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Lynch v Attorney-General [2003] 3 IR 416; [2004] 1 ILRM 129; [2003] IESC 44 Is a case related to the extradition time lapse between arrests and Garda using existing warrant for extradition to obtain information related to other crimes committed by Lynch.

Background
Undisputed Facts. Mr Lynch was born in Dublin on the 14th March, 1975; Irish citizen and domiciled. In 2000 in England Mr Lynch committed an offence under Section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act, 1861 and Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He was arrested and given bail to return later to the magistrates court which he failed, an arrest warrant was issued. Mr. Lynch returned to Ireland where he was arrested again. Mr. Lynch was living openly and was receiving a rent allowance from the Health Board at Drimnagh.

In Ireland Mr Lynch had a two incidents with possible criminal charges against him. In Kilkenny on the 21st May 2000 he was found in unlawful possession of drugs contrary to Section 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act. He also was found to have drugs for the purposes of Sale and Supply under  Section 15 and Section 27 of the same Act. Mr Lynch failed to attend at the District Court, as a result the warrant was issued. Mr. Lynch was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment on each charge. The charges were suspended. Later on Mr Lynch was charged with intent to defraud the manager of the Bank of Ireland; pretending that a stolen cheque was valid. He was released on bail and remanded to appear at Court 45 of the Dublin Metropolitan District Court on the 4th October, 2001.The previous issue to the arrest in Kilkenny took place and Mr Lynch was taken into custody. The warrant from England was executed by Sergeant O'Neil on the 1st October 2002.

Disputed Facts. Mr Lynch was assured that if he furnished certain information about other persons involved in the stolen cheque charge, the English warrant would not be executed. Mr Lynch was not able to provide Garda with such a information.

High Court Decision
Lynch v Attorney General [2003 8 I.C.L.M.D. 81 ] Mr. Lynch applied for a judicial review on the grounds that his rights were breached due to "a speedy trial and an abuse of process." Lapse of time with regards of the committed offence under the Extradition Act 50. Lynch stated that Gardaí were investigating unrelated criminal charges used the extradition warrants for the purposes of obtaining information in relation to alleged criminal activity. The delay between the date of the offence and the judicial review proceedings to extradition under s.50(2)(bbb) or was in breach of his constitutional right to a trial with reasonable expedition.

The High Court refused Lynch for judicial review and granted the extradition application.

Holding of the Supreme Court
Wayne Patrick Lynch, has brought three appeals to the Court. All appeals are related to an extradition application.The first appeal is from the order of the High Court under Section 50 of the Extradition Act 1965. The second is a judicial review. The third is under Section 47 of the Extradition Act, 1965.

Appeals were made on the facts:

1. Mr Lynch believe that he was tainted and his rights were violated under Section 50 of the Extradition Act, 1965. The Judge decided that under the facts taken that the extradition should not be refused.

2. Decision on Judicial review: The activity of Garda Rowe constituted an abuse of process, delaying his constitutional right to trial with reasonable expedition had been breached. The trial Judge held that Mr. Lynch could not succeed on the s. 50(2)(bbb) application or on this ground.

3. Proceedings relief under Section 47 of the Extradition Act 1965. Mr. Lynch claimed that Sergeant O'Neill should have a reasonable suspicions on the time of arrest. The trial Judge held that procedures are set out clearly in the statute and the procedures of the Act were followed.

The Supreme Court held: "In my respectful opinion, notwithstanding this court's finding on the interchanges between the applicant and Garda Rowe, I cannot identify any constitutional right of Mr. Lynch which has been infringed." An arrest under the Extradition Act is a procedure that deals with the endorsement and execution of warrants from other jurisdictions. Court held that procedures were followed under Section 41 to Section 50 of the Extradition Act, 1965 and the appeal is dismissed.

McKeown v Judge of The Dublin Circuit Court
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McKeown v Judge of The Dublin Circuit Court [2003 IESC 26 ], was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the lack of fingerprints is not enough for a test to unfair trial, as McKeown's legal adviser could requested to examine the vehicle in due course. Mr. McKeown claimed that his rights to a fair trial were breached. Gardaí failed to examine the motor vehicle and remove the petrol can from the vehicle.

Background
Mr. McKeown was charged for assaulting Gardaí Conlon and for use of unauthorised mechanically propelled vehicle that belonged to Mark Cronin. Initially Cronin's vehicle was reported as stolen. On 8th April, 2001 Gardaí Conlon saw McKeown and the co-accused getting out of the stolen vehicle, McKeown was getting out of the drivers seat. Mr. McKeown and the co-accused attempted to to run away. In this instance McKeown hit the Garda with the petrol can on the head. McKeown and the co-accused were arrested.

The stolen vehicle was returned to the owner the day after the incident, no forensic tests were carried out. On the same day of the incident Gardaí went to the place where incident occurred but did not find a "weapon." They called the of the car and he confirmed that he found the petrol can in the car and he had put it in his shed.

McKeown claimed the failure of the Gardaí  to investigate the scene violated his right to a fair trial.

Holding of the Supreme Court
The Judge Fennelly, J. ruled, that missing evidence or failure to seek it ,was not sufficient claim for the test of the fair trial. Therefore, the video that was given to the Gardaí, but not retained by him was key in the event of the fair trial. Fennelly J. found it strange that Gardaí had not searched the car before returning it to the owner. The evidence that Gardaí saw McKeown climbing out of the stolen car is not enough. The vehicle should have been returned to the owner after examination of both parties. The test claiming McKeown was not given the right to a fair trial failed. McKeown did not request to examine the car after the incident. His legal team made this request only after 10 months, when McKeown knew that vehicle was longer in  Gardaí possession.

Hardiman J. ruled in accordance with the Bowes case, if McKeown's solicitor had felt that an independent "examination for fingerprints were required, they would presumably have requested it". McKeown only complained of the lack of the fingerprint examination as a key factor of the unfair trial. McKeown's constitutional right to a fair trial therefore, was not breached. The case was dismissed.

Subsequent developments
To preserve evidence it is a constitutional guarantee to a fair trial and Gardaí duty to preserve all evidence. The evidence could help to accused or preserve the innocence. Evidence should be preserved until the conclusion of the trial.