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= Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence = Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence is an article written by M R. X. Dentith, published online in August 2017. They received their Ph.D. in the department of philosophy from the University of Auckland and became an Associate Professor at Beijing Normal University. As the article name hints to, their areas of interest include epistemology, common knowledge, and collective epistemology. The article aims to address the misconception typically associated with conspiracy theories, as unwarranted beliefs supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. They argue that the same types of evidence used in them are also used to support other theories unquestionably. In turn, solely disregarding them on their use of evidence is unreasonable, and each one needs to be judged according to its own merits.

Introduction
A conspiracy theory, at its most basic state, is simply a group of people working together to get to some sort of hidden end, malicious or not - despite the popular stigma surrounding the words "conspiracy theories." It is, in literal terms, a theory about some conspiracy. These conspiracy theories cannot be judged as a whole, and have to be assessed based on the evidence that they provide. In their argument, Dentith states that the evidence used by participants of conspiracy theories is not in and of itself incorrect or questionable; rather, it is an examination of principle, and comes down to the actual use of the evidence to make the claims. This paper is a discussion of other philosophers' arguments regarding how evidence is used in conspiracy theories, and an evaluation of those arguments, while making the claim that there is no real justification for having skepticism surrounding the evidence that conspiracy theorists depend on.

In order to construct this argument, there is an examination of the evidence that is considered questionable, and the ways it is used: evidence selection and manipulation, errant data, claims of disinformation, judgements of prior probability, and secret evidence, to understand that not all arguments made on conspiracy theories and their principles are reliable. At the end of the paper, there are two parts, labeled meta evidential concerns and informational hierarchies; these go in depth on not denouncing a claim before examining the "evidential concerns" surrounding it.

Conspiracy Theorists
The negative views around conspiracy theorists themselves overtake most discussion regarding them. The philosopher Charles Pigden offers the argument that if we accept news and information from media wherein we known conspiracies are happening, then we are therefore conspiracy theorists. On the other hand, if we do not accept that information without question, and we claim that it is completely false, then we are feeding into a conspiracy, which also makes us conspiracy theorists. So, Pigden argues that whether or not we believe in conspiracy theories even happening, the fact that we know of their existence and have an opinion on them confirms that we are conspiracy theorists.

That being said, even if we are all conspiracy theorists, we are only theorists regarding certain conspiracy theories. Dentith's use of "conspiracy theorist" in this paper is specific to a specific theory, rather than a general statement.

Evidence selection and manipulation
There is a common worry about the way in which conspiracy theorists present their conspiracy theories. When people assess the legitimacies of arguments that they are not well-informed about, they typically worry that they are not presented with every piece of relevant information. Dentith suggests that a prevalent strategy used by conspiracy theorists is known as selectiveness, which is where a presentation of propositions is carefully selected from a wider pool of evidence in order to make one’s explanation appear justified when it normally might not be. They also suggest that there are two features of selectiveness demonstrated by conspiracy theorists, which are the selection of snippets from total evidence and the framing of evidence as strongly suggesting a particular conclusion.

However, Dentith also argues that selectiveness is a characteristic of almost any explanation because it is a method that allows for the presentation of relevant evidence within explanations. Therefore, they also claim that if we are worried about conspiracy theorists using selectivity when presenting their evidence, then we should also be concerned about the non-conspiracy theorists, who practice the same method. For example, historians and scientists selectively cite evidence because only parts of the evidence are considered relevant to their points and citing all the evidence would cloud their portrayal of information. Furthermore, people tend to view the selection of evidence in conspiracy theories to be irrational to believe. Dentith also mentions that if we assume conspiracies are more common than not, then it seems feasible for the conspiracy theorist to select evidence that best explains a given scenario. The fact that selectivity of evidence can be a reasonable process goes to show that conspiracy theorists are not acting irrationally. Therefore, Dentith argues that we should assess conspiracy theories on an individual and evidential basis, rather than dismissing them automatically from a macroscopic point of view.

Checks and balances
One effective way to combat evidence selectiveness and manipulation purposed by Dentith is to check the public record to examine the trustworthiness of the evidence. After all, there is a huge amount of information available for public access and audiences can directly inspect the evidence by doing a research themselves. If people know that audiences can easily check the evidence they provide, they are less likely to select and manipulate evidence, or they will be easily caught and then probably lose their own credibility to the public.

However, a precondition has to be met for this approach to be effective—there has to be negative consequences of getting caught. Unfortunately, the society we live in now does not punish selectiveness of evidence harshly. For example, when CIA deliberately deleted the public file of its “torture” programme report, there was no serious repercussion even though most people know that the CIA was hiding the truth.

Errant data
Errant data is another kind of evidence that is regularly used by conspiracy theories. Errant data refers to evidence that is errant to the rival theory and there are two types according to Brian L. Keeley:

-Errant-unaccounted-for data: data that is not mentioned in rival theories but supports one explanatory hypothesis.

-Errant-contradictory data: data that contradicts the rival theories but supports one explanatory hypothesis.

Dentith points out that citing errant data is common in other fields as well. Historians often cite evidence that is contradictory to rival theories to prove that their theory is more accurate. In fact, in the total pool of evidence, there is always some evidence that contradicts some others. In other words, errant data is not a unique feature of conspiracy theories. The conspiracy theory of the death of Kim Jong Nam includes errant data and so does the U.S. and UK’s story of Iraqi’s weapon of mass destruction and subsequent invasion. In both cases, people use errant-contradictory data to support their theories.

Disinformation
The English word for “disinformation” stems from the Russian word ‘dezinformatsiya’, which was created by USSR agents in the 1930s to dismiss claims that the Moscow Trials were unwarranted. The term has evolved over time, and is now used in reference to the “presentation of fabricated or manipulated information” in order to make a claim appear to be true. Disinformation can come from many different sources, including institutions and individuals, and is present in day-to-day life.

Counterfacts and falsifiability
Philosopher Susan Feldman defines ‘counterfact theories’ as a type of conspiracy theory based on the evidence that accepted knowledge of a given event is incorrect. Based off this definition, Feldman concludes that a belief in ‘counterfact theories’ is, on first impression, irrational, because this type of evidence cannot be disproven. However, Dentith argues against Feldman’s theory. They suggest that this errant data can be included in any explanation, and that its inclusion does not automatically discount a theory. Instead, people must analyze this errant evidence on a case-by-case basis to determine its veracity. Further, theories stating that institutions are spreading disinformation are claims that “conspirators are engaging in a particular kind of cover-up.”

Probabilities
A person’s willingness to believe that a conspiracy is occurring relies on their worldview. For instance, Dentith states that “growing up in a culture where deceits and cover-ups are common place” makes a person more inclined to believe that a conspiracy is true. They attribute this increased likelihood to the idea that a person’s notions of conspiracy shape their perception of disinformation and selectiveness of evidence. Past conspiratorial activity makes people more likely to believe that a conspiracy is taking place in the current moment.

Fortuitous and fortunate data
Dentith explains that data presented in theories can be categorized as either fortuitous or fortunate data. They described fortuitous data for a particular theory is data that is purported evidence, forged in some way, and requires some sort of explanation. Dentith describes data that is fortunate data in the opposite way; as data that just luckily supports some theory and happens to align with a theory. Issues with determining which data is fortuitous and which is fortunate data arise, according to Dentith, occur because by distinguishing one from the other you must already have formulated an opinion on how believable you think the conspiracy theory is in the context to begin with.

Secret evidence
In this section, Dentith discusses how the evidence for or against conspiracy theories may not be manipulated but withheld deliberately. They coin this type of evidence as secret evidence; some claimed evidence, where the justification for the belief that the information presented is evidence is not just unexpressed but is stated as being deliberately withheld. Most governments are among the top candidates for such use of this type of evidence for justifying their actions or beliefs. There may be various reasons for keeping evidence secret, such as confidentiality or convenience. However, one should not trust the claim only because the speaker is credible or trustworthy as they may have said it insincerely or mistakenly. Accordingly, there must also be a principle given as to why secrecy is necessary and supporting evidence that is not secret to warrant the claim in question. Still, however, the principle given may also fall susceptible to insincerity. Overall, Dentith’s objective is to show that conspiracy theories are not the only theories that use such secret evidence to support their claims.

The worry about evidence
Dentith notes that conspiracy theories are common, and they use the same kinds of evidence as other theories. Yet, people still subject them to a high evidential threshold that other theories are not. In turn, people easily dismiss the likelihood of a conspiracy theory while also quickly supporting another that uses the same kinds of evidence. According to Dentith, this double standard held shows that the worry about the kinds of evidence used in conspiracy theories is baseless. Instead, the focus should not be on the type of evidence per se but on how conspiracy theorists use the evidence.

Size and number
This section discusses the claimed belief that conspiracy theories invoke more conspiracies which are so big that evidence for the conspiracy should be readily available. The lack of evidence then ends up being used as evidence against that conspiracy which results in claims like "it's too big to be true!".

Dentith brings up the arguments of Michael Barkun and David Robery Grimes. Michael Barkun distinguishes the claims of conspiracy into three types, 'event', 'systemic' and 'super-conspiracies'. Event conspiracies can be rational because they concern a limited, discrete event or set of events. On the other hand, systemic and super-conspiracies are typically irrational, in part because they are unfalsifiable. Dentith notes that while some conspiracy theories pose bigger conspiracies than others, it doesn't mean that those theories are unsustainable but instead it just tells us that the requirements for showing the legitimacy in such conspiracy might be harder to achieve. The argument of David Robert Grimes, presents a mathematical model for why conspiracies of a certain size are prone to fail and why belief in big conspiracy theories is irrational. In his argument, Grimes focuses of the viability of conspiratorial activity and how our understanding of the viability of that activity weighs upon considerations of the rationality of belief in associated conspiracy theories. Through his model, Grimes assumes that since exposure of a conspiracy via a leak should be a rare kind of event, there are two scenarios that explain why leaks happen. Either a mistake or leak is bound to happen as time passes or if the conspiracy doesn't need sustained cover up, conspirators can wait it out which might prevent a leak for longer. In his model, Grimes identifies two types of leaks, intentional and accidental. Dentith notes that the examples used by Grimes do not fit his model because there is a mismatch between Grime's chosen examples and his theories.

Conspiracies now
This section focuses on Grimes model in greater detail. Dentith emphasizes the problems with Grimes argument being that he fails to distinguish between the claims about the size of a conspiracy versus its putative structure. A conspiracy can look big, but only a small number of people involved in it might know everything about it. For example, Grimes uses the conspiracy theory about the NASA moon landing hoax. With his model, he is assuming that everyone in NASA knew and was complicit in the cover-up. According to Dentith, size really only matters once you take into account the structure of the purported set of conspirators.

Toxic truths
Dentith focuses this section on explaining what Lee Basham has referred to as "Toxic Truths," also referred to as "toxicity." Toxic Truths essentially refers to evidence that supports a conspiracy theory that individuals refuse to touch or distribute out of fear that it will affect them negatively in a social aspect. Toxic truths are problematic in different aspects. Authority figures may want to downplay evidence in order to benefit their organization. Appealing to evidence can also be problematic if it is toxic, though. Individuals may spread disinformation about the evidence's salience, or there could be an accusation that the evidence emerges from selective tampering. The example that the author uses to highlight toxic truths is about investigative journalists uncovering government secrets. If the journalist were to publish the secrets, it would result in a loss of trust in the paper and the government, leading to public discontent.

The polite society
The author details politeness and the way it is associated with toxicity. Not reporting or not talking about information can be referred to politely disregarding or downplaying evidence that could cause social disturbances. Politeness implies that a cover-up gets conducted in a bottom-up manner where citizens may neglect their communities' problems such as corruption. On the other hand, toxicity suggests a top-down cover-up where important individuals such as lawmakers and journalists do everything to prevent certain truths from becoming public knowledge. Within a society, both toxicity and politeness can be evident; evidence may need to get politely ignored, and the evidence may be toxic to the point where a cover-up is necessary. There are also instances where politeness can get used as a justification for not disclosing toxic evidence. In reference to conspiracy theories, the author points out how downplaying things like the severity of sexual assault, they point out how politeness and toxicity function in today's society, not just in conspiracy theories.

Conclusion
Dentith ends the analysis by affirming that society does not have the basis of claiming that conspiracy theorists have inadequate evidence standards. Often, evidence that gets utilized to support conspiracy theories also gets cited to support theories not deemed conspiratorial. The author clarifies that not all conspiracy theorists are worthy reasoners since some conspirators utilize fallacious evidence to support their theories. Still, they do think that there is a higher evidential threshold that gets held for conspiracy theories and not other theories.