User:TGCP/Development of Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is a family of single-seat, single-engine, fifth generation multirole fighters under development to perform ground attack, reconnaissance, and air defense missions with stealth capability. The F-35 has three main models; the F-35A is a conventional takeoff and landing variant, the F-35B is a short take off and vertical-landing variant, and the F-35C is a carrier-based variant.

The F-35 is descended from the X-35, the product of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. JSF development is being principally funded by the United States, with the United Kingdom and other partner governments providing additional funding. The partner nations are either NATO members or close U.S. allies. It is being designed and built by an aerospace industry team led by Lockheed Martin. The F-35 carried out its first flight on 15 December 2006.

The United States plans to buy a total of 2,443 aircraft to provide the bulk of its tactical airpower for the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy over the coming decades. The United Kingdom, Italy,  Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Israel and Japan are part of the development program and may equip their air services with the F-35.

JSF Program requirements and selection
The JSF program was designed to replace the United States military F-16, A-10, F/A-18 (excluding newer E/F "Super Hornet" variants) and AV-8B tactical fighter aircraft. To keep development, production, and operating costs down, a common design was planned in three variants that share 80 percent of their parts:
 * F-35A, conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variant.
 * F-35B, short-take off and vertical-landing (STOVL) variant.
 * F-35C, carrier-based CATOBAR (CV) variant.



George Standridge of Lockheed Martin has said that the F-35 will be four times more effective than legacy fighters in air-to-air combat, eight times more effective than legacy fighters in air-to-ground combat, and three times more effective than legacy fighters in reconnaissance and suppression of air defenses – while having better range and requiring less logistics support and having around the same procurement costs (if development costs are ignored) as legacy fighters. Further, the design goals call for the F-35 to be the premier strike aircraft through 2040 and be second only to the F-22 Raptor in air superiority.

While the actual JSF development contract was signed on 16 November 1996, the contract for System Development and Demonstration (SDD) was awarded on 26 October 2001 to Lockheed Martin, whose X-35 beat the Boeing X-32. Although both aircraft met or exceeded requirements, the X-35 design was considered to have less risk and more growth potential. The designation of the new fighter as "F-35" is out-of-sequence with standard DoD aircraft numbering, by which it should have been "F-24". It came as a surprise even to Lockheed, which had been referring to the aircraft in-house by this expected designation.

Design phase
Based on wind tunnel testing, Lockheed Martin slightly enlarged its X-35 design into the F-35. The forward fuselage is 5 in longer to make room for avionics. Correspondingly, the horizontal stabilators were moved 2 in rearward to retain balance and control. The top surface of the fuselage was raised by 1 in along the center line. Also, it was decided to increase the size of the F-35B STOVL variant's weapons bay to be common with the other two variants. Manufacturing of parts for the first F-35 prototype airframe began in November 2003.

The F-35B STOVL variant was in danger of missing performance requirements in 2004 because it weighed too much; reportedly, by 2200 lb or 8 percent. In response, Lockheed Martin added engine thrust and thinned airframe members; reduced the size of the common weapons bay and vertical stabilizers; re-routed some thrust from the roll-post outlets to the main nozzle; and redesigned the wing-mate joint, portions of the electrical system, and the portion of the aircraft immediately behind the cockpit. Many of the changes were applied to all three variants to maintain high levels of commonality. By September 2004, the weight reduction effort had reduced the aircraft's design weight by 2700 lb.

On 7 July 2006, the U.S. Air Force officially announced the name of the F-35: Lightning II, in honor of Lockheed's World War II-era twin-prop Lockheed P-38 Lightning and the Cold War-era jet, the English Electric Lightning. English Electric Company's aircraft division was a predecessor of F-35 partner BAE Systems. Lightning II was also an early company name for its fighter that was later named the F-22 Raptor.

On 19 December 2008, Lockheed Martin rolled out the first weight-optimized F-35A (designated AF-1). It is the first F-35 to be produced at a full-rate production speed and is structurally identical to the production F-35As that will be delivered starting in 2010.

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics is the prime contractor and performs aircraft final assembly, overall system integration, mission system, and provides forward fuselage, wings and flight controls system. Northrop Grumman provides Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, electro-optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS), Communications, Navigation, Identification (CNI), center fuselage, weapons bay, and arrestor gear. BAE Systems provides aft fuselage and empennages, horizontal and vertical tails, crew life support and escape systems, Electronic warfare systems, fuel system, and Flight Control Software (FCS1). Alenia will perform final assembly for Italy and, according to an Alenia executive, assembly of all European aircraft with the exception of Turkey and the United Kingdom. The F-35 program has seen a great deal of investment in automated production facilities. For example, Handling Specialty produced the wing assembly platforms for Lockheed Martin. In November 2009, Jon Schreiber, head of F-35 international affairs program for the Pentagon, said that the U.S. will not share the software code for the F-35 with its allies.

As of 5 January 2009, six F-35s were complete, including AF-1 and AG-1, and 17 were in production. "Thirteen of the 17 in production are pre-production test aircraft, and all of those will be finished in 2009," said John R. Kent, acting manager of F-35 Lightning II Communications at Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. "The other four are the first production-model planes, and the first of those will be delivered in 2010 to the U.S. Air Force, and will go to Eglin Air Force Base." On 6 April 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed speeding up production for the U.S. to buy 2,443 F-35s.

In August 2010, Lockheed Martin announced delays in resolving a "wing-at-mate overlap" production problem, which would slow initial production.

In October 2011, two F-35B VTOL aircraft conducted three weeks of initial sea trials aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1), logging more than 28 hours of flight time including 72 short takeoffs and 72 vertical landings.

Program cost increases and further delays
In 2006, the GAO warned that excessive concurrency in F-35 production and testing might result in expensive refits for several hundred aircraft planned to be produced before completion of tests. In November 2010, the GAO found that "Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft efficiently and on-time" and that "due to the extensive amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, if problems are discovered." The United States Air Force (USAF) budget data in 2010, along with other sources, projects the F-35 to have a flyaway cost from US$89 million to US$200 million over the planned production of F-35s. In February 2011, the Pentagon put a price of $207.6 million for each of the 32 aircraft to be acquired in FY2012, rising to $304.15 million ($9,732.8/32) if its share of RDT&E spending is included.

In 2011, program head Vice Adm. David Venlet confirmed that the concurrency built into the program "was a miscalculation". This was during a contract dispute where the Pentagon insisted that Lockheed Martin help cover the costs of applying fixes found during testing to aircraft already produced. Lockheed Martin objected that the cost sharing posed an uninsurable unbounded risk that the company could not cover, and later responded that the "concurrency costs for F-35 continue to reduce". However, the Senate Armed Services Committee strongly backed the Pentagon position. In December 2011, Lockheed Martin agreed to a cost sharing agreement. The Aerospace Industries Association trade group warned that such changes would force them to change their behavior and anticipate cost overruns in their future contract bids. As of 2012, problems found in flight testing are expected to continue to lead to elevated levels of engineering changes (to be made to newly produced aircraft and retrofitted onto previously produced aircraft) through 2019. The total additional cost for concurrency in the program is around $1.3 billion.

In 2012, Schwartz decried the "foolishness" of reliance on computer models to settle the final design of the aircraft before flight testing found the issues that needed redesign.

On 21 April 2009, media reports, citing Pentagon sources, said that during 2007 and 2008, computer spies had managed to copy and siphon off several terabytes of data related to the F-35's design and electronics systems, potentially enabling the development of defense systems against the aircraft. However, Lockheed Martin has rejected suggestions that the project has been compromised, saying that it "does not believe any classified information had been stolen". However, other sources have suggested that the incident caused a redesign of the aircraft's hardware and software to be more resistant to cyber attack. BAE Systems was reported to be the target of the cyber espionage that may have stolen secrets related to the F-35.

On 9 November 2009, Ashton Carter, under-secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, acknowledged that the Pentagon "joint estimate team" (JET) had found possible future cost and schedule overruns in the project and that he would be holding meetings to attempt to avoid these. On 1 February 2010, Gates removed the JSF Program Manager, U.S. Marine Corps Major General David Heinz, and withheld $614 million in payments to Lockheed Martin because of program costs and delays.

On 11 March 2010, a report from the Government Accountability Office to United States Senate Committee on Armed Services projected the overall unit cost of an F-35A to be $112M in today's money. In 2010, Pentagon officials disclosed that the F-35 program has exceeded its original cost estimates by more than 50 percent. An internal Pentagon report critical of the JSF project states that "affordability is no longer embraced as a core pillar". On 24 March, Gates termed the recent cost overruns and delays as "unacceptable" in a testimony before the U.S. Congress. He characterized previous cost and schedule estimates for the project as "overly rosy". However, Gates insisted the F-35 would become "the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation" and informed the Congress that he had expanded the development period by an additional 13 months and budgeted $3 billion more for the testing program while slowing down production. Lockheed Martin expects to reduce government cost estimates by 20%.

In November 2010, as part of a cost-cutting measure, the co-chairs of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform suggested canceling procurement of the F-35B and halving orders of F-35As and F-35Cs. At the same time, Air Force Magazine reported that "Pentagon officials" are considering canceling the F-35B because its short range means that the bases or ships it operates from will be within range of hostile tactical ballistic missiles. However, Lockheed Martin consultant Loren B. Thompson said that this rumor is merely a result of the usual tensions between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and there is no alternative to the F-35B as an AV-8B replacement. He also confirmed that there would be further delays and cost increases in the development process because of technical problems with the aircraft and software, but blamed most of the delays and extra costs on redundant flight tests.

The Center for Defense Information estimated that the program would be restructured with an additional year of delay and $5 billion in additional costs. On 5 November 2010, the Block 1 software flew for the first time on BF-4 which included information fusion and initial weapons-release capability. As of the end of 2010, only 15% of the software remains to be written, but this includes the most difficult sections such as data fusion. But in 2011, it was revealed that only 50% of the eight million lines of code had actually been written and that it would take another six years and 110 additional software engineers in order to complete the software for this new schedule. The total estimated lines of code for the entire program (onboard and offboard) had grown from 15 million lines to 24 million lines by 2012.

In January 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed the Pentagon's frustration with the skyrocketing costs of the F-35 program when he said "The culture of endless money that has taken hold must be replaced by a culture of restraint." Focusing his attention on the troubled F-35B, Gates ordered "a two-year probation", saying it "should be canceled" if corrections are unsuccessful. However, Gates has stated his support for the program. Some private analysts, such as Richard Aboulafia, of the Teal Group state that the whole F-35 program is becoming a money pit. However, on 20 January 2012, Gates' successor, Leon Panetta, lifted the F-35B's probation, stating "The STOVL variant has made — I believe and all of us believe — sufficient progress."

Former Pentagon manager Paul G. Kaminski has said that the lack of a complete test plan has added five years to the JSF program. As of February 2011, the main flaws with the aircraft are engine "screech", transonic wing roll-off and display flaws in the helmet-mounted display.

The current schedule has the delivery of basic combat capability aircraft in late 2015, followed by full capability block three software in late 2016. The $56.4 billion development project for the aircraft should be completed in 2018 when the block five configuration is expected to be delivered, several years late and considerably over budget.

Delays in the F-35 program may lead to a "fighter gap" where America and other countries will lack sufficient jet fighters to cover their requirements. Israel may seek to buy second-hand F-15s to cover its gap, while Australia may also seek to buy more American fighters from the USN to cover their own capability gap in the face of F-35 delays.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) will be determined by software development rather than by hardware production or pilot training.

In May 2011, the Pentagon's top weapons buyer Ashton Carter said that its new $133 million unit price was not affordable.

In 2011, The Economist warned that the F-35 was in danger of slipping into a "death spiral" where increasing per aircraft costs would lead to cuts in number of aircraft ordered which would lead to further cost increases and further order cuts. Later that year, four aircraft were cut from the fifth LRIP order to pay for cost overruns. And, in 2012, a further two aircraft were cut. Lockheed acknowledged that the slowing of purchases would increase the costs. David Van Buren, acquisition chief for the U.S. Air Force, said that Lockheed would need to cut infrastructure to match the reduced market for their aircraft. Lockheed has said that the slowdown in American orders will free up capacity to meet the urgent short term needs of foreign partners for replacement fighters. But Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said that there was no more money available for the project and that future price increases would be matched with cuts in the number of aircraft ordered. Later that month, the Pentagon reported that costs had risen another 4.3 percent, partially as a result of production delays. In 2012, the purchase of six out of 31 aircraft was tied to performance metrics of the program.

Japan has warned that it may halt their purchase if the unit costs increase, and Canada has indicated it has not fully committed to purchasing the aircraft. The United States is projected to spend an estimated US$323 billion for development and procurement on the F-35 program, making it the most expensive defense program ever. The total lifecycle cost for the entire American fleet is estimated to be US$1.51 trillion over its 50-year life, or $618 million per plane. Testifying before a Canadian parliamentary committee in 2011, Rear Admiral Arne Røksund of Norway estimated that his country's 52 F-35 fighter jets will cost $769 million each over their operational lifetime.

Also, in 2011, a Congressional Joint Strike Fighter Caucus was formed by some of the top recipients of Lockheed Martin contributions.

James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation has suggested that it would be cheaper to build additional F-35s with known defective structures and fix these later than it would be to refit legacy aircraft to remain operational until full production of F-35s with full lifespan rated structural components could be built.

The program delays have affected the program's worldwide supply chain, causing Australian Quickstep Holdings to struggle for capital, in spite of their 20-year contract with Lockheed Martin.

In order to reduce the estimated $1 trillion cost of the F-35 program over its 50-year lifetime, the USAF is considering reducing Lockheed's role in Contractor Logistics Support for the fighter. Lockheed has responded that the trillion dollar estimate relies on future costs beyond its control such as USAF reorganizations and upgrades to the aircraft that have yet to be specified.

In 2012, in order to avoid further redesign delays, the U.S. DoD accepted a reduced combat radius for the F-35A and a longer takeoff run for the F-35B. The F-35B's estimated radius has also decreased 15 percent from initial JSF goal. In a meeting in Sydney in March, the United States pledged to eight partner nations that there would be no more program delays.

On 31 May 2012, Lockheed Chief Executive Bob Stevens complained that the Defense Department's requirements for cost data were driving up the cost of the program. The same week he admitted that a strike over the company's plans to strip benefits from workers might cause a shortfall in the plan to produce 29 F-35s that year. The striking union workers raised questions about the standards of the replacement workers, even as their own work had been cited for "inattention to production quality" with a 16% rework rate. The workers went on strike to protect pensions whose costs have been the subject of negotiations with the Department of Defense over the costs of the next batch of aircraft. These same pension costs were cited by Fitch in their downgrade of the outlook for Lockheed Martin's stock price. Stevens said that while he hoped to bring down the costs of the program, the industrial base was not capable of meeting the government's expectations of affordability. He was however able to force concessions on the workers while retaining top management's generous bonuses and pensions.

According to the latest Government Accountability Office report, the F-35's per unit cost has almost doubled, an increase of 93% over the program's 2001 baseline cost estimates. However Lockheed fears that if the tighter policies for award fees of the Obama administration are not reversed, their profits on the aircraft will be reduced by $500 million over the next five years.

Concerns over performance and safety
In 2006, the F-35 was downgraded from "very low observable" to "low observable", a change former RAAF flight test engineer Peter Goon likened to increasing the radar cross section from a marble to a beach ball. A Parliamentary Inquiry asked what was the re-categorization of the terminology in the United States such that the rating was changed from Very Low Observable to Low Observable. The Department of Defence said that the change in categorization by the U.S. was due to a revision in procedures for discussing stealth platforms in a public document. The previous decision to re-categorize in the public domain has now been reversed. Publicly released material now categorizes JSF as Very Low Observable (VLO).

In response to Air Power Australia's criticisms, Australia's Air Vice Marshal Osley said that "Air Power Australia (Kopp and Goon) claim that the F35 will not be competitive in 2020 and that Air Power Australia's criticisms mainly centre around F35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities." Osley continued with, "these are inconsistent with years of detailed analysis that has been undertaken by Defence, the JSF program office, Lockheed Martin, the U.S. services and the eight other partner nations. While aircraft developments such as the Russian PAK-FA or the Chinese J20, as argued by Airpower Australia, show that threats we could potentially face are becoming increasingly sophisticated, there is nothing new regarding development of these aircraft to change Defence's assessment." He then said that he thinks that the Air Power Australia's "analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and a lack of knowledge of the classified F-35 performance information."

Andrew Krepinevich has questioned the reliance on "short range" aircraft like the F-35 or F-22 to "manage" China in a future conflict and has suggested reducing the number of F-35s ordered in favor of a longer range platform like the Next-Generation Bomber, but Michael Wynne, then United States Secretary of the Air Force rejected this plan of action in 2007. However in 2011, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) pointed to the restructuring of the F-35 program and the return of the bomber project as a sign of their effectiveness, while Rebecca Grant said that the restructuring was a "vote of confidence" in the F-35 and "there is no other stealthy, survivable new fighter program out there". Lockheed has also said that the F-35 is designed to launch internally carried bombs at supersonic speed and internal missiles at maximum supersonic speed.

In 2008, it was reported that RAND Corporation conducted simulated war games in which Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters defeated the F-35. As a result of these media reports, then Australian defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon requested a formal briefing from the Australian Department of Defence on the simulation. This briefing stated that the reports of the simulation were inaccurate and did not actually compare the F-35's flight performance against other aircraft.

The Pentagon and Lockheed Martin added that these simulations did not address air-to-air combat. A Lockheed Martin press-release points to USAF simulations regarding the F-35's air-to-air performance against potential adversaries described as "4th generation" fighters, in which it claims the F-35 is "400 percent" more effective. Major General Charles R. Davis, USAF, the F-35 program executive officer, has stated that the "F-35 enjoys a significant Combat Loss Exchange Ratio advantage over the current and future air-to-air threats, to include Sukhois". The nature of the simulations, and the terms upon which the "400 percent" figure have been derived remains unclear.

In March 2012, Tom Burbage, and Gary Liberson, of Lockheed Martin addressed an Australian Parliamentary Committee about earlier assessments. They stated "Time has moved on since 2008 and we know a lot more about this airplane now than we knew then. ... Our current assessment that we speak of is greater than 6 to 1 relative loss exchange ratio against, in 4 versus 8 engagement scenarios—4 blue F-35s versus 8 advanced red threats in the 2015 to 2020 time frame. And it is very important to note that is without the pilot in the loop and are the lowest number that we talk about, the greater than 6 to 1 is when we include the pilot in the loop [simulator] activities". They said: "we actually have a fifth-gen airplane flying today. The F22 has been in many exercises and is much better than the simulations forecast. We have F35 flying today; it has not been put into that scenario yet, but we have very high quality information on the capability of the sensors and the capability of the airplane, and we have represented the airplane fairly and appropriately in these large-scale campaign models that we are using. But it is not just us—it is our air force; it is your air force; it is all the other participating nations that do this; it is our navy and our marine corps that do these exercises. It is not Lockheed in a closet gleaning up some sort of result." Although the advanced threats are classified they indicated that all the first-tier air forces in the world would not look at analysis against inferior threats."

Regarding the original plan to fit the F-35 with only two air-to-air missiles, Major Richard Koch, chief of USAF Air Combat Command’s advanced air dominance branch is reported to have said that "I wake up in a cold sweat at the thought of the F-35 going in with only two air-dominance weapons." However the Norwegians have been briefed on a plan to equip the F-35 with six AIM-120D missiles by 2019.

Former RAND author John Stillion has written of the F-35A's air-to-air combat performance that it “can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run”, but Lockheed Martin test pilot Jon Beesley has countered that in an air-to-air configuration the F-35 has almost as much thrust as weight and a flight control system that allows it to be fully maneuverable even at a 50-degree angle of attack. However the aircraft has only been tested to 20 degree AoA.

Andrew Hoehn, Director of RAND Project Air Force, made the following statement: “Recently, articles have appeared in the Australian press with assertions regarding a war game in which analysts from the RAND Corporation were involved. Those reports are not accurate. RAND did not present any analysis at the war game relating to the performance of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, nor did the game attempt detailed adjudication of air-to-air combat. Neither the game nor the assessments by RAND in support of the game undertook any comparison of the fighting qualities of particular fighter aircraft.”

In an interview with the state-run Global Times, Chen Hu, editor-in-chief of World Military Affairs magazine has said that the F-35 is too costly because it attempts to provide the capabilities needed for all three American services in a common airframe. Dutch news program NOVA show interviewed U.S. defense specialist Winslow T. Wheeler and aircraft designer Pierre Sprey who called the F-35 "heavy and sluggish" as well as having a "pitifully small load for all that money", and went on to criticize the value for money of the stealth measures as well as lacking fire safety measures. His final conclusion was that any air force would be better off maintaining its fleets of F-16s and F/A-18s compared to buying into the F-35 program. Lockheed spokesman John Kent has said that the missing fire-suppression systems would have offered "very small" improvements to survivability.

In the context of selling F-35s to Israel to match the F-15s that will be sold to Saudi Arabia, a senior U.S. defense official was quoted as saying that the F-35 will be "the most stealthy, sophisticated and lethal tactical fighter in the sky," and added "Quite simply, the F-15 will be no match for the F-35." After piloting the aircraft, RAF Squadron Leader Steve Long said that, over its existing aircraft, the F-35 will give "the RAF and Navy a quantum leap in airborne capability."

Consultant to Lockheed Martin Loren B. Thompson has said that the "electronic edge F-35 enjoys over every other tactical aircraft in the world may prove to be more important in future missions than maneuverability".

In 2011, Canadian politicians raised the issue of the safety of the F-35's reliance on a single engine (as opposed to a twin-engine configuration, which provides a backup in case of an engine failure). Canada, and other operators, had previous experience with a high-accident rate with the single-engine Lockheed CF-104 Starfighter with many accidents related to engine failures. Defence Minister Peter MacKay, when asked what would happen if the F-35’s single engine fails in the Far North, stated "It won’t".

In November 2011, a Pentagon study team identified the following 13 areas of concern that remained to be addressed in the F-35:
 * The helmet-mounted display system does not work properly.
 * The fuel dump subsystem poses a fire hazard.
 * The Integrated Power Package is unreliable and difficult to service.
 * The F-35C's arresting hook does not work.
 * Classified "survivability issues", which have been speculated to be about stealth.
 * The wing buffet is worse than previously reported.
 * The airframe is unlikely to last through the required lifespan.
 * The flight test program has yet to explore the most challenging areas.
 * The software development is behind schedule.
 * The aircraft is in danger of going overweight or, for the F-35B, not properly balanced for VTOL operations.
 * There are multiple thermal management problems. The air conditioner fails to keep the pilot and controls cool enough, the roll posts on the F-35B overheat, and using the afterburner damages the aircraft.
 * The automated logistics information system is partially developed.
 * The lightning protection on the F-35 is uncertified, with areas of concern.

In December 2011 the Pentagon and Lockheed came to an agreement to assure funding and delivery for a fifth order of early F-35 aircraft of yet undefined type in spite of general national austerity measures affecting the program.

Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute has questioned the capability of the F-35 to engage modern air defenses, in spite of Russia's own admission that the S-300 systems are vulnerable to the F-35.

In July 2012, the Pentagon awarded Lockheed another $450 million to fix the electronic warfare systems of the F-35.

Problems with Lockheed
In September 2012, the Pentagon criticized, quite publicly, Lockheed Martin's performance on the F-35 program and stated that it would not bail out the program again if problems with the plane's systems, particularly the helmet-mounted display, were not resolved. The deputy F-35 program manager said that the government's relationship with the company was the "worst I've ever seen" in many years of working on complex acquisition programs. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley told reporters the Pentagon had no more money to pour into the program after three costly restructurings in recent years. He said the department was done with major restructuring and that there was no further flexibility or tolerance for that approach. This criticism followed a "very painful" 7 September review that focused an array of ongoing program challenges. Lockheed Martin responded with a brief statement saying it would continue to work with the F-35 program office to deliver the new fighter.

On 28 September 2012, the Pentagon announced that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter support program would become an open competition. They invited companies to participate in a two-day forum on November 14-15 for possible opportunities to compete for work managing the supply chain of the aircraft. Their reason is to reduce F-35 life-cycle costs by creating competition within the program and to refine its acquisition strategy and evaluate alternatives that will deliver the best value, long-term F-35 sustainment solution. This could be hazardous to Lockheed, as they are the current prime contractor for sustainment of all three variants, and selection of another company could reduce their revenues.

Testing
The first F-35A (designated AA-1) was rolled out in Fort Worth, Texas on 19 February 2006. The aircraft underwent extensive ground testing at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth in late 2006. In September 2006 the first engine run of the F135 afterburner turbofan in an airframe and tests were completed; the first time that the F-35 was completely functional on its own power systems. On 15 December 2006, the F-35A completed its maiden flight. A modified Boeing 737–300, the Lockheed CATBird is used as an avionics test bed inside of which are racks holding all of F-35's avionics, as well as a complete F-35 cockpit.

On 31 January 2008 at Fort Worth, Texas, Lieutenant Colonel James "Flipper" Kromberg of the U.S. Air Force became the first military service pilot to evaluate the F-35, taking the aircraft through a series of maneuvers on its 26th flight. F-35 AA-1, on its 34th test flight, began aerial refueling testing in March 2008. Another milestone was reached on 13 November 2008, when the AA-1 flew at supersonic speeds for the first time, reaching Mach 1.05 at 30,000 ft (9,144 m) making four transitions through the sound barrier, for a total of eight minutes of supersonic flight.

The first F-35B (designated BF-1) made its maiden flight on 11 June 2008. The flight, which featured a conventional takeoff, was piloted by BAE Systems' test pilot Graham Tomlinson. The BF-1 is the second of 19 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) F-35s, and the first to use new weight-optimized design features that will apply to all future F-35s. Testing of the STOVL propulsion system in flight began on 7 January 2010. The STOVL system was used for 14 minutes of the 48-minute test flight while the aircraft slowed from 210 kn to 180 kn. The F-35B's first hover (full stop in mid-air) happened on 17 March 2010, followed by a STOVL landing, and on 18 March 2010 the first vertical landing was performed. During a test flight on 10 June 2010, the F-35B became the second STOVL aircraft to achieve supersonic speeds, the first being its ancestor, the X-35B, which achieved the same feat on 20 July 2001. In January 2011, Lockheed Martin reported it had solved a problem with the aluminum bulkhead used only on the F-35B which had cracked during ground testing.



Although many of the initial flight test targets have been accomplished, the F-35 testing program completed "just under 100 sorties and about as many hours in 2.5 years" by June 2009 and was falling significantly behind schedule. A 2008 Pentagon Joint Estimate Team (JET I) estimated that the program was two years behind the latest public schedule, and a 2009 Joint Estimate Team (JET II) revised that estimate to predict a 30-month delay. Due to those delays in the testing program, production numbers will be reduced by 122 aircraft through 2015 in order to provide additional funds for development. Those additional funds will add $2.8 billion to the development funds and internal memos suggest that the official timeline will be extended by 13 months (not the 30 months the JET II team predicted the slip would be). The success of the Joint Estimate Team has led Ashton Carter to call for more such teams for other poorly performing Pentagon projects.

In June 2009, the F-35s APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar was integrated in the Northern Edge 2009 large-scale military exercise when it was mounted on the front of a Northrop Grumman test aircraft. The APG-81 test event represented a major milestone in electronic protection testing in an operationally representative environment, accomplished years ahead of normal developmental timelines and providing a significant risk reduction opportunity for the aircraft's key sensor. The test events "validated years of laboratory testing versus a wide array of threat systems, showcasing the extremely robust electronic warfare capabilities of the world's most advanced fighter fire control radar."

Nearly 30 percent of all the test flights have required more than routine maintenance to get the aircraft flyable again. As of March 2010, the F-35 program had used a million more man-hours than predicted and flight testing is expected to result in further design changes. The United States Navy has projected that lifecycle costs over a fleet life of 65 years for all of the American F-35s will be $442 billion higher than the U.S. Air Force has projected. The delay in the F-35 program is expected to lead to a shortfall of around 100 jet fighters in the Navy/Marines team. Given careful management, service life extension of the Marines' legacy F/A-18s, and more burdens placed on Navy fighters, it may be possible to reduce this shortfall.

The F-35C carrier variant's maiden flight took place on 7 June 2010, also at NAS Fort Worth JRB. The 57-minute flight was executed by Lockheed test pilot Jeff "Slim" Knowles, who was the chief test pilot for the F-117 program. A total of 11 U.S. Air Force F-35s arrived in Fiscal Year 2011.

On 9 March 2011 all F-35s were grounded after a dual generator failure and oil leak in flight. This was the first significant flight failure since 2007. Seven of the 10 test aircraft were cleared to fly four days later. These aircraft have an older model of generators, unlike the kind that failed in flight. The problem was found to be the result of faulty maintenance rather than a design or construction issue.

In June 2011, the F-35's sensors (radar and DAS) were tested in an operational exercise named Northern Edge 2011. Navy Cmdr. Erik Etz, the deputy mission systems integrated product team lead from the F-35 JSF Program Office, said the rigorous testing of both sensors during Northern Edge 2011 served as a significant risk-reduction step for the F-35 JSF program. "By putting these systems in this operationally rigorous environment, we have demonstrated key war fighting capabilities well in advance of scheduled operational testing," Commander Etz added.

From 3–18 August 2011, the F-35 fleet was grounded. The precautionary grounding was in effect while the Joint Program Office investigated the cause of an electrical system failure on test aircraft, F-35A AF-4 during ground tests. The Honeywell-built integrated power package (IPP) failed during a standard engine test following a maintenance check on 2 August at Edwards Air Force Base. The IPP is relatively unheralded, but plays a major role in the F-35's performance. It combines the functions of an environment control unit, engine starter and back-up power generator into a single system. The IPP has been a target for concern during the development phase, even though it has never failed before in more than 1,500 flight hours. The JPO was assessing the impact of the grounding on the schedule for the system development and demonstration phase, but the latest version of the schedule included margin for unexpected problems.

On 10 August 2011, ground operations for the F-35 Program were reinstituted while the investigation was ongoing; government and contractor engineering teams, after reviewing initial data, determined that the fleet could safely resume Development Test ground operations. Preliminary root cause inquiries indicate that a control valve did not function properly, which in turn led to the IPP failure. Monitoring of this valve is the mitigating action required to allow ground operations. The F-35 team is revising ground monitoring procedures to ensure testing involving the IPP takes place safely. While initiating DT ground operations is a "major step" for the F-35 fleet returning to flight, further reviews are required prior to lifting the suspension of flight operations for the 20 F-35s currently in flying status. On 18 August 2011, the flight ban was lifted for 18 of the 20 fighters. Two aircraft based at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida will remain grounded because they lack the monitoring systems used in developmental test aircraft that can detect any problems in flight.

On 25 October 2011 the F-35A reached its designed top speed of Mach 1.6 for the first time. Further testing demonstrated a speed of Mach 1.61 and 9.9g.

During testing in 2011, all eight landing tests of the F-35C tail hook failed to catch the arresting wire; the hook design is being modified to address the problem.

On 8 August 2012, an F-35B dropped an inert 1,000-pound bomb over the Atlantic test range in the program's first airborne ordnance separation test.

On 15 August 2012, an F-35B completed a series of engine air start tests, which involve shutting down and restarting the turbofan while in flight. The aircraft, designated BF-2, successfully completed a series of 27 air starts at various altitudes and using various methods. The F-35A variant completed its air start tests previously.

On 21 August 2012, J. Michael Gilmore wrote that he would not approve the Test and Evaluation Master Plan until his concerns about electronic warfare testing, budget and concurrency were addressed.

On 7 September 2012, the Pentagon failed to approve a comprehensive operational testing plan for the F-35. Instead on 10 September 2012, the USAF started an operational utility evaluation (OUE) of the F-35A variant. This is scheduled to last 65 training days. The purpose of the OUE is to evaluate the entire air vehicle system, including the logistical support and maintenance of it, the maintenance training, the pilot training, and the pilot execution. There will be four pilots as part of the OUE. Evaluators will have 90 days submit their report to Air Education and Training Command (AETC) chief, which should happen early in 2013. He will then either accept or decline any recommendations made in the report and is subsequently expected to formally authorize the start of training at the sea-side base. The Navy and Marines do not yet have an OUE scheduled for the F-35B and C versions. By October 1, the OUE was reported as "proceeding smoothly." The pilots went through academics and started their normal operations simulators. Actual flying is expected to begin on October 26.

On 19 September 2012, the F-35A completed 8,000 hours of airframe durability testing, which is equivalent to one lifetime for the aircraft. The durability testing proved the airframe was able to handle a variety of flying conditions it would experience when in service. The testing was completed ahead of schedule.

Training
In 2011, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation warned that the USAF's plans to start unmonitored flight training that fall "risks the occurrence of a serious mishap". The leaders of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services have called on Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to address the issue. The flights began in September 2012.

The F-35A and F-35B were cleared for flight training in early 2012. A military flight release for the F-35A was issued on 28 February 2012. Currently the aircraft are restricted to basic maneuvers with no tactical training allowed.

On 24 August 2012, an F-35 flew its 200th sortie while at Eglin Air Force Base, flown by a Marine pilot. The pilot said, "The aircraft have matured dramatically since the early days. The aircraft are predictable and seem to be maintainable, which is good for the sortie production rate.  Currently, the flight envelop for the F-35 is very, very restricted, but there are signs of improvement there too." The F-35s at the base no longer need to fly with a chase aircraft and are operating in a normal two-ship element. In the coming weeks, the aircraft will start aerial refueling operations.

On 27 September 2012, the 20th F-35 arrived at Eglin Air Force Base to support pilot and maintenance training. It is also the 14th of the F-35B version to arrive at the base.

Procurement and international participation


While the United States is the primary customer and financial backer, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway and Denmark have agreed to contribute US$4.375 billion toward the development costs of the program. Total development costs are estimated at more than US$40 billion (underwritten largely by the United States), while the purchase of an estimated 2,400 aircraft is expected to cost an additional US$200 billion. The initial plan was that the nine major partner nations would acquire over 3,100 F-35s through 2035. Sales to partner nations are made through the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales program.

There are three levels of international participation. The levels generally reflect the financial stake in the program, the amount of technology transfer and subcontracts open for bid by national companies, and the order in which countries can obtain production aircraft. The United Kingdom is the sole "Level 1" partner, contributing US$2.5 billion, which was about 10% of the planned development costs under the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding that brought the UK into the project. Level 2 partners are Italy, which is contributing US$1 billion; and the Netherlands, US$800 million. Level 3 partners are Turkey, US$195 million; Canada, US$160 million; Australia, US$144 million; Norway, US$122 million and Denmark, US$110 million. Israel and Singapore have joined as Security Cooperative Participants (SCP). Japan announced on 20 December 2011 its intent to purchase 42 F-35s with deliveries beginning in 2016 to replace F-4 Phantom II aircraft. The country wants at least 38 of the F-35s to be assembled in Japan.

By February 2012 many changes had occurred in the F-35 order book. Italy became the first country to announce it was reducing its overall fleet procurement, cutting its buy from 131 to 90 aircraft. Other nations reduced initial purchases or delayed orders, while still intending to purchase the same final numbers. The United States canceled the initial purchase of 13 F-35s and postponed orders for another 179. Britain cut its initial order and delayed a decision on future orders. Australia decided to buy the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as an interim measure until the F-35 is ready. Turkey also cut its initial order of four aircraft to two, but confirmed plans to purchase 100 F-35As. Turkey will buy four F-35s to be delivered in 2015 and 2016, while the order may be increased from 100 to 120 aircraft. The Netherlands and Norway were considering their options and may cut or delay their orders. All of these changes in procurement resulted in increased prices for the aircraft and thus increased the likelihood of further procurement cuts. The Auditor General of Canada Michael Ferguson published a report on 3 April 2012 outlining problems with Canada's procurement of the jet, including misinformation about the final cost of the jet. According to comments Ferguson made 5 April, the government knowingly understated the final price for Canada's 65 jets by $10 billion, igniting heated debate over the purchase. Canada's Conservative government had previously been saying it would not reduce its order, claiming an anticipated $75–80 million unit cost per fighter, and budgeting for cost overruns of ~10%. By 6 April the Canadian procurement was being termed a "scandal" and "fiasco" by the media and now faces a full review to determine whether Canada will buy any F-35s.