User:Stok1794tundra/HOPE VI

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Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere VI (HOPE VI) is a federal program aimed at revitalizing distressed public housing by demolishing and replacing outdated structures while providing supportive services to residents to promote self-sufficiency. The article covers HOPE VI's history, concepts, criticisms, funding, shortcomings, services, and residents.

Funding
To make HOPE VI successful, the funding needed to be present. Lawmakers sought out a financial plan that did not leave citizens under the public housing program homeless. From the beginning, it was aimed to be funded by a mix between public and private sources. Majority of the funds came from three different types of grants. Revitalization grants, demolition grants, and planning grants. The grant cash flow remained steady over the years. Between 1993 and 2003, it received an average of $552.36 million dollars. The program was threatened in 2004 when President Bush's administration tried to eliminate the program entirely. In 2004, only $149 million was received and since then, the program has only seen downward trends in its cash flow.

Another way HOPE VI aimed to fund its construction was through market-rate rentals and homeownership. Unfortunately, being market-rate meant it was subject to real-time market construction timelines. This made HOPE VI's redevelopment highly susceptible to delays.

Redevelopment Shortcomings
Since HOPE VI's redevelopment was in the hands of the real-time market, it was vulnerable to delays. After destroying 93,295 units, it was vital to the programs success for an equivalent number of units to be put back on the market. This was not the case for our government. The destroyed units to rebuilt units was not one-to-one. By June of 2009, 78,692 units were rebuilt. Although, that may seem like a good number, 14,603 units were still missing in action. On average, two people live in one household in public housing. That is 29,206 individuals that were or could have been in public housing that are now displaced with no space for them in the public housing sector. To mitigate this, critics argued that the HOPE VI program should have explored a new way of purchasing existing market-rate developments and turning them into affordable housing. Even though they may have solved the issues of delays and the lack of rebuilt housing, it still came at a hefty price tag that was not achievable.

Supportive Services
In October of 1992, Congress passed the fiscal year 1993 HUD appropriations bill. Part of the bill included the Urban Revitalization Demonstration program. The program which was a part of the HOPE VI initiative distributed $50 million each to 12 cities across the United States that needed their public housing revialized. The funds came with directions though. 80% was required to be spent on capital costs of major reconstruction, rehabilitation, and other physical improvements. The other 20% was required to be spent on community and supportive services. The goal is to increase and promote self-sufficiency among public housing neighborhoods. These community and supportive services included schools, early education, transportation, and civic and religious institutions. To ensure these services were not to be taken advantage of, the program achieved high quality management services in public housing and they enforced strict eviction regulations.

Resident Relocation
During the HOPE VI revitalization period, residents of public housing were displaced both temporarily and permanently. They were moved to other public housing locations or given vouchers to be used in the private market. By March 2006, 63,885 households in public housing were relocated. Of those households, 49% went to other public housing, 32% had received Section 8 vouchers, 6% were evicted, 13% left the public housing program, and 22% have been moved into revitalized units. It is said that some who were displaced and given the option to return decided not to as it was a hassle to move their belongings. It was estimated in 1999 by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) that 61% of public housing households were to return after being displaced. By 2003, the GAO had revisited that estimate and lowered it to 41%. Unfortunately, there is no record as to why those individuals have left or where they ended up. Many argue that the lack of data is a shortcoming of Public Housing Authorities as they do not track where individual households end up after leaving the program.