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Topic: The 1967 Anti-Chinese Riots in Burma 1	Introduction The 1967 anti-Chinese riot (6.26) (Burmese:   ၁၉၆၇တရုတ္ဗမာအေရးအခင္း) was the riot that has taken placed between Chinese and Burmese on 26 June 1967  in Myanmar (or formerly known as “Burma”)’s former capital, Rangoon (former name of Yangon). The riot was caused by the export of China’s Cultural Revolution which was triggered by Chinese students’ defiance of wearing Chairman Mao’s badges in school and this was strictly prohibited by the Burmese government. The riot was last for two days but this has caused a great impact on good and long-standing Sino-Burmese relations or probably known as Pauk Paw(kinsfolk). Subsequently, the diplomatic ties between the two countries has been affected severely as both countries recalled their ambassadors and the normalisation of the bilateral ties was only be resumed in 1970. 2.	Background and context 2.1 Sino-Burmese relations during 1949-1954 In the history of People Republic of China (PRC)’s foreign relations, Burma was the first non-communist country to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) when it was founded in 1949. Also, Burma was the first country to settle the border dispute with China and the first to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression with China. Post-independence Burma has practiced neutralist foreign policy and this was created to prevent or to minimise foreign intervention or interference in the domestic affairs especially its relations with China. And China was not happy with Burma’s neutralist foreign policy initially and it did not believe that the existence of third party called “neutrality” between these two camps which were anti-imperialist democratic and the anti-democratic imperialist. Burma’s premier U Nu has been denounced as neutralist along with India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno in November 1949 by China’s then president Liu Shaoqi in Beijing. Therefore, Burma has started to consider its strategy on how to continue stable and friendly relationship with China without comprising its neutralist foreign policy. And this Sino- Burmese relations was placed one of the key issues for Burmese government as it is concerned that China would interfere in its domestic affairs because of the inequalities in power and geographical proximity of the two countries. Despite the establishment of the diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1949, the China- Burmese relations has not developed and both sides were politically suspicious of each other during the period of 1950 to 1954. At this point of time, China still hold the belief that Burma was a minion of imperialist countries and on the other hand, Burma was constantly worried that China might invade the country and it may threaten to her national security. In view of this, Burma under the leadership of U Nu has proved that Burma was a fully independent state and it was not under the control of capitalist-imperialist camp but this did not convince China. At the same time, Burmese government became aware that China had begun to pursue her foreign policy at three different levels which was state-to-state, people-to-people and state-to-state relations since early 1950s. 2.2 Beginning of Pauk-Paw era (1954-1966) However, both Rangoon and Beijing started to cultivate good bilateral ties since 1954 and this also marked the beginning of the Pauk Paw era until the ties became deteriorated in 1967 due to the riot. The shift in the relations in 1954 was occurred because firstly, Burmese communist rebellion was in decline and in the international context, Burma’s stand on the Korean War may have proven to China that Burma was not an imperialist stooge. Amidst the backdrop of cold war, China has started to change its foreign policy in 1954 as it began to accept the neutrality and it aimed to promote and expand a peaceful area to create a safe buffer zone between China and the west. As a result, China and Burma has agreed to follow the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” during Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s first visit to Burma in 1954 and Burma was the first few countries to adopt this principles with China. After U Nu’s visit to Beijing in November 1954, the trade ties between the two countries has significantly improved  such as China tried to solve the Burma’s rice export problem as this was affected by the Korean war. Previously, Mao Zedong has assured his Burmese counterparts that China would not operate the communist parties in overseas Chinese communities and would not encourage overseas Chinese to undertake the political parties in Burma. And Chinese government has instructed the overseas Chinese that they need to obey the Burmese law and not to involve in Burma’s domestic affairs. This Mao’s promise on overseas Chinese issue was confirmed by the China-Burma communique in December 1954. The similar sentiment was echoed by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai during his state visit to Burma in 1956 where he clearly stated that those Chinese who have obtained Burmese citizenship should not be allowed to join overseas Chinese organisations and those who still hold Chinese nationality were not allowed to participate in Burmese political affairs. Apart from overseas-Chinese issue, the Sino-Burmese relations were also faced by three other major issues which were the Kuomintang (KMT) troops in Burma, Burma-China boundary dispute and Burma Communist party (BCP) issue. 2.2.1 Sino-Burmese relations after General Ne Win’s coup in 1962 The Sino-Burmese relations has not changed even after the military coup took place by then commander-in-chief General Ne Win on 2 March 1962. The revolutionary council led by General Ne Win stated that it would still adopt the “positive neutrality” and non-alignment for its foreign policy. After two months of the coup, the Revolutionary council implemented ‘Burmese way to socialism (BWS)” a socio-economic foundation which most of the revolutionary council build their policies on. Subsequently, the revolutionary council founded ‘Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP)’ on 4th July 1962 and this was emerged as a political organisation to lead the socialist revolution in Burma. General Ne Win’s revolutionary council was acknowledged by Chinese government two days after the coup. In order to implement the Burma way to socialism, General Ne Win’s government started to carry out its economic nationalisation and these include nationalisation of 6,700 Chinese stores, two of Beijing’s banks and all Chinese schools and newspapers between 1964 and 1965. Besides the nationalisation of the schools, the Revolutionary council has also suspended the publication of foreign language newspapers and this had severely effect on Chinese influence in Burma. In spite of these nationalisation, China still gave its support to General Ne Win’s policy even at the expense of its own economic interests in order not to reduce their influence in Burma. In June 1964, Chinese government not only informed General Ne Win about the possible coup to overthrow him when it received the information through its intelligence networks but it also offer assistance. This was followed by Zhou Enlai’s secret visit to Burma in July 1964 to discuss the Burma’s domestic and political issues with General Ne Win. The reason behind China’s support can be attributed that it believed that if General Ne Win fell from power, Burma would lean towards the west which would increase the influence of US in Burma and this would impact on the struggle of anti-US imperialism in Southeast Asia and to China. Therefore, China should support General Ne Win By late 1965, China began to frustrate with Burma’s non-alignment and neutralist policy such as Burma still stood by its neutrality for Vietnam War and its reluctance to take anti-US position, it did not support a Chinese military training program for anti-Indian government Miso insurgents on Burmese soil among other things. On the other hand, General Ne Win started to realise that Burma could not be isolated and the importance of forging friendship ties in the international community. And General Ne Win carried out his plan by visiting India, Soviet Union, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Thailand, Japan and including a state visit to US in 1966. At the same time, Burma has begun to cultivate its ties with Soviet Union by receiving technology assistance from them while China’s offers of assistance were unanswered. Holmes argued that perhaps this riot may be the manifestation of the China’s frustration of failing to gain political and economic domination in Burma and this case also illustrate that Burma has been successful in maintain its neutrality while keeping independence between East and West. Therefore, it may have pushed Beijing to take an assertive approach by exporting its Cultural Revolution to Burma and this would led to anti-Chinese riots in 1967 and China’s over support for BCP. 3.	Spread of Cultural Revolution Since 1966, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government has openly called for its overseas community to prove their allegiance to motherland by supporting Cultural Revolution. As early as 1952, the Burmese government has asked all Chinese schools in Burma were to register under the Private School Act but however, the levels of compliance were not satisfactory. By 1962, there were 259 Chinese schools in the whole country and a total of 183 schools (70 percent) of them were proclaimed as pro-PRC while two were politically neutrality. The situation has changed in 1963 as the Burmese government promulgated a new private school registration act which required all private schools with the student enrolment of twenty or more to register. The BSPP government has introduced the “Nationalisation of Private Schools Law” in 1965 and it has ordered to follow the state’s uniform curriculum in all the private schools that it has taken over. Afterwards, all Chinese schools has been nationalised and the teachers were dismissed except those with Burmese citizenship As a result, the private schools have estimated to grow to 470 pro-PRC schools and 200 non-or anti-PRC schools in 1966 and most of the PRC schools’ curriculum was based on Mao Zedong thought and the ‘History of the Chinese Communist Revolution and Literature’. Subsequently, the Burmese government aware that these schools became a focal point of tension as the Cultural Revolution became spread to Burma and want to limit the influence of “Red Guard” policy by issuing the orders such as the students were not allowed to wear any badges other than national emblem and General Aung San. 4.	Riot broke out on 26 June 1967 Lastly, the 1967 anti-Chinese riot (6.26) broke out on 26 June 1967. The riot was said to be cause by the China’s export of the Cultural Revolution which has begun in china in 1966 and it has slowly penetrating the Chinese community in Burma. Still, the Chinese students defied Burmese government’s order by wearing Chairman Mao’s badge to schools and the clashes happened between the students and teachers at Rangoon no.3 National Elementary School (the former Chinese Girls Middle school) on 22 June 1967. Subsequently, this brawl has triggered the outbreak between Chinese and Burmese which was going to take place four days later. The similar dispute took place in nearby Zhong Zheng Middle school where the students were capture inside the school gates and protesting against the school administrators and the police intervened and ended the dispute. Although both disputes at the Chinese schools has been settled, the Chinese students still continue to wear the badges to the schools with the full support of diplomats at Chinese embassy in Rangoon. According to Burmese newspapers, NCNA correspondent Yu Min-Sheng and some red guards from the Chinese embassy distributed Mao badges and “Little Red Book” to the Chinese students on 22 June 1967 and when the school lodge a complaint against it and Chinese charge d’ affairs maintained that it was the legitimate right of the overseas Chinese to wear Mao badges. In fact, the Chinese diplomats had encouraged overseas Chinese community to participate in the Cultural Revolution activities after they have returned from Beijing in March 1967. The situation escalated on 26th June 1967 as Burmese began to attack the Overseas Chinese Middle school, Chinese community surrounding the Chinese Teachers’ League, the Irawaddy River glee club and the Chinese Clerks’ association and finally to the Chinese embassy. The attackers surrounded the Chinese embassy on the afternoon of 26th June by throwing stones and titles at it and these groups made off with the Chinese national emblem. The following day, the mobs made six attacks at the offices of the New China News Agency (NCNA), the China’s civil Aviation Administration and office of the Economic and Commercial counsellor of the Chinese Embassy and the government had ordered that the nine schools with the majority of Chinese students were to be closed. Another attack at the Chinese embassy in Rangoon occurred on 28th June 1967 which resulted the death of Chinese aid technician, Liu Yi and injured several diplomats in the process. During the riot, the Chinese owned properties, associations and businesses such as beauty parlours, cinemas, shops and restaurants were burned or destroyed by Burmese and Chinese who were suspected of wearing Mao badges were also being attacked. The riot which began on 26th June has come to an end on 28th June 1967. The riot has resulted in casualties of thirty one Chinese dead and a total of thirty one victims at the Chinese associations and several of them were arrested or injured. The Burmese government imposed martial law on 29th June 1967 and by placing Chinese embassy and Chinatown under the tight control. 5.	Aftermath of the riot 5.1 Beijing’s Response Aftermath of the riot, the first protest note was issued by Chinese vice foreign minister, Han Nianlong and presented it to Burma’s ambassador to China on 28th June 1967 and this protest note was featured on Chinese communist party (CCP)’s official newspaper, People’s Daily on the following day. On the following day, Chinese Charge d’ affairs at Chinese embassy in Rangoon, Xiao Ming asked five demands from the Burmese government such as heavy punishment to the culprits, providing relief to the families of the victims, public apology, guarantee the safety of the Chinese embassy and Chinese personnel residing in Burma and to put an end to the attacks against overseas Chinese. Between August to October 1967, Beijing has issued more than 20 threatening messages to Rangoon including the one on 29th June which clearly accused Burmese military regime of engineering the riots. Not only the government but also the Chinese media has joined the attacks against Burmese government. There has been 153 reports and articles featuring on anti-Burma in People’s Daily from 29 June 1967 to December 1967 and it did reduce slowly. The Peking radio has broadcasted that how the Burma has started its anti-Chinese campaign by starting with the nationalisation of the Chinese state banks, businesses, schools and newspapers. The attack by Peking radio continue that this policy by Burma’s revolutionary council has deprived the overseas Chinese to learn about their culture and education of their motherland. During June 1967 to November 1970, the Chinese media has continuously featured articles which praised the Burmese communist struggles and labelling the Burmese government as ‘reactionaries” or “fascists”. General Ne Win has been branded as “Chiang Kai-Shiek” of Burma .However, this has changed after Premier Zhou Enlai has took over the foreign ministry from the Cultural Revolution group in 1968. Moreover, Beijing has actively used its support for BCP as a leverage against the anti-Chinese activities in Burma. At the memorial rally for Liu Yi, vice-chairman of the central committee of BCP who called for the overthrow of General Ne Win’s government and this address was feature not only in the People’s Daily but also in the CCP organ, Red Flag. There was a huge protest outside by residents in Beijing to show the support of the 28th June protest note and against the anti-Chinese riots. On 29th June 1967, some 200,000 people turned up outside the Burmese embassy in Beijing and the Red Guards managed to enter the embassy’s compound and took down the Burmese national flag and took down the national emblem. The similar accidents also happened at the other foreign embassies including Indonesia and India embassies during Cultural Revolution. Afterwards, Chinese government tried to limit the exchange visits made by citizens of both nations and China has accused General Ne Win of planting spy intelligence among its delegation members. There were no visits made by the Chinese high level officials to Burma until three years after the riot.

5.2	 Rangoon’s reaction The Burmese government has appealed to the public for tolerance and to consider the bilateral ties. And the Burmese newspaper has reported that three Burmese were injured while protecting a Chinese neighbour. Rangoon has rejected five demands made by the Chinese Charge ’de affairs and the Burmese government has also refuted the claims made by the Chinese government that they are instigating the attack and the Chinese embassy did not hold the right to involve in domestic affairs. After the riot, Burmese government started to restrict movement and contacts between Chinese embassy and its overseas Chinese community in Rangoon. This restriction was met with strong protest by the Chinese government. Following the riot, the influence of those pro-china organisations in Burma such as Burma-China friendship association, the All Burma Peace Committee and the People’s Democratic Youth League has stopped their activities. Subsequently, Burmese government recalled its ambassador to Beijing and terminated the economic assistance program. Apart from state-to-state relations, the economic aid in the form of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation between Beijing and Rangoon which was signed in 1961 was came to a halt. The agreement stated that China would provide its technical assistance to Burma and the Beijing agreed to lend interest free $84 million loan to Burma and it can be repaid over ten years. As result from the accusations by the Chinese government, Burmese government asked Chinese technicians to withdraw from this program and declined to be responsible for their living expenses after 31 October 1967. Together with the withdrawal of this economic aid program, Burmese government deported the reporters from NCNA and closure of NCNA office and arresting of pro-leftist Chinese by proving that Burma would not comprise when it came under the threat of her national security and foreign policy. During these two weeks interim period, the anti-Chinese riot changed the personal respect that characterized most Burma’s’ attitude towards China. This riot has made most of the Burmese to rally their support to General Ne Win which is highest since 1962 coup to stand united against the foreign power. The open support for BCP by Chinese government has also prompted Burmese to stand unify behind the General Ne Win which was an example of negative solidary against the foreign enemy. There were protests by Burmese public which opposed the Beijing (foreign)’s interference in domestic affairs and denounced the actions of hung weiping (red enemies) and their sponsors from Beijing

6.	Causes of the riot 6.1 Beijing’s perspective It is evident that the immediate cause of the riot is due to the export of China’s Cultural Revolution to Burma as it started to propagandise Mao Zedong’s thought internationally and Chinese Communist Party distributed its “Little Red Book” to the world. The Chinese embassies were tasked to promote the export of Cultural Revolution and it was out of control after the radicals seized the diplomatic power in 1967. This seizure of power at Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was admitted by Zhou Enlai in 1971 after the bilateral ties were being normalised. Therefore, Zhou stated that it was unfair to attribute the riots to the behaviour of the local Chinese. Holmes stated that China may have miscalculated its move if it has expected that Burma would have join its communist participation in a united front government given that Burma was politically divided and economically weak. In fact, China “Red Guard” policy may be the unintended consequence may have resulted from its own unstable domestic affair. China could not bring Burma to support its foreign policy combined with the reduction of Chinese’s influence in Burma has led Beijing to take a strong military stand towards Burma by resorting to verbal assault on the General Ne Win’s regime and to rally its support for Burmese communist insurgents.

6.2  Rangoon’s perspective This riot can be used to relate to its weak economy and domestic politics as in 1967 rice crisis and xenophobic atmosphere that envelope the country after General Ne Win came to power. The nationalisation process has caused price rises, the scarcity of goods and growth of Black market which caused discontent among the Burmese public. This period also coincide with the growing anti-Chinese sentiments as most Burmese faced by the poor harvest of rice and high price charged by the black marketers who happened to be Chinese and this has led Burmese to destroy Chinese’s businesses, properties and homes to avenge their anger. However, this riot has divert Burmese’s unhappiness with General Ne Win to anti-Chinese sentiments and against the influence of foreign power and it helped to boost his popularity by promoting Burmese nationalism. 7.	Impact of the riot 7.1	Chinese community in Burma The immediate victims of the riots were the overseas Chinese community in Burma as their lives were threatened and their properties were being destroyed and attacked. This has led to most of the Chinese to fled Burma where some returned to China and some had immigrated to Hong Kong, Macao, Europe, America, and Australia. After the riots, half of the Cantonese left for other destinations such as US, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. At the same time, the Chinese who remained in Burma started to assimilate with the majority Burmese by wearing Burmese’s attire, Longyis  and adopt Burmese names and identify themselves as ethnic groups such as Shan instead of Chinese. Furthermore, many Chinese chose to remain low profile to protect their identity in the fear of another racial riot may be erupted and the situation has not changed much until 1980s. Also, the Chinese became nonchalant to the local politics and remain themselves as businessmen for their survival. Another significant change is that the decline of Beijing’s influence in Burma because most of the Chinese were pro-Maoists and their movement has been watched by the local authorities. Many of them were also disappointed by the Beijing failure to protect them when they were encountered by the danger after involving in the export of Cultural Revolution.

7.2	Effect on Sino-Burmese ties Robert Holmes stated in his 1972’s article that Sino-Burmese friendship became a casualty of the china’s Cultural Revolution. Although the ambassadors were being recalled, the Chinese and Burmese embassies in Rangoon and Beijing were headed by Charge’s de affairs until 1970. In the article written by Badgley a few months after the anti-Chinese riots in Burma, Beijing announced its support for Communist Party of Burma (CPB) as “true liberation” and allowed two leading Burmese communist insurgents to address a rally with Chou En-Lai. Beijing has openly expressed its support for BCP’s activities in the media and offered them with weapons and training .This riot has caused a significant impact on bilateral trades as the trading value in 1969 was only four thousand dollars which was a huge decline of ninety three percent compared with 1967. 8.	Normalisation of Sino- Burmese relations The attack of Burma in Chinese media has diminished in 1968 and Chinese donated to the Myanmar Red cross for relief of hurricane victims The Sino-Burmese relations has resumed normal ties in 1970 which was three years after the riot as both countries agreed to reappoint ambassadors in 1970 and 1971 respectively. The improvement in bilateral ties was also marked by the informal visit by General Ne Win in August 1971 at the invitation of Zhou Enlai. During this visit, both parties agreed to resume its economic assistance and to promote its economic ties to improve Burmese’s economy. Despite the normalisation of the ties with China, Burma felt uneasy with China’s support for BCP’s arm struggle. And Burma has hoped that the good relations with China would deter its support for communist insurgents. The renormalisation of the ties was also due to the fact that China has changed it foreign policy by taking a more practical foreign policy line in 1968 after the Cultural Revolution because it was isolated from the rest of the world after reaching the peak of the revolution in 1966-67.

References: 1)	Aung Myoe, M. (2011). In the name of pauk-phaw: Myanmar's china policy since 1948. London;Singapore;: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2)	Badgley, J. H. (1967). Burma's china crisis: The choices ahead. Asian Survey, 7(11), 753-761. doi:10.2307/2642500 3)	Fan, H. (2012). The 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Burma and sino-burmese relations. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 43(2), 234. doi:10.1017/S0022463412000045 4)	Holmes, R. A. (1972). Burma's foreign policy toward china since 1962. Pacific Affairs, 45(2), 240-254. doi:10.2307/2755554 5)	Steinberg, D. I., & Fan, H. (2012). Modern china-Myanmar relations: Dilemmas of mutual dependence. Copenhagen;Abingdon;: NIAS. 6)	Trager, F. (1964). Burma and china. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5(1), 29-61. doi:10.1017/S02177811000022