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Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), was a United States Supreme Court case. The Venetie tribal council in Venetie, Alaska, wanted to collect tax from non-tribal members doing business on tribal lands. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled in the tribe's favor, finding that the businesses operated in Indian Country and were thus subject to tribal taxing authority. The question presented to the Court was whether the land, which the Venetie owned in fee simple following the statutory changes in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, was "Indian country" for the purposes of determining tribal taxing authority.

The Court reversed the decision below and unanimously held that even though the land was owned by the tribe, the land was not "Indian country," and therefore not subject to the tribal tax. Evaluating the question under ANCSA and 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which defined "Indian country" for criminal jurisdiction, the Court found that the land was not Indian country under either statutory regime. The decision had the practical effect of prohibiting almost all Indian tribes in Alaska from collecting taxes for activities conducted on historically tribal land.

The State of Alaska, petitioner, was represented by John G. Roberts, who later became the Chief Justice of the United States. Respondent was represented by Heather Kendall-Miller, an attorney of Athabascan descent.

Background
The Neets’ aii Gwich’in tribe historically lived in the Native Village of Venetie, which was part of the 1.8 million acre reservation later declared for the tribe by the Secretary of the Interior in 1943. In 1971, Congress passed ANCSA, which both extinguished Alaska native territorial rights and all but one reservation in Alaska. In exchange, the Act created Native shareholder owned corporations, each reflecting a Native village recognized by the Act. In the Native Village of Venetie, ANCSA organized the Venetie Indian Corporation and the Neets’ aii Corporation, following the recognition of two villages within the historical reservation territory.

Because the Neets’ aii Gwich’in was one of the tribes to have its reservation revoked, ANCSA provided for the native stockholders to vote for their respective corporations to obtain control of the previously designated reservation by means of taking fee simple title. Native shareholders of both corporations exercised this provision and held two votes. First, following successful votes to take fee simple title, land title was transferred to the Venetie Corporation. Second, the two groups of shareholders elected to dissolve the corporate entities, and the remaining area was called Venetie.

In 1986, the tribe established a tax on commercial business gains, targeting profits generated by non-tribal companies operating in the village. The state of Alaska and a private contractor entered into an agreement to build a public school in the village, and the Venetie attempted to collect tax on the activity by filing a suit in tribal court. Alaska moved the case to federal district court, which found that ANCSA were not Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1511.

Reasoning
Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas relied on the definition of Indian country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to determine whether the land, under the statutory regime of ANCSA, remained Indian country or not.

§1511's definition of Indian country was originally used for criminal jurisdiction purposes, but the Court acknowledged its general applicability and applied it to regulatory civil jurisdiction at issue. §1511 defined Indian country as "(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government ..., (b) all dependent Indian communities within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights of way running through the same."

Because there were no allotment issues present in the case, the Court evaluated the remaining two factors. First, the land was no longer part of a Native American reservation, since all but one reservation in Alaska (the Annette Island reservation of the Tsimshian) had been eliminated by ANCSA. Second, the land could not be considered a "dependent Indian community" following provisions in ANCSA that were incompatible with the statutory definition of a dependent Indian community. The Court reasoned that ANCSA's effects were incompatible with finding the tribe to be dependent on the federal government, since ANCSA "transferred reservation lands to private, state-chartered Native corporations, without any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions...[t]hus, Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie Reservation, and the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian purposes."

Related Cases About Indian Country Land and Tribal Regulatory Authority
Oneida Indian Nation of NY v. City of Sherrill, NY, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y 2001) Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 572 U.S. ___ (2014)