User:Shaskouri/Ahmed Belbachir Haskouri

Table of Contents

Introduction p. 3-14 Rise to power in Spanish Morocco p. 14-29 Belbachir’s positionality during the Spanish Civil war 21-23 Social contributions in Morocco p. 23-26 Social contributions in Palestine p. 26 Nationalist movement from Egypt p. 26-29 Involvement with the Western Sahara 29 Participation in the Second World War p. 30-33 Medals and recognition during the protectorate p. 33-34 Involvement in Post-independent Morocco p. 34-35 Foresight, diplomatic achievements from Great Britain and end of political life p. 35-39 Conclusion of the review of the literature of the political biography p. 39 References p. 39-43 Notes / External links 43-44 Pictures p. 44-46 (Getty Images)

Introduction of the review of the literature of the political biography: Due to certain transliterations in Roman script, Belbachir’s name has also been spelled as Si Hamed Ben Baxir Escuri, Sid Ahmed Bel Bashir Haskouri, Ahmer Ben Bazir Hasqouri, Ahamad Benbachir Scouri, Sid Ahmed Ben Bachi Scuri or Ahmad Ben Bachir El Hascouri or any combination or concatenation of these strings of letters. Notwithstanding, he is more commonly known by the middle name rather than by any last or first name. Since Belbachir’s childhood, his peers were customarily calling him as such. Ben Azouz, the first prime minister of Spanish Morocco who was the most powerful Moroccan in Spanish Morocco at the time and who was also known to be a nationalist around 1912, is believed to have initiated this appellation. This was due to the fact that Ben Azouz was a friend of Belbachir’s father, Bachir who was previously a military governor in charge of royal protocol in Marrakesh during pre-colonial times. “Ben” or “Bel” means son of; therefore, Belbachir means son of Bachir. Regardless which name is used in a published document, one must understand the political situation in Morocco shortly before this politician comes into the political scene. Spanish and French Morocco were protectorates rather than colonies. The difference between a colony and a protectorate is that a colony is a territory claimed and owned by another country as opposed to a protectorate that owns itself but is guided by a more powerful country. Therefore, it stands to reason that political dialogues in a protectorate are necessary between the insiders and the outsiders occupying the same space. Theoretically, neither side shall totally impose its will on the recalcitrant “other”. The relationship between French and Spanish Morocco was an agglutinative one as per the Algeciras Conference. This conference that took place shortly before 1912, the year of occupation, stated that Spain and France shall divide Morocco and that the former occupier shall leave whenever the latter occupier does so. The Concise Encyclopedia of Arabic Civilization states that the sultan appointed as representative a viceroy holding, by delegation, sovereign power (Ronart, 1966, p.309). Le Monde newspaper states that even though the sultan was technically Morocco’s sovereign, the Spaniards, for the most part, increasingly treated the khalifa/Jalifa/caliph (viceroy), representative of the sultan in Spanish Morocco, as an independent entity (Ferro, 1947). The French newspaper, L’illustre, supports Ferro’s statement about the caliph’s autonomy, but further defines the caliph’s position by stating that he had his own flag, decoration and hymn and that he was referred to by the public as “Sidna” (Sire) (Abramovici, 1949). The Spanish newspaper, La Offesiva, complements both Ferro and Abramovici by stating that the caliph had his own throne (“El Jalifa celebra el aniversario de su exaltacion al trono”, 2008, p 1). The Spaniards treated the Khalifa as a head of state in many different situations. For example, when General Petain was ambassador in Spain, he made it a point to visit the Khalifa and Belbachir. During other visits in Spain, the Khalifa would sit in the same car with General Franco as the car paraded the streets in Madrid. In sum, to make it clear to the world that the Spaniards viewed the caliph as a head of state, the Spanish government gave him the medal of Carlos Tercero, a medal that can only be given to heads of states. Belbachir made sure that such caliphal power maintained its sovereignty by enforcing and enlivening it. For example, Belbachir chose to decorate Nahas Moustafa, the first Secretary General of the Arab League, in the name of the Khalifa. Furthermore, Ductur Shuqairi, the undersecretary of the Arab League, personally visited Belbachir in Tetuan to further reinforce Spanish Morocco’s membership in the Arab League (“Ductur Ahmed Shuqairi Fi Tetuan”, 1953). Belbachir also gave a medal to Shuqairi in the name of the caliph. This gave Spanish Morocco (in the name of the khalifa) a great deal of credibility in the Arab world. To maintain solidarity in the name of the caliph with French Morocco, Belbachir saw to it that the foreign policy was always balanced by keeping the sultan of French Morocco aware. This was primarily maintained by keeping the sultan’s private secretary, Ahmed Ben Masoud, posted. For the most part the sultan had no serious grievances, given the delegated powers given to the caliph, except to say that the sultan once sent Belbachir several messages insisting that the caliph should not wear an ottoman outfit, a perceived symbol of a “western” imperial power, especially when foreign dignitaries were present. In essence, Belbachir entered this political scene after the caliph’s position was fully defined, but it was not enforced at the time that the Spanish protectorate came into existence. He entered this political scene after the occupation was already in place for almost twenty years; this period was during the second caliphate, a period that starts two years after the death of the first caliph in 1923 in Spanish Morocco. During the period from 1923 to 1925, a regent was playing the role of the caliph. Upon the recommendation of a few potentates such as Ben Azouz, the second son of the first caliph seized the throne. Therefore, Belbachir was dealing with an inherited problem. Subject to the constraints of the inherited situation, this politician’s position and contributions fit in some of the missing pages in Moroccan and world history. In other words, some historical gaps and seemingly grey areas, needing clarification, could be rectified by means of looking at this man’s political biography. Such a political biography has yet to be found. This man’s political biography cannot be found anywhere due to the fact that Spanish/Moroccan history has not mentioned Ahmed Belbachir Haskouri enough. Consequently, the world as a whole has known less about him. This is partly due to the fact that Morocco’s curricular canon was primarily shaped by the ruling family and secondarily shaped by the political parties. Furthermore, provincialism, coming form the city of Tetuan, capital of Spanish Morocco, a city where he had no pre-existing roots, has also made a contribution to a greater or lesser degree along those lines insofar as official publications are concerned. On the other hand, historians during the Spanish government under Franco were unwilling to write about a man who was a Moroccan nationalist and who was an obstacle to Spanish interests in Northern Africa. However, his name is omni-present in the Spanish archives about Spanish Morocco that belong to Spain’s national libraries. In contrast, some Moroccan historians and writers felt awkward about giving credit to someone who was operating in juxtaposition with the Spanish occupiers. This belief is erroneous, for Belbachir was already born when the colonizers were at the doorsteps of Morocco. Furthermore, someone needed to fill this position from the Moroccan side. Other earlier, but less biased historians (Moroccan or Spanish) have erroneously thought that, by using the term caliph, the laity would interpret the achievements to be coming from Belbachir due to the life-time symbiotic existence between the caliph and Belbachir. This erroneous thinking has also facilitated matters for those who were deliberately trying to avoid giving the man the deserved credit. Furthermore, this thinking would also be very misleading for the future generations who will only be able to understand and give credit at face value. Finally, Belbachir’s untimely death in a distant country such as Great Britain has also equally made a similar contribution along these lines. Such an incident sped the forces at work that were trying to totally eliminate him from the curricular canon. And, the immediate family was too young to try to salvage the situation at the time. Over-arching terms such as the “makhzen”, government, caliph and other terms have been used (intentionally or unintentionally) to circumvent giving the man credit. By fully analysing the term caliph and the marginal role that the person holding this title can be limited to, due to circumstances, one can say that there is nothing incongruous and/or innovative about giving credit to the decision-maker rather than to the one who signs and seals the documents if Western historians had already given virtually all the credit to the Cardinal de Richelieu rather than Louis the Thirteenth who was barely a living figure. Giving all the possible credit without any preconceived notions, but with due diligence calls for a look at the Belbachir’s personal and family background as well as his political ideologies. Ahmed Belbachir Haskouri was born in Marrakesh, Morocco around 1908 to an aristocratic family allied to the Alaouite dynasty of Morocco through previous marital alliances and a long standing high level service to various sheikdoms under the sultan of Morocco. He was equally a direct descendant of the Hafsid dynasty (1229-1574) that ruled most of North Western Africa and that eventually succumbed to Spanish sovereignty during the tail end of that time frame. Eventually, some of the Hafsids settled near Marrakesh in Haskoura (Scoura) and adopted the name “Haskouri” from the area that became their new home. In the course of time, the Haskoura tribe became one of the building blocks as well as one of the dominant tribes in Moroccan tribal history and thereby the Glaoua tribes that dominated a significant portion of Morocco had to come to terms with them through political alliances. Having been raised and primarily educated in the palace, he was partly influenced by the “makhzen”, the ultimate political power historically and primarily incarnated by the sultan and to a certain extent this incarnation includes those who are close to him historically and continue to unconditionally support him. This power overrides the governmental power and is geographically headquartered in the central palace. Similarly, having received his secondary education in the Spanish School, El Pilar, administered by Spaniards and located in Tetuan, coupled with his higher education in banking and in protocol in Spain, he was partly influenced by Spain’s educational system. Later, he married Zoubeida Raissouni (Raisuli/Raisuni) in 1950, direct grand-daughter of Muley Sadiq Raissouni, ex-finance minister of the first caliphal government and both cousin and negotiator of Mulai Ahmed Raisuli, the historical hero in the American movie called The Wind and the Lion and the most adamant rebel against both domestic and foreign powers during pre-colonial and colonial times. This alliance politically upgraded Belbachir in Northern Morocco (“Afrah Tetuan fi bayt rais diwan el amer”, 1948). Consequently, it made the public more receptive to the position of the caliph, a caliph who pre-eminently accepted Belbachir’s socio-political ideologies. Belbachir was anti-Nazi, anti-communist and pro-monarchist with progressive views. These political ideologies can be understood in a nutshell via those leaders whom he admired and those leaders who made comments about him. His political ideologies are partly reflected by his great admiration for General De Gaulle, especially when the latter freed France from the Nazis and went back to his home without asking for anything until he was called upon to continue serving the country. Belbachir was equally a great admirer of President Kennedy for his anti-communism and for his support of the civil rights. He always felt that Kennedy would reform America for the better. Moreover, when Haili Selasi was in Spain on his way to exile, Belbachir went out of his way to visit him on a boat to wish him the best. Even though there were no political ties with Ethiopia at the time, Belbachir’s monarchical background coerced him to pay the due respect to the deposed monarch. Belbachir’s political ideologies can be further understood through future encounters with the Spanish leaders. When Belbachir’s oldest son, Bachir, met Don Juan Bourbon, Conde de Barcelona and son of Alfonso the Thirteenth, in 1979 in the UAE, the latter reported that Belbachir was an unsurpassed monarchist. This historical tie was further reinforced and extended when Juan Carlos Borbon, the current king of Spain met Bachir again in May 2008 in the UAE and requested that a picture be taken immediately together to highlight the shared monarchical history. The king remembered that Belbachir politically protected him at the local level by dint of his “makhzen” power during his hospitalisation due to a sudden appendicitis attack that required an immediate operation in Tangier. At that time, the future Spanish king was around ten years old. Such recent and meaningful encounters could have only been made possible by Belbachir’s importance and reputation during the occupation. Belbachir was destined to be one of the most prominent political figures in Spanish Morocco and was often alluded to as the “eminence grise” of the caliph of Spanish Morocco (Wolf, 1994). Benjelloun (1994) further supported the term “eminence grise” in the Moroccan newpaper, Al Bayan, the last Moroccan newspaper up to that point, in the passage of time that mentioned Belbachir. He is historically known to be the only intermediary between the sultan, Mohammed the Fifth of French Morocco and the caliph of Spanish Morocco as well as the only negotiator between Franco and the caliph. Additionally, he was the only politician from Spanish Morocco who could socially and politically communicate, especially during times of crises, with nineteenth century politicians and warriors who were still around in the 1950’s. Thami Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh and the supreme head of the Glaoua tribes at the time, had to pay top-secret visits to Belbachir to maintain a balance and unity between the two protectorates. Furthermore, Belbachir was the only politician from Spanish Morocco who could socially bond with Mohammed Al Muqri (Mokri), the Grand Vizier of French Morocco at the time who served seven consecutive sultans and who was the longest lasting and the oldest public servant in world history according to the Guinness Book of Records. Similarly, Belbachir is historically known to be in the higher social circles the only politician from Spanish Morocco who negotiated, to the satisfaction of all domestic and foreign powers, the last phase of the exile of Abdelkrim Khattabi, the most distinguished military rebel against the Franco-Spanish forces prior to the occupation and the future military model for Che Guevarra, Mao Tse Tsung and Hochimin. Belbachir was the only known politician from Spanish Morocco who could communicate and financially support all the political parties in “colonial times” (Benjelloun, 1988). He was in touch with the Independance (Istiqlal), Reformist (Islah), Unity (Wahda) and Council (Shura) parties. Belbachir sustained and controlled the Unity party both politically and economically. Ideologically, he empathized with the Council party due to its progressive views. Abdelhadi Boutaleb, an ex-member of the council party in “colonial” times as well as an ex-politician and an ex-professor in post-colonial Morocco openly testifies in writing today that Belbachir was constantly supporting these parties. Moreover, in the higher social circles, Belbachir is historically known to be the supervisor and architect of the caliph’s wedding, the most celebrated wedding in the world in 1949 (“Rais Diwan Madani Khalifi Amama Microfone Bi Munasabat Id Zafaf Khalifi” (The Chief of the Caliphal Cabinet on the microphone for the celebration of the caliphal wedding)(1949)) (“Amama Qasr Khalifi El Amer” (In Front of the Caliphal Palace)(1950, p. 22)) (Dimitri Kessel 1949, p. 10) (Mohammed Ben Ibrahim 1949, p. 8). This wedding is also known to be the most celebrated wedding in Moroccan history after the wedding of Sultan Abdulrahman (Abramovici, 1949). To reveal more information about this wedding, it should be noted that Belbachir was the only negotiator for this nuptial union. He successfully negotiated this union from 1943 to 1947 to the satisfaction of the caliph, the bride who was daughter of the Sultan Abdulaziz and who was born and raised in Tangier and Sultan Mohammed V who was initially adamant about the union. Notwithstanding, this union brought more solidarity between two main branches of the Alaouite dynasty as well as between the protectorates including Tangier. Belbachir is also known to be the only politician who overhauled the inherited government and palace under the first caliph who passed away around 1923. Together with the Spaniards, Belbachir established a system of financial and work accountability for the palace and government employees. As time went by, he also chose many new employees that the Spaniards did not hesitate to approve of. Marin (1973, p. 34) stated that, by 1955, a new caliphal government emerged that included nationalists such as Abdullah Guennoun. However, the missing fact in Marin’s account is that Belbachir caused the emergence of that new government. And, he was the only politician who had a foot in the palace and a foot in the government and thereby creating a solid link between those two institutions. Belbachir is also known to be the only politician in the entire history of Spanish Morocco who politically dealt with fifteen consecutive High Commissioners (who were generals) representing the Spanish government. Some of these Commissioners were from the pre-republic time, republic time and Franco’s time. What is noteworthy herein is that General Franco was one of these commissioners at one point. Belbachir is also known to be the first politician who sent a cultural representative from Spanish Morocco to the Arab League of Nations. This contrasts with French Morocco; for this zone had no representation in the Arab League. As a matter of fact, French Morocco counted on Spanish Morocco’s ability to maintain and cultivate such ties. At the request of the Muslim community in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in Northern Morocco occupied by Portugal in the early fifteenth century and given to Spain in the late sixteenth century in a peace treaty, Belbachir built the first mosque yonder. He came up with a budget drawn from the palace for that mosque and supervised its construction. Belbachir was also popularly known to be the only long-term and gainfully employed politician from Spanish Morocco who helped link the two protectorates after independence. The country’s perception was such that the country could not do without him until such a matter is settled. Finally, Belbachir is socially known to be the leading pioneer of the first Moroccan Embassy at Great Britain. He chose most of the staff that went to Great Britain. He was also in charge of promotions, demotions and terminations of all the staff. He was the first and only diplomat from that group who visited Queen Elizabeth in her palace with a Moroccan Princess upon his arrival to Great Britain. In order for Belbachir to be known to a greater or lesser degree in the above-mentioned ways, certain positions must have provided him with the platform. Most of these positions were given to him during the protectorate. The last positions were sequels to the period of occupation. Belbachir held various key and powerful positions during the Spanish occupation such as Chief of the Civil Household, Director General of the Secretariat of the caliph and Secretary General of the Privy Council of the caliph. Other positions were not officially granted, but implied or perceived such as the “advisor to the caliph” (Bowles, 1952, p. 113) (Dimitri Kessel 1949, p. 10). Similarly, on November 1949, the Spanish newspaper, Ofensiva, alluded to him as the chamberlain, receiving top officials of Franco’s government in celebration of the Jalifa’s throne day (“El Jalifa celebra el aniversario de su exaltacion al trono”, 2008, p 1). The accumulation of said positions together with his “makhzen” background, Spanish education, symbiotic existence throughout his life with the caliph (a symbiotic existence that starts under the same roof with the caliph’s birth, the second and last caliph) and progressively acquired political savvy in juxtaposition with innate ability opened the doors for a unique role which eventually allowed him to dominate the political scene in this rather fleeting but crucial “colony”, politically, socially and economically linked to the rest of North Africa, Europe and the Middle East. In brief, the acid test of this man’s significance comes from the various writers from different walks of life. In June 1949, Life Magazine highlighted his highly effective, but unusual managerial skills where he was observed as the hovering reference point for everyone in the center of very complex activity (Dimitri Kessel 1949, p. 10). In Benjelloun (1988)’s doctoral dissertation, based on two hundred interviews, he summed up Belbachir as the major architect and the pillar of the vice-regal system, the caliphal government that communicated with the Spanish authorities. In the field of poetry, Mohammed Ben Ibrahim (1949, p. 8), poet of Al Hamra, described Belbachir as the politician who can skilfully and benevolently run the nation while the head of state is peacefully resting in his palace. By synthesizing these three testimonies coming from a journalist / photographer, a historian and a poet respectively, one understands that Belbachir was the leading figure and the driving force of the vice-regal system. Hence, a series of events need to be explained to understand how this man attained and maintained such power, a power that would not be overlooked by a nation’s curriculum. Rise to power in Spanish Morocco: First of all, the intelligentsia as a whole in the city of Tetuan was cognizant of the fact that Belbachir succeeded in keeping the Spanish High Commissioners in check and, at times, checkmated. For example, during General Asencio’s tenure, Belbachir refused to accept a Spanish bill that was at loggerheads with Moroccan tradition. The latter convinced the palace officials as well as the government ministers to turn in their resignations in writing should the bill forcefully become law. The petition with the signatures was presented to the High Commissioner. As a result, the commissioner’s hands were tied, lest a political vacuum temporarily surfaces from the Moroccan end. General Varela, the most highly decorated general in Spanish history and one of the two youngest officers to attain the status of a general in European history along with Napoleon Bonaparte, was no exception to the rule. Belbachir constantly reminded Varela that the Spaniards had a vassal state in their hands and that France, the superpower at the time, could ask them to leave any minute. At one point in 1946, Belbachir warned Varela in writing about the dire consequences of using force against the nationalists (Marin, 1973, p 31). These reminders were necessary to prevent the Spaniards from overstepping their limits. These political dialogues that, at times, turned into political warfare reached an impasse during the tail end of the protectorate that was during General Valino’s tenure. Eventually, Valino accused Belbachir of a conspiracy to assassinate him in 1954 (Wolfe, 1994). Upon the recommendation of General Valino, General Franco agreed to Belbachir’s dismissal even though the allegations were found to be baseless after a series of trials. Much to the dismay of the Spaniards, the dismissal could not be finalized due to the fact that it required the caliphal seal that was completely on the palm of Belbachir’ s hand. On the other hand, the caliph was willing to abdicate had Belbachir chosen to resign in protest. This is reminiscent and contrastive with Ben Azouz whom the Spaniards exiled in Chefchaouen for his dissidence during the first caliphate. In contrast, Belbachir had the caliphal seal while Ben Azouz had the prime minister’s seal in his possession. Moreover, Ben Azouz did not have a symbiotic existence with the first caliph. As a result of the zenith of political warfare, Belbachir’s previous political friendship with General Franco started to fade away. Belbachir’s previous yearly hunting trips with Franco (where he is photographed side by side with Franco and his spouse) in Andujar, Spain came to an end. Similarly, Belbachir’s previous political friendship with Duke De Huetor y Santillan, Franco’s Chamberlain started to equally phase out. The relationship between Munoz Grandes, one of Franco’s right-hand men and Belbachir was limited to the necessity level only. On the other hand, throughout his career, he was popularly known to have managed and negotiated/facilitated various significant events related to the sultan: the visit of Mohammed the Fifth to Azilah, Spanish Morocco; Mohammed the Fifth’s official visit to Tangier (a coastal and international city occupied by the major European powers in 1923); the visit of Mohammed the Fifth to Madrid, Spain on April 7, 1956 to sign the declaration of independence (Marin, 1973, p 36), as well as Mohammed the Fifth’s subsequent and first triumphant visit to Tetuan in April 1956; this last event (where Belbachir and the sultan are photographed side by side) symbolized the unity of both protectorates. By 1951, the prelude to the most challenging political demands started to show its signs when the French and the Spaniards were politically diverging after the death of General Varela and the dismissal of Marechal Juin, French High Commissioner in French Morocco. General Valino and General Guillaume replaced these two generals respectively. These two newcomers, in turn, started to develop separate political positions without much consultation with each other (Marin, 1973, p.33) Shortly afterwards, Glaoui personally visited Belbachir, Glaoui’s political counterpart in Spanish Morocco, to seek the necessary support to ensure that the occupiers do not cause the two zones to diverge and that the Alaouite dynasty continues to exist. Belbachir vibrated in the same wavelength as long as unity between the protectorates is maintained, independence is forthcoming and the Alouite dynasty continues to exist in the person of one of its suitable members. These precise facts fit in with the more general context written by Abdessadeq El Glaoui (2004, p. 96) that his father, Thami Glaoui was a friend of the “makhzen” in Spanish Morocco. This last crucial meeting was followed by the most challenging political demands that emerged in 1953 with the deposition of the sultan in French Morocco (for failure to concur with the French government’s will to extend the occupation beyond the implicitly understood period of forty years starting with 1912 as well as personal problems and ideological differences with the Glaoui); this posed a question of legitimacy towards the position of the caliph. As a further response, Belbachir mandated that the Friday prayer maintain the accompanying “bey’a” (a ceremonial speech, a ratification of a “fait accompli” and an agreement of submission to a man who is the representative of God on Earth) on behalf of the deposed sultan as “Imam” (spiritual leader) of the envisioned Morocco in its entirety. Such a delicate statement was personally and publicly declared at the grand mosque in Tetuan in August 1953. In January 1954, the Swiss newspaper, La Tribune De Geneve, supported the fact that the prayers in Spanish Morocco were performed on behalf of Mohammed V, but it did not stipulate that Belbachir was the author (“La Tribune De Geneve”, 1954) Belbachir’s clearly precise oral mandate subsequently expressed uniformly in Spanish Morocco contrasted very sharply with the concurrent situation in French Morocco where “the mosques were not clearly declaring support in unison for the deposed sultan” (Bencheikh, 2008, p 48). It follows logically that many mosques in French Morocco were doing the “bey’a” on behalf of the new regent, Sultan Mohammed Ben Arafa Alaoui, a distant cousin of both Mohammed the Fifth and the caliph. Furthermore, he was related by marital alliance to the caliph. By positioning himself in such a manner, Belbachir progressively gained popularity, acclaim and trust amongst both the political parties as well as the army of resistance. By 1955, Ben Arafa was pressured to abdicate as the perception of Mohammed the Fifth’s return was becoming more apparent as the military resistance was successfully moving forward; therefore, a political vacuum emerged. Both Wolf (1994) and Benjelloun (1994) stated that the French government and the Glaoui requested that the caliph be acting king of Morocco in its entirety. They also stipulated that General Valino reacted by willing to accompany the caliph to French Morocco. However, the missing piece is that Belbachir did not allow the caliph to temporarily seize the throne of Morocco in its entirety; he felt that it was politically incorrect. At the time, Belbachir equally used his personal and political energies by financially and morally supporting the army of liberation and extending his humanitarian aid to the victimized families in Tangier and in the Spanish zone (Benjelloun, 1988). He also facilitated the clandestine transfer of armaments to the leaders of the liberation army and negotiated with the Spanish authorities for the wounded freedom fighters to be given Spanish traveling documents and to be sent for urgent medical attention to Spain. In the same manner that Belbachir helped the resistance, he was equally helping the nationalists (Benjelloun, 1988). Belbachir had to pay a bail bond to release the arrested freedom fighters in the Spanish zone. In other less severe cases, he provided them with “makhzen” protection if they were running away from the French zone. For example, Abdellah Guennoun, a member of the independence party, declared himself an enemy of Ben Arafa and ran off to Tetuan where Belbachir protected him for a length of time. During those bloody years Belbachir was in direct personal contact with all the party leaders of the Moroccan political spectrum including the independence party. Allal Fassi, leader of the independence party, urged Belbachir to help prevent Morocco from being divided into two independent countries after independence is declared. On the other hand, upon gathering data, via a sophisticated network of spies spread out throughout the country, about the Reformist party’s attempt to liase with Stalin’s communist party in the early 1950’s in Tangier, Belbachir warned the party to refrain from doing so on the basis that it would weaken his dialogue with the Spaniards as well as the western powers. Given that Belbachir financially supported this party via his own personal and governmental funds (as per Omar Benouna, one of the current survivors of this party), the reformists had no option other than to comply accordingly. Such a strategic move helped keep the communists at bay. As Belbachir funded the reformist party, the reformists continued operating within the parameters set by Belbachir as they established a Moroccan propaganda office in New York to hopefully bring the Moroccan question into the crisscross of world politics. This office was obliged to report to Belbachir as it made progress. One of greatest risks that Belbachir took at the time was when he drove back and forth the disguised political nationalists from Tangier to Tetuan in March 1950 to see crown prince Hassan, future King Hassan the Second. The nationalists met the prince in the palace at Tetuan to make crucial preparations for independence. The Spaniards were only aware of this incident via a system of spies after the fact when the dissidents were driven back to Tangier the next day. One of the most challenging political situations for the political parties who were constitutional monarchists, the army of resistance that started drifting away from republican views, but was at loggerheads with the political parties, was Abdelkrim’s positionality from a distant country like Egypt. Furthermore, the French and Spanish governments as well as Mohammed the Fifth were also concerned about Abdelkrim’s positionality. The nationalists in Port Said telegraphically alerted Belbachir that Abdelkrim was convinced to accept political asylum in Egypt and to contribute to the freedom of the Maghreb from yonder. It was incumbent upon Belbachir to finalize the exile by designing a final plan to the satisfaction of the French, Spaniards, Mohammed the Fifth, political parties and the army of resistance. King Farouk gave Belbachir the green light to send funds for Abdelkrim’s medical care as well as for his material welfare. Belbachir equally negotiated with the Arab League for a monthly stipend to be given to Abdelkrim in order for him to continue struggling for the freedom of North Africa. It stands to reason that Belbachir facilitated these parties’ political accommodation in the long run by reconciling them with the different forces at work. By 1951 the political parties felt at home in the Spanish zone. Such an accommodation crystallized the developing ties with these parties. Such crystallization created no room for main secrets between Belbachir and the resistance. Subsequently, one of the greatest final secret surprises for the army of resistance and the political parties was shortly before independence when Franco offered the caliph the option of seceding from French Morocco by accepting a delayed independence. Franco literally offered the caliph the whole Spanish army as a driving force should he decide to reticently comply accordingly. At that time, Franco had sent a specially sealed letter, containing the mentioned information. Due to the type of seal, the caliph was the only one entitled to open the letter. When Belbachir received the letter, he handed it, in its original state, over to the caliph only for the latter to hand it back to the former for a decision. As a nationalist, Belbachir showed it to the resistance and mentioned it to the political parties. By 1955, Belbachir played one of his last international cards with the political parties, by funding the trip to Bandung, Indonesia for the president of the council party. Bel Hassan Ouazzani (Wazani), president of this party, brought the Moroccan question into the crisscross of Third World politics. Therefore, Belbachir was a financial benefactor and, consequently, a facilitator in this historical and worldwide event. All-in-All, despite Belbachir’s affiliation with the political parties and the military resistance, he had to operate in a singular manner due to the fact that he had an official position alongside the Spaniards. As a top government official contributing to and facilitating the forces of nationalism at work by all means necessary, Belbachir was gender and race/national origin blind. Gaston Perez, a French Jew and Belbachir’s political collaborator, was constantly informing Belbachir if the latter was being encroached upon in the effort to liberate the nation using his own style. Batoul Sbihi, a military nationalist, who was phased out of Moroccan history, for unknown reasons, was brought under Belbachir’s protection in 1954. She was bringing arms for the resistance, under the supervision of Doctor Abdelkrim Khatib, the arms coordinator for the North, together with Ibrahim Niyal, a Sudanese national, from Nador in Spanish Morocco to French Morocco. This motley crew and network, where some of the members did not necessarily know each other is one of the samples of a highly compartmentalized, covert and colorful nature of a long-standing operation whose leading figure was Belbachir. Belbachir’s positionality during the Spanish Civil war: As Belbachir played his semi-silent role in the Spanish Civil war, a war that contributed to Moroccan independence, he was also rising to power. He maintained a balance between the Spaniards and the caliph who was in a sensitive position. This was so because Belbachir did not want to see Moroccan blood shed in Spain. He equally maintained a balance between the nationalists and the caliph, despite the fact that a few prominent Moroccan high ranking officials under the caliph, acting on their initiative and prompted by the Francoist Spaniards, were encouraging Moroccan troops to fight for Franco in a very crucial civil war at a time where Nazis/Fascists, Communists and the democratic world were vying for supremacy. Cushion (2009, p1) states that the possession of Morocco as a base of operations was crucial to Franco during the Spanish Civil War and many of his best troops were Moroccans. Spain, under Franco made many amenities during and after the civil war such as allowing the circulation of nationalist papers from French Morocco in Spanish Morocco due to the Moroccan participation in the war and to ensure that Spain is not caught between two fires (Cushion, 2009, p. 2). Marin (1973, p.22-24) further supports Cushion by stating that liberal policies started to take place in Spanish Morocco due to the Moroccan contribution in the Civil War. Notwithstanding, Belbachir was against the idea of Morocco fighting for or funding Franco, even though he wanted to see the defeat of the communists in Spain. This seeming position of neutrality was consistent with nationalistic parties’ positionality. For example, Marin (1973, p. 24) implicitly indicates that, by July 19, Belbachir, who had first-hand knowledge of business transactions at the state level; and subsequently, the nationalists protested about the telegram going from Peyrouton, the Resident General of the French Popular Front, to the Director of the State Bank in Tetuan requesting 500, 000 Francs to help the Spanish “Fanlange”. Hilary Raguer (2006) sums up to the best of her knowledge the caliph’s positionality during the civil war. Hillary states that, once one leaves the volunteers from Navarra, the first rebel on record as having publicly declared a religious motivation was not one of the fascist generals, but His Imperial Highness, the Jalifa of the Spanish zone of the Moroccan protectorate (p. 48). A refinement of this statement would be that Belbachir was the first political dissident to declare a religious motivation in both Spain and Morocco in the name of the khalifa; for he wanted the ultimate triumph of the church over the communists. Notwithstanding, Belbachir did not want this to be achieved at the expense of Moroccan blood and funds for the sake of General Franco. Social contributions in Morocco: Although Belbachir lead a very comfortable life due to multiple salaries, coming from simultaneously multiple jobs and successful personal businesses, the amount of financial contributions to share with friends and relatives, to diminish poverty, to maintain the Alouite dynasty and to liberate Morocco could be measurable by the fact that, after his death, the immediate family only had enough money to eat and buy clothes. Furthermore, this could show that there was no embezzlement on his part, despite the millions of dollars that were entrusted to him, especially in a time and place where there was no financial accountability for top government officials. Additionally, he could have easily asked for millions of dollars in exchange for monumental favors; this included but was not limited to the Moroccan population (both Jews and Muslims). In 1973, Bachir met Marshall Ameziane, the Spanish-born Moroccan general who was formerly stationed in the Canary Islands by the Spaniards and who later became the only Marshall in independent Morocco. The latter testified that he had never seen someone more socialist than Belbachir. A decade later Bachir met Gaston Perez, one of the prominent leaders of the Jewish community in Europe who made a similar observation. Gaston had advised Belbachir to considerably reduce the number of guests in the house and to give him the money to buy him real estate property. Belbachir could not bring himself to operate along these lines. To shed some more light and to elaborate the above theme, one needs to come up with a more revealing situation. There was a time when Thami Glaoui gave Belbachir a Rolls Royce for his wedding. Belbachir turned around and sold it to further support his practices. As soon as Glaoui found out about the transaction, he coerced the buyer to sell him the car on the grounds that Belbachir and Glaoui were the only ones entitled to drive such a car in Spanish and French Morocco respectively. Glaoui, in turn, gave the car back to Belbachir. Belbachir’s political and social involvement constituted two sides of the same coin. He was concurrently involved in social welfare by sharing his personal wealth, in a great scale, with the needy institutions or groups like hospitals, orphanages, schools and particularly young Moroccans who were eager to get a higher education. In this last case, he used government as well as personal funds to provide students with sufficient financial aid to allow them to pursue their education mainly in Syria, Morocco or Egypt. Other students ended up in countries such as Spain, Germany and the United States. In his recent biography, Mohammed Sabbagh, a prominent writer and retired public servant, recently decorated in front of the television cameras by King Mohammed the Sixth, positioned himself along these lines by stating that Belbachir funded his first publication in 1953. All this boiled down to the notion that Belbachir wanted well-educated Moroccans running post-independent Morocco. During post independence times, Sabbagh motivated an illiterate twenty-one year old and very poor Moroccan called Mohammed Shoukri who later on became the Jean Genet of modern Arabic literature and one of its most colorful and outspoken voices in the last fifty years” (Hafez, 2003, p. 1). Later in life, Choukri became part of a discourse where Tennessee Williams was writing down his literary work via Paul Bowles who was translating it from Arabic into English (Hafez, 2003, p 2) This chain reaction (where A financially empowers B and B intellectually empowers C), initiated by Belbachir, is one of the many prolific stories where people coming from abject poverty hit the top in their careers. A group of ministers in post-independent Morocco openly spoke about how Belbachir directly inspired them to pursue their education in different countries during the protectorate. Belbachir saw to it that scholarships were drawn from the palace fund to actualize this goal. Additionally, in certain cases, Belbachir contributed from his own pocket to reinforce the palace contribution. Another story was when Belbachir helped an ambitious young singer and musician by the name of Abdessadeq Cheqara. In 1940, along with other artists, the latter petitioned the former in the name of the caliph for a conservatorium for Morocco’s Andalusian musical heritage. The conservatorium was founded as the Hasani Conservatory of the Moroccan Music (“Abdessadeq Sheqara”, 2009). This contribution opened the doors for other conservatoria in post-independent Morocco that eventually helped preserve Andalusian music in Morocco. In sum, Belbachir protected the civil rights of Moroccans; this mostly included education. His goal was to make sure that Spain was there to advance rather than to subordinate and to retrogress Morocco during the previously understood period of forty years. And, he was the only politician from Spanish Morocco who had the authority to operate within that framework. To shed more light on Belbachir’s social contributions in Morocco, one needs to mention the fact that such contributions were not confined to those who shared his political ideologies or to Moroccan nationals. For example, when Boumedienne and Boudiaf who were Algerian socialist-republicans and who were future presidents of Algeria entered Spanish Morocco via Nador, the local authorities from yonder alerted Belbachir about their presence. As soon as Belbachir learned that Boumedienne had come in to treat his tuberculosis, the former immediately provided the latter with “makhzen” protection until he was fully recovered. Social contributions in Palestine: The Lebanese historian, writer and poet “Prince” Shakib Arslan, paid a visit to Tetuan during the occupation to familiarize Belbachir with the Palestinian question. Shakib put Belbachir in contact with Mufti Amin Al-Husseini (“Shakib Arslan”, 2009) who subsequently entrusted Belbachir with the collection of funds for the Palestinian welfare as well as with the safe transfer of funds to Palestine (“Mohammad Amin, Husayni”, 2009). Therefore, Belbachir’s humanitarian concerns were extended to the other corner of the Arab world by becoming the head custodian of the Palestinian funds in Morocco. He was equally one of the earliest financial supporters of an impoverished Palestinian state prior to 1948. The financial aid was channeled through both Spanish Morocco and Spain. These funds were officially used to enhance the lives of the indigent. Such incipient, humanitarian and cordial relations could have only helped kindle the torch of future rapprochement in the decades that were to follow between Palestine and the emergent and independent Morocco. Nationalist movement from Egypt: After the Second World War, Spain was isolated from the rest of Europe due to its neutrality during the war. As a consequence, Spain was seeking stronger ties with the neighboring Arab world. Precisely, Spain wanted to strengthen social, political and economic ties with this region. In light of this, Belbachir saw a golden opportunity for Morocco to get culturally closer to the Near East and to create a platform that could give birth to Moroccan nationalism from that part of the world. This was clearly indicated in the Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram (“Min Khalifa Malik Marrakesh Ila Mu’tamar Maghrib al Arabi”, 1947). Although this newspaper highlighted Belbachir’s nationalistic contributions in the meeting strictly between the Northwestern African nations in Egypt, it later also became a concern in the Arab League of Nations. In retrospect, Belbachir legally planted one of the seeds that later caused the Moroccan question to be brought into the crisscross of Arab politics in the Arab League of Nations as well as in king Farouk’s court. In 1949, King Abdullah of Jordan (great grand-father of the current king) was due to visit Franco. After Franco had met this first Near-Eastern head of state to visit Spain in a period of ten years, Belbachir was scheduled to complement Franco’s meeting by providing the monarch with entertainment and protocol before he left Spain. Belbachir took Moorish musicians and singers from Spanish Morocco to Cordova, Sevilla and Granada to provide the king with the ceremony before his departure. Such a visit further showed the combined solidarity of Spain and Spanish Morocco, especially after WW2, with the rest of the Arab World whose center was Egypt. As those trying times were making inroads in the Arab World and Franco was, at the same time, trying to get closer to this world, Belbachir’s voice carried weight among the national leaders. Belbachir facilitated the nationalists’ ties to the caliph, and the hour came when the Arab League, with which it was Spanish policy to collaborate cordial relations, he was able to send a Moroccan delegation to the session of the Cultural Committee in Cairo, Egypt in March 1946 (Marin, 1973, p 31). The Concise Encyclopedia of Arabic Civilization further extends and supports Marin’s explanation along these lines by unknowingly (due to the information provided by this political party at the time) alluding to Belbachir’s effort in this matter as preparatory work upon which the reformist party exercised decisive influence (Ronart, 1966, p. 305). The above goal gave way to the much political activity thereafter through “Beit Al Maghreb”, the media representative office of North Africa. This office, the first of its kind in North Africa, was located in Cairo. Ferro(1947) states that the caliph’s “name” established and officially managed this office. However, Ferro’s report misses the fact that Belbachir caused such a matter to happen in the name of the khalifa by extensively negotiating with the Spaniards and choosing, upon the recommendation of the political parties, to open the office with the caliphal seal. After the green light was granted, Belbachir approved or appointed individuals (party and non-party) who locally managed such an office with palace funds and with certain autonomy and who intermittently reported their activities to him. To fully complement Ferro’s (1947) report, one needs to understand that Mekki Naciri, leader of the Unity party and future local manager of “Beit El Magrhib”, played a major role in the recommendation to establish such an office. Given that Belbachir completely held the reigns (politically and economically) of this political party, he was the negotiator between the Spanish High Commissioner, General Begbeider and Naciri, especially in establishing “Beit el Maghrib”. Much to the dismay of the Spaniards who were trying to create a rapprochement with the Arab world, this office became a springboard for nationalistic activities. In 1948, Belbachir revealed from “Beit el Magrib” the Spanish top- secret plan to establish civilian settlements en mass in Northern Morocco with the intent to convert a protectorate into a colony in the long run. This family revealed fact is consistent with Elhabti (2007, p. 5)’s statement that Belbachir exposed in “Beit el Maghrib” the different dimensions of Spanish politics in Northern Africa. Consequently, Belbachir partly spearheaded and galvanized from therein the nationalistic movement in the Arab World, primarily in French Morocco (Elhabti, 2007, p.5). In 1955, Belbachir was on the verge of becoming a totally detached dissident such as Abdelkrim Alkhatabi, the leader of the military resistance and Allal Fassi, the leader of the independence party. Both of these leaders were forcefully exiled in other foreign lands. In contrast, Belbachir was planning on exiling himself in Egypt in 1955 until independence is declared. However, due to the assumed belief that one leads a wretched life in exile, the caliph was unwilling to make the move along with Belbachir. Consequently, Belbachir decided not to take that route lest the resistance totally rejects the caliph for staying behind. Involvement with the Western Sahara: Belbachir’s influence had already moved further south by cultivating and maintaining socio-political relationships with the notables and elite families (such as Maa Al Ainain family) of the Western Spanish Sahara. This was due to the fact that Spanish Morocco managed this region after 1939 as opposed to the previous period where Spain took it upon itself to manage it single-handedly. Belbachir’s ongoing correspondence reset the wheels of motion that ensured the Western Sahara’s ties to Moroccan sovereignty during the latter part of the occupation. These ties of kinship often culminated with an allegiance that found expression in the Western Sahara’s subordination to Spanish Morocco to a greater or lesser degree. For example, at the annual feasts such as Eid al Mouloud (celebration of the prophet’s birth) celebrated by Spanish Morocco, it was customary for the caliph’s local subjects in the Western Sahara to renew their vows of loyalty to him by physically appearing in his court. Furthermore, the local governors in the Western Sahara were appointed by caliphal decree. The Saharan lords who were already in place recommended new governors. Belbachir and the Spanish High Commissioner chose from the list of recommendations (Western Sahara, 2009). Said relations sewed some of the seeds of the calculations that were taking place in the mid 1970’s as Morocco prepared for the Green March in 1975, (an attempted Moroccan civilian occupation of the Western Sahara). The unexpected and posthumous results of Belbachir’s previous socio-political efforts to that effect culminated with the ex-caliph’s presence on T.V. with King Hassan the Second in order to highlight the Western Sahara’s historical ties with Spanish Morocco. Participation in the Second World War: Seidel (1995) states that Spain and its Moroccan protectorate were of great importance to Germany during the war. He further argues that Spanish territory kept an eye on the western Mediterranean at the same time that Spain provided important resources such as wolfram and iron ore. Therefore, Germany was zeroing on a large German presence in Spain, Spanish Morocco and Tangier in a time where geopolitics was of paramount importance. Seidel (1995) states that, at the end of 1941, there were 7,500 Germans in Spanish territory, and by 1945 there were around 12,000, many of whom were engaged in espionage for the German government. Furthermore, Germany had already developed an interest in Gibraltar by 1940. After reviewing Seidel (1995)’s work, Goda (1996) concludes that the use of the Spanish military records and those of the High Commissariat in Spanish Morocco would have been of great help for Seidel’s study, but these matters remain difficult to access under current Spanish laws, despite the death of Franco. As a response, one could say that Belbachir’s role during this period of time fits in some of these missing pages. At the same time that the North African and Middle Eastern internal events were happening, Belbachir was also looking at the political situation in Europe to help empower the allied forces by all possible means necessary. As the war progressed, Belbachir kept close and discreet contact with the allied forces in French Morocco and closely collaborated with the French forces through Josephine Baker who was placed under his protection (Emmanuel Bonini, 2000, p. 130). He further reinforced the allied position in North Africa by issuing visas and passports to those who were escaping from Hitler and Mussolini’s persecution (Baker, 1993, p. 243). Belbachir obtained these documents through the Spanish High Commissioner under the pretext that such individuals were originally Moroccans (Baker, 1993, p. 243). Finally, such amenities were filtered through Josephine (Baker, 1993, p. 243). Moreover, operating under the International Statute of Tangier (1924) that gives Spain the right to take over Tangier should the European powers be at war with each other, Spain felt that the time was ripe to annex Tangier in the person of the caliph in 1940. This was manifested by means of the caliph’s visibility on his galloping horse in Tangier accompanied by the necessary pomp and ceremony due to a head of state. Such an actualized show of force portrayed Spanish Morocco as an indispensable chess piece for the European balance of power. Belbachir was a major organizational component in this historical event (Benumaya, 1940). Belbachir’s contributions in the above mentioned event included, but were not limited to the caliph’s protocol such as organizing the caliph’s private household and the accompanying palace/government staff. Eli Cohen, one of the prominent Jewish leaders in Morocco led the Sephardic, Semitic and Berber Jews, some of whom were very rich refugees such as the Rothchilds (Baker, p.243), from different parts of Nazi Europe, in Tangier to Belbachir to seek refuge from the new system that was setting in, especially when Franco’s neutrality was leaning towards the seemingly victorious Nazis by 1940. Enthused by the Jewish concern, Belbachir, then, serving as Secretary General of the “makhzen” in Spanish Morocco that included Tangier at that point, took this community under his wing. This event internationally popularized Belbachir’s reputation as protector of the Jews. Belbachir’s posionality vis a vis the Jews is consistent with Robert Satloff (2006)’s theme- some Arabs were protecting Jews during WW2. Of particular interest is Satloff (2006, p. 26)’s statement that the Spaniards permitted the rise of even more virulent and anti-Jewish and pro-Nazi sentiment in the area of Northern Morocco under their control. It follows logically that Belbachir was going against the power above him. Later, as Belbachir played the Spanish card within acceptable norms, he continued trying to strengthen the allied position in Northern Africa. First, he tried to convince Franco to let the Americans (with whom he was communicating through Josephine) use the Western Sahara as a military base to defeat the Nazis (Baker, 1993, p. 239). Second, he alerted Franco in 1942 not to take over Gibraltar, lest the Americans take over Spanish Morocco; this information, originating from U.S. Intelligence, had also reached Belbachir by osmosis. In fact, the American troops were stationed in Fez and ready to take over Spanish Morocco had Franco made such a move. On the other hand, Rosalinda Powell Fox, a British agent, kept Belbachir posted about the intentions of the British forces in Morocco. There were two theories that caused this to happen. One theory stated that the Germans wanted both Gibraltar to control the entrance to the Mediterranean and an island in the Canary Islands to move into North Africa from the West, given that the war at the end depended very heavily on who wins North Africa. The Spaniards partly wanted Gibraltar due to territorial integrity. They also wanted it to facilitate matters for the Germans during a time where Spain moved from neutrality to non-belligerance. As a response, the British forces were becoming more visible to keep the Spaniards and the Germans in check. Belbachir was increasingly receptive to the British position. Medals and Recognition during the protectorate: In sum, the fruits of his achievements during “colonial” times became visible by virtue of a number of obtained medals and recommendations. Some medals were given due to his services to the nation. Albeit he was a nationalist, some foreign medals, titles or recognitions were given due to his incessant political dialogue that carried on despite very difficult times with the foreign/occupying powers. The domestic medals were the following: 1) Mohammed the Fifth gave him the Youssoufia in 1947 in Azilah. 2) The caliph gave him two Mehdaouias after the caliphal wedding in 1949. 3) The caliph also gave him a medal of the vice-regal palace. There were only four people in the protectorate that obtained it.    The foreign medals were the following: 1) In 1934, The Spanish government under the republic gave him La Gran Cruz Isabella La Catolica, the most outstanding medal given to an outsider, especially to someone at the age of 26. The title of “comendador” (knight/gentleman) was also attained in 1934. 2) Franco’s government gave him La Gran Cruz Merito Civil in 1940. 3) Franco’s government again gave him Merito de Africa for twenty consecutive years of dialogue in 1951. In conversation with Belbachir’s son, Bachir, in early 1979, in Tangier, Gaston Perez stated that the Jewish community in Europe had recommended Belbachir for the Legion of Honor for his cooperation with the allied forces. However, Belbachir declined such an honor on the grounds that he was not the caliph. Involvement in Post-independent Morocco: In the immediate aftermath of the declaration of independence, the resistance army, coming from the Rif area, occupied Tetuan and stopped at the doorsteps of the royal palace as Mohammed the Fifth was getting ready to land in Tetuan. At that point, the Spanish army was reduced to a mere spectator while the caliphal army/guards took orders from Belbachir only. The army of resistance was holding the public hostage until they were given the highest priority to greet the sultan. Their claim was based on the fact that the liberation army brought the sultan back rather than the political parties who were insisting that the sultan bring an acceptable constitution in his hands before he is allowed to enter Morocco. As the crisis intensified, the public and the caliphal soldiers insisted that Belbachir was the only one who could resolve the complaint. When Belbachir appeared in the scene, he politically resolved the complaint in favor of the resistance army, given that it brought the sultan back by sheer force of weapons. Consequently, the army of resistance, accompanied and headed by Belbachir, entered the airport along with the latter’s selected delegation to greet His Majesty. Later on, Mohammed the Fifth was due to visit the Rif area and Belbachir was the most qualified politician to pave the way for the sultan. The resistance army drove Belbachir from Tetuan to Nador in the Rif area while the roads were completely controlled by the resistance army. As Belbachir accompanied by his wife, entered the Rif, demonstrations started to welcome his triumphant visit. The resistance presented him with a petition to be presented to the sultan. Such a petition contained a list of demands such as fixing the roads and other expected amenities that could come from the sultan’s end. Belbachir was receptive to the demands, even though the matter was left to the sultan for final consideration. During the latter part of 1956-57, a consequent period to the occupation, Morocco was undergoing a transitional phase inasmuch as an administrative union that included the palaces between the two previously separated zones was a territorial imperative. Such a territorial imperative called Belbachir into the administrative arena and made him play his last card before leaving the new nation to engage in a parallel nationalistic movement in the Arab World. In the wake of independence, Belbachir was popularly known to have been the only long-term politician from the government of Spanish Morocco who was able to administratively help link the two zones (“ Mohammed V of Morocco”, 2009). The fact that the national radio at the time announced Belbachir’s name without his prior approval as the first governor of the province of Tetuan reflected a nation’s over-reliance on a man for a transition within an administrative framework. The aftermath of such collective efforts, where Abderahim Bouabid was one of the major players in French Morocco, was attained at the time that Morocco emerged with a uniform administration, an administration that included but was not limited to a single educational system in the public sector. Foresight, diplomatic achievements and end of political life in Great Britain: A year following Morocco’s independence, Belbachir was Acting Ambassador to Great Britain. Unlike other diplomats yonder, he was on a special mission with an official passport and a salary coming from the royal cabinet rather than the ministry of the interior. Morumbi, the future vice-president of Kenya, was Belbachir’s embassy translator at that time. In 1960, the Tatler Magazine & Bystander highlighted Belbachir’s presence in Great Britain (“Ambassadors’ Night”, 1960, p 515). In 1959, Fidel Castro, with the help of Che Guevarra, took over the Cuban government. Consequently, the dismissal of all the earlier Cuban ambassadors, under Batista, was under consideration. Fearing for his job, the Cuban ambassador in Great Britain panicked and asked Belbachir for advice. The latter assured him that nothing would happen to him because he had already become Dean of ambassadors in Great Britain and that he would continue making Cuba, as a nation, look good. Belbachir also informed him that the Cuban ambassador in the Vatican would not be removed to maintain continuity and solidarity with the church. Subsequently, Fidel Castro dismissed all the ambassadors except those in the Vatican and Great Britain. Similarly, during those times, Moroccan students, studying in Great Britain, had no scholarships from the Moroccan government. They often came to the embassy and requested financial assistance. Believing that the future of Morocco depended very heavily on an educated populace, Belbachir bent the rules by coercing the treasurer to donate sufficient funds to the students. Later on, these students occupied key positions in the Moroccan government and in the business world. Some of them ultimately became a successful self-employed people in metropolitan cities. One person in that group ended up in the United Nations. During that time frame, Belbachir met with Winston Churchill to highlight a shared history in Marrakesh (where the latter used to spend his summers with El Glaoui) and a shared one struggling against the Nazis. At that time, he was also the major advisor of an ad hoc committee headed by Sultan Abdelaziz’s daughter, a princess who was previously under Belbachir’s care from 1943 to 1949, immediately after the death of her father, sultan Abdulaziz. This committee successfully urged Churchill to appeal to the world on the radio to help Morocco get back on its feet after a devastating earthquake in Agadir on February 29, 1960, an earthquake that claimed the lives of one third of the city’s inhabitants, the most destructive “moderate” earthquake in the 20th Century. Receptive to the appeal, the world engaged in almsgiving Moreover, he was responsible for the management of the relations of the Algerian FLN (Front de Liberation National). He was equally responsible for the movement of their armaments in Europe. These armaments were shipped through a complex road map. These arms had exactly two different major routes. One route started in Great Britain and went to Madrid, Spain. Then, it went to the Canary Islands and eventually to the Western Algerian border via Morocco. The other route started in Great Britain and went to Germany. Then, it went to Tunis where it eventually reached the Eastern Algerian border. Belbachir designated Hajj Mohammed Shergui to be responsible for this route. The Algerian General, Bou Hafid Bousouf, known as “Mabrouk”, used to frequently visit Belbachir in London about the matter. Si Ahmed Ben Massoud, private secretary of the king of Morocco, was fully aware of this operation. At that time, Khaidar, an Algerian revolutionary, under Farhat Abbas, the Algerian president in exile, was the treasurer of the FLN. At one point, Belbachir’s life was on the line for the Algerian independence whenever a specified airplane with the boxed weapons was stranded due to inclement weather in France, a country where he had no diplomatic immunity. The heavy storm gradually subsided and the plane was ordered to continue to its final destination in London without forcing the cargo to be exited and opened. Such armaments were continuously transferred to a nascent and struggling Algeria. His political career came to an end when he died in office in London in 1962 in Saint George Hospital. Such an incident was not unforeseen; for Doctor Castillo, Belbachir’s Maltese personal doctor, had already informed him years before that his weary brain had worked an equivalent of one hundred years during the protectorate. (Forty plus years later, Ben Mansour, the Moroccan state historian, without knowing Castillo’s previously stated theory, further supported the idea of one hundred years of dedicated work to consolidate the monarchy and to contribute to the public by personally informing Bachir). Ambassadors from all over the world attended the funeral and the London Newspaper announced the death. King Hassan the Second of Morocco sent two top government officials, one of whom was Muley Hafid Alaoui, Belbachir’s counterpart in palace affairs, to attend the official funeral. Belbachir’s twenty-seven year old widow, called Zoubeida and five children-three boys (Bachir, Said and Saleh) and two girls (Amina and Sakina who passed away in France in 1979) survived him. Their ages ranged from four to ten. His remains were officially flown back to the city of Tetuan, Morocco. After Belbachir’s burial, one of the prominent Spanish civilians who interacted with the caliph’s household, informed General Rafael Garcia Valino, who was “retired” in Spain as director of a military camp, about the death. Valino stated that the caliph died and that Belbachir was still alive. By stating that the caliph passed away, one can easily interpret that Belbachir was the decision-maker for the caliph. By stating that Belbachir was still alive, one has yet to interpret that. Such a comment/perception, made by Valino, was not unprecedented. In 1949, Habib Bourgiba, the future and first president of Tunisia, then a leading nationalist for his country, did not go through a slip of the pen when he addressed Belbachir as “His Highness” in a telegraph. Bourgiba could have thought that Belbachir was the caliph’s equal in Spanish Morocco. Conclusion of the review of the literature of the political biography: To conclude the review of the literature, that includes the immediate family’s positionality as authority in the subject of this brief political biography, one would have to search for the salient characteristics in Belbachir’s political life. Such characteristics are the following: 1) Loyalty to the Alaouite dynasty in Morocco (Benjelloun, 1988). 2) Loyalty to the nationalistic / patriotic movements in the Arab World (El Habti, 2007). 3) Loyalty to the allied forces during World War II (Bonini, Emmanuel, 2000). Whether one or all of these contributions served a worthwhile cause is a matter for posterity to determine. Additionally, this topic could call for analytical research if open-ended questions or issues presented themselves to the researchers by dint of the presented text. References: Abdessadeq Cheqara (2009, July 3). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved July 3, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdessadeq_cheqara#Life Abramovici Rene (1949, June 23). Pendant Trois Semaines Tetouan a Vecu Les Mille Et Une Nuits. L’Illustre. “Afrah Tetuan Fi Bayt Rais Diwan El Amer” (Celebration in Tetuan in the House of the Chief of Cabinet) (May 1948) Rif p.1-2 “Amama Qasr Khalifi El Amer” (In Front of the Caliphal Palace) (May 1950) Al Anis p. 22 Baker, J. C. & Chase, C. (1993). Josephine: The Hungry Heart. New York: Random House Benaboud Mohammed (1987, March) “Min wathiqa Maktab Al Magrib Al Arabi fi Qahira.” (From the documentation of the Maghrebi Office in Cairo). Mawqif Majalat Thaqafia. p. 133 Benaboud Mohammed (1950). “Risalat ductur Ahmed Benaboud min Qahira ila Faqih Mohammed Afailal” ( A Message from Doctor Ahmed Benaboud from Cairo to the Faki Mohammed Afailal in Tetuan). Tetuan, Morocco: Manshuwat Jumiat Tetuan Asmir Bencheikh, S. (2008, August). Bey’ a Enquette sur un archaisme, Telquel, 334, 38-48 Benjelloun, Abdelmajid (1988). Approches du colonialism espagnol et du movement nationaliste marocain dans l’ex-Maroc Khalifien. Rabat, Morocco: OKAD Publishing Company Benjelloun, Abdelmajid (1994, November 16). La verite sur le Protectorat franco-espanol. Al Bayane, p 3 Ben Brahim, Mohammed (1949). “Ilayka Ya Ni Ma Sadiq”(To you my dear friend). Tetuan, Morocco: Hassania Publishing Company Benumaya, Gil (1940). El Jalifa en Tanger. Madrid: Instituto Jalifiano de Tetuan Bonini, Emmanuel (2000). La veritable Josephine Baker. Paris: Pigmalean Gerard Watelet Bowles, Paul (1952). Let it Come Down. (1st edition). London: John Lehman Cushion, Steve (2009). The Question of Moroccan independence and its effect on the Spanish Civil War. Retrieved July 14, 2009 from http://www.city.londonmet.ac.uk/langstud/med/med/morocco.htm Delero, M., Hakim, M. 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Mohammed V of Morocco (2009, September 15). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved September 15, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_V_of_Morocco

Proxima Boda del Jefe de la Casa Civil de S.A.I. el Jalifa (1950, May 19). Espana, p. 2 Raguer Hillary (2006). The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War Volume 2. London: Routledge “Rais Diwan Madani Khalifi Amama Microfone Bi Munasabat Id Zafaf Khalifi” (The Chief of the caliphal Cabinet on the microphone for the celebration of the caliphal wedding) (1949, June). Al Marifa. P. 7-8 Ronart S. & Ronart, N. (1966). Concise Encyclopedia of Arabic Civilization. ( Rev. ed. ) New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Satloff, Robert (2006). Among the Righteous Lost Stories from the Holocaust’s Long Reach into Arab Lands. New York: Public Affairs, member of Perseus Books Group. Seidel, Carlos Collado (1995). Zufluchtsstatte fur Nationalsozialisten? Spanien, die Alliierten und die Behandlung deutscher Agenten 1944-1947, Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschic

Shakib Arslan (2009, September 15). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved September 15, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shakib_Arslan

Western Sahara (2009, September, 15). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved September 15, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Sahara

Wolf, Jean (1994). Les Secrets du Maroc Espagnol: L’epopee D’Abdelkhalaq Torres. Morocco: Balland Publishing Company

Notes / External links: El Habti, Hassan (2007). La Trayectoria Blog de Los Hispanistas de Tanger, Retrieved July 31, 2007 from http://hassan-elhabti.blogspot.com/2007/07/la independencia-de-marruecos.html.

1.	Picture of General Franco’s hunting group in Andujar, Spain. From left to right are the following: the caliph’s chamberlain, wearing a white hat, the caliph’s brother wearing black glasses, Belbachir wearing a red rounded hat, the caliph, El Duke De Huetor y Santillan, Franco’s Head of the Palace wearing a black hat, General Franco and Franco’s wife. http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See Picture 01jpg

2.	Letter from Allal Fassi, the leader of all the independence parties, to     Belbachir requesting continued urgent political and financial support from Spanish Morocco http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See GGG004

3.	Letter of correspondence between the Palestinean spiritual leader, Husseini, and Belbachir. The former is grateful for the latter’s monetary contributions. http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See GGG003 4.	 Two letters of correspondence between the prominent sheikh Maa El Ainain from the Western Sahara and Belbachir during this period of time. The former acknowledges the caliph as the head of state for the Sahara. http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See GGG001 and GGG002 5.	Letter of correspondence between Josephine Baker and Belbachir where the latter requests that the former extend her visa in Morocco http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Homen See Picture 02.jpg 6.	The Spaniards conferred the title of “Gentleman” on Belbachir in 1934. The file is named DAHIR.jpg in http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home 7.	Letter of correspondence between Belbachir and Farhat Abbas, the president of the Algerian government in exile. The latter acknowledges the extraordinary effort put forth by the former to free Algeria. http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See GGG005

8.	Habib Bouguiba responds to Belbachir’s invitation to the caliph’s wedding. Bourguiba apologizes for not being able to attend due to monetary constraints. http://sites.google.com/site/politicalbiographydocuments/Home See Picture.jpg

Editorial (see picture below) 01 Jun 1949 Si Ahmed Bel Bashir;Fatima [RF: Misc.];Hassan B... By: Dmitri Kessel Time & Life Pictures
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Next picture: El Glaoui and Belbachir from left to right during the caliphal wedding, 1949