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Joseph Stalin and the Korean War
Introduction

Soviet leader Josef Stalin exerted tremendous influence in beginning the Korean War in 1950. In other words, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s personal will to invade South Korea and to create a unified communist state would not have seen fruition had Stalin not approved and supported the operation in the first place.

Background

Almost as soon as the North Korean regime was established in 1948 after the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945, Kim Il-Sung, the Soviet-backed leader of the Soviet occupation zone of northern Korea, pursued his ambition of uniting divided Korea through force. As political, social, economic, and military consolidations were being pursued in North Korea in early 1949, Kim Il-Sung continuously lobbied Stalin for approval to attack South Korea. Though the specific time is uncertain when he personally started planning the attack, Kim Il-Sung first mentioned the possibility of a military advance during a conversation with Stalin in March 1949 in the Soviet Union, when he was accompanied by five other north Korean leaders, including Bak Heon-yeong. During a visit that lasted about two weeks, Kim Il-Sung reportedly told Stalin, “We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means”. However, Stalin initially rejected Kim Il-Sung’s plan. Stalin argued that the (North) Korean People’s Army (KPA) was still too weak and it would be best to wait for provocation from South Korea. American forces had been deployed in South Korea in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement over the partition of the Korean peninsula at the 38th Parallel and the subsequent formal establishment of both South Korea (Republic of Korea) and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) in August and September, respectively, of 1948. Stalin, instead of accepting Kim Il-Sung’s request, ordered Kim to continue to strengthen defensive abilities in preparation for a possible attack from the South.

Stalin not only feared North Korea’s lack of preparation but also was concerned about the possibility of the intervention of the United States. Stalin was aware that combat operations could be used by the US as a pretext for an increased American interference in Korean affairs. Stalin worked to erase the American influence remaining in the mainland of East Asia by improving the alliance with the newly created People’s Republic of China. Therefore, he was concerned that Kim Il-Sung’s plan could lead the US to further interfere in East Asian affairs. Stalin also emphasized that the North would not have the moral right to start a war without any provocation from the South. Thus, he suggested waiting until South Korea attacked North Korea first, as small military conflicts along the border between two countries were intensifying.

Kim Il-Sung’s Persistent Requests

However, Kim Il-Sung did not stop pursuing his ambition and continued preparations for launching a military attack. Along with requesting that the Korean units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) be returned to North Korea following the completion of the Chinese civil war in the summer of 1949, the North Korean regime created the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF), whose goal was to unify Korea using force under Kim Il-Sung’s leadership. Also, on August 12, 1949, following the complete withdrawal of the American military from South Korea on June 29, Kim Il-Sung met with Shtykov, the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, and reiterated his desire to unite Korea by force. Finally, while other Korean political figures continued to pursue a peaceful unification, Kim Il-Sung relentlessly argued for military conquest of South Korea at a number of public occasions, such as in his New Year's address of 1947 and 1950 and at a speech at a party congress on January 19, 1950. But as Stalin continued to reject his requests, Kim Il-Sung became desperate, as he believed it was Korea’s turn to establish a communist state in East Asia after that established in China.

Stalin’s Change of Mind

The situation quickly shifted in late 1949, as the Kremlin began to change its policy regarding Korea. After the withdrawal of the American military and Kim’s persistent lobbying, on September 11, 1949, Stalin instructed the Soviet embassy in North Korea to examine the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on South Korea, ordering a new appraisal of the situation in Korea. In March 1950, when Kim met with Stalin in Moscow, Kim attempted to assuage Stalin’s two biggest fears by assuring him that the KPA was finally dominant enough to quickly take over the South, and that the U.S. would not intervene due to lack of time to mobilize after a rapid attack. Stalin finally agreed to Kim’s request.

However, it was not only Kim’s persuasion that changed Stalin’s mind. By late 1949, the international factors that had restrained Stalin were eliminated. The victory of the communists in China, the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb in August 1949, the establishment of NATO and aggravation of Soviet relations with the West, and Washington's weakened position and will to militarily intervene in Korea allowed Stalin to become more confident of Soviet strength and less concerned about American reaction.

Finally, improved Sino-Soviet relations greatly influenced Stalin’s decision. Between March 1949, when Stalin initially denied Kim Il-sung’s request for forceful unification, and May of 1950 when he gave the final approval, one of the most important political developments was the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, on February 14, 1950. In China, Mao’s victory in the Chinese Civil War was close to completion, and in order to retake Taiwan and eradicate the Nationalists, Mao needed Soviet military support. For Stalin, he not only felt a necessity to expand the size of Soviet buffer zones in East Asia but also desired to prevent China from getting close to other Western nations, especially the US. The newly signed treaty affirmed the political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and, in hindsight, established the framework for both nations’ roles in the Korean War, which to Stalin alleviated the Soviet Union's risk of direct conflict with the US.

Following the American occupation forces' withdrawal from South Korea and Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech that officially announced that South Korea did not fall in the American defense perimeter, Stalin became convinced that a possibility of a direct conflict with the US due to Korea was less likely. To ensure this, Stalin wanted the Chinese, not the Soviets, to take the burden of the Korea situation. Thus, Stalin refused to approve open Soviet military operations in Korea, even as he was orchestrating the plan.

While agreeing with the concept and approach, Stalin made sure that the official approval to start the war would seemingly come from Mao. Thus, when Kim Il-Sung visited Moscow, Stalin reportedly told Kim, “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.” He also said, “The Korean friends should not expect great assistance and support from the Soviet Union, because it has more important challenges to meet than the Korean problem.” By exploiting Kim Il-Sung’s longstanding ties to the Chinese, including from the Chinese civil war, Stalin sought to steer Kim Il-Sung into a direction in which he would receive military support and official approval from China, not the Soviet Union. By making Kim Il-Sung dependent upon Mao’s approval, however, Stalin also raised China's profile as the key communist power in Asia and provided Mao an increased level of authority. This made it nearly impossible for Mao to deny Kim’s request for support. Stalin ultimately created a situation in which the Soviet Union commanded affairs on the Korean peninsula and the alliances between the three communist states in East Asia, while avoiding any responsibilities for and risks of possible conflict with the US.

When Kim revisited Stalin in April 1950, Stalin assured Kim of Soviet support and material assistance in the latter's ambitious plan and even decided on the date of the attack as late June, based on Kim’s recommendation. In mid-1950, Stalin gave final approval by telegramming Shtykov, “I am ready to help him in this matter of attacking South Korea,” to which Kim reacted to with great joy, but also insisted on acting without “too much risk involved.”

Historical Significance

It appears that Stalin had considerable and perhaps the most control, influence, and responsibility in the decision to start the Korean War, although he successfully avoided official responsibility by bringing the Chinese into the scene while enhancing the communist alliance between the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Such recognition can drastically alter one’s view of history. If one believes it was Stalin who had de facto control in instigating the war, one is inclined to view the Korean War as a conflict between two large hegemonic forces in the emerging Cold War that manipulated their respective satellite states. If so, however, Stalin failed to correctly anticipate the American reaction. On the other hand, if one views Kim Il-Sung as the one most responsible for beginning the war, then one could argue that the Korean War was at heart a civil war between two somewhat-autonomous states.