also a bastion of opposition to Mr. Chávez. Resentment has been festering against the president there since corruption charges were brought against Manuel Rosales, a leading opposition figure who ran against Mr. Chávez for president in 2006 and was elected mayor of Maracaibo last year. Mr. Rosales fled to Peru last month rather than submit to an order for his arrest to face corruption charges."


 * Romero, Simon. Chávez Tells His Navy to Take Over Key Seaports, The New York Times, 2009-03-15 "President Hugo Chávez ordered the navy on Sunday to seize seaports in states with major petroleum-exporting installations, part of his effort to assert greater control over infrastructure that had come under the dominion of political opponents in regional elections last year. The move points to a spreading radicalization by Mr. Chávez, as he responds to a slowing economy and the gains made by his opponents. Economic growth slowed in the last quarter to its most sluggish pace in five years, 3.2 percent, weighed down by low oil prices."






 * Threats to Venezuela's opposition, The Economist, 2009-04-08 "AFTER winning a referendum to abolish presidential term limits on February 15th, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, said he was embarking on the “third phase” of his “Bolivarian revolution”. On the evidence so far, one of its main traits will be the repression of dissent and the concentration of even more power in Mr Chávez’s own hands.… "

"Coup", general strike, recall referendum, Sumate

 * NYT on "coup"


 * Venezuela's curious coup, (Retitled to "Riddle wrapped in a mystery"). The Economist, 2009-06-11 "ON APRIL 11th 2002 nearly a million people marched on the presidential palace in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, to demand the ousting of Hugo Chávez, the elected president whom they accused of undermining democracy and causing the creeping “Cubanisation” of the country. As they neared the palace, violence broke out, 19 people were killed and over 150 wounded.…"


 * Partial snips, to avoid copyvio (there is much, much more in this article, which is a must-read):
 * As Brian Nelson, who teaches at Miami University, writes in this superbly researched account, the short-lived coup "would become one of the most important, yet most misunderstood, events in recent history."
 * Mr Nelson interviewed more than 40 of the main actors ... He concludes that Mr Chavez's brief ouster was "not a coup in the classic sense", nor a premeditated conspiracy, and he exonerates the United States of direct involvement. He finds that the National Guard and CHAVISTA gunmen started the shooting, and were responsible for most of the bloodshed, ...
 * When Mr Chavez ordered the army to suppress the demonstration, his top generals refused. They rightly argued that the order was unconstitutional. ... Though he did not sign a written resignation, he did agree to step down in return for safe passage to Cuba. But the generals failed to broker a constitutional transition.
 * Within days his government began "a multi-million dollar campaign to rewrite the history of the coup". According to Mr Nelson, it destroyed evidence of the killings, blocked all attempts at police and judicial investigation, and swiftly shut down hearings by the CHAVISTA-controlled National Assembly. It offered money and benefits to those willing to say they or their relatives had been shot by the opposition, writes Mr Nelson, and harassed those who truthfully claimed the opposite. In this enterprise, Mr Chavez was abetted by foreign admirers, including the Irish makers of an award-winning documentary on the coup which, Mr Nelson finds, contains "many manipulations".
 * General Baduel, having broken with the president, was arrested last month on corruption charges which he claims are politically motivated. His arrest is part of a wider crackdown on the opposition, intensifying Mr Chavez's hollowing-out of Venezuelan democracy. This makes Mr Nelson's scrupulously unbiased account of the events of April 2002 all the more important. Those who truly care about human rights may hope that one day Mr Chavez will face trial for his role in the bloodshed of April 11th. It should be read by all those who continue to believe that Mr Chavez is a worthy champion of democracy and the oppressed.
 * The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chavez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. By Brian A. Nelson. Nation Books; 355 pages; $26.95
 * http://www.amazon.com/Silence-Scorpion-Against-Chavez-Venezuela/dp/1568584180/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1266933761&sr=8-1

(From old article) Following the changes made to Venezuela's Constitution and electoral processes, based on elections in which more voters abstained than voted in favor of Chávez's policies, Súmate, a Venezuelan grassroots volunteer civilian organization, was founded in 2002, and began work towards a constitutional presidential recall referendum.

(From old article) The provision in the Constitution allowing for a presidential recall requires the signatures of 20% of the electorate in order to effect a recall. Further, the cedulas (national identity card numbers) and identities of petition signers are not secret, and in fact were made public by Luis Tascón, a member of the Venezuelan National Assembly representing Chávez' party (Fifth Republic Movement - MVR) and the Communist Party of Venezuela of Táchira state. The government was accused of increasing the voter rolls by giving citizenship to illegal immigrants and refugees; and the oposition claimed that it was a citizenship for votes program. Voter registration increased by about 2 million people ahead of the referendum, which in effect raised the threshhold of the 20% of the electorate needed to effect a recall.

The recall vote was held on August 15, 2004. A record number of voters turned out to defeat the recall attempt with a 59% "no" vote. European Union observers did not oversee the elections, saying too many restrictions were put on their participation by the Chávez administration. Chávez would not allow open audits at the polling places to reconcile electronic voting and paper ballot tallies, an independent audit sample, a statistically reliable audit sample, a closed-door audit with CNE members present, inspection of the electronic voting machines immediately after the vote, or unlimited access to the electronic vote center. The Carter Center "concluded the results were accurate." However, a Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates (PSB) exit poll showed the opposite result, predicting that Chávez would lose by 20%, whereas the election results showed him to have won by 20%. Schoen commented, "I think it was a massive fraud". US News and World Report offered an analysis of the polls, indicating "very good reason to believe that the (Penn Schoen) exit poll had the result right, and that Chávez's election officials — and Carter and the American media — got it wrong". PSB used Súmate personnel and its results contradicted five other opposition exit polls. Publication or broadcast of exit polls was banned by government officials, but results of the PSB poll went out to media outlets and opposition offices several hours before polls closed. The Schoen exit poll, and the fact that election machines were programmed by the government, was the basis of claims of election fraud.

ChavezElections2004 Economists Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard University and Roberto Rigobón of MIT's Sloan School of Management performed a statistical analysis at Súmate's request, analyzing how fraud could have occured during the referendum. They concluded that the vote samples audited by the government were not a random representation of all precincts, noting that the Chávez-backed CNE had "refused to use the random number generating program offered by the Carter Center for the August 18th audit and instead used its own program installed in its own computer and initialed with their own seed." They also noted that opposition witnesses and international observers were not allowed near the computer hub on election day. CEPR, a liberal think tank based in Washington, reports that other economists have called the Harvard/MIT assumptions about how the alleged fraud was conducted unlikely.

After the referendum failed to revoke Chávez's mandate, Chávez's government charged the founders of Súmate with treason and conspiracy for receiving foreign funds, earmarked for voter education, from the United States Department of State through the National Endowment for Democracy, triggering commentary from human rights organizations and the U.S. government. The trial has been postponed several times.

Corruption

 * Not surprisingly, not linked to anything, virtually an orphan.
 * Note to self, locate missing content. Sandy Georgia  (Talk) 03:08, 8 February 2010 (UTC)
 * After I posted this, content was partially expanded by Rd232, but article remains orphaned with content still missing. Sandy Georgia  (Talk) 23:19, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

(From old article) Chávez was first elected on an anti-corruption platform and on promises of redistributing wealth to the poor, but Michael Shifter of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service says that "despite record oil profits that are funding social spending, his initiatives have yielded only very modest gains", and The Economist reports that his policies are most vulnerable in the areas of corruption, jobs and crime.

Note, this content was apparently not merged''' to the now-orphaned Corruption in Venezuela, which completely distorts this text:

(From old article) In its annual survey, Berlin-based Transparency International ranked Venezuela as one of only a dozen countries where perceived corruption had "greatly increased", resulting in a ranking of 130 out of the 150 countries surveyed, to become the nation perceived as the third most corrupt in Latin America, above Paraguay and Haiti. Critics claim that rampant corruption reaches the highest levels of Venezuelan airport and security officials, that billions of dollars have been siphoned away from social programs by corrupt officials, and that leaders of the military have limited oversight, creating an environment in which impunity and corruption develop. Members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces are alleged to be involved in supplying arms to Colombia's FARC, and U.S. anti-drug officials allege that corruption within the Chávez administration is converting Venezuela into a trafficing route for Colombian drugs. Critics also allege widespread corruption in the police force.

Crime

 * Venezuela and Colombia, (Retitled to "Politics versus trade"). The Economist, 2009-09-10 "BUSINESS is slack at José Nelson Uribe’s tiny grocery store in San Antonio del Táchira, just a stone’s throw from Venezuela’s border with Colombia. “I’m not selling even a quarter of what I sold before,” says Mr Uribe.… "
 * The main winners in all this are the mafias who smuggle petrol, foodstuffs and other goods across the border.

(From old article) Since Chávez took office, The Economist reports that the murder rate has almost tripled, and that Venezuela's capital – Caracas – has become South America's most violent, with police implicated in some of the crimes. The United Nations reported in 2005 that Venezuela had the highest number of deaths by gunfire per capita in the world, garnering for Venezuela a claim to the title of the world's most violent crime capital. Critics claim that Chávez's policies are largely responsible for these declines. The U.S. State Department says there is a "politicization of the judiciary, the electoral authorities, and the legal system" and a "reported 13% increase in politically motivated detentions".

(From an older verion) Since he took office, The Economist reports that the murder rate has almost tripled, and that Venezuela's capital – Caracas – has become South America's most violent, with police implicated in some of the crimes. The United Nations reported in 2005 that Venezuela had the highest number of deaths by gunfire per capita in the world, garnering for Venezuela claim to the title of the world's most violent crime capital.

Critics claim that Chávez's policies are responsible for some of these declines. Amnesty International reports that Venezuela lacks an independent and impartial judiciary, and the U.S. State Department says there is unchecked concentration of power in the executive and the legal system. Critics accuse the Bolivarian Circles Chávez founded of furthering violence, while Chávez supporters say they are neighborhood associations, promoting and facilitating literacy classes and helping run local health clinics. According to a study by Brigham Young University scholars, the "Bolivarian circles" also help the government identify opponents, who are then denied services.

According to an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, "On average, Chávez shuffles more than half of his cabinet every year." During his presidency, Chávez has had six Ministers of Interior and Justice. In August 2006, following assaults on a squatter and a National Assembly member, El Universal says that Chávez called on the latest Minister, Jesse Chacón to quit if he could not do the job, demanding more rigor in the fight against corruption, and affirming the need to clean up and transform the local police forces. He questioned the impunity that exists in the country, and challenged authorities, like Chacón, to resign if they couldn't make progress against crime. He also called for greater protection of squatters settling on landed estates.

Democracy
(From old article) Critics ... claim that the Chávez government has engaged in extensive electoral fraud throughout its duration, and is leading Venezuela in an authoritarian direction. The United States administration of George W. Bush, described the State of Democracy in Venezuela as "in grave peril", with "unchecked concentration of power in the executive", saying Chávez has "turned his back on the Venezuelan electorate", "suffocated the democratic debate", "resisted external efforts to support democratic political activity", and committed an "assault on Venezuela's democratic institutions".

(From old article) The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom ranked Venezuela 152 out of 157 countries, among the 12 economies of the world labelled "repressed".

Economy

 * Fall of the Boligarchs: Hugo Chávez cracks down on allies, The Economist, 2009-12-10 "“BEING rich is bad,” Hugo Chávez is wont to remark. But in the decade in which he has been Venezuela’s president, some people with close ties to his regime have made fortunes. ... Those now in disgrace were behind a string of bank takeovers. They were among the most prominent of the “Boligarchs”, as wags dub those who have enriched themselves from Mr Chávez’s “Bolivarian revolution” ... Venezuela’s economy is falling deeper into recession, even as the rest of the region recovers. Mr Chávez faces a difficult legislative election in September. One theory is that the government owed Mr Fernández so much money that arresting him was an appealing option. Others have stressed the rivalry between four different groups of corrupt officials and their allies, over access to public funds."
 * Wheels of revolution: An example of socialist production principles—but not a good one, The Economist, 2009-11-26 " They complained of poor safety conditions and exploitative work practices. Their supposedly socialist employer refuses to recognise trade unions and has ignored the labour ministry’s order to reinstate sacked union activists."
 * The weakening of the “strong bolívar”: In a harsher world Venezuela faces a reckoning, The Economist, 2010-01-14 "The finance minister, Ali Rodríguez, admitted that the devaluation would boost Venezuela’s already high inflation rate (of 27% last year) by three to five percentage points. José Manuel Puente, an economist at IESA, a Caracas business school, reckons that inflation could reach 35% to 40% this year. ... While many other Latin American economies are recovering, some strongly, Venezuela is stuck in recession. The Central Bank says the economy contracted by 2.9% in 2009. The industrialists’ association reckons that manufacturing output fell by 7.2%. Along with the devaluation, the government announced a $1 billion fund to provide credit and subsidies. But details are fuzzy. Mr Chávez’s price controls, punitive regulation and threats of expropriation have depressed private investment. ... It is not only the opposition that thinks the president has set off on a downhill path. Heinz Dieterich, a Mexican-German political scientist and advocate of the “21st-century socialism” Mr Chávez proclaims, wrote this week that the devaluation “reveals once again the utter incapacity of the government and the leadership of the PSUV to understand and contain the terminal political crisis they are experiencing.”"
 * Venezuela's energy shortage, The Economist, 2009-11-05 "THE economy is in recession but sales of at least two items are booming in Venezuela: water-storage tanks and portable generators. A country that has claimed the world’s biggest oil reserves and is home to its fourth-mightiest river, the Orinoco, has recently been forced to ration both water and electricity.…"
 * Venezuela's oil policy, The Economist, 2009-09-03 "IN A world in which oil is scarcer, the 272 billion barrels of heavy crude that Venezuela reckons are contained in the oil sands of its Orinoco basin ought to seem like a more attractive proposition to multinationals and state oil firms alike. Yet three times this year Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company, has postponed bidding for seven blocks in the Orinoco which officials think would yield 1m barrels per day of synthetic oil.…"
 * Venezuela's oil-dependent economy, The Economist, 2009-06-18 "GLOBAL capitalism may be in crisis, but thanks to “21st-century socialism” Venezuela’s economy is “armour-plated” and the country’s poor have nothing to fear. That has been the message from Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, and his ministers in recent months.…"
 * Venezuela's economy needs more than a small rise in the oil price, The Economist, 2009-05-29 "The price of Venezuelan crude oil rose above US$50/b in mid-May for the first time in eight months. Yet this level is still too low to alleviate financing pressures on the government.…"
 * Venezuela's oil industry, The Economist, 2009-05-14 "UNTIL a few weeks ago, the Venezuelan government was encouraging private investment in oil services. But in a sudden about-turn, President Hugo Chávez changed the law to make the whole industry a preserve of the state.…"
 * Venezuela's government seizes oil assets, The Economist, 2009-05-12 "In the latest episode in its drive to increase its control over Venezuela’s oil and gas industry, the government of President Hugo Chávez has announced its intention to seize the assets of 60 local and foreign oil-services companies. Ultimately, the move could prove self-defeating if it exacerbates the downturn in oil production and export income, and dissuades other private investors and contractors from entering the country.… "
 * Adjusting spending and taxes in Venezuela, The Economist, 2009-03-25 "Venezuela’s government has announced moderate adjustments in spending and taxes in order to offset the global recession and steep drop in the price of oil, by far its chief source of fiscal revenue. The measures are likely to ease but not eliminate the cash crunch, and more steps will be needed to narrow this year’s wide fiscal gap.… "



(From old article) However, some economists argue that recent job creation may not be permanent, for it relies on an expanded public payroll that will become unaffordable if oil prices fall. Critics also question the government's reported poverty figures, based on contradictory statistics and definitions, which they say have not fallen enough considering the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years. The Economist reports that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvement and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant, and point to the 1-2% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP early in Chávez's term, before the 2004 surge in oil prices. According to The Boston Globe, critics say the government defines "informal workers, such as street vendors, as employed, and exclud[es] adults who are studying in missions from unemployment numbers." When the president of the Venezuelan National Statistics Institute released numbers in 2005 which showed that poverty had actually risen by more than 10 points under Chávez (to 53% in 2004, just after the strike), Chávez called for a new measure of poverty, defining a "social well-being index". Under this new definition, poverty registers at 40 percent. The minimum wage in Venezuela in July 2006 covered only 65 percent of the cost of the basic food basket.

(From old article) The Heritage Foundation's, a conservative public policy analysis group, Index of Economic Freedom ranked Venezuela 152 out of 157 countries, among the 12 economies of the world labelled "repressed". At the same time, The Economist opines that the administration's unwillingness to use private sector resources has resulted in a crumbling public infrastructure and a deficit in housing.

(From old article) According to Venezuela's El Universal, one of the Chávez administration's outstanding weaknesses is the failure to meet its goals of construction of housing. Chávez promised to build 150,000 houses in 2006, but in the first half of the year, completed only 24 percent of that target, with 35,000 houses.

(From old article) But despite the almost universal agreement that "Chavez has made the welfare of the Venezuelan poor his top priority" and record oil profits for funding, Chavez's "initiatives have yielded only very modest gains," according to Michael Shifter of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. The same study the Globe quoted went on to say "The poor of Venezuela are living much better lately and have increased their purchasing power . . . [but] without being able to improve their housing, education level, and social mobility," .... "Rather than help [the poor] become stakeholders in the economic system," what the government has done is "distribute as much oil wealth as possible in missions and social programs.”

Francisco Rodriquez, a former Chief Economist of the Venezuelan National Assembly, goes further saying "neither official statistics nor independent estimates show" improvements in most health and human development indicators in Venezuela "beyond what is normal in the midst of an oil boom." In fact some indicators "have deteriorated worryingly," including measures of income inequality.

Rodriquez argues that the decline in poverty in Venezuela is a product of national income growth. Poverty in Venezuela declined from 54% at the height of the national strike in 2003 to 27.5% in the first half of 2007. During this time per capita GDP went up by 50%. But this rate of poverty reduction per "percentage point increase in per capita income ... compares unfavorably with those of many other developing countries," lacking Chavez's flamboyant anti-capitalist ideology.

Human development indicators that have deteriorated during Chavez's rule include percentage of underweight babies (increased from 8.4% to 9.1% between 1999 to 2006) household without access to running water (up from 7.2% to 9.4%), and families living in dwellings with earthen floors, which "multiplied almost threefold" (from 2.5% to 6.8%). Despite government claims that illiteracy had been "eliminated", Rodriquez found little evidence that Chavez's programs "had had any statistically distinguishable effect" on literacy rates.

"Even as oil profits were surging," Venezuela's anti-poverty agency, Consolidated Social Fund (FUS), has been underfunded. And while Chavez supporters point to the social spending of the "Bolivarian Missions", the share of the budget currently (2008) devoted to health, education, and housing under Chavez is lower than it was in the last year of the `neoliberal` administration (that of Carlos Andrés Pérez) that Chavez tried to overthrow on grounds of neglect of Venezuela's poor. Mismanagement of the economy has led to accelerating inflation and scarcity of basic foodstuffs and chronic failures in the provision of basic public services. The Gini coefficient has fallen from 48.7 in 1998 to 42 in 2007 (claims that the Gini has risen were based on data from two different (non-comparable) statistical series). Populist economic measures, such as expanding the supply of foreign currency to consumers, has subsidized imports and foreign travel, helping the well-off but not the poor who "cannot find basic food items on store shelves."

Electoral processes

 * Venezuela annuls election of anti-Chavez mayor, The Washington Post, 24 February 2010.


 * Venezuela's term-limits referendum, (Retitled to "Chavez forever?"). The Economist, 2009-02-19 "WHEN Hugo Chávez first proposed abolishing a clause in the constitution he himself had sponsored which limits the president to two consecutive terms Venezuelans rebuffed the idea. That was in a referendum in December 2007.… "
 * On February 15th, after a blitzkrieg campaign involving the brazen use of state resources, the president finally got the answer he wanted. Some 55% of a high turnout of voters said "yes" to a referendum question so convoluted as to be barely intelligible.
 * Mr Leon adds that there was "an explicit threat" in the president's message to the electorate: "without Chavez there will be war". In belligerent speeches, he accused his opponents of seeking violence, ordered the police to disperse student demonstrations with tear-gas and said anyone who did not vote for him was guilty of treason. That seemed to apply especially to the more than 3m Venezuelans on the government payroll. On one occasion he held up a list on television and said he would be checking who voted and who did not.

Foreign policy

 * Venezuela and Cuba: “Venecuba”, a single nation, The Economist, 2010-02-11.
 * ... after a decade of rule by Hugo Chávez, Cuba’s communist regime seems finally to have achieved its goal of invading oil-rich Venezuela—this time without firing a shot.
 * Earlier this month Ramiro Valdés, a veteran revolutionary who ranks number three in Cuba’s ruling hierarchy and was twice its interior minister, arrived in Caracas, apparently for a long stay. Officially, Mr Valdés has come to head a commission set up by Mr Chávez to resolve Venezuela’s acute electricity shortage. But he lacks expertise in this field, and Cuba is famous for 12-hour blackouts. Some members of Venezuela’s opposition reckon that Mr Valdés, whose responsibilities at home include policing Cubans’ access to the internet, has come to help Mr Chávez step up repression ahead of a legislative election in September. Others believe he was sent to assess the gravity of the situation facing the Castro brothers’ most important ally (Cuba depends on Mr Chávez for subsidised oil). He has been seen in meetings with Venezuelan military commanders.
 * A group of Cubans who recently fled Venezuela told a newspaper in Miami that they had bribed a Cuban official working in passport control at Caracas airport.
 * In some ministries, such as health and agriculture, Cuban advisers appear to wield more power than Venezuelan officials. The health ministry is often unable to provide statistics—on primary health-care or epidemiology for instance—because the information is sent back to Havana instead.
 * In a recent poll 85% of respondents said they did not want their country to become like Cuba.


 * Latin America's New Cold War? Venezuela's and Colombia's ambassadors to the United States tell their sides of an increasingly tense story. Foreign Policy, 2009-12-08


 * Romero, Simon Venezuela Still Aids Colombia Rebels, New Material Shows, The New York Times, 2009-08-02 "Despite repeated denials by President Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan officials have continued to assist commanders of Colombia’s largest rebel group, helping them arrange weapons deals in Venezuela and even obtain identity cards to move with ease on Venezuelan soil, ... Intelligence of this kind has been a source of tension between Colombia and Venezuela, with the government here claiming the information is false and used to further political ends. Colombian officials, by contrast, argue that the intelligence proves that the FARC survives in part on its ability to operate from Venezuela’s frontier regions."


 * Venezuela's foreign policy, (Retitled to "Dreams of a different world: Arms and the tyrant"). The Economist, 2009-09-17 "AFTER a two-week tour that included stops in Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iran, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia, where he placed orders for tanks and missiles, Hugo Chávez this week got what he seemed to be seeking all along: the attention of the United States. Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, worried that Venezuela’s weapons’ purchases might trigger an “arms race” in Latin America, and her spokesman described Mr Chávez’s actions as a “serious challenge to stability”.… "
 * Nowadays Mr Chavez's foreign policy gives top priority--outside Latin America--to forging an anti-American political alliance with Iran, Syria, Belarus and Russia.
 * Bank accounts in Andorra, supposedly belonging to people close to Mr Chavez, have been frozen at the request of the United States Treasury, reportedly because of suspicions of links to terrorism.
 * But the more immediately worrying development may be Venezuela's arms build-up.


 * Venezuela and Colombia, (Retitled to "Politics versus trade"). The Economist, 2009-09-10 "BUSINESS is slack at José Nelson Uribe’s tiny grocery store in San Antonio del Táchira, just a stone’s throw from Venezuela’s border with Colombia. “I’m not selling even a quarter of what I sold before,” says Mr Uribe.… "
 * ... July 28th, when Mr Chavez declared a "freeze" on diplomatic ties and said he would seek alternatives to Colombian goods. This was officially a response to an agreement formalising American use of seven Colombian bases for anti-drug operations, but it also coincided with questions as to how anti-tank rocket-launchers sold by Sweden to the Venezuelan army ended up in a camp belonging to the FARC guerrillas in Colombia.
 * The impact on the border region was swift. For each country, the other is the second-biggest trading partner (after the United States in both cases). Bilateral trade totalled $7.2 billion last year, of which $6 billion consisted of Colombian exports, mainly of food, live animals, clothing and cars. Four-fifths of that trade passed along the twisting mountain road that links San Antonio with the state capital, San Cristobal. "That represents 50,000 direct jobs and 250,000 indirect [ones]," says Jose Rozo, a local business leader.
 * The main winners in all this are the mafias who smuggle petrol, foodstuffs and other goods across the border.


 * de Cordoba, Jose. Chávez Lets Colombia Rebels Wield Power Inside Venezuela, The Wall Street Journal, 2008-11-25 "For years, President Chávez has denied giving refuge to the FARC and Colombia's National Liberation Army, or ELN, both considered terrorist organizations by the U.S. and Europe. But as the Colombian military has stepped up pressure against rebels, the number of guerrillas using Venezuela as a safe haven has swelled, according to Colombian officials, intercepted e-mails and dozens of interviews on both sides of the border. Colombian and U.S. officials say Venezuela's military and police authorities turn a blind eye to guerrilla activity, and at times cooperate in areas including the trafficking of arms and cocaine. As these groups expand operations here, often in brutal competition with each other, Venezuela has suffered a sharp increase in kidnapping, drug trafficking and extortion."


 * Devereux, Charlie. Venezuela vs. Colombia: The Battle Over Emigrés, Time, 2009-11-05 "While tens of thousands of poor Colombians might be flocking to Venezuela, just as many middle-class Venezuelans are leaving. A report by the Latin American & Caribbean Economic System, a multi-lateral organization based in Caracas, finds that from 1990 to 2007, Venezuelan emigration to developed countries rose 216%. Erick Castro, a Caracas-born engineer, left for Canada last month thanks in large part to the Venezuelan capital's out-of-control violent crime, 30% annual inflation and what he insists is the Chávez government's hostility to private enterprise. ... Flerida Rengifo, a demographics analyst at the Central University, says stories of the Venezuelan middle-class brain drain are getting more common. "There's no support for private industry," she says ... "

Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe requested on October 26 his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chávez to coordinate measures to safeguard the lives of border residents and prevent further events such as the slaughter of 10 people by an illicit armed group. Uribe made the appeal even though the two countries are going through a diplomatic crisis that has started to hit the bilateral trade of more than USD 7 billion a year, Reuters reported."
 * Renewed tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, El Universal, 2009-10-30 "Uribe asks Chávez to safeguard lives on the border


 * These got shuffled off, see if text survived:

(From old article) Chávez has been represented as "thriving on the atmosphere of confrontation" between Venezuela and the U.S., an "ideologue", "hurtful to Venezuela's democracy", "making all types of unfounded allegations", and being "America's nemesis". He has also been accused of "funding revolutionaries and terrorists throughout Latin America".

Chávez's foreign policy conduct and anti-Bush rhetoric has occasionally reached the level of personal attacks. In response to the ousting of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, Chávez referred to U.S. President George W. Bush as a pendejo ("dumbass"). In a later speech, he made personal remarks regarding Condoleezza Rice, referring to her as a "complete illiterate" with regards to comprehending Latin America.

There have also been heated disputes between Chávez and other Latin American leaders. On November 10, 2005, Chávez, stated regarding Mexican President Vicente Fox in a talk before supporters in Caracas that he was saddened that "the president of a people like the Mexicans lets himself become the puppy dog of the empire" for what he alleged was Fox's support of U.S. trade interests in his promotion of the newly stalled FTAA. Additionally, on the November 13, 2005 episode of his weekly talk show, Aló, Presidente!, Chávez stated that the Mexican president was "bleeding from his wounds" and warned Fox to not "mess" with him, lest he "get stung". Fox, upon hearing of the remarks, expressed his outrage and threatened to recall the Mexican ambassador to Venezuela if the Venezuelan government did not promptly issue an apology. However, rather than apologizing, Chávez simply recalled Venezuela's own ambassador to Mexico City, Vladimir Villegas. The Mexican ambassador to Caracas was recalled the following day. Although ties between the two countries have been strained, neither country will say that diplomatic ties have been indefinitely severed. Several groups in both Mexico and Venezuela are working to restore the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

In 2001, a dispute with Peru occurred over suspicions that Chávez's administration was protecting and hiding Vladimiro Montesinos, a former Peruvian intelligence director under the Alberto Fujimori administration, wanted for corruption. Montesinos was captured in Venezuela in June of that year and extradited a few days later. In 2006, he would allege Chávez wanted to control Peru through Ollanta Humala, a candidate for the presidency of Peru. Another dipolomatic dispute with Colombia, referred to as the Rodrigo Granda affair, occurred in 2004, after the kidnap of Rodrigo Granda, a high ranking member of the political wing of the FARC.

Between January and March of 2006, Chávez commented on the candidates of the 2006 Peruvian Presidential election, openly backing Ollanta Humala while referring to Alan García as a "thief" and a "crook" and considering Lourdes Flores a "candidate of the oligarchy". Chávez's comments led the Peruvian government to consider that he was interfering in Peru's affairs in breach of international law. Both countries recalled their ambassadors. The defeat of Humala (the Chávez-backed candidate) in Peru and the reelection of a U.S. ally, Álvaro Uribe, in Colombia can be seen as a rebuke to Chávez.

President Chávez has developed strong ties with the government of Iran, in particular in the area of energy production, economic, and industrial cooperation. He has visited Iran on several occasions, the first time in 2001, when he declared that he came to Iran to "prepare the road for peace, justice, stability and progress for the 21st century". Mohamed Khatami also has visited Venezuela on three occasions. During his 2005 visit, Chávez awarded him the Orden del Libertador and called him a "tireless fighter for all the right causes in the world". In May of 2006, Chávez expressed his favorable view of the production of nuclear energy in Iran announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and denied that they had plans to develop atomic weapons. His relationship with Iran and his support of their nuclear program has created concern for the US administration. Condoleezza Rice commented that, given the political strategy of President Chávez in relation to Iran, "Venezuela has become a negative force in the region".

President Chávez's first trip to Libya occurred in 2001 after a personal invitation he received in 1999 by Muammar al-Gaddafi. During this short visit, they discussed the international situation, declining oil prices, and OPEC production levels. Some members of the National Assembly of Venezuela accused Chávez of not reporting his trip to Libya and hiding it under a tour of Europe and Africa. In 2004, Muammar al-Gaddafi awarded Chávez in the city of Tripoli the "Gaddafi Human Rights Award" and Chávez called him a "friend and brother", affirming they "shared the same social view". In 2006, during Chávez's third visit, the leaders signed a general treaty of economical and cultural cooperation, and Chávez called for a mutual union against "American hegemony". All his visits to Lybia have been critized by the US administration.

Human rights

 * Venezuela annuls election of anti-Chavez mayor, The Washington Post, 24 February 2010.


 * OAS Report Critical of Venezuela's Chavez NPR
 * OAS Report Critical of Venezuela's Chavez NPR
 * OAS Report Critical of Venezuela's Chavez NPR
 * OAS Report Critical of Venezuela's Chavez NPR

(From old article) Human Rights Watch Americas Director Jose Miguel Vivanco and Daniel Wilkinson were summarily expelled from Venezuela by the Chavez government in September 2008, over the publication of a report, highlighting the systematic violation to human, civil and political rights in Venezuela.

(From old article) While human rights organization Amnesty International has catalogued human rights violations under Chávez, scores of deaths and hundreds of injuries inflicted during both opposition and pro-Chávez demonstrations saw little official investigation. As of December 2004, Amnesty International has documented at least 14 deaths and at least 200 wounded during confrontations between anti-Chávez demonstrators and National Guard, police, and other security personnel in February and March 2004. Human Rights Watch criticized Chávez for stifling press criticism of government authorities and restrict the public’s ability to monitor government actions.

(From old article) Meanwhile, Chávez faces allegations of both censorship and ill treatment or torture of his opponents at the hands of the Chávez government's security forces. There are reports of slow and inadequate investigations into these abuses, which Amnesty International had attributed to the lack of police and judiciary impartiality. The organisation also has documented numerous reports of both police brutality and unlawful extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects, as well as intimidation of witnesses to the abuses. Calls by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Chávez government to quell such threats and intimidation have also reportedly not been addressed, and Chávez himself has suggested that some international human rights defenders had intentions of fermenting turmoil and destabilizing the country. These allegations have been reported to result in endangering human rights defenders, including death threats.

(From old article) Amnesty International has reported that two anti-Chávez activists were detained as political prisoners. Carlos Fernandez, the President of the business association, Fedecamaras, and a prominent leader of the general strike called by the opposition, is currently exiled in Miami.

Judiciary

 * Venezuela annuls election of anti-Chavez mayor, The Washington Post, 24 February 2010.

Political persecution

 * Venezuela annuls election of anti-Chavez mayor, The Washington Post, 24 February 2010.


 * FACTBOX-Venezuelan political figures who fell out with Chavez. Reuters, 24 February 2010


 * Venezuela's curious coup, (Retitled to "Riddle wrapped in a mystery"). The Economist, 2009-06-11
 * General Baduel, having broken with the president, was arrested last month on corruption charges which he claims are politically motivated. His arrest is part of a wider crackdown on the opposition, intensifying Mr Chavez's hollowing-out of Venezuelan democracy.






















 * Too many sources to list from Leopoldo López
 * Easier just to add Category:Human rights in Venezuela, which all have sources

"President for Life"

 * Hugo Chávez for Life? by Sara Miller Llana, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 February 2009

(From old article) In November of 2002, Chavez made comments indicating that, even if a referendum succeeded, he would not leave office. He stated, on his weekly television show,
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This statement was one of the bases for claims that Chávez has dictatorial aims. Once the referendum was approved, Chávez softened his stance, stating,
 * "Referendum to remove Chávez? That is not possible, don't waste time. I will not go in a referendum, I say that to the country and the world. It's like this: I won't go. ... Not even if we suppose that they hold that referendum and get 90% of the votes, I will not leave. Forget it. I will not leave."
 * }
 * }
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When asked how he could support Fidel Castro "if he's a dictator", Chávez responded,
 * "If the opposition wins, then I am out of here."
 * }
 * }
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 * "But Cuba doesn’t have a dictatorship — it’s a revolutionary democracy."
 * }
 * }

(From old article) In spite of a presidential term limit of 12 years, Chávez often suggests that he will remain in power for 25 years, which would require a constitutional amendment via popular referendum. Chávez has suggested that he might hold a referendum to extend his term until 2032 or later.

A program called "Mission Identity", to fast track voter registration of immigrants to Venezuela &mdash; including Chávez supporters benefiting from his subsidies &mdash; has been put in place prior to the upcoming 2006 presidential elections.

Press freedom

 * European Parliament resolution, 12 Feb 2010
 * "The members expressed concern about the movement toward authoritarianism by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's government, the European Union said Thursday in a release. In January 2010, six cable and satellite television channels were ordered off the air after they were criticized for failing to broadcast Chavez's speech on the 52nd anniversary of the overthrow of Perez Jimenez."


 * Venezuela's media crackdown, (Retitled to "Switched off: Moving towards monologue") The Economist, 2009-08-06 "A SLUGGISH economy, inflation, strikes and rampant crime: much of the recent news in Venezuela has been bad for the socialist government of President Hugo Chávez. Its response has been to intensify its harassment of the media.…"
 * On August 1st, 34 radio stations were taken off the air for allegedly failing to submit the proper paperwork to the broadcasting regulator. In all, more than half the country's 656 privately owned radio stations face fines and possible closure on this ground. Their owners say they have tried for years to update their paperwork, with no response from the authorities."
 * The government's concerted crackdown on critical media comes as Mr Chavez is pressing ahead with other measures that seem designed to make his "socialist revolution" irreversible. ... This month the government amended the electoral law to award a hugely disproportionate share of seats to the largest party, even though the constitution (drawn up under Mr Chavez) guarantees proportional representation. ... The new law also gives the electoral authority (controlled by the government) the power to gerrymander constituency boundaries.


 * The media in Venezuela, (Retitled to "Chavez's bugbear) The Economist, 2009-06-25 "TO CRITICS who call him an autocrat, Venezuela’s leftist president, Hugo Chávez, responds by pointing to a largely uncensored opposition media. Yet it is an argument that is wearing thin. Mr Chavez recently vowed to curb what he sees as the excesses of Globovision, a 24-hour news channel that is his main bugbear. Closing it down may be the only way to do so."
 * Meanwhile, the government has built itself a huge media empire. Of the dozen free-to-air national television channels it controls six, as well as hundreds of radio stations and dozens of newspapers and magazines. These pump out pro-Chavez propaganda, interspersed with diatribes against the opposition and smears aimed at those who cross the president. In addition, the president has decreed his right to interrupt all radio and television broadcasts, without notice, for as long as he likes.
 * The tax office imposed a fine of over $2.3m for non-payment of taxes on income [Globovision] says it did not receive. After a public collection was launched to pay the fine, the authority doubled it.

(From old article) The National Assembly approved by a simple majority the controversial Law on the Social Responsibility of Radio and Television, or gag law, which, in effect, makes the private radio and television system part of the state, which controls its schedules, programs and content.

(From old article) President Chávez announced that the operating license for RCTV—Venezuela's second largest TV channel which has been broadcasting for 53 years—will not be renewed. The license expired on 27 May 2007. He publicly stated: "It runs out in March[sic]. So it's better that you go and prepare your suitcase and look around for what you're going to do in March ... There will be no new operating license for this coupist TV channel called RCTV. The operating license is over ... So go and turn off the equipment ...".

(From old article) The freedom of the press is secured by two key clauses in Chávez's Constitution of Venezuela of 1999. The right to freedom of expression is set out in Article 57 and Article 58 of the Constitution. The right to express opinions freely without censorship (Article 57) and the right to reply (Article 58) are generally in line with international standards. However, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed concern about Article 58 of the Constitution, which provides that "Everyone has the right to timely, truthful, impartial and uncensored information." The Commission took issue with the right to "truthful and timely" information arguing that this is "a kind of prior censorship prohibited in the American Convention on Human Rights".

(From old article) In 2006, Reporters Without Borders ranked Venezuela 115th out of 168 countries in its global press freedom listing, sharply down from the last year's rating of 90th. Freedom House currently rates Venezuela as "Partly Free" according to its latest survey. The U.S. Senate also passed a resolution condemning the closure of RCTV.

(From old article) Chávez has been widely criticized by proponents of free speech, for controversial moves to restrict the abilities of private media to publicly criticize Chávez and his policies, and general censorship for certain other types of 'unfavourable' content. The Chávez government has been denounced by Human Rights Watch for its passage of legislation that threatens to stifle anti-Chávez criticism and dissent from Venezuelan media. The statements are leveled specifically at restrictive amendments to the Venezuelan Criminal Code that criminalize insults, disrespect, and libelous remarks from the news media aimed at either the president or other government authorities. Severe punishments, including sentences of up to 40 months, are part of the so-called "Law on the Social Responsibility of Radio and Television" personally endorsed by Chávez.

Terrorism, arms and weapons acquisitions

 * Romero, Simon Venezuela Still Aids Colombia Rebels, New Material Shows, The New York Times, 2009-08-02 "Despite repeated denials by President Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan officials have continued to assist commanders of Colombia’s largest rebel group, helping them arrange weapons deals in Venezuela and even obtain identity cards to move with ease on Venezuelan soil, ... Intelligence of this kind has been a source of tension between Colombia and Venezuela, with the government here claiming the information is false and used to further political ends. Colombian officials, by contrast, argue that the intelligence proves that the FARC survives in part on its ability to operate from Venezuela’s frontier regions."


 * Venezuela's foreign policy, (Retitled to "Dreams of a different world: Arms and the tyrant"). The Economist, 2009-09-17 "AFTER a two-week tour that included stops in Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iran, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia, where he placed orders for tanks and missiles, Hugo Chávez this week got what he seemed to be seeking all along: the attention of the United States. Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, worried that Venezuela’s weapons’ purchases might trigger an “arms race” in Latin America, and her spokesman described Mr Chávez’s actions as a “serious challenge to stability”.… "
 * Nowadays Mr Chavez's foreign policy gives top priority--outside Latin America--to forging an anti-American political alliance with Iran, Syria, Belarus and Russia.
 * Bank accounts in Andorra, supposedly belonging to people close to Mr Chavez, have been frozen at the request of the United States Treasury, reportedly because of suspicions of links to terrorism.
 * But the more immediately worrying development may be Venezuela's arms build-up.

(From old article) Abroad, sources in the Western mainstream news media have reported that Chávez is a confrontational ideologue who willingly harbors, funds, and trains terrorists in Venezuela and insurgents abroad. The US Government claims Venezuelan cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism is negligible or purposely indifferent, particularly in regards to FARC and ELN in neighboring Colombia, which the US government considers to be terrorist organizations. However U.S. officials acknowledge that there is no evidence of Chavez engaging directly in terrorism. Public figures have accused Chávez of supporting and training terrorists.

Critics say that Chávez's large purchases of military hardware are for reasons other than the defence of his country in the event of the "imminent US invasion" which he has repeatedly claimed will take place, and has used as a reason to justify these large transactions. Reasons cited by critics include covert or otherwise intervention in other South American countries in order to further political objectives in the region. They say Chávez's new civil reserve defense force is intended to intimidate domestic opponents and repress internal dissent. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States.

Misc
(From old article) During his first marriage, Chávez also had a nine-year affair with Herma Marksman, a Venezuelan historian. She wrote the book "Chávez me utilizó" (Chávez used me, ISBN 980-6598-05-9) with her views and opinions about Hugo Chávez. Her beliefs are that Chávez is a person without values, ambitious, disloyal and who uses others to later "discard" them: "... (he) has turned into an assassin".

(From old article) Chávez has had a series of disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and Protestant church hierarchies.