User:StephenWeiss1/Knowledge (legal construct)

In law, knowledge is one of the degrees of mens rea, or "guilty mind," that constitute part of a crime or civil wrongdoing. For context, other degrees of mens rea, in addition to "knowingly," include "purposefully," "willfully," "negligently," and "recklessly." The mens rea of knowledge refers to awareness and understanding of events and facts.

Knowledge of a material fact is often a required element of an offense. Elements of an offense are things that have to be proven in order for a conviction to stand. Material facts, also referred to as "attendant circumstances," are facts about a case that have a bearing on its outcome. For example, where a person is being charged under a criminal statute prohibiting the knowing distribution of controlled substances, the fact that the substances they are alleged to be distributing are in fact controlled substances is a material fact. The person alleged to be distributing those substances must know the substances are controlled.

Knowledge generally involves conscious and intelligent action. A person can be said to have knowledge of a material fact such that an element of a crime may be satisfied if (1) they are aware of the fact, and (2) correctly believe that the fact exists. So, in the distribution of controlled substances example above, a person "knows" of the material fact that what they are distributing is a controlled substance if they are aware that the substance is controlled and they are correct in their belief that it is controlled. That person can often also be said to "know" of the material fact or be "willfully blind" to it if they go out of their way not to discover it.

Early Developments
Early case law helps illuminate the beginnings of jurisprudential understandings of knowledge as it relates to legal culpability. In 1882 the concept of knowledge as "willful blindness," (discussed more fully in the Types of Culpable Knowledge section below) though not directly proposed as such, in part sprouted its head through a jury instruction in the federal case of United States v. Houghton, involving a question of whether a person can simply "close their eyes" to incriminating information surrounding their action and then claim ignorance such that they cannot be deemed guilty. A few years later, in 1899, the same concept was revisited in the United States Supreme Court case of Spurr v. United States. There, under a statute prohibiting bank officers from certifying checks drawn against insufficient funds, a bank officer was said to have knowledge that a bank drawer had insufficient funds if he purposefully remains ignorant of the drawer's contents.

The case of United States v. Jewell (also discussed in more detail in the Types of Culpable Knowledge section below), is one of the important earlier American criminal law cases involving constructive knowledge. There, a person who avoided ascertaining facts that would allow them to understand if their conduct was illegal was said to have knowledge of those facts despite going out of their way not to discover them.

Federal civil cases dating back to the 1800's speak of defendants' guilt turning on their knowledge of certain facts. For example, in the 1889 case of Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O'Brien, the Circuit Court in Massachusetts held that a necessary condition of the defendant's culpability was his knowledge of the patent held by the complaining party. In 1907, the Supreme Court held in Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co. that a defendant in a patent infringement case did not have sufficient evidence of notice, similar to a knowledge element, to make them liable.

Relationship to Other Degrees of Culpability & Mens Rea
All degrees of mens rea entail a perpetrator having a guilty mind in some capacity. Generally, all of the degrees of mens rea ascribe some form of moral blameworthiness to the perpetrator, but they differ in severity and certainty from that of knowledge. A comparison between knowledge and other levels of culpability is helpful to illuminate the meaning of knowledge in the law.

The degree of culpability that must be met for a crime that requires the perpetrator to act "purposely," for example, can be said to be slightly more extreme than "knowingly." Indeed, a person who acts with "purpose" desires to conduct themself in that way, or otherwise desires for the harm to result from their conduct, whereas a person who acts with "knowledge" might simply be aware that the result is likely to occur, but does not necessarily desire it. To illustrate, imagine three people, A, B, and C. C shoots at A with a crossbow with the purpose to harm them. C knows that B is standing behind A, but does not necessarily intend to harm B. The arrow goes through A and hits B, harming them. In that case, C purposefully harmed A, but only knowingly harmed B, given C was aware that their action was very likely to harm B as well but did not act against B with purpose to harm them.

The culpability level of "recklessness," like knowledge, also calls for a level of awareness of the existence of a certain material fact exists. With that said, recklessness is often considered less severe than knowledge because it involves mere awareness of a possibility that a material fact exists, as opposed to practical certainty of the facts existence or a purposeful avoidance of becoming aware of that fact.

Knowledge is also sometimes embedded in the elements of other degrees of culpability. For example, a person can often be said to act "intentionally" such that they have the sufficient mens rea to be guilty of a crime where they simply know that harm is very likely to occur when they behave in that way.

One way that a person may act "willfully" in the commission of a crime is if they intentionally violate a "known" legal duty. This is another example of the way in which culpability levels and degrees of mens rea are intertwined with knowledge, and with each other. In that conception of a willfully culpable act, the perpetrator must act intentionally, but also must "know" of the duty that they are violating. If the do not have knowledge of the legal duty they are violating, it is likely they will not be held liable. In that way, knowledge is a culpability level within a culpability level.

"Negligence" is more easily distinguishable from knowledge as a form of culpability in that it does not require a person to have any level of awareness. Whereas knowledge involves understanding the existence of a fact or otherwise the purposeful avoidance of learning that fact when it is almost certain to be true, negligence is distinctly a failure to realize a fact or to behave in a way that a reasonable person would have.

Actual Knowledge
Actual knowledge is knowledge that exists in fact or reality, as opposed to knowledge that is ascribed as a legal fiction. Actual knowledge has a general meaning in the law, but also is used as a term of art pertaining to direct and clear knowledge. In that way, it is more intuitive than its more elusive counterpart in constructive knowledge, discussed and distinguished below. Indeed, in working to define actual knowledge in the 2020 case of ''Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma'', the Supreme Court of the United States simply looked to the dictionary for the term's plain meaning. The Court essentially defined actual knowledge in the context of its constructive counterpart, discussing the idea that it is distinct from knowledge that is presumed to be had.

It is rare that a person has absolute knowledge of anything in particular, either in a legal sense or epistemologically, so the legal concept of knowledge is arguably not an arduous threshold. With that said, actual knowledge is a higher bar relative to constructive knowledge or willful blindness.

Constructive Knowledge & Willful Blindness
A number of jurisdictions recognize "willful blindness" as a way to impute the element of knowledge to a person charged with a crime. This entails a finding that, even though the accused person may not have literally "known" of the material fact in the actual sense, they might as well have known because any reasonable person could have or should have known. Traditionally, people with this type of knowledge are said to be just as morally blameworthy or culpable as someone with actual knowledge of the incriminating facts.

Willful blindness is sometimes said to exist such that a person can be deemed to have knowledge of an attendant circumstance where they (1) believe that an attendant circumstance is likely to exist, and (2) deliberately avoid confirming the attendant circumstance or deliberately fail to attempt to confirm the attendant circumstance. Ultimately, when a person should have known or been aware of a material fact when conducting themselves, they can be deemed to have actually known it.

One of the first appearances of willful blindness in American jurisprudence was in 1976 in the case of United States v. Jewell. It involved a defendant being charged with knowingly or intentionally bringing drugs into the United States. After declining an offer from a stranger to purchase marijuana, the stranger then asked if the defendant would drive the stranger's car into the United States for a sum of money. Despite admitting he thought there was probably something illegal in the car, defendant accepted the offer. Coupled with that suspicion, the Defendant noticed a secret compartment in the trunk but chose not to investigate further. The jury determined that the defendant had a conscious purpose of disregarding the contents of the vehicle and avoided learning the truth, such that he should be considered to have had knowledge of what was in the vehicle.

Judge Richard Posner, a well-renowned judge and legal scholar who served on the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit until 2017, explained willful blindness jury instructions with reference to ostriches: Essentially, people who are willfully blind are like ostriches in that they "bury their heads in the sand" so as not to acquire incriminating knowledge and take deliberate steps to that end. In short, deliberately turning a blind eye to facts that would confirm one's conduct is prohibited is effectively knowledge of the same.

To illustrate further, imagine a defendant agreed to drive someone's car across the boarder into the United States despite having strong suspicions that the car had drugs concealed within it. The defendant purposefully failed to check the trunk or other areas of the car for fear that such efforts would confirm his suspicion of the presence of drugs. If in fact there were indeed drugs in the car which defendant drove into the United States, that defendant could be said to have had knowledge of that fact.

Utility of Knowledge as a Mens Rea Level
In addition to other mens rea and culpability levels, "knowledge" acts as a utilitarian function under the law. Knowledge is a useful way to ensure that the perpetrator actually appreciates that harm could come from their actions. Its utility lies, in part, in its use in the context of deterrence. In other words, a person who is aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding their actions, and is aware that such action could constitute a crime or a wrong, may potentially be deterred from following through with that action. Additionally, since knowledge encompasses a mental state of willful blindness and purposeful avoidance of actual knowledge, a broader swath of perpetrators can be held accountable, hopefully further deterring potential bad actors.

Additionally, if a person conducts an act but has no reason to "know" that such act constitutes a crime, or does not have any awareness of material facts and circumstances surrounding an incident or their action, knowledge would not have a utilitarian function as a deterrence and punishment would be ineffective given that person would never have been deterred from their actions for fear of consequences in the first place.

Knowledge Under the Model Penal Code
Under the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 2.02, to act knowingly in the commission of an offense generally involves an element of awareness of the nature of such conduct or an awareness that such conduct is "practically certain" to cause the result. This is often, but not always, in contrast to a person who acts innocently, ignorantly, or unintentionally in causing a result.

Knowledge can be thought of as part of the Model Penal Code's spectrum of culpability levels. That spectrum ranges from "negligently" to "purposely," and "knowingly" is the second most severe level of culpability. For that reason, a person who is said to have knowingly committed a harmful act under the Model Penal Code could be ascribed a greater degree of moral blameworthiness than those who committed an act merely "negligently" or "recklessly."

Knowledge in Case Law
Though they can be said to mirror each other, knowledge as an element of a criminal offense is not always the same as a civil offense. A survey of case law can help illuminate the legal meaning of knowledge and the distinctions between knowledge in criminal and civil law.

Criminal Law

 * United States v. Jewell: Driver of a car suspected that it contained illegal drugs, and purposefully avoided checking a secret compartment in the trunk to confirm the presence of drugs.
 * United States v. Vera: To be convicted under the relevant statute, the Court stated that the defendant must have knowledge that they imported a controlled substance into the United States.
 * Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.: To be guilty, the defendant must have had either actual or constructive knowledge of activity that amounted to human trafficking.
 * United States v. Booth: Jury was instructed that the element of knowledge of possession of a firearm could be inferred from the defendant's control of the area in which a firearm was located.
 * United States v. Moody: Defendants deemed to have knew of and knowingly entered into a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.
 * State v. Barry:  Case involving the appropriateness of a jury instruction surrounding the concealing of illegal drugs and constructive knowledge of an impending investigation by a police officer.

Civil Law

 * Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma: Supreme Court of the United States determines the definition of actual knowledge to be when a person is actually aware of relevant facts.
 * El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R.: Parents’ receipt of delivered copy of procedural safeguards amounts to constructive knowledge of rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
 * CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen: Issue of whether the owner of premises had actual or constructive knowledge or notice of risk of harm from unstable stairs.
 * Phillips v. Surfside Ventures Inc.: Restaurant considered to have no actual knowledge of hazardous condition, and plaintiff was unable to show constructive knowledge of the same.
 * Samsson Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, United States DOL: Constructive knowledge of scaffolding violations imputed to company.
 * Tsasu LLC v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.:  The term "without knowledge" under the relevant statute was construed to mean lacking either actual or constructive knowledge.
 * Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.: Discusses issues involving a railroad's imputed knowledge of continued use of defective railroad car.

Examples of Knowledge Under Federal Statutory Law

 * 21 U.S.C. § 952(a): To be convicted, defendant must knowingly import a controlled substance.
 * 18 U.S.C. § 287: Statute prohibits people from making knowingly false claims against the government. Under this statute, a claim is a demand made of the government, such as a tax refund.
 * Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA): ERISA bars claims brought within three years of the date that the person bringing the claim had "actual knowledge" of the violation.
 * Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595: Civil action may be brought against a perpetrator who knowingly benefits from human trafficking.

Examples of Knowledge Under State Statutory Law

 * Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.180: Involves actual and constructive knowledge, or reasonable cause to know, of defects in title to a property a person purchases.
 * Rev. Code Wash. § 18.86.100: Principal is deemed not to have any knowledge of facts known by the principal's agent unless agreed to in writing.
 * N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-5.1: Driver of a car who knows they were involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene may be guilty of a crime where a person involved in the accident has died.

Criticism
There is controversy surrounding the concept of knowledge, particularly in the context of "willful blindness." Much of that controversy stems from the idea that other culpability levels, such as negligence or recklessness, more accurately comport with the actions of someone who we may say was willfully blind. Indeed, a willfully blind person can often be convicted based on failing to take actions that might prevent the commission of the harm, such as simply checking the trunk of the suspicious car that they are driving. Arguably, then, giving a jury an instruction about willful blindness might result in that jury convicting a person based on actions that would constitute mere negligence, but that are now stepped up in severity to result in punishment commensurate with having had knowledge of the circumstances.

The same can be said for a defendant that might in reality have been acting "recklessly" in continuing to act without confirming or denying their inkling that something is amiss. Since recklessness is often considered under the law to be a less severe culpability level resulting in a less severe punishment, it is arguably unjust to ascribe the more severe culpability level of knowledge to a person who may in reality have been acting merely recklessly.