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The OPERATION GREEN SEA

Part 1 - The context of the war in the Guiné

Since 1963 that the Portuguese Armed Forces faced a war of taken guerrilla the handle for the African Party for the Independence of the Guiné and of Cabo Verde (PAIGC). Although to have promoted shares of disobedience in 1961, year where the attentions of Portugal were centered in the beginning of the war in Angola, was from January of this year that the independentista party, supported for the Soviet Union and respective block undertook that one that was the most difficult war of guerrilla who Portugal had to face.

The conditions of the theater of operations were necessarily most favorable Portugal. First that everything, the exiguidade of the territory (36,125 Km2), without strategical depth. Second, the fact of, in the sequência of the independence of the French and British colónias, the Guiné if to have become in a small European colonial enclave in a region of new politically adverse independent states Portugal. This age the case of both the neighboring countries, the Guiné-Conakry (pro-Soviet) and the Senegal (following one source politics third-mundista, still that refreada for France), that they allowed the use of its territories as sanctuaries for the PAIGC.

Geography was problematic, being most of the territory a true labyrinth of rivers and canals among small islands and peninsulas, being that aquando of full tide one terço of the territory is submerged, and aquando of the empty tide are short extensive slimy areas of difficult transposition. To little depth of the maritime ways it limited the navigation greatly, placing limits to the size of military and civil ships, and the efficiency of the maritime transport, what it had económicas consequências. The road net was precarious is of the few great cities, the same if being able to say of port infrastructures, to the exception of the port of Bissau. It are of savannahs and mountainous areas (little raised) of the interior, the climate is inhospitable and unhealthy, with temperatures and relative moistness very raised throughout all the year, being habitual temperatures very above of 40º Celsius. The coastal forests contain all habitually harmful the natural elements to the presence human being.

The great ethnic and religious heterogeneidade of the aboriginal population was not necessarily an obstacle, a time that existed, at the same time, favorable and favorable groups Portugal. But this context, where it coexisted a great number of languages and local dialectos, allies cultural, social and religious the habits different, compelled to a multiplication of the adaptations of procedure that the Armed Forces had that to make, in accordance with the tácticos interests and diplomatists, in the relationship with the populations. This effort was for excessively well-known from the moment where military units formed exclusively for aboriginals had been created, regular as in such a way milicianas, in an incorporation that in 1974 reached 70% of the Portuguese total cash, 80% if to enter only the Army.

To join to these factors of more directa influence no to uncurl das military operations, had aspects that its presence took ao to question do Portugal reason to invest na prohibited da na Guiné. First, the fact of the Guiné to be a territory extremely poor and delayed, with scarce natural resources. In economic terms, Portugal did not have advantages with the Guiné and, for the the opposite, the prescriptions of the province were insufficient to support the maintenance of the administrative, educative device and of medical assistance. The Guiné depended on deep metropolitans and this dependence was multiplied with coming out of the war of rebellion, and the necessity to establish a vast military device. The economic-cultural reality also espelhava little the numerous population of European origin, result of the climate, and for consequent the little public investment in the territory, being to notice that the public administration was managed for handle-verdianos and substantial part of the commercial activity was done for Lebanese and Syria immigrants. These aspects took the military (the Europeans) to question the reason of being of the war effort, with consequências in the motivation and moral of the troops.

Guerrillas of the PAIGC

But he had three strong arguments Portugal to justify the effort in the Guiné. First, most of the aboriginal population was favorable to remain Portuguese, for some reasons. In a country with ethnic and religious diversities, where Portugal acted as neutral and stabilizing element between local rivalries, the Portuguese presence was faced as one guarantees of Peace. Also fact of the independentista movement, the PAIGC, being of communist ideology - being apologist of great alterations in social, económica, cultural and religious the organization of the country - was valid it to it diffidence and enmity of significant part of the population (to start for the Muslen, as the more numerous religious group, with 40% of the population), that it did not accept the perspective to radically modify its way of life and its institutions. Under Portuguese sovereignty, the population of the Guiné was not only free to keep its way of life as it had the benefits of living under an administration of European quality (as an example, the Central Hospital of Bissau was best and most equipped of all Africa Occidental person).

To join to this, with running of the time, they had been being known the bad experiences of other African countries in after-independence, with economic disasters, tirânicos civil wars and regimes that they had become the life of entire peoples in a calvário, what still more discredited the independentista option. Although, with elapsing of the war and the contact of the PAIGC with the populations, a percentage each greater to transfer its loyalty to the independentista side, gave rejoinder to it of contrary signal, with the increase of the support Portugal on the part of the remaining population. This would be in the origin in the plans, advanced for both the sides, to find a solution politics for the Guiné passing for an autonomy instead of an independence.

A typical motor boat of Portuguese patrol: the LFP Aljezur (of the Alvor classroom), in a river of the Guiné

Another argument of weight was the strategical situation of the Guiné, supplying a point of implantation in Africa Occidental person, the half way between the Europe and Angola, constituting an eventual scale in the Route of the Handle and the maritime routes and aerial Portuguese. This aspect became still more important from the vacant of 1960 independences, with the boycotting of the new African states to the ticket of ships and Portuguese airplanes for its territories. The also constituía Guiné an important military abutment (for ships and airplanes) in the coast west-African, to the similarity of the Senegal for the Frenchmen (that they had kept important naval bases there, aerial and terrestrial after independence).

The third strong reason - and the main one - politician arrested itself with the precedent who would create the concession of independence or of a statute of autonomy to the Guiné that, exactly having some valid arguments to make it, could have consequências in the plans that Portugal had to keep the remaining territories in Africa (for which the Government did not consider the hypothesis of a similar concession). This age a polémica question inside and is of the regimen politician and the Armed Forces, without that never it had a consensus.

For its side, the PAIGC had much its favor. To join to all the difficulties with that Portugal if debated and that for itself they were advantages, the PAIGC did not have significant rival independentistas movements (the MLG and the FLING, this last one supported for the Senegal, had little expression and later it lost the support of the Organization of African Unit, the OUA), it had one commands very competent in the person of Amílcar Cabral (that it obtained to surpass the internal rivalries between handle-verdianos and guineenses - these last ones that the totality of the guerrillas in the land constituíam almost, and to get international supports), and its combatants had a knowledge of the land that congéneres Portuguese only acquired with the time.

Decisive in the correlation of forces between Portugal and the PAIGC they were the external supports to each one of the sides. In a conflict that if inserted in the context of the Cold War, one of the sides was supported for the country-leader of its strategical block (the PAIGC for the Ussr) and the other not. Portugal was not not only supported for the United States, as this country was openly hostile to the Portuguese presence in Africa during the decade of 60 (having created and supported you engage in guerilla warfare them of the FNLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Moçambique, that had initiated the war in these two countries). In the African question, Portugal was ostracizado mostly of the said International Community, having against itself all the Communist Block, being white of sanctions of the Joined Nations, the totality of the countries of the African continent (even so many countries were in practical the neutral ones, it only had allies in Africa of the South and the Rodésia), and in the Europe counted only on the solidarity of France, Germany and Spain. These three countries accepted to pierce the embargo of venda of weapons intentionally Portugal for the Nations Joined in 1961, becoming German and French in the main military equipment suppliers (even so, in many cases, the embargo prices "").

In contrast, the United States (that they had intentionally an unilateral embargo Portugal) and the Joined Kingdom, allies in NATO, accepted to supply only equipment that was not destined to Overseas, but still thus the availability was little. Being that in the beginning of the war, substantial part of the military equipment in service age of North American origin, the situation was serious. Exactly what he had been acquired in the bilateral scope (in years 40 and 50) and was not subject to limitations of use, suffered from equal way the relative sanctions the parts spare and the ammunition, that only could be acquired (in the biggest part of the cases, with difficulty) of other origins in the international market, frequent in the black market.

This caused serious limitations, nominated to the Air Force, not being able to use airplanes that nalguns cases had in great amount. One of these cases was the use, necessarily in the Guiné, of huntings North American F-86 Sabre, between 1961 and 1963, year where, face to the great pressure of U.S.A., the FAP if saw debtor to make to return the fleet Portugal. The FAP had to seat its power of attack in the North American T-6G, and alone it came back to make use of huntings the spurt in the territory in 1966, with the arrival of eight G-91 Fiat, of a lot acquired to the Luftwaffe. In this exactly, the first helicopters Alouette III had year arrived at the Guiné. In the set, the countries that they accepted to vender equipment over all Portugal (Germany and France; in lesser amounts Spain, Africa of Sul and Israel) produced material in variety and quality, but it had some equipment and subsystems that were only possible to get of U.S.A. and Joined Kingdom (as air-to-ground missiles), and whose lack if was becoming each bigger time. The small industry of Portuguese defense was developing until reaching the self-sufficiency in the sustentation of fast terrestrial forces, and in the supply of sets of ten of fluvial and coastal motor boats to the Navy (in the case of oceanic ships, it was necessary to import naval armament). But it was little face to the necessities.

Small but robust Alouette III was one of the horses of battle of the operations in Africa.

On the other hand, such as the other independentistas movements, the PAIGC received remittances from fast armament in amount and quality of the Communist Block (and also trainings in Algeria and Morocco, and financial support of some countries of the Europe, nominated Sweden, Norway and Denmark), arriving nalguns cases to get superior armament to the existing one of the Portuguese side (amphibious equipment of communications, tanks PT-76, air-to-ground missiles SA-7 - among others, as we will see ahead). The trainings, especially the given one for Cuban military council members, from 1965, was extremely competent, and made of the combatant of PAIGC one of the most efficient guerrillas of Africa, even so the method of attack to the Portuguese forces more frequent was for the use of mines, for the assembly of ambushes, and for attacks of the type it touches and it runs away quarterings (using mortars and cannons without jib). Its better strategy was of consuming.

The PAIGC had as its sanctuary the Guiné-Conakry neighbor (old French Guiné), having in this country fields of trainings and its headquarters, in the capital, Conakry. It benefited of the total support of the ditatorial regimen of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré, who assented that he used its territory as base to infiltrate itself in then the Portuguese Guiné. Without surprises, the main zone of war was necessarily in the South, where the PAIGC could easily infiltrate and replenish its forces and by sea fluvial, being enough to cross the border to take off left of the labirínticas hidrográficas conditions.

The LFP (Motor boat of Small Fiscalization) Arcturus, of the Bellatrix classroom, in the Guiné

Of the Portuguese side, the Armed Forces made use since the beginning of the war in Angola (in 1961) of a doctrine of mature against-rebellion, based in the intent study of the strategy of "Revolutionary War" (in special the thought of Mao Tsé Tung) and in the collected lições of other experiences in this type of war, nominated of the British in Malaysia and the Frenchmen in the Indochina and Algeria. The Armed Forces were adaptaram and had been trained quickly for this type of war. But the fact of the war in Angola to have started of sudden and premature form in relation to the forecasts (in consequência of the unexpected withdrawal of Belgium of its Congo, in 1960) apanhou the Armed Forces in wide measured unprepared in material terms. E the beginning do international embargo na same height hindered that the process of attainment of weapons and appropriate equipment if initiated as foreseen. This compelled to the equipment use dating of the Second World War I (that he was maioritário during the first half of years 60), and the adaptations ad hoc, as the use of airplanes of maritime patrol Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon for next air support. In the Navy, the squadron also sufficiently was aged, and in insufficient number to patrol the maritime waters of the Guiné, Angola and Moçambique, routes between the some territories and to effect the escort to the merchant navigation and the transport of troops. The situation was not only more serious because the biggest effort fit to the "naval dust", the sets of ten of small motor boats of patrol and transport that actuavam in the rivers, constructed in Portuguese shipyards, and that they did not require the importation of armament.

Riflemen, disembarking of a pneumatic small boat Zebro III, in the Guiné

Still in the scope of the external supports, Portugal was in sufficiently damaged rule for them measured and international cultural ways, arriving at the point of these to conotarem the Portuguese troops with the Nazi ideology. In contrast, the PAIGC benefited (as it was habitual with the African movements independentistas) of the affection of the press of left (and not only) in the Ocidente, that helped to construct a romantic image of the guerrillas, and to promote Amílcar Cabral internationally. But nor only of the Soviet Block, the OUA and the left supports arrived. As an example, in the principle of years 70, most of the used vehicles of transport for the PAIGC was camiões Volvo offered by Sweden. Finally, the Church Catholic, following the ideias of Vatican Concílio II, emphasizing the call "Theology of the Release", tacks for the independentistas movements. In the case of the Guiné, many missionaries catholics (nominated Italian) worked in the direction to turn the feelings the population against Portugal.

However, and despite the obstacles of all the order, in 1966, and an annual report, the war in Africa ran Portugal favorably. In Angola, and against the forecasts of all people in 1961, the Armed Forces had been in this height very next to the total victory and the destruction of the independentistas movements. In Moçambique, where the war starts in 1964, the activity of the FRELIMO was intense, but the shares of the guerrilla (for the time being) were confined to the border North (with the Tanzânia) and to the coast of the Niassa Lake, not afectando the life of the remaining portion of the country. But, in contrast, in the Guiné the situation was gone spoiling gradually. Surrounded in a territory exíguo, the Armed Forces were obliged to a defensive war. Before the insufficience of half human beings and materials, the pressure of the PAIGC and the necessity to create some strategical depth, the military device was concentrated in the coast and the main cities, where it was the majority of the population. This made with that the PAIGC could circulate for a part of the territory, exactly moving away from its sanctuaries and logistic supports, and make contact with the local population, attracting it for its side. In 1963, it exactly arrived to implant itself in the South, in the Islands of As, that it used as logistic base. Only many months later, in January of 1964, were of banish there for the biggest amphibious operation efectuada by Portugal in all the war, the Tridente Operation, that a force of landing of 1200 men of the Army, Riflemen involved and Parachutists, supported for naval and aerial bombardeamento against an esteem cash of 300 guerrillas of the PAIGC and also 15 military of the Guiné-Conakry. Of the defeat, the guerrilla one more time held back the lesson that direct confrontations with Portuguese forces would always finish in disaster and, for the the opposite, the consuming strategy was the one that brought it shares. E, year after year, the consuming was feeling each time more of the Portuguese side, with the moral of the regular troops to decrease, at the same time that the population of the interior more adhered each time to the PAIGC. To add to this it had the bad performance of the high-command under the orders of general Arnaldo Schultz, governor and commander-head since 1964. In the first months of 1968, height where the 25,000 Portuguese troops had already to face between 8 and 10.000 guerrillas, and with the PAIGC to obtain to implant themselves and to structuralize themselves in the interior of the territory, the situation was grown worse consideravelmente, finishing for becoming precarious. Perspectivou it military defeat.

The dense vegetation in the edges allowed the easy assembly of ambushes in the rivers

But 1968 would bring changes of various order. In May, Salazar would take one of its last important decisions to the end of decades to the front of an autocratic government: to substitute Schultz, descredibilizado to the eyes of military and civilians, for then Brigadier General António de Spínola (later promoted the general). To the front of the government and military command of the Guiné it would start to be a general rejection of the habitual one, with a style of command that passed for the proper cult of the charisma one, for demonstrations of physical courage in the displacement to the combat fronts and for an energy that infected the troops, raising to them the moral and assuming the dimension of an alive legend.

But the wars are not gained only with high moral and the new commander-head introduced changes in the way to lead the war. He started for applying new tácticas, between them a bigger job of helicopters, and search and destroy operations, to the style of the efectuadas ones for the North Americans in the Vietname. Lisbon accepted to send a reinforcement of 10.000 men, being raised the cash to it the 35.000. But Spínola did not only follow a strategy to militate but equally form politics to face the PAIGC also neste field. It created representative agencies of the some etnias, that had been congregated later in the Congress of the Peoples of the Guiné, form to conquer the loyalty of the populations, or at least to get its neutrality. It obtained to explore the rivalries intelligently Inter-ethnic, mining the base of support of the PAIGC, and would finish for concluding an alliance with the étnia Fula. To take the handle its plans, substituted some superior officers, surrouning itself with a young group of e prepared well official, of clear lower, expert in operations of against-subversion and psychological war. They had been known for the youngsters of Spínola, and constituíam its pretoriana guard. Making use of new ways and psychological tácticas, the psychological impact of Spínola also was duly rentabilizado in measured them national and international. The international press started to be interested itself for this general of monóculo, camouflaged dress of and that it folloied the fire troops underneath, and became in an international figure. This made with that in it measured them international started to pass another message that not only that one that the Guiné was a small farm of Africa where the Portuguese bombed with napalm.

General António de Spínola (to the right) in a fire, combat zone underneath, in 1969.

1968 were also the year of the substitution of Salazar, for reasons of health, in the position of Chairman of the board, for Prof. Marcello Caetano. Belonging to the liberal section of the regimen, Caetano defended a reform in the relationship of Portugal with its colónias, by means of the adoption of a federal model, one projecto that it had the opposition of the orthodox sectors of the regimen and the Armed Forces. Marcello Caetano was also favorable to the increase of the military expenditures, in contrast to Salazar that had tax too much severe financial limitations, exactly having in account of that the war was drawn out and was necessary geriz it of sustainable form. But Marcelo Caetano had another great difference in relation the Salazar. With a reformador speech in favor of a gradual autonomy and through visits to the territories in Africa, it looked for - successfully - to obtain the support of the sectors of the colonial societies to take the handle reforms. In the streets of the great African cities it had multitudes to receive it.

Helicopters Alouette III of the Portuguese Air Force

Finally, another alteration had place but this is of Portugal. In U.S.A., Richard substituía Nixon Lyndon Johnson as president, representing a viragem to the right and an alteration of the politics in relation Portugal. The antagonism of U.S.A. to the presence of Portugal in Africa dated gradually since the end of the Second World War I, becoming more evident during the Eisenhower administration, as much in the speech as with the refusal in supplying military equipment whose use in Africa was previsible. With the Kennedys, and before processes of descolonização on the part of Kingdom Unido and France (causing that many of the new states if became pro-Soviets), U.S.A. had looked for to obtain bastiões its in Africa and, when opposing themselves it Africa of the South and to the presence of Europeans in Africa, to obtain the affection of the Third World, who felt to be to them to run away it for the Soviet sphere. The sudden concession of independence for Belgium to its Congo established the precedent. Belgium precipitadamente ran away before the slaughter from its colonists, leaving the free way the one that U.S.A. and the Ussr if degladiassem to the will for the control of the strategical territory. One expected that the same the Portugal happened and, under the politics of Kennedy, U.S.A. had sponsored the independentistas movements that they had initiated the rebellions in Angola (for the UPA) and Moçambique (FRELIMO), trying to anticipate it identical initiative on the part of the Ussr. Also they had legalized its position how much to the supply of weapons, decreeing an embargo in 1961. U.S.A. had looked for to knock down Salazar through a failed attempt of coup d etat in Lisbon, also in 1961, of form to sponsor its substitution for somebody favorable thing. In this year, when Portugal tried to deal with the emergency in Angola, U.S.A. had provocatórias attitudes, with the presence of ships and military airplanes its in Luanda, the excuse to attend the operations in the Congo. The ideia that had is that Portugal would not obtain to keep a military effort in Angola and the regimen would fall with the defeat, following the logic (very American) of a strong kick in the door and the tent falls all of a time. But the Portuguese power in Angola did not not only caíu as a castle of letters, as it obtained to dominate the rebellion last months, thanks to a formidable mobilization of forces that nobody judged possible. Péssimas relations luso-Americans had had as resulted the not-renewal of the agreement for the use of the Base of the Flagstone, in the Açores, 1962. Frustrated the plans of Kennedy, the attentions in Washington had been turned toward bigger problems that came becoming each time: the increase of the power of the Pact of Warsaw, Cuba and the Vietname. This last one was inherited by its Lyndon successor Johnson, having centered its concerns. The position politics of U.S.A. stops with Portugal remained same it, but the supports to the guerrila movements pro-Americans - that they had already the competition of the pro-Soviets - had been being reduced, finishing for losing the FRELIMO for the influence of China. The administration Johnson became indifferent Portugal, being too much busy to deal with successive problems left for the disastrous external politics of Kennedy, to start for the bog of the Vietname.

LDMs (Average Motor boats of Landing) brought alongside to the LFG Lira, in the Guiné.

Nixon inherits this great problem, and had many others to decide. Johnson had passed the time all to erase fires while others started to the side, and the new president did not want to pass for the same calvário. In contrast to Johnson, Nixon was one politician clarified in international subjects and was surroundd with pertaining figures to the ways of the American right and to the university elite. This caused that some sympathetical of Portugal went up the relief places in the White House. However this was not the case of the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon and Kissinger commanded the a North American external politics, attended for a circle estricto, and the default of the predominantly leftist Department of State. Kissinger printed a realistic and pragmatic boarding to the external politics, looking for to prevent that U.S.A. if involved in secondary questions, of form to be concentrated in solving the envolvement in the Vietname and to face the Ussr decisively. For this, they needed to strengthen the regional alliances, and to leave that they were its allies to take care of of the small problems.

In relation Portugal, the pragmatismo advised to a discrete reaproximação to this bother ally, of form to guarantee that U.S.A. could make use of the strategical base in the Açores (that since 1962 they used as a favor politician but without a commitment on the part of Portugal), and that the Portuguese territories in Africa (nominated Angola and Moçambique) and Africa of the South did not not only fall in the Soviet orbit, but also they served to stop the Soviet expansion in Africa, in the Atlantic and in the Indian one, case the opposite they would more create if problems for U.S.A.. This age the opinion of the Pentagon and the CIA (that they had always disagreed with Kennedy and Johnson in this subject). Portugal acted in the embroidery frames of Washington in favor of a change of attitude in relation itself, to Africa of the South and the Rodésia, and in briefing it got resulted. To convince the Department State how much to the politics alteration, Kissinger ordered in 1969 the National Security State Memorandum ( 39 NSSM-39) a study made for a group of connoisseurs of the Departments of State and the Defense that would serve to support the politics change. Despite the attritions between the two sectors, the conclusions of this study pointed that the Portuguese were in Africa to be and that the best option them U.S.A. to get an agreement on the use of the Base of the Flagstone was to relax the diplomatical pressures on Portugal - exactly continuing to pressure so that reforms were made politics - and to exclude from the embargo not-lethal equipment of double use, civilian and military man, who could be useful to the Portuguese Armed Forces, as cargo planes and camiões. This was very on this side of the desired one for Portugal, but always it was a change of attitude on the part of Washington. U.S.A. started to distanciar itself of the independentistas movements and to abstain to criticize Portugal public, besides making promises of military equipment supply. On the other hand, and on the other hand of not the supply of armament, it was given to trainings the Portuguese officers in tácticas anti-guerrilla, partilhando the experience acquired in the Vietname. The use of the American techniques opened a phase in the war that was known for the one of the vietnamização. In cômputo general, the military cooperation given by U.S.A. was not very significant. The material level, what of more important Boeing 707 for the fleet of transport of the Air Force was vendido had been two, twelve helicopters the Bells 212 used in Moçambique and a hidrográfico ship loaned cost zero. Very the necessary huntings of attack, helicopters Bell UH-1 in great number, and cargo planes Lockheed C-130, that U.S.A. if refused to vender Portugal since years 50, had never come. Exactly thus the position change was important politics, that increased the confidence of Portugal and gave more freedom of share to its Armed Forces.

General Spínola, passing reviewed the Commands African.

In a Guiné, Spínola had obtained to save the situation but nor therefore this if becomes favorable Portugal. It had an impasse, with the Portuguese forces to control the cities and most of the population, and the PAIGC to control the interior.

It was clearly that, exactly with the support of the majority of the guineense population, Portugal could contain the shares of the PAIGC but the point of being able did not obtain to cause enough damages to it extinguiz it. The PAIGC could always count on the shelter of the neighboring countries, over all while in the Guiné-Conakry was a regimen that it was favorable, and did not have problems of attainment of armament for external support. To reach the PAIGC seriously, it would have of if attacking these factors.

E was also clearly that the PAIGC, for well trained and armed that was, and very same having part of the population of its side, never could make more of the one than to provoke consumes to the Portuguese forces. It was it are of question to be able to defeat Portugal, and to try to take the cities was risky. To attack Bissau, that had a well elaborated plan of defense foreseeing this possibility, was suicide. While the Portuguese Navy could assure the navigation in the rivers and the access to the ports, nothing it hindered that the device was kept. To modify the situation, it would be therefore necessary to face the Portuguese warships.

Copyright Fórum Armed - 2005

PART 2 The OPERATION GREEN SEA

Part 2 - The decision and the preparation

One of the concerns of Spínola to weaken the PAIGC was to stanch the flow of abastecimentos, great part of the which done and by sea fluvial age. It was important to deny the PAIGC this capacity and for this, in 1969 principles, a vast work of retraction of information on the fleet of boats of the PAIGC was made. In elapsing of this work one was to know it that the PAIGC had, for beyond three small ships and of a indeterminate number of canoes and small boats the engine, of two or three fast motor boats of the P6 type, supplied for the Soviet Union. This country had equally supplied to the Guiné Conakry four fast motor boats of the Komar type.

Integrated in the quarter-general of Spínola it was the Body of Special Operations that, commanded for the captain-lieutenant Guillermo Alpoim Calvão (of the Riflemen) prepared and executed a series of shares against the naval ways it PAIGC. These had consisted of fluvial ambushes mounted by the Riflemen, in pneumatic small boats, that took by assault the ships of the PAIGC. Thus they had been captured and destroyed two ships, the Patrice Lumumba, of the Guiné-Conakry but to the service of the PAIGC (Misty Operation, in August of 1969) and the Bandim (Brave Good-looking Operation, in February of 1970, territory of the Guiné-Conakry), this last especially important one for the guerrila movement. In result of these operations, the capacity of supplying of the PAIGC severely was afectada.

But the small fast motor boats of the PAIGC and the Guiné-Conakry constituíam a serious risk for the Portuguese, if over all used ships of night or taking off left of the hidrográficas conditions of the Portuguese Guiné. The P6 was a Soviet model of years 50, seted of torpedoes and fast cannons.

Torpedeira motor boat of the P6 type

Displacement: 75 tons; Dimensions (in meters): 25,7 x 6,1 x 1.8; Armament: two pipes double torpedo launchers of 533mm and two repairs of 25mm: Propulsion: four engines diesel setting in motion four helices, totalizing 4800 cv; Speed: 43 we; Autonomy: 450 nautical miles 30 we; Members of the crew: 25.

The Komar was similar, having entered to the service in the Ussr in 1961, being an evolution of the P6, but where the main armament was missiles anti-ship SSN-2 Styx, guided for radar, with a reach of 23 nautical miles.

Motor boat of attack seted with missiles of type KOMAR

Displacement: 80 tons; Dimensions (in meters): 25,5 x 6 x 1.8; Armament: two missiles SSN-2 Styx and a double repair of 25mm: Propulsion: four engines diesel setting in motion four helices, totalizing 4800 cv; Speed: 40 we; Autonomy: 400 nautical miles 30 we; Members of the crew: 25.

It was Egyptian a Komar motor boat that, in 21 of October of 1967, sank the Israeli torpedo-boat destroyer Eilat with the detonation of a Styx, having been the first time that a warship was sunk of this form.

With these ships, the Portuguese naval superiority could be ece of fish in cause.

Alpoim Calvão, trained officer as diver-combat engineer considered the Spínola an operation that neutralized this threat, attacking the motor boats in the port of Conakry and sinking them with mines-lapa placed in the hooves for man-frog. General Spínola and the Head of State of the Armed, vice-admiral Seting of Roboredo had agreed to the operation that, of course, would have of being prepared in the biggest secret.

In the sequência, Alpoim Calvão looked for to get mines-lapa, that in the height the Navy did not have, in Africa of the South, where they were manufactured. The mines readily had been supplied by the South African private services (Bureau of State Security - BOSS). Without delays nor burocracias, Alpoim Calvão brought the mines in simple luggages of trip, as one any passenger of Boeing where it returned.

The commander Guillermo de Alpoim Calvão

Also they were necessary actualizados plans of the port of Conakry. To get them, national and foreign merchant ships in Bissau discrete had been searched until if finding a plan acceptable, although desactualizado. Exactly thus, the Conakry was necessary to effect a recognition, in September of 1969. A motor boat of great fiscalization (LFG), the Cassiopeia, was disfarçada of ship of the PAIGC, is of Bissau, in the island of Vieira João, where the mission was prepared. In case that some ship if approached to the Cassiopeia, the ship would display the flag of the PAIGC and the exterior alone if they would see sailors black. He was what he happened in the passage, with the special handle-rifleman August António Da Silva, of cap of captain-lieutenant in the head, that made pipe the side (impecavelmente) to the joined fishing boats.

To the zero hours of 17 of September, the lights of the city of Conakry had been sighted and, to the two of the morning, the ship was located in the canal enters the peninsula of Conakry and the islands of Loos, starting to collect information, with its radar, on the done alterations to infrastructures of the port, nominated the acostagem piers. One hour later, the task was concluded and the initiated trip of return, still that disturbed for a enervante it damages of the generators that the ship compelled to anchor for little time in full canal of exit of the port.

But in Lisbon doubts how much to the validity had appeared of the operation, nominated of the part of the Minister of Overseas, Joaquin Da Silva Wedge. At the same time, in Bissau, Spínola and Calvão moved of plans how much to the operation. Alpoim Calvão considered that since an incursion became the Conakry, if it had to use to advantage the occasion to free the Portuguese military done prisoners for the PAIGC (about twenty) and that they were kept in the city. Spínola agreed and the plans for the operation had been being made.

However, they had started to be equated other objectivos. If for the Navy the Komar motor boats existed and P6, for the Air Force existed the Mig-15 huntings and Mig-17 of the Guiné-Conakry that, if piloted for Soviets duly trained (as it frequent happened in countries allies of the Ussr) could take off left of the limitations of the Portuguese Air Force, whose G-91 Fiat was not vocacionados for the air combat. To destroy the Mig in the same way as if they would destroy the motor boats would eliminate this threat to the Portuguese aerial supremacy.

But most ambitious of the new objectivos it was to organize a coup d etat in Conakry, being knocked down the regimen of Sékou Touré and placing in the power a favorable regimen Portugal. This would remove to the PAIGC its main sanctuary and source of support, and could exactly lead to the end of the war in the Portuguese Guiné. But also it implied an operation in very bigger scale of the one than simple raide of commands, and with all the inherent, military risks and politicians. It had very to equate.

Amhed Sékou Touré

As as many controllers of its time, the marxist Amhed Sékou Touré went up to the power for saw of the violence. Of mailman maire of Conakry, with a ticket in the French National Assembleia for the way, had a fast ascension in the career politics in the space of a dozen of years. Its party, Parti Democratique de Guinée, gained the elections of 1956 thanks to the violence of its bandos and with the support of the French Communist Party, and Touré became governor of Conakry. Deeply racist and anti-Frenchman, made with that in 1958, the Guiné-conakry was the only colónia of Africa French Occidental person to reject the maintenance of politico-institucional bows with France in after-independence. "Therefore then they are not nor with a tostão" - it decided Of Gaulle. Proclaimed unilaterally independence, in October of 1958, the new Republic of the Guiné-Conakry, under it commands of Sékou Touré, one becomes in a communist, adverse dictatorship of France and with strong bows with the Soviet Union. From this country it receives support military and on the other hand it grants the use of the port of Conakry for ships of the Soviet Navy. With one of regimes brutais than Africa already it knew (exactly for the standards of the continent), Sékou Touré governs the country with iron hand, massacreing the etnia Fula at the moment of the withdrawal of the Frenchmen, and pursuing the traditional authorities of form to politicize the population around its power. It is supported in dismissed bandos of young in the misery that for little money is enlisted to pursue, to arrest, to torture and to denounce everything and all. One installs a psychosis of monitoring and denunciation between the population. In 1960, scarce year and way after independence and in consequência it cut of relations with France, the economy is ruined and the dissatisfaction spreads. To the long one of the years the revolts against the regimen are succeeded. Real some, others invented by the proper Touré as excuse to arrest, to torture and to kill. Its form to govern has as much of tirânico as of nonsense. It installs in its palace sick mental, deficient and albinic, that uses in human sacrifices. It complained for the country territorial waters of 130 miles. In 1971, it fusilladed the son of one old professor of school, because this had given bad notes to it in 1936. Certain time, one of the wizards who encircled it said to it that its regimen would fall to the hands of somebody David call or Ibrahim; in consequência, the Policy arrested during years all the individuals with these names in the country.

It would not be, therefore, difficult to get the adhesion of the population for it knocks down it of the regimen. But Portugal could not make everything alone.

Alpoim Calvão then was informed by the PIDE/DGS, the policy Portuguese politics that accumulated the functions of private services, that some time had already that if kept contact between Portugal and the Front de Libération Nationale Guinéen (FLNG), the main movement of opposition in the Guiné-Conakry, hosted in France, country that also it looked to knock down Sékou Touré. The Front complained to count more than on 600,000 members exiled in the Coast of Ivory, Senegal and Gâmbia, and had made its last attempt of blow in March of 1969, without success. Since 1964 that they looked for, also without success, the support of the Portuguese authorities. But now Portugal had moved of opinion, and starts to support the movement, including with the creation of its periodical, "La Guinée Libre", published in France. The increase of the contacts with the FLNG allowed the Portuguese authorities to take conscience of the true dimension of the movement and Spínola decided to grant to it installation to it of its armed arm in the Portuguese Guiné, of where it would leave for the guerrilla in the neighboring country. But a posterior analysis of the possible consequências politics (nominated the probable reaction of the Joined Nations, the OUA and the Communist Block) led to conclude that to support a guerrilla of the FLNG it could create more problems of that to decide. One concluded that the best option would finish for being a coup d etat of the FLNG in Conakry, from which would all come out a survey in the country, in the way it which if it would uncurl the Portuguese operation. It would be a fast, decisive solution and that it would place the international community before a consummated fact. After all, nothing of different of that U.S.A. or the Ussr made in its zones of interest.

This went against the current thought in the high Portuguese commands. The small incursions of Portuguese troops beyond borders, in persecution of the enemy and to destroy its infrastructures, had become habitual the long one of the years. But the great operations were faced as a too much great risk, not of the military point of view but before politician. They could serve of excuse to an international intervention against Portugal, under égide of the ONU or the Organization of African Unit. This age, by the way, one of the worse scenes that the Portuguese decisores faced. A rare exception to this chain of thought was the plans for the invasion of the Malawi in the case of the regimen pro-Portuguese of Hastings Band to be in risk.

But in Lisbon, Marcello Caetano revealed favorable the shares most decisive, fact the one that was not other people's the change of the politics of U.S.A. in relation Portugal. In July and August of 1970 the Operation had place Knot Górdio, in the interior of the Tanzânia. 8,000 men supported for airplanes and helicopters in persecution of the FRELIMO, attacking and destroying its bases and transforming the South of the Tanzânia in that the international press described as "a small Vietname in Africa". For its side, Spínola argued that only reaching the PAIGC in its sanctuary it is that if excellent damages caused it. Caetano agreed to the operation to the condition of that it was made in way to nobody to aperceber itself of that Portugal was involved in the blow of the FLNG. In case that contrary, the discovery of the Portuguese envolvement could have serious consequências the international level. They had continued the preparativeses for the operation.

The task most demanding was to form the force armed of the FLNG. The conscription was made through contact with the controllers of the movement in the Europe and the some nuclei of dispersed oposicionistas of the Front for countries of the region. This age a difficult work, not only because much of these individuals was watched by the authorities of these countries, but also because frequent already they were installed in the exile countries, with its jobs and families. But it was a successful task, and the enlisted individuals (between which old military) had been collected by the Navy, in a series of clandestine operations in the coasts of the Senegal, Gâmbia and Serra Lioness, until the a border with the Libéria. Small group-task composites of landing and fiscalization motor boats made rendez-vous with the groups of elements to collect in seleccionadas beaches, in dates and combined hours, always during the night. Through the structure of the FLNG also the luminous number of men to embark in each operation, and codes were combined radio and to be changed between the ships and the groups in beaches. The elements were collected with pneumatic small boats for small edge of the e discrete Portuguese ships, having been the LFG Orion the ship most used in these operations. Thus two hundred elements, that would form the force of landing of the Front ,and concentrated in the island of Soga had been collected, in the Portuguese Guiné. In this discrete island to quarterings and the field of trainings had been constructed, where the oposicionistas had been trained by Portuguese officers, between which the best available instructors in the Guiné. It was an arduous task because it was necessary to exceed the tribal and religious rivalries between the guineenses oposicionistas. But with trainings intensive and it disciplines rigorous was possible to become the force of the FLNG in a coesa unit.

Work was made vast of retraction of information on Guiné-Conakry (evidencing itself that the Intelligence that existed until then was manifestly insufficient), appealing to the most varied sources, since exiled guineenses the old members of the PAIGC, beyond notice and publications. A mockup of the port zone of Conakry was made but still thus it lacked to information the operational and táctico level. To get local sources in a country living under a regimen as of Sékou Touré was not easy. Also information supplied for the French private services and of the RFA was gotten.

Being raised the probability of victory of the blow, the program was elaborated politician of the FLNG in set with three commission agents of this movement, in Bissau. The members of the future government of the Guiné-Conakry had been seleccionados and chemical preparations the official notices to be spread out for the radio.

Of the side of the Portuguese forces, the plans of the attack had been made and chosen the units that would participate in the operation. It was evident that the combatants of the FLNG, for very intensive that had been its trainings, hardly would be to the height to execute operations special and to face the units capable of the Guiné-Conakry in great numerical inferiority. Thus, some more difficult objectivos and that they would be crucial for the success of the blow of the Front would be attacked by Portuguese troops. The most important of them all age the physical elimination of Sékou Touré.

But this would not be nor a classic amphibious operation, nor simple raide of commands. Also it would not be an invasion to the style of the one of the Cuban exiled ones in 1961, known by the Bay of the Pigs, because the country that also supported would go to participate it with forces its, and the objectivo would be the proper capital of the country. The solution was an amphibious operation, seats in an limited number of small ships, in which would be efectuado a great number of raides of commands in simultaneous, each equips reaching a specific objectivo. E a time that the Portuguese forces would actuariam dissimulated and as if was exiled forces, would have to operate with the same limitations of a vulgar armed group. This meant that it would not have infiltrations for helicopter, nor air support, nor use of any sophisticated armament. Everything would have of being made with pneumatic motor boats, boats and fast armament. It did not have precedent of an operation with this combination of objectivos and auto-imposed limitations.

The LDG (Motor boat of Great Landing) Upstream, one of the participant ships in the Operation Green Sea, here sailing in a river of the Guiné

As one of the conditions for the success of the operation it was that they at least did not have vestiges of the participation of Portuguese forces or of the envolvement of Portugal in the blow, had been taken a series of measures for this end. As much the Portuguese combatants as of the FLNG would use uniform the same and the same armament, that would have of being of current use in Africa. For other words, of Soviet model. To buy the armament without that the final destination was disclosed, the black market was appealed to it, through the firm Import North Lda, property of Jose Zoio João, known tauromáquico knight and also trader of weapons. Of fact, this company was one of the involved ones in one of facetas irónicas of the war stopped in Africa: the purchase of weapons the manufacturers of the Communist Block. Portugal, for reasons of the existence of an international embargo and for the limitations of its proper industry, appealed with some frequency the manufacturers of the other side of the Curtain of Iron, who did not look at ideological aspects e, for the the opposite, if they showed open to vender its varied products without making great questions and the convidativos prices. One of its more popular products was rocket launchers RPG, that did not have equivalent in the industry occidental person. E a time that this not vendia company weapons only to the Portuguese Armed Forces, nobody could foresee which its destination. Zoio dislocated it Bulgaria, in whose capital it ordered the lot of weapons destined to the operation in the Guiné-Conakry, of that if they detached fast rifles of assault AK-47 (Kalashnikov), machine guns RPD (Degtyarev) and rocket launcher RPG-2. The weapons had been manufactured under the specification of that none would have production number nor any identification of the manufacturer or native country. The manufacturers Bulgarians had supplied the weapons readily.

In Lisbon, the General Workshops of Fardamento and Equipamento (OGFE) had conceived and manufactured a special lot of uniforms, very different of the Portuguese. Also hats of very similar a tropical model to the one of Soviet origin had been made. Of the hats to the boots, nothing it could indicate its Portuguese origin. To complete the disguise, the Portuguese military of white race would take part in the operation with the form body spotted to seem black.

Finally, in the end of October of 1970, the preparativeses had entered in the final phase, with the choice of them you equip and its attribution to the objectivos seleccionados and commanded by priority degree. 52 necessary objectivos had been identified to the stoppage of the city of Conakry. But he was determined that the landing would have place in a night of Saturday for Sunday, height where the majority of the paramilitary military and would be of license and the desactivados public services. In consequência, the number of objectivos was reduced the 25. To each objectivo one was attributed equips, 0 variable in number and with the necessary armament to each case.

The order of the operations passed first for the domain in the sea, later in land and, finally, air. For the domain of the sea (and results politicians) it was condition sine qua non that no Soviet warship was at this moment in Conakry.

The great objectivos of the operation were:

- To destroy the motor boats in the port

- To free the Portuguese prisoners of war

- To destroy the Mig huntings

- To attack and to destroy the quarter-general of the PAIGC (having the hypothesis to capture Amílcar Cabral)

- To provide the landing of the FLNG, and to assist its taking of the power

Name of code: Operation Green Sea

In the principle of November the information is spread of that it is to be prepared a great operation in the island of As. Discrete, the concentration of forces starts, made of discrete form, in the island of Soga, where the combatants of the FLNG were based. Given the characteristics of the operation, the Portuguese forces that participate are composed maioritariamente for African military: the Detachment of Special Riflemen 21 (African), the Company of African Commands and a small number of Páraquedistas.

The 14 of November, commander Alpoim Calvão is sent by general Spínola the Lisbon to describe the plans the Marcello Caetano, that gives to green light to the operation the 17.

Copyright Fórum Armed - 2005

PART 3

The OPERATION GREEN SEA

Part 3 - The Operation

17 of November. In the same day where Lisbon gives the green light, general Spínola gives to knowledge to the Commanders Associate Heads of the order of operations for the Operation Green Sea. The Army strengthens and puts of alert its units next to the border with the Guiné-Conakry. For its side, the Air Force prepares missions of recognition and support to the group of involved ships, and missions of bombardeamento of objectivos of the PAIGC in the Guiné-Conakry, that would be attacked case the blow had success.

The 18, the Air Force initiates the missions of recognition of waters of the Guiné-Conakry, of the port of the capital and its approaches, with an airplane of maritime patrol Lockheed P2-V5 Neptune, of form to detect movements of merchant, warships and concentration of ships of fish.

To 09h00 of this day the mission of the forces in the island of Soga is verbally communicated the commanders: the operation is not in the island of As but yes one has disembarked in the capital of the Guiné Conakry. One confirms that the secrecy that the preparation of the operation involved was kept: in briefings final, two officers, one of the Army and another one of the Navy, would reveal very skeptical how much to its execution. Of the Army one opposed it to participate and was given it taken voice of arrest and for Bissau of helicopter. But Spínola and Calvão would finish for convincing it, and would return to the island of Soga.

The 19, Calvão soon returns of Lisbon and part for the island where if they make the last preparativeses. Also in this day, the Air Force informs of that warships in waters of the Guiné Conakry do not exist, and that a P2-V5 made listening of the communications of the tower of control of the airport of Conakry, if not registando traffic of military airplanes.

To the men of the landing force, guineenses Portuguese and opponents, are distributed the new weapons and uniforms. The involved ships are painted to dissimulate all the signals that indicate them as Portuguese. Until the salvation buoys. They are four LFGs (of the Argos classroom), Cassiopeia, Dragon, Hidra and Orion (ship-head), and two LDGs, the Bombard (of the classroom of its name) and the Sum (of the Alfange classroom). They compose force-task TG27-2.

LFG (Motor boat of Great Fiscalization) Orion, of the Argos classroom, in a river of the Guiné

Displacement: 210 tons; Dimensions (in meters): 41,7 x 6,7 x 2,1; Armament: 2 Bofors cannons 40mm/70, machine guns 7,62mm and garnet of dilagrama; Propulsion: 2 engines diesel Maybach Tunel MD 440/12 setting in motion two helices, totalizing 2400cv; Speed: 17,3 we; Autonomy: 1660 nautical miles; Crew: 24. The used ships of this classroom in the Guiné partially were armored.

Upstream LDG, of the Alfange classroom, in the Guiné

Displacement: 480 tons; Dimensions, in meters: 56,54 x 11,8 x 1,27; Armament: 2 Bofors cannons 40mm/70, machine guns 7,62mm and garnet of dilagrama; Capacity of Transport: 270 tons; Propulsion: 2 engines diesel Maybach-Mercedes setting in motion Benz two helices, totalizing 910cv; Speed: 10,3 we; Autonomy: 2860 nautical miles; Crew: 20. The Bombard is very similar, with Oerlikon cannons 20mm in time of the Bofors 40mm.

You equip them are distributed by the ships:

In the LFGs Dragão and Cassiopeia they are embarked you equip them that they will go to attack the objectivos of the PAIGC, to eliminate Sékou Touré in its residence, the Villa Silly, and the field of military services of the PDG. They are formed by riflemen strengthened for commands.

In the LDG Bombard it follows part of the FLNG, fit for Commands. They are you equip them that they will attack the Presidential Palace, Ministry of the Interior, the command of the Gendarmerie, residences of the controllers Lansana Beavogui and Sayfoulhah Djallo, quarter of the Gendarmerie, quarter of the Cuban military council members, the radio of Boulbinet and the isthmus who divide the two parts of the city, hindering the ticket of reinforcements come of other military installations.

In the Upstream LDG it follows the remain of the force of the FLNG, with you equip them destined to attack the power plant, the general staff of the Armed Forces of the Guiné Conakry (Samory Field) and Republican Guarda.

In the LFG Hidra it follows equips it that it will go to destroy the Mig based in the airport of Conakry.

In the LFG Orion it is the command of the operation and it equips it that it will attack the motor boats of the Guiné Conakry and the PAIGC.

The landing force totalizes 400 men.

The force finishing preparativeses, hours before the departure.

You equip them would according to act sequência of control of the sea (destruction of the motor boats), of land (neutralization of the main forces and cut of the this) and of air (destruction of the Mig before the dawn; the ships had an antiaircraft capacity very reduced). Also the capture of the Boulbinet radio was with priority (the listened to sender more) soon in the beginning of the operations.

Day 20, friday, per the morning, the force is visited by the commander-head and governor of the Guiné, general António de Spínola.

General Spínola (of camouflaged) on board the Sum.

To 19h50, force-task TG 27-2 wide of the island of Soga and is congregated in the point of rendez-vous, together to the island of Canhambaque. To 22h00, hour H, follows in column for Southeast, with occulted lights, and ranks of antiaircraft combat from the sunrise. It sails of this form until 03h50 of day 21, when the force adopta an adjusted disposal more, in two groups (main body and screen, distando the 4 6 miles between itself), maneuvering of form to prevent the maritime traffic and following the indications of a P2-V5 of the Air Force. But a ship, the Banko attack by teen street gang, is not obtained to prevent that pass next to the Sum, due to slow speed of this.

To 17h50 the force comes back to sail in column, being used to advantage the proximity of the night. It is come close to Conakry, where it arrives without profits, and to 20h45 the lighthouse of the island of Date is sighted and commanded split of the formation, following the ships individually for the positions of where will be launched you equip they of landing.

To 21h30, the command (in the Orion) indicates the hour until the a which all the landings will be efectuados stops of followed to give the order of attack for all equips them: 01h30 of the following day.

00h45 of Sunday, 22 of November of 1970.

Completely full tide, no wind.

The force is divided in three groups, the South (LDG Bombard and LFG Hidra), North (LDG Upstream, LFGs Cassiopeia and Dragão) and Norte-Noroeste (LFG Orion) of Conakry.

It equips it VICTOR, composed for 14 riflemen special and a guide of the FLNG, commanded for 2º lieutenant Rebordão de Brito, wide of the Orion in three pneumatic small boats Zebro III, with engines of 50cv, in the direcção of the pier of La Prudence, that protects the interior port, the half mile of distance. Fond next to the pier, the Cmdt Rebordão de Brito climb for top of the construction to make a detailed comment of the port. But what it sees with the binoculars it is the very different silhouette of something of small motor boats: a frigate. Knowing that the Navy of the Ussr costuma to use the port of Conakry, does not have doubts to who belongs the ship.

A Soviet frigate would be more than enough to sink the Portuguese motor boats and to become the operation in a disaster. Reasoning quickly, the experienced caboverdiano officer turns over for one its men and says: there "He looks at, we have a frigate to the front, us we are only catorze, we do not have hypothesis to survive, we go to launch us it the attack of the frigate, rights to quarterings of the garrison and break with everything what he is possible. Already we know that we do not leave livings creature there, but to little we leave our units to actuar to the will ". While this, the guineense guide starts to sharpen an enormous knife in the rocks of the pier. Rebordão de Brito opts conscientiously to a suicidal mission, in the hope of being able to damage the frigate in the vital agencies the sufficient to put the ship is of share.

The attack order is given 01h40, since the Orion. VICTOR equips it launches itself in the small boats to the assault. To the measure that if approaches, in time of the silhouette of the frigate they go appearing two overlapped silhouettes of motor boat in the prolongation (the one nose and poop of another one) that to far they seemed to be a very bigger ship. In the port they are after all three P6 motor boats, four Komar and a motor boat of landing of the PAIGC. The assault continues. Grumete special rifleman Abou Camara apunhala quiet the sentry who keeps the three P6 motor boats. He equips it goes up on board the ships and, for the doors of the covers, he on board shoots offensive garnets of hand for the interior, provoking fires. The first explosion and the shoot out are listened to on board the Orion to 01h55. The occupants are eliminated and the riflemen run stop next to the other motor boats. The alarm in the port sounds and the enemy opens fire since the interior of the ships, with fast and garnet weapons of hand, and land with a machine gun weighed, installed in the roof of a together warehouse to the dock berth. Located in strategical points, the riflemen eliminate the resistance causing low to the enemy. The Komar is destroyed in the same way, with shot garnets of hand for the interior of the motor boats. Eliminated the focos of resistance, VICTOR equips it retakes the pneumatic small boats and dirige of return for the Orion, where he arrives at 02h10.

Commander Alberto Rebordão de Brito

Suffering only one fast wounded, he equips it of 15 men had destroyed seven motor boats (three sunk and four set on fire) and abated the 15 20 enemy combatants. In result of fires, the motor boats, with missiles, torpedoes, the ammunition and fuel on board, blow up in fire balls that are seen of edge of the Orion. The first objectivo of the Operation Green Sea is reached and the city of Conakry wakes up to the sound of explosions.

For this height already all you equip them are placed in the land.

Of the Upstream LDG are launched equip they OSCAR, INDIA and MIKE.

The OSCAR is constituted by 40 men, Portuguese commands and of the FLNG, commanded for 2s second lieutenant Ferreira and Tomás Camarã, he disembarks together to the quarter of Republican Guarda, to 01h35, from pneumatic small boats. This force constitutes the elite of the Armed Forces of the Guiné Conakry, trained for checoslovacos military council members, and the main pretoriana guard of the regimen. Five of the men are dirigem discrete for the gate of the entrance but exactly thus they are detected by the sentry, who 2 second lieutenant Ferreira tries to dominate, but that he is taken refuge in the guard house. In the persecution, the 2 second lieutenant is abated in the door-sill of the door for a gust gone off for others two men who if find in the interior, and that they open nourished fire on the group assailant. Courageous, furriel Marcelino command of Mata is shot for the window for inside of the house and abates the shot the occupants. OSCAR equips it bursts for the enclosure locating itself in the threaded one of the exit of casernas. The republican guards, apanhados of surprise, try to run away but the majority is abated, while some obtain to disappear in the night. The quarter is in the hands of equips OSCAR, who frees about 400 prisoners politicians who were jailed there, and that they had celebrated its release efusivamente. Many of them catch in weapons to join themselves to the blow. In the end of the share, the quarter is left to the guard of 20 men of the Front.

Marcelino of Mata: the military man more decorated of all the History of the Portuguese Armed Forces

For its turn, you equip them INDIA and MIKE are disembarked directamente of the Upstream LDG for land. To 01h40, the abica motor boat to the pier of the Yacht Club you equip them continue for the objectivos. In this height, already the shoot out in the port hears and, lowered the slope of the LDG, the scared men of the FLNG they hesitate in leaving. 2 second lieutenant Sisseco, of the African Commands, commands its men to disembark and thus to give the example and to convince the comrades the Front to gain courage and to go for the combat, what he results.

It equips it INDIA, consisting of 10 commands commanded for furriel Demda Sêca and folloied for an element of the FLNG, they cross the line of way of Conakry-Fria iron and are dirigem for the power plant. Eliminated two of the sentries, the commands penetrate in the installation arresting the person in charge, that compel to cut the electricidade to the city. To 02h15, the inhabitants of Conakry, who had been waked up for explosions and shots, saw its city now to be to the dark ones. It was an important contribuía psychological effect and for the disorientation of the Armed Forces of the Guiné Conakry, that had been apanhadas completely of surprise. But, unexpectedly, the proper guides of the FLNG (nor always competent) would also finish they for being for disoriented times in the city to the dark ones.

He equips it MIKE, composed for 15 commands and 35 FLNG, these under the command of major Thierne Diallo, dirige it Military Field of Samory, to one quilómetro. In this installation a great amount of valuable material of the Army of the Guiné Conakry is stored and is necessary to capture it to hinder the governmental soldiers to use it. It equips it progresses in the direcção of the objectivo without difficulty. When it is the one hundred meters of the field, a "jipão" of the Army of the Guiné Conakry, carrying wounded, is come close and it is ordered to stop. The conductor indicates the Samory Field, but he tries to run away with the viatura and he is abated. The commands come close themselves to the backs of the field, verify that the door is opened and 2 second lieutenant Sisseco orders to advance the elements of the FLNG. A section advances in the interior of the enclosure in direcção to the main gate. Of a tower, a Breda machine gun makes fire, but it is been silent by a detonation of RPG-2 made for the commands. After having broken with a smaller gate with an offensive garnet, it opens the main gate. In this height already it does not have resistance in the Samory Field, and is mounted the defense device.

An unexpected difficulty is that the radios had been outside of share, and the contacts with the others you equip have now of being made directamente. In the enclosure a great amount of weapons and vehicles, including 15 is stored tank fast of recognition, 50 jeeps and more than 100 camiões GMC. Also enormous amounts of weighed machine guns, bazookas meet, mortars, pistol-machine guns, rifles Kalashnikov and Simonov, and many ammunition. Incendeiam the buildings of the State Biggest. But however they go arriving governmental military whom they look to enter in the field for arming itself there.

During three hours and stocking, the field is defended by the commands. The soldier command Mamadu Saliu Diallo thus shows to a exímio pencil sharpener of RPG-2, destroying alone 16 governmental vehicles that arrive loaded of staff, and killing some sets of ten of enemy soldiers. On the other hand, it is evidenced lack of courage and inability in combat of the elements of the FLNG, for that they have of being the commands to make the biggest effort. In result of the shoot out, it equips it of commands counts already on two dead and six wounded (including the commander), some of the which facts for a detonation of RPG-2 badly executed by the men of the Front. Thus being, and fulfilled that is the mission of capture of the field, 2 second lieutenant Sisseco divides equips it MIKE. The Portuguese commands will go to remove, while the men of the FLNG, commanded for major Thierne Diallo, and folloied for Assad commander and the journalist of the magazine "Jeune Afrique" Siradiou Diallo, the instructions of the Portuguese officer mount the defense following, later to join it equip INDIA.

Returning to the Yacht Club, the commands are intercepted by a full camião GMC of guineenses soldiers, who jump for land and start to make fire. The small group of Portuguese commands is divided for the left and the right, answering to the fire of the enemy. Proper 2 second lieutenant Sisseco goes off a shot of RPG-2 pointed to the fuel deposit of the GMC, destroying the vehicle and putting the enemy soldiers in escape. In this share, one of the wounded commands comes back to be reached in a leg. Fond of the wharf, the group is recouped by pneumatic small boats, having suffered two serious deceased, two wounded and four fast ones, including the commander. The mission of equips MIKE is complete, having caused a number esteem of about 100 died the enemy.

01h40. It equips it ZULU, composed for riflemen and commands, wide of the LFGs Dragão and Cassiopeia in ten pneumatic small boats. During the passage, some small boats are stopped by nets of fish that they had not been seen, provoking some delay. Arrived the land, to 02h15, it equips it is divided in three groups.

One of the groups, commanded for 1º lieutenant Wedge and Hisses, has as objectivo the arrest in the outskirts of the city where the PAIGC keeps the Portuguese prisoners of war. One of them is lieutenant António Lobato, pilot of the FAP that, after a landing of emergency in its T-6G, was made prisoner of the PAIGC in 1963. During the seven years of captivity, the oldest prisoner of Portuguese war carried out two attempts of evasion that had been close to the success. Its experience is described in its book "Freedom or Evasion".

"distant matraquear of machine guns going off with frenesim, it intervenes with the my sleep of almost onírica form. However the oiço with more intensity, giving the ideia of approach, however if is silent for a few seconds, however is reduced to a surdina, as if the weapons were endowed with silencers. This sonorous stacatos and cycle high, low, the enough time is drawn out so that I take conscience of that I am not to dream and of that something of more serious is to happen.

The first ideia that occurs me is of plus an attempt of coup d etat against the sanguinário Sékou Touré, in the sequência of as much others of that I was having knowledge to the long one of the years.

The imagination gallops in the dark one of two or the three of the morning and brides me with the victory of the coup-minded incognitos, who I thanks my release advanced.

However the next machine guns do not keep silent and hear each time. The sensorial acuidade becomes so intense that the certainty of that those weapons if dirigem to the arrest, is acquired data.

It consoles me the thought of that in a coup d etat, one of the things that really if must make is to free the prisoners.

I do not have time to continue with my fancies: an enormous boom in the tecto one of the arrest exactly stifles the shoot out that now is more intense, here behind me.

Instinctively I shoot myself for the soil, I look a better esquina for sheltering me and here I am lying of bruços protecting the head with the arms. I am few seconds in this position: a dilagrama or a bazooka, breaks the convicted window of my dungeon. The shoot out continues, but when crepitar of the weapons a voice is overlapped that cries out: "Lobato"

The same sensorial acuidade that in situations has never limited abandoned me and always despoleta in me forces of whom normally I do not have conscience, says me that she is people ours and catapult me for the exterior through the gap opened in the wall for the explosive.

Badly seat the feet in the ground, somebody that leaves the way of the night guesses who I is and asks to me where they are the others.

With it and its small group we exactamente give to the return to the building, making the same passage that I made in the day of my arrival to this house and indicate it to them door of the room where twenty and three Portuguese soldiers are piled up. In one to open and to close of eyes the door are burglarized and the twenty and three prisoners, young of twenty years, in the total ignorance of that it is to happen, do not leave immediately. She is necessary that the elements of the attacking group enter in the room to hurry the exit.

With all congregated in the space that served of recreation, the commander puts in charge to me to keep all people in column until arriving at the destination, that does not disclose.

At the moment of the departure, one of the soldiers opposes to follow it us, but the spontaneous reaction of all, hinders it to reveal one second time its intention. The enemy is about a deserter in who nor believed."

To all, they are the 26 freed Portuguese prisoners, and that they walk in the direcção of the beach in silence, guided and escorted for the group of assault. In the way they are attacked by guineenses military, who are rejected and ranks in escape for the riflemen. Until they reach the beach:

"Keeping the sped up march, we finish for arriving at a beach where we embark in rubber small boats route to the high sea. In brief minutes we agree to an anchored ship the scarce miles of the coast and becomes our overflow.

They are about four and half one of the morning. The members of the crew of the LFG Dragon on board do not hide its joy when receiving them, but at the same time they do not disfarçam a merciful astonishment before our magreza. Sailors until the bones, react to this detail distributing food and drinks.

Somebody that I assume to be the commander, removes me of the group and it takes me with it for another zone of the ship. From there little, he appears a sailor with an enormous beefburger that places in my front."

As the group of assault of equips Zulu, composition for commands and commanded for the second lieutenant Lucas Hawk, it has as objectivo to attack the quarter-general of the PAIGC in the city. In the assault to the installations, he neutralizes a series of sentries, he abates some elements of the PAIGC, and destroi the 5 buildings and still 6 viaturas that if found in the enclosure.

The third group of assault, composition for 21 riflemen and one guides of the FLNG commanded for 2º lieutenant Benjamim Abreu, has as objectivo the Villa Silly, the secondary residence of Sékou Touré, to eliminate it physically, and the Field of the Popular Military service of Conakry, 100 meters ahead. The Villa Silly is composed for two houses (the residence properly said and the house of the guards) e, when coming close itself to the objectivo, the group divides in two sections of attack (one for each house) and a protecção section. The two sentries are abated to the door, without at least having time to use its PPSh pistol-machine guns, that are collected. A section, commanded for the second lieutenant Lucas Hawk, successively penetrates in all the divisions of the residence, without finding nobody. Not even it had indications of occupation in this night, being the arranged house and the beds still made. Sékou Touré is not where it is presumption. The houses are destroyed with shots of bazooka and garnet of hand, provoking a fire. Also the automobile particular of the guineense dictator is destroyed.

The group continues for the Field of the Popular Military service, the one hundred meters. The 22 men penetrate in the enclosure transposing a wall of two meters of height to prevent the detention. The attack with two detonations of RPG-2 against the two is initiated casernas, causing some deceased and wounded, and a short circuit that originated a fire. Of followed, the riflemen had assaulted the interior of casernas with defensive garnets of hand. The troops in the interior try to mount an opposition, without success, before the fire power of the riflemen who, strengthened for a bazooka and a thrower of RPG-2, are armed with a set of ten of machine guns RPD Degtyarev, for beyond the AK-47. Three automobiles and one motociclo carrying eight milicianos burst inside for the field, but soon all are stopped by the shrapnel, dying the occupants and setting on fire the vehicles. A camião GMC is destroyed with two defensive garnets. One of the sentries in the main gate makes fire but it finishes for being dominated and being captured its pistol-machine gun.

After regrouped, the 22 men abandon the place to congregate to the group of assault of 1º lieutenant Wedge and Hiss. He stops backwards is the Field of the Popular Military service of Conakry in flames and its interior 60 milicianos out of action, 30 of died them. Walked only 50 meters three enemy soldiers are detected, who are abated. Still of inside of the field he tries to leave a Volkwagen automobile that is destroyed and abated its conductor. The documents of this are consulted, concluding that it is about a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Despite the good results, of the three objectivos of this it equips imperfection one: to find and to eliminate Sékou Touré. But the prisoners had been freed, the quarter-general of the destroyed PAIGC, and the Field of the Military service very reached. Despite the hard combats (over all in the arrest of La Montaigne, in the quarter-general of the PAIGC and the Field of the Military service) this he equips did not suffer to any deceased or wounded. Re-embarked for 04h30, ZULU equips it starts to constitute the reserve of maneuver of the Commander of the operation.

01h05. Of edge of the LDG Bombard, the 300 yards of the Peronné beach, commanded for Aguiar captain-lieutenant de Jesus (with a imperturbável calm, smoking its cigarette relaxed), they release two small boats with equips HOTEL, with the mission to capture the radio of Boubinet. It equips it it is constituted by 9 commands, under the orders of 2 second lieutenant Jamanca, and includes an element of the FLNG, electrónico engineer Tidiane Diallo, who knows the place. Incompreensivelmente, a disembarked time, equips it does not leave the beach. Or for disorientation of the guineense engineer or indetermination of the officer, it equips it did not saíu of the landing place until it received order to re-embark. However, the radio will finish for being reached.

However two vacant of rubber small boats place in land the remains equip of the Bombard: ALPHA, BRAVE, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF. All you equip them, composed for commands and FLNG, follow for the respective objectivos, guided - nor always well - for the guides of the Front. The objectivos are governmental installations, that are taken without difficulty. In the quarter of the Gendarmerie resistance is only found significant.

When arriving at the place, it equips it ECHO, commanded for captain João Bacar, and strengthened for the GOLF, BRAVE and DELTA, in a total of 50 men, it delays to regroup the staff, and an armored column of gendarmes is prepared to leave. The vehicles are attacked, being 4 destroyed and the enemy suffering a great number from decreases.

It equips it ALPHA, formed for ten elements, is come close to the Presidential Palace, being seen for the guards, that run away the great speed. Nobody equips it reviewed the interior of the great building not finding.

01h40. Coming of the LFG Hidra, equips it SIERRA disembarks of the pneumatic small boats. She is composed for parachutists and commands (38) and elements of the FLNG (6), under the command of Moral captain Lopes, the parachutists. Its objectivo is the airport that also serves of base the Air Force of the Guiné Conakry, to destroy the Mig huntings and to assure that the operation will not exist an aerial threat to all. One of the elements of the Front is one old controller of air traffic of this airport. They are started to still hear rebentamentos to it for all the city before initiating the progression for the objectivo. This is made to a hasty rhythm, tax for the commander, despite proper it being with a lesionado knee, result of a jump of recent parachute. The data moment, captain Lopes Moral feel some resistance to the course in the military who follow it more behind and order one of its men to investigate the reason. To 02h00, it communicates for the LFG Hidra:

02h00 - the son of puta of the lieutenant ran away with 20 from my men: he traiu me miseravelmente.

It is the defection of Januário lieutenant and the men who follow it, that they will go to the meeting of the forces of the PAIGC to reveal its will to adhere to the movement. E thus falls for land one of the main objectivos of the operation: now it is impossible to contradict the envolvement of Portugal in the events. All the effort of dissimulation of forces and equipment was em.vão. E is also one rude blow for equips SIERRA, that thus sees the half of its dimension reduced.

On board the LFG Orion, commander Alpoim Calvão commands to the ship to change of position, being joined itself it the LDG Bombard and to the LFG Hidra, and orders to disembark equips it POPE, that has for mission to cut the isthmus that separates Conakry I of Conakry II.

He equips it SIERRA continues in direcção to the objectivo. Of the airport, for radio, captain Lopes Moral goes informing the Hidra:

02h15 - I am together objectivo. Encircled airport barbed wire.

02h25 - I covered track and not vi no Mig.

However, bugle calls and noises of engines in the neighboring field hear to militate Alpha Ya-ya.

02h28 - I am to hear the racket of the autometralhadoras to pass.

Taking offense itself at its knee, captain Lopes Moral is with three men the half one of taxi-way and orders 2 second lieutenant Justo and 2º Teixeira sergeant will look to the Mig. Voltam twenty minutes later, informing that in the end of the track they are three old airplanes the helix and that has another track, in beaten land, to the side of the main one. The captain comes back stops backwards and comes close itself to the plate, where they are two Caravelle airplanes, of the Air Afrique, and four Fokker F-27 Friendship. 2 second lieutenant Justo wanted to destroy them, but captain Morais did not authorize.

02h30 - I covered the hangars and they do not meet Mig there nenhuns.

03h00 - I inform that I am encircled by two tank and many troops.

Of the LFG Orion, Alpoim Calvão orders equips it SIERRA to return to the landing place.

To this same hour is communicated since equips them in land that, according to welded made prisoners, the Mig had been sent for the aerodrome of Labé in day 20, had to a ministerial remodelling. An imperfection of intelligence.

This is serious revés for the operation since the security of the forces seriously will be compromised by the possible entrance in share of the MIG. The only available antiaircraft weapons are the Bofors cannons of 40mm that they equip the motor boats. In an limited airspace as it is the case, with 10 cannons until it has reasonable hypotheses to reach the airplanes, but the ships are white easy for an aerial attack. Alpoim Calvão still gives order to equips SIERRA to destroy the track before removing, but already they do not have the mortar and the mines of spalling to be able to make it. It equips it re-embarks in the Hidra for 04h15.

Failed the destruction of the Mig, subsistia still the hope of if finding Sékou Touré.

To 04h30, most of you equip already it had concluded them its mission and it was re-embarked, exceptuando the forces of the FLNG that would be in the land. The situation was the following one:

- Domain of the assured sea

- Objectivos of the PAIGC reached in the biggest part

- freed Prisoners of war

- Domain in land still in dispute, but with strong possibility of success (already it had all equips it available Zulu as reserve and briefing all DFE 21 also)

- Sékou Touré not found

- Migs not found and domain of air not assured.

The factor most important and the risk of one have this age attacked aerial too much serious to be run. If it could not assent that some ship was sunk. Beyond disso, was important to prevent that some Portuguese vestige was left (na height was not known that 2 second lieutenant Januário intended to join ao PAIGC). Commander Alpoim Calvão takes the decision to give the concluded operation for, commanding the return of thus equips them to the ships that its missions are fulfilled. Also he weighs in the decision uncurling of the events of the side of the FLNG: this movement did not not only have the implantation that it said to have, as the survey the national level had not been verified. The Portuguese forces had made its part, causing great damages to the regimen communist of Sékou Touré, and left the FLNG in a very favorable situation to take the power in the capital. The elements of the Front that want to re-embark with the Portuguese forces make it. Others opt to being and continuing the combat.

To 05h00 it only lacks to re-embark some you equip of the Upstream LDG. Thus being, 27-2-1 is given to order to the formation YOU, constituted of LFG Hidra and LDG Bombard, to remove more fast possible of the share zone.

To 6h00, it is commanded to the LFGs Cassiopeia and Dragão still to collaborate with the Sum in the reshipment of the staff in land.

With the sunrise, in all the ships the antiaircraft positions pass the combat ranks. A new day, very special starts for the just-freed Portuguese prisoners, as it remembers António Lobato:

"However the day is, all, in front of full there of sun.

Behind us the immense sea, to the front, an enormous bay, border between the city and the sea. Conakry, the capital of the terror, is there, our feet, begging not to be violated clemency more."

Morning of 22 of November. In the bay of Conakry, the ships wait the last troops to re-embark.

On board the Sum, the troops rest, with the city attacked far.

To 07h40, of a position next to the Palace to the People, they are gone off quatros mortar shots of 82mm in the direcção of the Sum, much badly pointed. The LFG dumb Dragon of position, interposing itself enters the Sum and land to make of shield the staff who re-embarks, and the two ships make fire of 40mm on the position in land. Four shots are enough more them ships not to be attacked.

Against 08h05, the Dragon leans against the Orion to receive material from transfusion of blood destined to the wounded, and to transfer pilot António Lobato.

"the Dragon, moved for an order emanated of the invisible one, starts to dislocate itself cautiously in direcção to another ship anchored here well close. Skillfully maneuvered, it is placed in position to facilitate my overflow.

Helped for the vigorous hand of a sailor, step for edge of the ship that I come to know to call Orion. He is daqui that the orders for the forces in field emanate all, as was daqui that it left the order for my overflow.

Immediately I am lead to the brain of the Operation Green Sea.

In the command bridge, Capitão-Tenente Alpoim Calvão perscruta the sky with the apreensivo, conscientious look of that on itself he weighs all the responsibility for the lives of four hundreds of men, for the return of seven ships to the country and for the success of the operation. When aperceber itself of my presence, he congratulates me warmly, but one would say that he was to my wait to only make me a question that tempers its joust apprehension: "the Mig's, does not appear..."

For force of my profession that is simultaneously my ideal, during all these years of captivity, it stows of course intent to the noises of the sky.

In as much time, less of half dozen of times it was given to hear me the characteristic whistle of the turbines of one hunting. In two of these times, for occasion of visits of Sékou Touré to the region, I could observe, through the gratings of the cell nº7 of the Fort of Kindia, even of Mig's flying very high and efectuando soft maneuvers very. This type of voo is not normal when if it folloies the visit of a President much less when this President is a exibicionista of the power.

He is thus that I bedding my reply, "the Mig's do not come", to the question of Calvão Commander.

I do not know if my words tranquilizam it or not, but exactly thus, to the sight of the enormous lace of people that to the eight hours of the morning full the delinquent of the bay, looking at estupefacta for the invading ships ostensive anchored in waters of the capital, the Commander wait, calmer, half dozen of faulty."

To 08h10, the formation of the ships in losango, more appropriate is commanded against aerial attacks, to initial evasivo route 240.

"people with the eyes Are all fitos in the beach donde if it waits to see to appear the faulty group. After about one hour of exasperante tension, a group of half dozen of men runs to the long one of the sand, under the look of a atónita ousadia so great multitude.

Immediately a small boat is launched to the water and 2º-Tenente Rebordão de Brito, going too far itself it all, goes until the o to break of the waves to collect the last invaders.

They are about the nine hours of the morning. The ships head for the plaza furrowing waters in direcção to the freedom.

It stops backwards is a people the accounts with the madness of its President who goes to use the Portuguese intervention to eliminate, one more time, all those that imagine to be able to remove the power to it. It goes to accuse all, exactly the ones that during the attack had tried to organize an impossible resistance." (António Lobato)

"To the nine of the morning, I had the city in the hands. What it lacked to me was the air support." (Guillermo de Alpoim Calvão)

The naval force however takes the way of return to the Portuguese Guiné, without profits, keeping the highest degree of antiaircraft promptitude until the o to put of the Sun.

They arrive in the following day at the island of Soga, where they anchor to 15h30. In this night none of the Portuguese former-prisoners of war uses to advantage to sleep: they are too much busy to festejar!

Suffering only 3 dead and 3 serious wounded, the landing force had of knocked down fact the regimen of Sékou Touré in the capital, destroyed significant part of its Armed Forces (including all its Navy), freed 26 Portuguese prisoners of war and 400 prisoners guineenses politicians, and inflicted about 500 died the enemy. The reached targets had been:


 * Presidential palace * Ministry of the Interior * Direcção of the Gendarmerie * House of Lansana Beavogui * House of Sayfoullah Diallo * Quarter of the Gendarmerie * Ministry of the Foreign affairses * Paternal building * Post offices and Services of Linking * Shipyards (ships of the PAIGC and the RGC) * Sender of Boulbinet * Union * Lodging of the Soviet military council members * Commissariat of 6ª Avenue * Old studio of the Guiné Radio * Mobile squad of the Gendarmerie * Archives of Parti Democratique de Guinée * Services of Security/Arrest * Military field of Samory * Station of Radiotelegraphy * Power plant * Central banking (BCG) * Federacy Conakry I * Field of the Popular Military service of Conakry * Villa Silly (portuguese orginal reads: * Palácio Presidencial * Ministério do Interior * Direcção da Gendarmerie * Casa de Lansana Beavogui * Casa de Sayfoullah Diallo * Quartel da Gendarmerie * Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros * Edifício Paternal * Correios e Serviços de Ligação * Estaleiros (navios do PAIGC e da RGC) * Emissora de Boulbinet * Sindicato * Alojamento dos conselheiros militares soviéticos * Comissariado da 6ª Avenida * Antigo estúdio da Rádio Guiné * Pelotão Móvel da Gendarmerie * Arquivos do Parti Democratique de Guinée * Serviços de Segurança / Prisão * Campo Militar de Samory * Estação de Radiotelegrafia * Central eléctrica * Banco Central (BCG) * Federação Conakry I * Campo da Milícia Popular de Conakry * Villa Silly )

Of the 26 targets, only the Airport was unbroken. One of the felt difficulties more was to evidence that much of the information (about 30%) gotten for the preparation of the operation was incorrecta. Due to postponed information, it had been left to escape Mig. Only one arrived to fly over Conakry, the great altitude and without at least giving signals of wanting to attack the ships. One knew later that the pilots of the Guiné-Conakry still were to receive instruction and they were not qualified to execute combat shares.

Also the elimination of Sékou Touré failed. The information of that it would be in the Villa Silly had origin in a source of the Private Services of the RFA infiltrated in the proper Presidential Palace. But, even so nor all the targets have been reached, the rocking of the operations are very positive. Same E that had not obtained more nothing, for the release of the Portuguese prisoners of war in the hands of the PAIGC already the Operation Green Sea would only have validates the penalty.

The Portuguese prisoners of war, in the trip of return, on board the LFG Dragon

Copyright Fórum Armed - 2005

PART 4

The OPERATION GREEN SEA

Part 4 - The Epilogue

If not giving the waited survey in all the country, the forces of the FLNG had been incapable to knock down the regimen, front to the counterattack of the faithful forces the Sékou Touré, comings of the interior, and a contingent of Cuban troops. The combats had lasted some days, having suffered the died numerous FLNG and 100 of its members are made prisoners. The guineense dictator finishes for coming back to have the city under its control. The prisoners tell the operation and disclose the names of its mentors. The international scandal is followed, habilmente explored for the regimen of the Guiné-Conakry.

Lisbon denies any envolvement in the events, but the United Nation Security Council congregates itself of emergency and approves two resolutions against Portugal: one condemning the Operation Green Sea, and another one sending an inquiry commission the Conakry. The Nigéria offers the sending of a contingent of troops to prevent new Portuguese attacks. Sékou Touré asks for military aid to the Ussr and to U.S.A.. The Soviet Union answers ordering a naval force consisting by three warships, that start to be established in Conakry, and that she is known as the West Africa Patrol and, in the Joined Nations, it complains the Portuguese withdrawal of Bissau.

How much to the United States, they are furious with Portugal. Kissinger blows up: "This nastiness of this dictatorship alone in them brings problems". Seeing the rapidity with that the Ussr takes off left of the situation, and knowing of the North American mining investment of company in the bauxite reserves of the Guiné-Conakry, president Nixon attributes to the country helps to feed in the value of 4,7 million dollar. E sends a confidential letter the Sékou Touré lamenting the incidents. In the following day, the White House is surprised by the guineense dictator, who becomes public the letter, thanking it as "a message of affection and support for occasion of the serious and criminal aggression of Portugal". For its side, the Federal Republic of Germany cuts diplomatical relations with the Guiné-Conakry, in result of the death of a German diplomat during the events in the guineense capital.

Of the point of view diplomatist, the results of the Operation Green Sea are countyer-productive, therefore they put in evidence the international isolation of Portugal, and afectaram the relations sufficiently luso-Americans. An officer of the General staff of Spínola relieved to Washington Post:

"We have that to pursue the guerrillas. But if we make what the Americans make in the Cambodja and the Laos, the entire world sets it the shouts against us - including the Americans ".

On the other hand, the Ussr and Cuba had consideravelmente increased the material aid to the PAIGC, and the Ussr less constructed a naval base in Conakry, denounced for Portugal of one year later. The Soviets compensate the loss of the four Komar motor boats offering to the equal Guiné-Conaktry number of P6, and six motor boats of coastal patrol. In U.S.A., he verified himself that the Ussr if had become much more adventurer in Africa Occidental person and that Portugal ran the risk "to face the Soviets alone".

In the Guiné-Conakry, and the sequência of the invasion, the repression is implacable. The rebels who are not apanhados, are executed without mercy, such as all the ones that are white of suspicion. Thousands of people are deceased. Its bodies are desmembrados and the streets of Conakry full of arms and legs hung of trees, oil lamps and signals of transit. The population lives frightened.

"Four bodies baloiçam under the Tombé bridge, in the auto-road to the entrance of Conakry. In front of the bodies in decomposition under the implacable sun of January, they dance megeras ignobilmente that they show in the extremities of long poles, the sexual agencies of the convict "(Jean Paul Alata, in Arrest of Africa)

The defection of Januário lieutenant and the twenty men who had folloied it, abandoning equips it SIERRA, is of short duration: its adhesion to the PAIGC is not acceptance and is fusilladed in Conakry.

Any that has been the politically negative aspects, of the military point of view, the Operation Green Sea demonstrated as a small group of well trained troops can launch the chaos in a country, in surgical attacks of forces special. The Portuguese troops had executed its missions without the trainings specific habitual in raides of operations special, a time that had only taken knowledge of the operation hours before the departure. In contrast of the enemy and the allies of the FLNG, they had been for the combat with weapons that were not the prescribed ones, very different of that used habitually. Such was only possible for being well trained and extremely experienced troops. The Armed Forces, under the orientation of an exception military man as it is Alpoim Calvão, had demonstrated to an initiative and a capacity of surprising intervention on the part of the Armed Forces of a country small e that in the height made face to a good dose of international isolation. With half extremely limited they had taken the handle an ambitious operation and that, in equal situation, if it was made by other powers (as U.S.A. or the Kingdom, for example) normally would imply the job of half avultados. The example would be followed, in very lesser dimension for Africa of the South, with raides of commands against the neighboring countries. The Operation Green Sea was also source of inspiration for the book "Dogs of War", of Frederick Forsyth.

In the pursuing of the operation, in 1970, the participants in the Operation Green Sea and the freed prisoners of war in Conakry had committed themselves to fulfill a silence pact to it. This pact was broken by a small number, between them proper estratego and operational commander, Alpoim Calvão, that also published a book on the events. Other workmanships relate to this operation, having public station of television, the RTP, made a set of documents in years 90. However, in the 2005, official position of the Portuguese State it continues to be that the Operation Green Sea never existed.

In 1995, in declaration to the RTP, then the President of the Republic of the Guiné-Conakry it praised the invasion of its country for the Portuguese, seeing it as a lost chance to free the country of the yoke of Sékou Touré. E said that the Portuguese military had made what it is a natural desire of the Armed Forces of any country: to free its prisoners of war.

END

Copyright 2005 - Fórum Armed

Bibliography:

"Of Conakry to the MDLP", Guillermo de Alpoim Calvão, Intervention, Lisbon, 1976

"Great Reporter RTP: The Operation Green Sea ", RTP, 1995

"Battles and Combats of the Portuguese Navy - Volume VIII: 1808-1975 ", Saturnine Hunter, Sá Bookstore of the Coast, 1997

"Americanos and Portugal - Nixon and Caetano - Promises and abandonment", Jose Freire Antunes, Cultural Diffusion, Lisbon, 1986

"the War of Africa 1961-1974 - Volume I", Jose Freire Antunes, Circle of Readers, Lisbon, 1995

"Freedom or Evasion - the longest captivity of the war", António Lobato, Erasmos Woman editor, Fan, 1995

"the Last Warriors of the Empire", Rui Rodrigues (coordination), Erasmos Woman editor, Fan, 1995

"Colonial War", Aniceto Alfonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes, Editorial Notice, 2000

Bibliografia:

«De Conakry ao MDLP», Guilherme de Alpoim Calvão, Intervenção, Lisboa, 1976

«Grande Repórter RTP: A Operação Mar Verde», RTP, 1995

«Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa - Volume VIII: 1808-1975», Saturnino Monteiro, Livraria Sá da Costa, 1997

«Os Americanos e Portugal - Nixon e Caetano - Promessas e abandono», José Freire Antunes, Difusão Cultural, Lisboa, 1986

«A Guerra de África 1961-1974 - Volume I», José Freire Antunes, Círculo de Leitores, Lisboa, 1995

«Liberdade ou Evasão - O mais longo cativeiro da guerra», António Lobato, Editora Erasmos, Amadora, 1995

«Os Últimos Guerreiros do Império», Rui Rodrigues (coordenação), Editora Erasmos, Amadora, 1995

«Guerra Colonial», Aniceto Afonso, Carlos de Matos Gomes, Editorial Notícias, 2000

«Revista da Armada»

http://historiaeciencia.weblog.com.pt/arquivo/031226.html História e Ciência Sandra Cristina Almeida

novembro 09, 2003 ENTREVISTAS EM TORNO DO 25 DE ABRIL: Alpoim Calvão

History and Science Posts relative the different conceptions of the Historical one to the long one of the times. Philosophies or Theories of History. History of the Culture and the Mentalities. Historical episodes. Structures and Conjunctures. Publications in the scope of History. Sites, assays, interviews, commentaries. Notes. Notes. Posts relative to the scientific knowledge. CONTACT: Sandra Cristina Almeida (almeida649@hotmail.com) "INTERVIEWS AROUND THE 25 OF APRIL. Note | Entrance | 1972: The YEAR Of The RIBEIRO DEATH SAINTS. Note " November 09, 2003 INTERVIEWS AROUND THE 25 OF APRIL: Alpoim CalvÃ£o

Alpoim CalvÃ£o was born in Keys, lived in MoÃ§ambique, frequentou the Naval School, made the course of the Navy and was some times in the combat front, in the war of Africa. He was one of the decorated officers more of the Armed Forces, distinguishing itself in November of 1971 when it lead the failed invasion of the GuinÃ©-Conakry.

INTERVIEW WITH ALPOIM CALVÃƒO

PUBLIC- When he is that he heard to speak for the first time of the 25 of April?

ALPOIM CALVÃƒO- When I was invited to participate in the movement for then the commander Pine of Azevedo.

P- When it was this?

R- One 6 or 7 weeks before the 25 of April.

P- It accepted?

R- Not, I did not accept. It spoke me (ahead of that he can testify this colloquy), in a movement that he intended to put end to the previous regimen and in the necessity of democratization. I made it to it only question that stops me was fulcral: "and overseas, as it is". It answered me that it was a question of autodeterminaÃ§Ãµes, I found that this vacant age and I insisted. Clearly that I found that the democracies are less bad of regimes but wanted guarantees on overseas. As it did not leave the auto-determination, I asked for not to count to it on me.

P- SpÃ­nola Knew well, is with it in the GuinÃ©. They had never spoken of the MFA?

R- Not.

P- it had read the book of it?

R- I read "Portugal and the Future".

P- What it finds? How it reads the book?

R- One was achega important for the only problem that we had that he was politician. It was a reflection that all people made: having the Armed Forces during 13 years given a space of maneuver for, in the metropolis, if thinking the problem politically and if taking initiatives, the truth is that nobody took them. I considered the book of general SpÃ­nola as one strong contribution to explain to the consisting power, that had other solutions for beyond that iimmobilism. All we perceived as the meandros of the power were fragile as by the way it is confirmed for this correspondence between Marcello Caetano and Salazar: it was complicated and fragile the teia of being able inside of so proclaimed dictatorship...

P- In day 25 of April, when it saw its comrades in the television, what she said proper itself?

R- It knew some: SpÃ­nola, Coast Gomes, the Bruno, Garci'a Dos Santos who was of my course. But vi there people that me left the biggest doubts. The Melo Antunes, for example. I wise person for the convivÃªncia that with it has when we frequentÃ¡mos both the School of the Army -, that he was a man of marxist root, what by the way never hid. For the way as the day it elapsed, I perceived that the Box of Pandora confides and that all those men were tipsy with the small possibility to be Che Guevarazinhos. Later, all the revolutionary process walked during months to the hard jolts and collisions, to the flavor of the event of the day... What evidently it hindered any share on the part of the forces that if had grouped behind SpÃ­nola -, of if putting in practical the initial program of the MFA.

P- But in that context and forty years after Salazar, it was not fatal that the signal of the revolution was to the left?

R- At the time it was fatal, senÃ£o would call counterrevolution. This revolutionary romantismo that found that only the release of the peoples for the force of the weapons is legitimate... All gÃ©nese of the independentistas movements of the former-colÃ³nias lode of this global concept of the freedom for the fight armed. Reason for which I, agreeing to the necessity of the Movement of the MFA, says the Pine of Azevedo that if would have to take the power but to harden the conditions still more. It is that it had a clivagem between who was in Africa and the air of the Metropolis... It cost to who fought there, to see a certain euphoria, a certain laxismo here...

P- Then what it would have lawyer?

R- In first the six months the war efforts would be redoubled where it had war, GuinÃ©, Angola, MoÃ§ambique. Later, it would be announced the world that we would go to give to the autonomy Green Handle and S. TomÃ©- to the others not, because it was in war. An autonomy passing for the self-determination that escolhecem: with independent Portugal, or associates the Portugal or of us. This us would have given very bigger a business force and would take off the reason to the movements that in fought them for the weapons. Nobody never makes dialogue attempts to get, in another way, independences or auto-determination, the fight was started soon armed...

P- Coming back Portugal: which was its share in the 28 of September?

R- The 28 of September were organized by on people general SpÃ­nola and were a last attempt for giving a demonstration to it of civic support, in the ideia of that it could lead back a time more the PREC to the dictated principles and acceptances for the people, in day 25 of April.

P general SpÃ­nola was despaired? Or perplexed?

R- It never asked for that mobilization that we intended. But in multiple colloquies she counted its immense concerns on the speed with that everything escaped to it of the hands, with that the people moved of opinion; the speed with that, for example, Coast Gomes, in 25 of August of 74, it takes off the carpet of the feet. E on the sadness and the disgust with that it are obliged to make a speech on the independence of MoÃ§ambique, because Coast 150 Gomeses announced to it that company would have that they would surrender if it, SpÃ­nola, immediately did not announce the end of the hostilities.

P... but because it is that it did not denounce the pressures of that was white, did not oppose they?

R- But it tried opÃ´r of all the ways! He repairs that to be able itself to reveal he had to be orders to somebody but this somebody never fulfilled these orders...

P Who age this "somebody"? Coast Gomes?

R- Yes, the head of the State Biggest of the Armed Forces... The clivagem started soon there.

P But the 28 of September was a failure full...

R- The communist party mobilized itself total, raised barriers, etc. I remember passing them of pistol in the hand to be able to go the BelÃ©m! I know for interposed person, since there it does not stow -, that in a meeting that had in this night in BelÃ©m, general Neto gave a slap in the Vasco GonÃ§alves, that this if complained for the other to have beaten to it, but that it did not pass of this... He did not appear nobody in the manifestation, the people had had fear of the barriers, the pregos in the soil, etc. The military who had promised to put into motion not had made it... E was everything in same and general still more isolated SpÃ­nola. By the way nor in the proper Advice of State it had support... The proper professor Freitas of the Amaral that had considered to it to write two decrees, one for the emergency state, another one for the state of siege, that I also know it I did not write them...

P Is from there that they decide to leave for another one? To react, passing to "superior forms of fight"?

R- For curious that it seems, this reaction it is initiated with a document that has the visa of general Costa Gomes and of that I have a copy (...). I am here, is a document, supported for a series of officers, where if it describes the situation, underlining that it nothing has to see with the program presented to the country in 25 of April, and where if it describes the necessity to change the state of the things. For example, this historia text the conclusions of an occured meeting of 7 for 8 of August, according to which sobressai the hypothesis of cancellation of the President of the Republic and the Heads of the State Biggest of the Army and Air Force; it denounces the existence of a Coordinating Commission that was illegal because never it are foreseen in the program of the illegitimate MFA- and because never it are democraticamente elect, etc. General Costa Gomes to who if showed to this our document for a question of military ethics -, apÃµe its visa, but later, when collated with it, she says that the fact of it to have rank the visa and signed having, did not mean that forcibly it agreed.

P From there until the a formation of the MDLP was a step?

R- This document was gÃ©nese and congregated Ã¡ here its return much people worried about the floor of the things and for the route that they took in Africa where if they invented broken politicians for delivering the power to them. Admiral Rosa Coutinho, has times in the television, exactly said that when High Commissariat in Angola took ownership of its, wise person to who not to deliver the power. We knew that the MPLA has six months that it disappears of the land, the FNLA- said me the Holden personally Robert, in the Ambriz, September of 75- had conditions to aguentar months more one or two, the UNITA all people wise person who would have 300 guerrillas. However it is the MFA of the time that force the delivery in these conditions: she was necessary to walk to run to grasp the remaining portions of these parties, to finance them, to look pictures, etc. Everything was made by this MFA, always dominated by that dominant dull ideia of that the freedom of the peoples alone could be obtained by the force of the weapons and that only the parties that fought it is that they had right to sit down it the table of the negotiations and to take the power. It was what it was transferred.

P However has this your document and the defeat of SpÃ­nola. In face of this, that had decided to make?

R- From the speech of resignation of it, it started to have conversations to see itself if if they minimized males.

P This is vacant. What they wanted? That objectivos had?

R- To stop the communist party. I was formed in the fight against the ideia, the philosophy and the form of the communism, against the dictatorship of the proletariat, the espezinhamento of the man and the "nomenklaturas" living in its "datchas". If it was only insensitive is that it would not leave for this war. I left.

P Left then for this war. It had the 11 of March however: which is its version on this event?

R- As she was necessary to stop the PC, it started gizar-if with the contribution of members of the Advice of the Twenty -, a plan to use to advantage certain easinesses that had. For example: we knew that if he could count on the guard of BelÃ©m, where this Advice if congregated. This Guard was assured for some forces between them a company of parachutists whose captain would be available for the operations that we wanted to make.

P Which were these operations?

R- To arrest some members of the Advice of the Twenty that we knew on to the PC. E through a palaciano blow, to stop the route of the PREC. The more difficult things went being each time, already nor we had general SpÃ­nola in the Presidency of the Republic.... But they had been installing doubts, had suspicion of information escapes, diffidences, some of that were with me had considered that it was had still to hear this or that one, etc. The first attempt made in a night where this such company was of guard failed exactly because it had people that they had not appeared because of the such doubts. However this company whose official commander was close to us -, only came back to be of service one month later, that is, would only be turned to try of new, from 17 of March. However in this interval, I left myself to be, although to suspect already of most serious escapes of information. In day 10 of March an officer comes to have with me and speaks to me of the "slaughter of Passover": a "operation" that the PC would go to take the handle to eliminate the against-revolutionaries, between which I. I did not make case but of surprise something alerted to me. He was when this friend said me that after all our attempt of taking of being able in the Palace of programmed BelÃ©m- already for 17- would be made before, days later. "As", I interrogated it. It said me that the Air base of Tancos was of acodo, that the parachutists of Rafael DurÃ£o would go to participate and that was enough to take general SpÃ­nola Tancos and to protect it. I was for Tancos without knowing what it was transferred.

P But as is possible, that it has fallen from there below, a superior and tried officer as it was?

R- I was prepared for, in a palaciano blow, to grasp some elements of the Advice of the Twenty and he does not stop to that... But if that people to who are on all this time were in the disposal to proceed from another way, if they said that the Air Force was connosco, I to me I trusted. Moreover already it did not have time, it was to dive or to abandon the ship. As I am not rat, I was. I appeared in Tancos to the 2 of the morning, and heard SpÃ­nola, in the way of the confusion and the bubbling, to say me: "I am to see that it does not have plan none". It said to it that we went to try to hold some thing. We had the Military Region of Brigadier General Morais, the proper Base of Tancos, etc. But I distrusted still more when I heard the Commander of the Base of Tancos to say to the telephone the Head of the State Biggest of the Air Force, general Mendes Days, "that yes, that they were all with it". It did not have nor organization, nor time, everything precipitated: the parachutists leave to attack the Ralis, the airplanes unglue, but everything processed without base nor organization... The Radio was come to ruin Club but nobody wise person where she was the Sender...

P Conclusion?

R- This history of the "slaughter of Passover" was a formidable trap! The ferret launched itself and the rabbits had left. Some people had been of helicopter for Spain with SpÃ­nola, others had been. When the general was for Brazil was I already in Madrid - there, I obtained to arrange ways to go to see it and to the officers who had followed it. She was from there that if she started to activate the Democratic Front for the Release of Portugal, later Democratic Movement for the Release of Portugal.

P Where and as enlisted the people for the MDLP?

R- It was an opened movement, the people passed word... From certain height the rows had been thickening and people had been in Portugal, others in Madrid. I? She walked of a side for the other, the jump, although diverse mandates of capture and the accusation for 17 crimes.

P Of where came the financings?

R- To the principle, of the proper ones. It had much people of the north that smuggled things through the border. Proper I vendi, in a antiquÃ¡rio of Madrid, a service that belonged to me, of the Company of India, with which I financed, of beginning, these mine andanÃ§as. Later they had been appearing people, as for example the Manuel Queiroz Pear tree who contributed monthly for the Movement. Later, who started to control the finances was dr. Manuel Cotta Days.

P Had much people of the old on regimen to the MDLP?

R- Figures of nose, not. It had until people who dantes had made opposition to the regimen and that they had started to collaborate connosco, did not like it route that the PREC took.

P and of the regimen left the 25 of April?

R- It repairs that we in them knew all: I am of the course of the Almeida Bruno, the Melo Antunes, Garci'a Dos Santos, the Eanes, the Jaime Snows, etc, etc. E the fact of together terms been at least one year in the Military School, gave a great knowledge, ones to us of the others. Therefore, we had narrow contacts with many officers. In the Advice of the Revolution, with I sing and I castrate and Freire Pine, for example, but inside of the Army also. The Eanes was contactado but as already it was compromised to the group of the Nine, could not accept. However, it was always to the chain of everything, knew to each moment what it was gone passing. I remember that the lieutenant colonel Days Rasp, that is with SpÃ­nola in the GuinÃ© and the Presidency of the Republic, if dislocated a time Spain to say with SÃ¡ Sheep when it was there in convalescence, to inform it. It also had contact with the CDS and the proper PS, but my function of the MDLP always was essentially operational...

P... that is?

R-... it dislocated me of the country inside, organized the cells, the MDLP arrived to have a complicated structure: a directÃ³rio presided over for general SpÃ­nola; a Cabinet Politician where they were Jose Miguel JÃºdice, Jose Valley Figueiredo, the SÃ¡ Luis Wedge, among others. E a composed operational organization for Gilbert Saints and I castrate, the lieutenant colonel Saucers of Rasp and for proper me. E in the interior, had the coordinating commissions: one in the north, another one in the center and was to organize it of the south.

P What it was the work in the "interior"?

R- To mobilize, to clarify and also to cement the ideia of that, if it had an armed conflict what we did not exclude had that to be prepared for it: to know where if they deposited the weapons, which would be the forces that in the three branches of the Armed Forces would distribute the weapons, etc.

P Where had arranged these weapons?

R- In the Army, over all. For my part I arranged two a thousand weapons that asked for to the Holden Robert in exchange for an operation that would make it to close the port of Luanda- that after all finished for not consummating itself. But this is another history... But the Holden Robert fulfilled the part of it, delivered to it to two a thousand weapons and the five hundred a thousand ammunition.

P Where was these weapons?

R- They were in Tunisia, we carried them as if they were for Angola and the ship, to arriving the Gibraltar, headed the north it was for Cadiz. There, through contact that I established with Civil Guarda and its contribution -, foiz us indicated a small port where it was possible to unload the armament and conduziz it, in light trucks, for Spain, until Tuy. When we walked in this, gives the 25 of November and the MDLP started to get rid itself. E the weapons had been deliver to the Spanish authorities.

P Wanted to stop the Communist Party. But dr. MÃ¡rio Soares also. How they looked at for it? Them it did not seem that it well was placed with most of the country behind of it -, to cheat your objectivo that was also of it?

R- Respeiro the President of the Republic, already respect less dr. MÃ¡rio Soares. It passed for the PC, it worked in S. TomÃ© for the large estate owners, Paris was lawyer of bankers. It is in its right, was an option. But who I eat I lived the African question, I could not applaud nor to agree to the way as it, as Minister of the Foreigners, ran pressurosamente for the world is, to deliver the provinces more fast possible! I recognize its you endow politicians, I know that he is a culture man, but in this time, all had the biggest diffidences of that haste!

P Alone dr. MÃ¡rio Soares infused it this diffidence?

R- Not, clearly, it had the same diffidence in relation to many military, for example: they came to the gravies to eat to the table of the power! Some Council members of the Revolution walked in a desvario, to divide the BMW of the Jorge de Brito or the Mercedes of the Jorge de Mello... Others, civil or military, daily insulted in the radio the Portuguese soldiers who were in Africa... But as well as I say this, I recognize that a basic objectivo was obtained: the democracy, less bad of the systems, most solid, although everything.

P Spoke has little that the MDLP if desmembrou from November. But until there, that participation yours had in the 25 of November?

R- AliÃ¡mos the people of the north, since the rapaziada one of the Alentejo walked in the euphoria of the agrarian reform.

P Who is the people of the north?

R- People are all, since the Church the thousand of people...

P cÃ³nego Melo, of Braga?

R- Yes, cÃ³nego Melo was a rock key in all this movement.

P Who set on fire the headquarters of the PC in the north? R- You had already some other movements in the land. For example, it had a called pirate Paradela de Abreu, but that she was a useful pirate. E the linking of its movement "Maria of the Source" - connosco, was done for the engineer Jorge Garden, for who I had consideration and admiration. He had thus some movements as this that if had joined we and arrived to have 10, 15, 20 a thousand people as he happened in Braga and noutros small farms. When of the Cultural DinamizaÃ§Ã£o the certain villages arrived found 50 donkeys to the wait of them and the desert village... The headquarters had been set on fire, were reacted... A vacant of deep was generated thus where some entered for the reverse speed-of-soil and the others, they leave to fly for the first one to walk. But in many headquarters the Communists had defended it caÃ§adeira shot... Either as she will be, much people arranged themselves what she explains that, the given height, the MDLP had cheated a certain expression and importance.

P Coming back the November of 75...

R- Although to have already in this height many contacts with officers of some sides, with the group of the Nine, civilians of the parties, the 25 of November passed for a black nail: when it is broken military regulations it and the command chain, nobody knows to who to obey. Exactly the Jaime Snows one of the nose figures alone had to trust half dozen of men! E one of the responsible ones for success of this 25 of November was the Otelo.

P As thus?

R- Because he was it who reintegrated the Jaime Snows in the Commands. It outside saneado by one grupÃºsculo of extremistas- and the ones that supported it had one more time been paralyzed - but when after this the Otelo it goes to the Fan and, arriving at the conclusion of whom after all almost all wanted the Jaime Snows in return, it reintegrates... If it does not have it fact, is certain of that the 25 of November would not have occurred nor in that date, nor in that way.

P and the MDLP, were satisfied with the 25 of November? Or...

R- ... I do not know well if some time read the objectivos of the MDLP... One of them was the guarantee of democratic elections. E when it happens the 25 of November, arises question to know who to it went to speak to explain the things... because it was necessary sense and serenity, all that people wanted to eat the Communists! It had the general consensus of that it would have to be the Eanes... but clearly that if the Eanes was to the television, the Communists did not believe. E was the Melo Antunes. But it, intentionally or not, instead of to say what it would be acceptance for that the culprits of the situation the one that if arrives had been the Communists, declared that the PC was basic for the democracy in Portugal. The majority of ours thought: "Then one became the 25 of November and these types continue"?

_ p But what be that this majority of people that be obtain want make to the PC?

R- I never was at least of most radical, but I think that he could have had more balance. A thing is to say that the PC was "basic for the democracy", another age to have left clearly before the country that they had been the culprits and later then giving generously the "possibility to them" to recover and to participate in the construction of the democracy.

P That happened to the MDLP after this? R- We were closing the store devagarinho... but continuing to say ones with the others. Pine of Azevedo asked for to one day the Vitor Alves, then minister of the Education, that was there above to speak with me. We met, was easy to dialogue with it, we agreed that the things had run badly until there for cause of these great democrats who are the Communists, but that she enters we, we wanted all after all the same thing... Simply it had more radical sectors in the MDLP to murmur that "after all it was everything in the same one, ue some of them continued with mandates of capture" etc. The result was that some of these elements had entered in a species of difficult self management to stop... There they had appeared bombs that nobody ordered to put...

P Already after the 25 of November?

R- Yes. Before this, they can say that I was who I ordered them to put, to all, that I do not contradict. After this, nor one! Well, the things had been deciding for the time and for the dialogue, even so, inside of that it remained of the MDLP, it had still who continued to put bombs for profession almost... Already I did not have nothing to see with this.

P Twenty years later finds that the MDLP had of fact a paper?

R- It had, he was positive, in some heights was same a referencial. The press published things, made interviews, obtained to publicitar our objectivos and simultaneously to angariar more people, more wills. Much people felt that of fact some thing if would obtain. What she came to happen, with the elections of April of 76. Later, people erased themselves, were each one to its life.

P However, has independence in the some Ãfricas...

R- Who lived this tremendously everything was Gilbert Saints and Castrates that it worked during months and months with the Holden Robert in Angola. We were in Madrid, it we changed ourselves for Angola.

P Reason with the FNLA?

R- Because he was who fought in the land. The UNITA did not fight, the MPLA was half dozen of people... was construÃ­ndo and financed for the Coutinho Rose and the MFA. With money and everything.

P Has tests of this?

R- We knew this but now who is the proper Coutinho Rose comes it to say to the TV...

P Is case to say that to each one, its supports: the CIA supported the FNLA...

R- It supported, also we knew it. The Holden Robert had Brazilian officers of II the Army as observing and the Fernando Casculho Chamber as a species of Minister of the Information and also counted on zairenses troops.

P and in the exterior?

R- In the exterior it counted equally on supports. In Paris it had a representative of the Holden, Miguel Corner, that co-ordinated the financial support to the FNLA.

P Has little related that I change it of weapons, if disponibilizou to close the port of Luanda, in favor of the FNLA. It did not arrive to make it. Reason?

R- If if it closed the port what it was not difficult, is one piscininha with a width mile and 30 meters of depth the MPLA would die because it left of being supplied. Miguel Corner caught in this ideia and I was invited to go Angola, to the Ambriz, speech with the Holden Robert and Gilbert Saints and Castrate. Me they had said that the Holden did not say Portuguese, expressed in a Portuguese correctÃ­ssimo. In this height, in September of 75, they were to come close itself to quilÃ³metro 16, of the water station. When the plan to the individual of the CIA, it was submitted also agreed. But one days later, it does not ask reason to me, the CIA says that it does not make the operation. But despite this, the Holden Robert gives the weapons to me who promises to me.

(...)

P the 25 of April appears twenty years to it later, as negative?

R- Of the three "D", only one was become fullfilled: the democratization of the country. The descolonizaÃ§Ã£o was what it saw, is what it is known. The development... happened by chance and later. Because during years and years, after the 25 of April, had the destruction of the fabric industrial Portuguese, the subversion of all the rules of the economy. It had jobs to catadupas, launched money the rodos. Until it came the European integration, even so somebody comes one day to pay the invoice of deep the communitarian ones... But this question brings another one: which will be our identity in the Europe with all the other closed ways is not to see, at least in the next years, a return Africa... Therefore, which will be then this identity?

(...) Published for sandra in November 9, 2003 03:04 p.m. Commentaries

I nao kero nothing of this I kero and koisas on general Gomes coast fire Affixed for: jessica in January 13, 2004 06:05 p.m.

General "Gomes Coast" or Coast Gomes? ;) Calm, goes to appear. Affixed for: Sandra in January 13, 2004 06:32 p.m.

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Military Photos > General > Military History and Tactics > Operation 'Mar Verde' (Green Sea) - 1970 PDA

View Full Version : Operation 'Mar Verde' (Green Sea) - 1970 Lancero 11-03-2007, 03:33 PM I'll post a document about the little known (abroad) operation Mar Verde (Green Sea) that took place in Guinea, 1970, during the portuguese African War. It's a 4 part document that I'll try to post in the next days. It's my translation from portuguese Forum Armada - all credits go to them and all errors to my translation.

THE OPERATION GREEN SEA

Part 1 - The context of the war in Guinea

Since 1963 the Portuguese Armed Forces faced a guerrilla war carried out by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Despite having promoted disobedience in 1961, the year in which the attention of Portugal were focused at the beginning of the war in Angola, it was from January that the PAIGC, supported by the Soviet and its bloc undertook what was the most difficult guerrilla that Portugal had to face. The conditions of the theater of operations were the most unfavorable to Portugal. First, the lack of the area (36,125 km2), without strategic depth. Second, the fact that, following the independence of the French and British colonies, Guinea become a small European colonial enclave in a region of new independent states politically adverse to Portugal. This was the case for both neighbors, Guinea-Conakry (pro-Soviet) and Senegal, which allowed the use of their territory as sanctuaries for the PAIGC. The geography was problematic, and most of the territory a real labyrinth of rivers and canals between small islands and peninsulas. With the full tide, one third of the territory submerged, and when the tide empty it discovered extensive mud areas of difficult acess. Shalow sea lanes largely limited to navigation, placed limits on the size of military vessels, and the efficiency of maritime transport. The road network was precarious outside of the few big cities, the same goes for port infrastructure, exception to the port of Bissau. Outside the savannas and mountainous areas (small) of the interior, the climate is harsh and unhealthy, with high relative humidity throughout the year, and normal temperatures well above 40 °C. The coastal jungles contain all the elements usually harmful to the human presence. The great ethnic and religious diversity of the indigenous population was not necessarily an obstacle, since there was, at the same time, groups favorable and unfavorable to Portugal. But this context, where coexisted a large number of local languages and dialects, together with cultural habits, social and religious different, forced a proliferation of adaptations of procedure that the Armed Forces had to do, according to the tactical and diplomatic interests, on the relationship with the people. This effort was all too apparent from the moment there were created military units formed exclusively by indigenous, both regular and milicia - in 1974 70% of the total Portuguese Armed Forces, 80% if only the Army account. In addition to these factors with more direct influence on the conduct of military operations, there were aspects that led to the question of why Portugal invest in the defense of their presence in Guinea. First, the fact that Guinea is a very poor area and delayed, with scarce natural resources. In economic terms, Portugal had no income with Guinea and, by contrast, the revenue of the province was insufficient to support the maintenance of the administrative, educational and medical assistance. The Guinea depended on funds from metropolitan Portugal and this dependence increased with the outbreak of the war of insurrection. The economic and cultural reality also was a reflection of the little population of European origin, the result of climate, and the consequent low public investment in the territory - note that the government was run by Cape Verdeans and most of the business was done by Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. This led the military (Europeans) to ask the reason for the effort of war, with consequences in the motivation and morale of the troops.

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PAIGC insurgents

There were three strong arguments to justify the effort in Guinea. First, the majority of the indigenous population was keen to remain Portuguese, for several reasons. In a country with ethnic and religious diversity, in which Portugal acted as a neutral and stabilizing between local rivalries, the Portuguese presence was seen as a guarantor of peace. Also the fact of the PAIGC, be of communist ideology - being in favor of major changes in the organization of social, economic, cultural and religious diversity of the country - earned him the distrust and enmity of a significant part of the population (beginning with Muslims, the second largest religious group, 40% of the population) who did not accept the prospect of radically change its way of life and its institutions. Under Portuguese sovereignty, the population of Guinea was not only free to maintain their way of life as it had the benefits of living under a European quality of administration (for example, the Central Hospital of Bissau was the most well-equipped across West Africa). In addition to this, with the course of time, were known the bad experiences of other African countries in the post-independence, with economic disasters, civil wars and regimes that made the lives of people a ordeal. Although, in the course of the war and the contact of the PAIGC with the population, a greater percentage shift their loyalty to the independence side, there was a increase of support to Portugal from the remainder population. This would be the source in the plans, by both sides, to find a political solution to Guinea through autonomy instead of independence.

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A typical patrol boat from Portuguese: the LFP Aljezur (of class Alvor), in a river of Guinea

Another argument of weight was the strategic situation of Guinea, providing a point of deployment in West Africa, half way between Europe and Angola, a possible stop in the Cape Route and the sea and air routes of the Portuguese. This has become even more important from the wave of independence in 1960, with the boycott of the new African states to the passage of portuguese ships and aircraft by its territories. Guinea also was an important point of military support (for ships and airplanes) in western Africa, like the Senegal for the French (who kept there important naval, air and land bases after independence). The third reason - the most important - had to do with the political precedent that would create the granting of independence or autonomy to Guinea that, even with several valid arguments for doing so, could have consequences in the plans that Portugal had in keeping the remaining territories in Africa (for which the government did not consider a similar concession). This was a controversial issue within and outside the political system and of the Armed Forces, so there was never a consensus. For its part, the PAIGC had much in its favor. In addition to all the difficulties that Portugal had (that were advantages for the PAIGC), the PAIGC had no significant rival independence movements (the MLG and FLING, the latter supported by Senegal, had little expression and later lost the support of the Organization of African Unity, OAU), and had a very competent leadership in the person of Amilcar Cabral (which could overcome the internal rivalries between Cape Verde and Guinea - the latter constituting almost all of the guerrillas in the field, and obtain international support), and their fighters had a knowledge of the terrain that the Portuguese purchased only with time. Crucial in the correlation of forces between Portugal and the PAIGC were the external support to each side. In a conflict that is formed in the context of the Cold War, one side was supported by the leader of your block strategy (PAIGC / USSR) and the other not. Portugal not only was not supported by the US, as the US was openly hostile to the Portuguese presence in Africa during the decade of 60 (having created and sustained the guerrillas of the FNLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, which started the war in these two countries). On the African issue, Portugal was criticised by most of the international community, had against him the Communist bloc, suffered sanctions of the UN, sanctions of all countries of the African continent (although many were neutral in practice, Portugal only had allies in South Africa and Rhodesia), and in Europe counted only with France, Germany and Spain. These last three accepted breaking the 1961 UN embargo on arms sales to Portugal, becoming Germans and French the main suppliers of military equipment (although, in many cases, on "embargo prices"). In contrast, the US (which had decreed an embargo unilaterally to Portugal) and the UK, allies in NATO, accepted only to provide equipment that was not destined to Africa, but still the availability was little. In the beginning of the war, a substantial part of the equipment in service was of US origin, so the situation was "serious". Even what had been acquired under bilateral agreements (in 40's and 50's) and was not subject to limitations on use, suffered equally the penalties for replacement parts and ammunition, which could only be purchased from other sources in the international market, often on the black market. This caused serious limitations, specialy to the Air Force, since they could not use aircraft they had, in some models, in large quantity. One of these cases was the use, especially in Guinea, of the North American F-86 Saber fighter, between 1961 and 1963, the year, in the face of great pressure from the US, the PoAF was obliged to return the fleet to Portugal. The PoAF had to build its atack power on the North American T-6G, and only returned to dispose of a fighter jet in the territory in 1966, with the arrival of eight Fiat G-91 purchased from Luftwaffe. In that year, the first Alouette III helis arrived to Guinea. Overall, the countries that accepted to sell equipment to Portugal (Germany and especially France; In smaller quantities Spain, South Africa and Israel) produced material in variety and quality, but there was equipment and sub-systems that was only possible get the US and UK (such as land-air missiles), and whose absence was beeing increasingly important. The small Portuguese defense industry was developing itself to achieving self-sufficiency in support of infantry ground troops, and the supply of dozens of coastal and river boat to the Navy (in the case of ocean vessels, it was necessary to import guns). But it was little compared to the needs.

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The small but robust Alouette III was one of the 'horses of battle' in the operations in Africa.

However, like other independence movements, the PAIGC received shipments of small arms in quantity and quality of the Communist bloc (and also training in Algeria and Morocco, and financial of some European countries, including Sweden, Norway and Denmark), in some cases obtaining weapons superior to the Portuguese side (communications, amphibious tanks PT-76, land-air missiles SA-7, among others). The training, especially given by the Cuban military advisers, from 1965, was extremely competent, and made the fighter of the PAIGC one of the most efficient guerrillas in Africa, although the method of attack on Portuguese were more often by use of mines, ambushes and hit and run atacks to barracks (mortars and recoiless cannons). It's best strategy was to wear the portuguese down. The PAIGC had as its sanctuary in neighbour Guinea-Conakry (former French Guinea), and training camps and its headquarters in it's capital Conakry. It beneficted of the full support of the dictatorial regime of the pro-Soviet Sékou Touré, which consented the use of its territory as a base to infiltrate in the then Portuguese Guinea. No surprises, the main area of war was precisely in the South, where the PAIGC could easily infiltrate and replenish forces by sea and river, just across the border to take advantage of labyrinthine hydrographic conditions.

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The LFP (Small Surveillance Boat) Arcturus, class Bellatrix, in Guinea

On the Portuguese side, the Armed Forces had from the beginning of the war in Angola (in 1961) a mature doctrine of counter-insurgency, based on careful study of the strategy of "Revolutionary War" (especially the thought of Mao Tsé Tung) and the lessons gathered from other experiences in this kind of war - the British in Malaysia and the French in Indochina and Algeria. The Armed Forces adapted itself and rapidly trained for this type of war. But the fact that the war in Angola started so sudden (as a result of the unexpected withdrawal of Belgium of its Congo, in 1960) caught the Armed Forces largely in the "wrong foot" in terms of material. And the start of the international embargo at the same time prevented the planned process of obtaining appropriate weapons and equipment. This forced the use of equipment dating from WWII (which was in majority during the first half of the 60s), and to ad hoc adjustments, such as the use of maritime patrol aircraft Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon in close air support. The Navy was also very aged, and in insufficient number to patrol the waters of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, the shipping routes between the various territories and to make escort to merchant shipping and transport of troops. The situation was not only worse because of the great effort in the "dust shipyard" - the dozens of small patrol and transport boats operating in rivers, built in Portuguese shipyards, wich did not require the import of guns.

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Marines, disembarking from a Zebro III, in Guinea

Portugal was normally mistreated by the internation media and opinion-makers, reaching the point of conotations of Portuguese troops with Nazi ideology. In contrast, the PAIGC enjoyed (as most African independence movements) of sympathy in the "left oriented" press in the West, which helped build an image of romantic guerrillas, and to promote internationally Amilcar Cabral. But not only from the Soviet Bloc, the OAU and the political left arrived support. In the early 70's, most of the transport vehicles used by PAIGC were Volvo trucks offered by Sweden. Finally, the Catholic Church, following the ideas of the Second Vatican Council, emphasizing the 'Theology of Liberation', was in favour of the independence movements. In the case of Guinea, many Catholic missionaries (especially Italians) worked to turn the population against Portugal. Despite the obstacles of all kinds, in 1966, the war in Africa was running in favor of Portugal. In Angola, and against the forecasts in 1961, the armed forces were very close to victory and the total annihilation of the independence movements. In Mozambique, where the war started in 1964, the activity of FRELIMO was intense, but their actions (for now) were confined to the northern border (with the Tanzania) and the coast of Lake Niassa, not affecting the rest of the country. But on the contrary, the situation in Guinea was deteriorating. Sorrounded in a small territory, the armed forces were forced to a defensive war. Given the lack of human and material resources, the pressure of the PAIGC and the need to create a strategic depth, the military focused on the coasts and major cities, where was the majority of the population. This caused the PAIGC to freely move in parts of the territory, even distancing themselves from their sanctuaries and logistical support, and make contact with the population, attracting it to their side. In 1963, they even implemented in the south, on the islands of Como. Only several months later, in January 1964, they were expelled by the largest amphibious operation carried out by Portugal throughout the war, Operation Tridente, a landing force of 1200 men of the Army, Marines and paras, supported by naval and air bombardment against estimated 300 guerrillas of the PAIGC and 15 soldiers of Guinea-Conakry. With that defeat, the guerrillas retained once again the lesson that direct confrontations with Portuguese would always end in disaster and, by contrast, the strategy of attrition was the best. Year after year, the wear was felt increasingly on the Portuguese side, with the decrease in morale of regular troops, while the population of the interior increasingly supporting the PAIGC. In addition, there was the poor performance of the high-command of General Arnaldo Schultz, governor and commander-chief since 1964. In the first months of 1968, when the 25,000 Portuguese troops had to face between 8 and 10,000 guerrillas, and with the PAIGC to establish itself and structure within the territory, the situation deteriorated there significantly, ultimately become precarious. There was a perpective of military defeat.

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The dense vegetation on the banks allowed easy ambushes in rivers

1968 would bring various changes. In May, Salazar made one of his last major decisions after decades ahead of a autocratic government: replace Schultz, who lost credit of soldiers and civilians, by the Brigadier António de Spínola (later promoted to general). At the government and military command of Guinea would be a unusual general, with a style of command that cultivated it's charisma, demonstrations of physical courage in the visits to the fighting zones and an energy that was contagious to the troops, lifting their moral - he assumed the size of a living legend. Wars are not only won with high morale and the new commander introduced changes. He began to apply new tactics, including greater use of helicopters, and search and destroy operations, in the style made by US in Vietnam. Lisbon agreed to send more 10,000 men, bringing the number to 35,000. Spínola followed a strategy not only military but also political. He created bodies representing the various ethnic groups that were meeting later in the Congress of Peoples of Guinea, in order to win the loyalty of the people, or at least get its neutrality. He intelligently exploit the inter-ethnic rivalries, eroding the base of support for the PAIGC, and did eventually conclude an alliance with Fula ethnic group. To carry out it's plans, replaced several senior officers by a group of young, well-prepared officers of lower patent, experts in counter-subversion operations and psychological war. They were known by the boys of Spínola, and constituted its pretorian guard. Making use of new media and psychological tactics, the psychological impact of Spínola was also duly used in national and international media. The international press began to interest themselves in this general, monocle, dressed in camo and who accompanied the troops under fire, and became an international figure. This has caused the international media to begin to pass another message that not only one that Guinea was a site of Africa where the Portuguese bombarded with napalm.

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General António de Spínola (right) in an area of combat, under fire, in 1969.

1968 was also the year of replacing Salazar, for reasons of health, as President of the Council, by Marcello Caetano. A member of the liberal wing of the regime, Caetano advocated a reform in the relationship with the colonies, through the adoption of a federal model, a project that had the opposition of the Orthodox sectors of the regime and the Armed Forces. Marcello Caetano was also favorable to the increase of military expenditure, unlike Salazar who had imposed financial restrictions too severe, even taking into account that the war was prolonged and it was necessary to manage it in a sustainable way. With a reformer speech in favor of a progressive autonomy and through visits to the territories in Africa, he attempted - with success - to get the support of colonial societies to carry out reforms. In the streets of large cities, he had African crowds to welcome him.

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Helicopters Alouette III of the Portuguese Air Force

Finally, another change has taken place outside of Portugal. In the United States, Lyndon Johnson was replaced by Richard Nixon as president, representing a shift to the right and a change of policy in relation to Portugal. The antagonism of the United States to the presence of Portugal in Africa dating from the end of World War II, becoming progressively more evident during the Eisenhower administration, both in speech and with the refusal to provide military equipment whose use in Africa was predictable. With Kennedy, and the processes of decolonization by the UK and France (which caused many of the new states became pro-Soviet), the United States sought to achieve its bastions in Africa, and, by opposing to the South Africa and presence of Europeans in Africa, get the sympathy of the Third World, which US felt were fleeing to the Soviet sphere. The sudden granting of independence to the Congo by Belgium established the precedent. Belgium fled hastily in presence of the massacre of its settlers, leaving the way open to the USA and the USSR to fight over the control of those strategic territories. It was hoped that the same happened to Portugal and, under the policy of Kennedy, the United States sponsored the independence movement that started insurgency in Angola (the UPA) and Mozambique (FRELIMO), trying to pre-empt a similar initiative on the part of the USSR. Also made formal its position on the supply of weapons, by the 1961 embargo. The United States sought to overthrow Salazar through one unsuccessful attempt of coup d'etat in Lisbon, also in 1961, sponsoring its replacement by someone favorable. That year, when Portugal tried to deal with the emergency in Angola, the United States had provocative attitudes, with the presence of their vessels and military aircraft in Luanda, on the pretext of watching the operations in the Congo. A ideia que tinham é que Portugal não conseguiria manter um esforço militar em Angola e o regime cairia com a derrota, seguindo a lógica (muito americana) de um pontapé forte na porta e a barraca cai toda de uma vez. They had the idea that Portugal would fail to maintain a military effort in Angola and the regime would fall with the defeat, following the logic of a strong kick in the door and the all house would fall at once. But not only the Portuguese 'survived' in Angola, has they managed to control the uprising past few months, thanks to a tremendous mobilization of forces that no one believed possible. The poor Portuguese-American relations led to the non-renewal of the agreement for the use of the Lajes Base, in the Azores, in 1962. With the frustration of Kennedy's plan, the spotlight is back in Washington for problems that were becoming ever larger: the increase in the power of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba and Vietnam. Vietnam was inherited by his successor Lyndon Johnson, focusing his concerns. The U.S. policy posicion towards Portugal remained the same, but the support for pro-American guerrilla movements, which had the competition of the pro-Soviet were being reduced and eventually US lost the FRELIMO to the influence of China. The Johnson administration become indifferent to Portugal, being too busy to deal with problems left by the successive disastrous foreign policy of Kennedy, starting with Vietnam.

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LDMs (Medium Landing Boats) next to the LFG (Large Landing Boat) Lira, in Guinea.

Nixon would inherited this problem, and had to solve many others. Johnson had passed all the time erasing fires, while others started right beside, and the new president did not want to spend the same ordeal. Unlike Johnson, Nixon was a politician clarified in international affairs and surrounded himself with figures belonging to the right of the American media and the elite university. This led to promotion to relevant positions in the White House of some supporters of Portugal. But that was not the case of the National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Nixon and Kissinger commanded the US foreign policy, assisted by a strict circle, and against the predominantly leftist Department of State. Kissinger had an realistic and pragmatic aproach on foreign policy, seeking to prevent US involvement in secondary matters, in order to concentrate on resolving decisively the involvement in Vietnam and the USSR issue. Therefore, they needed to strengthen regional alliances, and would allow their allies to take care of their own small problems. Towards Portugal, the pragmatism advised a discreet re-aproach to this ally, to ensure that the United States could have the strategic base in the Azores (which since 1962 used as a political favor but without a commitment on the part of Portugal), and that the Portuguese territories in Africa (including Angola and Mozambique) and South Africa would not only not fall in the Soviet orbit, but also served to stop the Soviet expansion in Africa, the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, otherwise it would create more problems for the U.S. This was the view of the Pentagon and the CIA (which always differed from Kennedy and Johnson in this matter). Portugal has acted behind the scenes in Washington for a change of attitude towards Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and soon got results. To convince the State Department about the change in policy, Kissinger ordered in 1969 the National Security State Memorandum 39 (NSSM-39) a study by a group of experts from the Departments of State and Defense that serve to support the change in policy. Despite the friction between the two sectors, the findings of this study suggest that the Portuguese were in Africa to stay and that the best option for the United States to obtain an agreement on the use of the Lajes Base was to relax the diplomatic pressure on Portugal - even continuing to pressure for political reforms that were made - and delete the ban non-lethal equipment for dual use, civilian and military, which could be useful to Portuguese Armed Forces, as transport aircraft and trucks. This was well below the desired by Portugal, but was a change of attitude on the part of Washington. The US began to distance itself from the independence movements and refrain from publicly criticizing Portugal, in addition to making promises for the supply of military equipment. Moreover, in contrast to non-supply of arms, training has been given to Portuguese in anti-guerrilla tactics, sharing the experience gained in Vietnam. The use of techniques American opened a phase in the war that was known by the vietnamization. In whole, cooperation given by the U.S. military was not very significant. As for material, the most important sold were two Boeing 707 to the fleet of transport of the PoAF, twelve Bell 212 used in Mozambique and a borrowed hidrographic ship. The much needed fighter planes, the Bell UH-1 in large numbers, and C-130 transport planes, that the US refused to sell to Portugal since the 50's, never came. Even so, the change of political position was important - it increased the Portuguese confidence and gave more freedom of action to its Armed Forces.

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General Spínola, passing review to African comandos, in Guinea.

In Guinea, Spínola had achieved to save the situation but it hadn't become favorable to Portugal. There was a stalemate, with the Portuguese forces to control the towns and the majority of the population, and the PAIGC control the interior. It was clear that, even with the support of the majority of the Guinean population, Portugal could contain the actions of the PAIGC but could not cause it harm sufficient to the point of extinguish it. The PAIGC could always count on the refuge in neighboring countries, especially while in Guinea-Conakry was a regime that it was favorable, and had no problems in obtaining arms for external support. To stike the PAIGC seriously, it would have to address these factors. And it was also clear that the PAIGC, however well trained and armed that was, and even taking part of the population on their side, could never do more than wear the Portuguese forces. It was out of the question to defeat Portugal, and try to take the cities was risky. Attacking Bissau, which had a well prepared defense plan anticipating this possibility, was suicide. Lancero 11-03-2007, 05:42 PM Part 2 - The decision and the preparation

One of the concerns of Spínola to weaken the PAIGC was to stop the flow of supplies, most of which was done by sea and river. It was important to deny the PAIGC this capacity and for this reason, early in 1969, was made a vast work of collecting information on the fleet of vessels of the PAIGC. In the course of this work was learned that the PAIGC had, in addition to three small ships and an unspecified number of canoes and motor boats, two or three fast boat of the type P6, supplied by the Soviet Union. This country also provided to Guinea Conakry four fast boat of the type Komar. Integrated in the headquarters of Spínola was the Special Operations Corp, led by captain-lieutenant Guilherme Alpoim Calvão (Marine), who prepared and executed a series of actions against the PAIGC boats. These consisted of river ambushes mounted by Marines in inflatable boats, which took the assault ships of the PAIGC. There were caught and destroyed two ships, the Patrice Lumumba, of Guinea-Conakry but in the service of the PAIGC (Operation Nebulosa in August 1969), and the Bandim (Operation Gata Brava, in February 1970, in territory of Guinea-Conakry), the latter especially important for the guerrilla movement. As a result, the supply of the PAIGC was severely affected. But the small fast boats of the PAIGC and Guinea-Conakry were a serious risk for Portuguese ships, especially if used at night or taking advantage of the hydrographic conditions of Portuguese Guinea. The P6 were a Soviet model of the 50's, armed with torpedos and light cannons.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/p62.jpg Torpedo boat type P6 Displacement: 75 tons; Dimensions (in meters): 25.7 x 6.1 x 1.8; Armament: two tubes of 533mm torpedos and two doubles repairs of 25mm: Propulsion: four diesel engines with four propellers, totaling 4800 cv; Speed: 43 knots; Autonomy: 450 nautical miles at 30 knots; Tripulation: 25.

The Komar were similar, and entered the service in the USSR in 1961, a evolution of the P6, but where the weapons were main anti-ship missiles SSN-2 Styx, guided by radar, with a range of 23 nautical miles.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/komar1.jpg Attack boat armed with missiles, type KOMAR Displacement: 80 tons; Dimensions (in meters): 25.5 x 6 x 1.8; Armament: two SSN-2 Styx missiles and two doubles repairs of 25mm: Propulsion: four diesel engines with four propellers, totaling 4800 cv; Speed : 40 knots; Autonomy: 400 nautical miles at 30 knots; Tripulation: 25.

It was a Egyptian Komar who, on 21 October 1967, sank the Israeli Eilat with the shooting of a Styx, the first time that a vessel of war was sunk this way. With these ships, the Portuguese naval superiority could be challenged. Alpoim Calvão, official trained as a sapper-diver, proposed Spínola an operation that neutralizasse this threat, attacking the boats in the port of Conakry and sinking them with bombs placed in the hooves by frogmen. General Spínola and the Head of State of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Armando de Roboredo agreed to the operation, which, of course, would have to be prepared in greater secrecy. Following, Alpoim Calvão sought special bombs (the kind that glued to the hooves), that where not in the Navy inventory, in South Africa, where they were manufactured. Mines were readily provided by South African secret services (Bureau of State Security-BOSS). Without delay or bureaucracies, Alpoim Calvão brought the mines in simple bags of travel, as any passenger, on the Boeing in wich he returned.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/alpoimcalvao.jpg The commander Guilherme de Alpoim Calvão

Also needed were updated blueprints of the port of Conakry. For that, merchant foreign ships in Bissau were discreetly searched until a acceptable blueprint was found, though outdated. Still, it was necessary to make a recognition to Conakry, in September 1969. A Large Surveilance Boat (LFG), the Cassiopeia, was disguised as PAIGC ship, outside Bissau, on the island of Joao Vieira, where the mission was prepared. If a ship was to near the Cassiopeia, the ship raised the flag of the PAIGC and only black sailors were seen. It happened on the journey, with the corporal Special Marine Antonio Augusto da Silva, with the cap of captain-lieutenant in the head, which saluted (impeccably) the fishing boats. At zero hours of September 17, the lights of the city of Conakry were sighted, and at two in the morning, the ship positioned in the channel between the peninsula of Conakry and the islands of Loos, starting to collect information, with its radar - it saught the changes on the infrastructure of the port, including the piers. An hour later, the task was complete and the journey back started, though disturbed by a failure of the generators that forced the ship to anchoring for a short time in the exit channel of the port. But in Lisbon doubts arose as to the validity of the operation, particularly from the Minister of Overseas, Joaquim da Silva Cunha. At the same time, in Bissau, Spínola and Calvão chaged the plans of the operation. Alpoim Calvão proposed that since there was to be an incursion to Conakry, they should take the opportunity to release the Portuguese soldiers taken prisoner by the PAIGC (about twenty) that were kept in the city. Spínola agreed and plans for the operation were made. However, they began to be balanced other goals. If for the Navy there were the Komar and P6 for the PoAF there were the Mig-15 Mig-17 fighters of Guinea-Conakry, that if piloted by Soviets properly trained (as happened often in countries allies of the USSR) could take advantage the limitations of the PoAF, whose Fiat G-91 were not designed for air combat. Destroying the Mig in the same way they destroy the boats would eliminate the threat to the portuguese air supremacy. But the most ambitious of the new goals was to organize a coup d'état in Conakry, down the regime of Sékou Touré and putting in power a regime favorable to Portugal. This withdraw the PAIGC its main sanctuary and source of support, and could even lead to the end of the war in Portuguese Guinea. But it also meant an operation in scale far greater than a simple raide of comandos, and with all the inherent risks, military and political. There was much to consider.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/sekoutoure.jpg Ahmed Sékou Touré

Like many leaders of his time, the Marxist Ahmed Sékou Touré rose to power through violence. From postman to maire of Conakry, with a passage in the French National Assembly by the way, he had a rapid rise in the political career in the space of a dozen years. His party, the Parti Democratique de Guinée, won the elections of 1956 through the violence of their flocks and with the support of the French Communist Party, and Touré become governor of Conakry. Deeply racist and anti-French, in 1958 he made that Guinea-conakry the only colony of French West Africa to reject the maintenance of politico-institutional ties with France in the post-independence. "So, they wont get a penny!" De Gaulle decided. Proclaimed the independence unilaterally in October 1958, the new Republic of Guinea-Conakry, under the leadership of Sékou Touré, was a communist dictatorship, adverse to France and with strong ties with the Soviet Union. From Soviets they received military support and in return granted the use of the port of Conakry by ships of the Soviet Navy. With one of the most brutal regimes that Africa has known, Sékou Touré governed the country with iron hand, massacre the Fula ethnicity at the time of withdrawal of the French, and pursuing the traditional authorities in order to politicize the population around his power. It based on gangs of unemployed young people in poverty who are recruited by little money to persecute, arrest, torture and denounce everything and everyone. In 1960, short year and a half after independence and as a result of cutting relations with France, the economy is ruined and the discontent spreading. Over the years there are several riots against the regime. Some real, others invented by Touré himself as a pretext to arrest, torture and kill. Its form of government is both a tyrannical as absurd. He claimed for the country 130 miles of teritorial waters. In 1971, executed the son of a former professor of school, because he gave him bad notes in 1936. One day, one of the witches that surrounded him, told him that his regime would fall into the hands of someone named David or Ibrahim; Consequently, the Police arrested over the years all individuals with these names in the country. There wouldnt, therefore, be difficult to obtain the support of the population for the overthrow of the regime. But Portugal could not do everything alone. Alpoim Calvão was then informed by the PIDE / DGS, the Portuguese political police that was also the secret services, that there were contacts between Portugal and the Front de Libération Nationale Guinéen (FLNG), the main opposition movement in Guinea-Conakry, based in France, a country that also sought to overthrow Sékou Touré. The Front claimed to have more than 600,000 members exiled in the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Gambia, and had made its last attempt of a coup in March 1969, without success. Since 1964 they tried, also without success, the support of the Portuguese authorities. But now Portugal had changed its mind, and supported the movement, including with the creation of its newspaper, "La Libre Guinea," published in France. Increased contacts with the FLNG allowed the Portuguese authorities aware of the true extent of the movement and Spínola decided to grant them the installation of its military wing in Portuguese Guinea, from where guerrillas departed to the neighboring country. But a subsequent analysis of the possible political consequences (including the likely reaction of the United Nations, the OAU and the Communist Bloc) led to the conclusion that support a guerrilla of FLNG could create more problems than it solved. It was concluded that the best option would be a coup d'état of FLNG in Conakry, from which arised a uprising throughout the country, in the middle of which the Portuguese operation would take place. It would be a quick solution, decisive and that the international community would face as a done fact. After all, no different than the US or the USSR did in their areas of interest. This was against the current thinking in the Portuguese high command. Small incursions of Portuguese troops across borders in pursuit of the enemy and to destroy their infrastructure, had become customary over the years. But the major operations were seen as too great a risk, not military but political. They could serve as a pretext for an international intervention against Portugal, under the auspices of the UN or the Organization of African Unity. This was, moreover, one of the worst scenarios that the Portuguese faced. A rare exception to this line of thought were the plans for the invasion of Malawi in the case of the pro-Portuguese Hastings Banda was at risk. But in Lisbon, Marcello Caetano showed itself in favor of more decisive actions, nothing strange to the change of U.S. policy in relation to Portugal. In July and August of 1970 took place on Operation Nó Górdio, in the interior of Tanzania. 8,000 men backed by planes and helicopters in pursuit of FRELIMO, attacking and destroying their bases and turning the south of Tanzania, as described in the international press, "a small Vietnam in Africa". For its part, Spínola argued that only reaching the PAIGC in its sanctuary would cause relevant damage. Caetano agreed to the deal on condition that it was made so none will realize that Portugal was involved in the coup of FLNG. Otherwise, the discovery of the Portuguese involvement could have serious consequences at the international level. Preparations continued for the operation. The more demanding task was to form the armed force of FLNG. The recruitment was done through contacts with the leaders of the movement in Europe and the various chapters of the Front dispersed in african countries. This was a difficult job, not only because most subjects were monitored by the authorities of these countries, but also because they were often installed in the countries of exile, with their jobs and families. But it was a successfully task, and recruited individuals (including former soldiers) were collected by the Navy, in a series of clandestine operations on the shores of Senegal, Gambia and Sierra Leone, to the border with Liberia. Small task groups composed of survailance and landing boats did the rendez-vous with groups of elements to be collected at selected beaches in dates and times combined, always at night. Through the structure of FLNG were also combined the number of men to embark on each operation, and radio and light codes to be exchanged between ship and groups on beaches. The elements were collected with pneumatic boats on board the small and discrete Portuguese ships, and the LFG Orion was the vessel more used in these operations. There were collected a total of 200 elements, which form the landing force of the Front, and concentrated on the island of Soga, in Portuguese Guinea. In this discrete island were built the barracks and the field of training, where the opposition were trained by Portuguese officials, including the best instructors available in Guinea. It was a difficult task because it was necessary to overcome the tribal and religious rivalries between the Guinean. But with intensive training and strict discipline was possible to make a cohesive unit. It was made a vast work of collecting information on Guinea-Conakry (noting that the intelligence that existed until then was manifestly inadequate), using the most diverse sources, from the Guinean exiled former members of the PAIGC, in addition to news and publications. It has made a model of the port area of Conakry but still lacked information to operational and tactical level. Get local sources in a country living under a regime like that of Sékou Touré was not easy. It was also obtained information from the French and Federal German secret services. Existing a high probability of victory of the coup, it was drafted the political program of FLNG together with three representatives of this movement, in Bissau. The members of the future government of Guinea-Conakry were selected and the announcements to be broadcast by radio prepared. The Portuguese forces made their plans of attack and selected the units which participate in the operation. It was obvious that the fighters of FLNG, however intensive had been the training, hardly would be able to execute special operations and face the most capable units of Guinea-Conakry in large numerical inferiority. So, more difficult objectives and that would be crucial to the success of the coup would be attacked by Portuguese troops. The most important of them all was the physical elimination of Sékou Touré. This would not be an classic amphibious operation, or a simple comandos raid. Nor would it be an invasion of the style of Cuban exiles in 1961, known as the Bay of Pigs, because the country that supported also would participate with their forces, and the objective would be the very capital of the country. The solution was an amphibious operation, based on a limited number of smaller vessels, with a number of simultaneous comando raids, each team achieving a specific objective. And since the Portuguese forces would act as if they were disguised and exile forces, they would have to operate with the same limitations of a vulgar armed group. This meant that there would be no infiltration by helicopter or air support, or use of any sophisticated weapons. Everything had to be done with boats, inflatable boats and light weapons. There was no precedent of an operation with this combination of goals and self-imposed limitations.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montante2.jpg The LDG (Large Landing Boat) Montante, one of the ships involved in Operation Green Sea, in a river of Guinea

As a condition for the success of the operation was that there should be no traces of the participation of Portuguese forces or even the involvement of Portugal in the coup, a series of measures were taken to this end. Portuguese and FLNG would use the same uniform and weapons, which would be of common use in Africa - meaning soviet. To purchase the weapons without the final destination was revealed, they went to the parallel market, by the firm Norte Importadora Lda, owned by José João Zoio, known bullfighter and trader of weapons. Portugal, because of the existence of an international embargo and the limitations of their own industry, went frequently to gun manufacturers on the other side of the Iron Curtain. One of its most popular products were the RPG rockets, which had no equivalent in Western industry. And since Norte Importadora Lda not only sold arms to the Portuguese Armed Forces, nobody could predict what its destination. Zoio went to Bulgaria, were he ordered the weapons to be used in Guinea-Conakry - AK-47, LMG RPD (Degtyarev), and RPG-2. The weapons were manufactured under the specification that they should not have any number of manufacturing nor any identification of the manufacturer or country of origin. Bulgarian manufacturers provided the weapons promptly. In Lisbon, the Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equipamento (OGFE) designed and manufactured a lot of special uniforms, very different from the Portuguese. Hats were also made of a tropical model very similar to the original Soviet model. From hats to boots, nothing could indicate its portuguese origin. To complete the disguise, the white portuguese soldiers part in the operation should have the body painted in order to appear black.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/mrpormenor.jpg

Finally, at the end of October 1970, the preparations entered the final phase, with the choice of the teams and their allocation to the objectives selected and sorted by degree of priority. There were identified 52 objectives needed to paralysis of the city of Conakry. Iit was decided that the landing would take place in a night of Saturday to Sunday, when the majority of military and para-military personnel were on leave and public services disabled. Consequently, the number of targets was reduced to 25. Each goal was assigned a team, varying in number and with the weapons needed in each case. The order of operations was first the domination of the sea, then land, and at last in the air. For the domain of the sea (and political results) was mandatory that no Soviet ship was then in Conakry.

The main objectives of the operation were: - Destroying the boats in the port - Freeing the Portugueseprisoners of war - Destroy the Mig fighters - Attacking and destroying the headquarters of the PAIGC (with a chance to capture Amilcar Cabral) - Providing the landing of FLNG, and help its seizure of power Code Name: Operação Mar Verde (Operation Green Sea)

In early November the information is spread that a major operation is beeing prepared on the island of Como. Discreet, the concentration of forces begins in the island of Soga, where the FLNG fighters were based. Given the characteristics of the operation, the Portuguese forces involved are composed mostly by African military: Marines Special Company 21, the African Comandos Company and a small number of paras. On November 14th, the commander Alpoim Calvão is sent by General Spínola to Lisbon to describe the plans to Marcello Caetano, which gives the green light to the operation on the 17th. Lancero 11-04-2007, 12:05 PM Part 3 - The operation

November 17. On the same day that Lisbon gave the green light, General Spínola gives knowledge of it to the deputy commanders. The Army puts on alert and strengthens its units near the border with Guinea-Conakry.The PoAF prepares recognition and support to the group of ships involved, and missions of bombing of targets of PAIGC in Guinea-Conakry, which would be attacked if the coup had success. On the 18, the Air Force begins the missions of recognition of the waters of Guinea-Conakry, the capital port and its approaches, with a maritime patrol aircraft Lockheed P2 V5 Neptune, in order to detect movements of ships of war, merchants and concentrations of fishing vessels. At 09:00 that day, the mission is communicated orally to the commanders of the forces on the island of Soga: the operation is not on the island but a landeding in the capital of Guinea Conakry. It was confirmed that the secrecy that involved the preparation of the operation was maintained: in briefings two officers, one Army and one of the Navy, declared very skeptical about its implementation. The Army one refused to participate and he was given voice in arrest and taken to Bissau by helicopter. But Spínola and Calvão ultimately convince him, and he returned to the island of Soga. The 19, Calvão is back from Lisbon and goes imediatly to the island where they made the final preparations. Also that day, the Air Force reported that there are no war vessels in the waters of Guinea Conakry, and that a P2 V5 listening to communications from the control tower of the airport in Conakry, did not registred traffic of military aircraft.

To the men of the force, Portuguese and Guinean opponents, were distributed the new weapons and uniforms. The vessels involved are painted to hide all signs that were Portuguese. Even the buoys. Four LFGs (class Argos), Cassiopeia, Dragão, Hydra and Orion (ship-chief), and two LDGs, Bombarda (class of his name) and the Montante (class Alfange). Theire the task-force TG27-2.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/orion.jpg LFG (Large Surveillance Boat) Orion, class Argos, in a river of Guinea Displacement: 210 tonnes; Dimensions (in meters): 41.7 x 6.7 x 2.1; Armament: 2 cannons Bofors 40mm/70, machine guns 7.62 mm and grenades; Propulsion: 2 diesel Maybach Tunnel MD 440 / 12 triggering two propellers, totaling 2400cv; Speed: 17.3 knots; Autonomy: 1660 nautical miles; Crew: 24. The vessels of this class used in Guinea were partially shielded.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montante1.jpg LDG Montante, class Alfange, in Guinea Displacement: 480 tonnes; Dimensions, in meters: 56.54 x 11.8 x 1.27; Armament: 2 cannons Bofors 40mm/70, grenades, and machine guns 7.62 mm; Transportation Capacity: 270 tonnes; Propulsion: 2 diesel Maybach-Mercedes Benz triggering two propellers, totaling 910cv; Speed: 10.3 knots; Autonomy: 2860 nautical miles; Crew: 20. The Bombarda was very similar, with Oerlikon 20mm instead of the Bofors 40mm.

Teams are distributed by ships: In LFGs Dragão and Cassiopeia are loaded the teams that will tackle the objectives of the PAIGC, eliminate Sékou Touré in his residence, the Villa Silly, and the barrack of militias of the PDG. They are formed by marines reinforced by comandos. In LDG Bombarda follows part of FLNG, assisted by comandos. These are the teams that attack the Presidential Palace, the Interior Ministry, the command of the police, residences of the leaders Lansana Beavogui and Sayfoulhah Djallo, the gendarmerie barracks, barracks of Cuban military advisers, the radio of Boulbinet and the isthmus that divides the two parts of the city, preventing the passage of reinforcements from other military installations. In LDG Montante follows the remainder of the force of FLNG, with the teams to attack the power plant, the headquarters of the Guinea Conakry army (Camp Samory) and the Republican Guard. In LFG Hidra is the team that will destroy the Mig based at the airport in Conakry. In LFG Orion is the commanders of the operation and the team that will atack the Guinea Conakry and PAIGC. The landing force totals 400 men.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montantecon3.jpg The troops finalizing preparations, hours before departure.

The teams acted on the planed sequence: control of the sea (destruction of the boats), land (neutralization of the main forces and cutting of isthmus), and air (destruction of Mig before dawn; the ship had a very low anti-air capacity). Priority was also the capture of radio Boulbinet (to most listened) early in the operations. Day 20, Friday, in the morning, the force is visited by the commander-chief and governor of Guinea, General António de Spínola.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montantecon4.jpg General Spínola (in camo) aboard the Montante.

At 19h50, the task force TG 27-2 departures from the island of Soga and for the rendez-vous, on the island of Canhambaque. At 22:00, sails in column for Southeast, with concealed lights, and anti-air alert from the rise of the sun. It sails this way up to 03h50 on 21st, when the force adopts a more appropriate formation in both groups (main body and screen, with spaces of 4 to 6 miles between them), manouvering to avoid the traffic and following the indications of a PoAF P2 V5. Only one ship, the trawler Banko, was not avoided and passed close to the Montante, due to the slow speed of this. At 17.50 they sail again in column, taking advantage of the night. At 20:45 is sighted the lighthouse on the island of Tâmara and ordered the split of the formation, and the ships follow individually for the positions from which the teams will be landing. At 21:30, the command (at Orion) indicates the time up to which all landings will be made in succession. And gives the order to attack for all teams: 01h30 the following day. 00h45 of Sunday, November 22, 1970. Tide completely full, no wind. The force is divided into three groups, the South (LDG Bombarda and LFG Hidra), North (LDG Montante, LFGs Cassiopeia and Dragão) and the North-west (LFG Orion). VICTOR team, consisting of 14 special marines and a guide of FLNG, commanded by 2 º lieutenant Rebordão de Brito, depart from Orion in three Zebro III inflatable boats with 50hp engines, in the direction of the pier at La Prudence, which protects the port inside, a half mile away. Arrived at the pier, Rebordão de Brito climbs up a building to do a detailed observation of the port. But what he sees with the binocular is the silhouette of something very different from small boat: a frigate. Knowing that the Navy of the USSR usually used the port of Conakry, there is no doubt to who belongs the ship. A Soviet frigate would be more than enough to sink the Portuguese boats and make the operation a disaster. Thinking quickly, the experienced african official turns up for one of his men and says: 'Look, there we have a frigate ahead, we are only fourteen, we have no chance to survive, we will launch a attack the frigate, right at the garrison barracks and blow all that is possible. We know that we wont get out of there alive, but at least let our units operate freely'. Meanwhile, the Guinean guide starts sharpening a huge knife in the stone pier. Rebordão de Brito consciously chooses for a suicide mission in the hope it can damage vital organs in the frigate enough to put the ship out of action. The order to attack is given at 01h40, from the Orion. VICTOR team launches itself on the boats. As they approached, instead of the silhouette of the frigate appeared two silhuetas of motorboats in overlapping extension (the stern of one an the bow of another) that, from far, seemed to be a much larger vessel. In the port are actually three P6, four Komar and a landing boat of the PAIGC. The assault continues. The grumete special Marine special Abou Camara silently stabs the sentinel that guards the three P6. The team climbs on board the vessels and throw offensive hand grenades to the interior, causing fires on board. The first explosion and the shooting were heard aboard the Orion at 01h55. The occupants are eliminated and the marines run into with the other boats. The alarm sounds in the port and the enemy opened fire from inside the vessels with small arms and hand grenades, and in land with a heavy machine gun, installed on the roof of a warehouse near the dock. Placed at strategic points, the marines eliminate the resistance causing casualties to the enemy. The Komar are destroyed in the same way, with the hand grenades thrown into the interior of the boat. Eliminated the hotbeds of resistance, VICTOR team returns to the inflatable boats and return to the Orion, where arrives at 02h10.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/rebordaodebrito.jpg Commander Alberto Rebordão de Brito

Suffering only a slight injured, the team of 15 men had destroyed seven boat (three sunk and four burned), and killed 15 to 20 enemy fighters. As a result of the fires, the boats, with missiles, torpedos, ammunition and fuel on board, explode into balls of fire that are seen on board the Orion. The first objective of Operation Mar Verde is reached and the city of Conakry wakes to the sound of explosions. By this time, all teams are placed on the ground. From LDG Montante are launched OSCAR, INDIA and MIKE teams. OSCAR has 40 men, portuguese comandos and men of the FLNG, commanded by Ferreira and Tomás Camarã, and lands from inflatable boats next to the Republican Guard - the elite of the Armed Forces of Guinea Conakry, trained by Czechoslovak military advisers, and the main pretorian guard of the regime - headquarters. Five of the men are discreetly directed to the gate of entry but are detected by sentinel, wich Ferreira tries to dominate, but manages to refuge in the guard house. In the pursuit, Ferreira is killed in the doorstep by a manichegun shot by two men who are inside the guard house. Bravely, comando Marcelino da Mata throw itself into the window of the house and killed the shooting occupants. The OSCAR team enters the Republican Guard headquarters positioning itself outside the barracks. The republican guards, caught by surprise, try to escape but most are slaughtered, while some disappear in the night. The headquarters are in the hands of OSCAR team, which released about 400 political prisoners who were incarcerated, and that celebrated their release. Many of them take up arms to join the coup. In the end of the action, the headquartes are left to the care of 20 Front men.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/marcelinodamata.jpg Marcelino da Mata, the most decorated military throughout the history of the Portuguese Armed Forces

For its part, INDIA and MIKE teams are landed directly from LDG Montante. At 01h40, the boat touches the peer of the Yacht Club and the teams go for the objectives. At this time, they hear the shooting in the port, and the frightened men of FLNG hesitate to leave the LDG. Commander Sisseco, of the African comandos, orders his men to land and persuade the Front men to gain courage and go to the fight, which results. INDIA team, consisting of 10 comandos headed by Demda Sêca and accompanied by an element of FLNG, cross the line of the Conakry railway and go to the power station. Killed two sentinels, the comandos penetrate the facility holding the men in charge, which was ordered to cut the electricity to the city. At 02h15, the inhabitants of Conakry, which had been waked by explosions and shots, now saw their city in the dark. It was an important psychological effect and contributed to the disorientation of the Armed Forces of Guinea Conakry, which had been caught completely by surprise. But, unexpectedly, the guides of FLNG (not always competent) were also sometimes disorientated in the city at dark.

MIKE team, consisting of 15 comandos and 35 FLNG, under the command of Major Thierne Diallo, is targeted for the Military Field of Samory, a kilometer away. In that installation is stored a large quantity of valuable material of the Army of Guinea Conakry and we must capture it to prevent his use. The team progresses towards the goal without difficulty. When they are a hundred meters from Samory, a jeep of the Army of Guinea Conakry, carrying injured, approaches and is stopped. The driver indicates the Camp Samory, but tries to flee with the car and is killed. The comandos move closer to the Samory, notice that the door is open and Sisseco orders the advance of FLNG men. One section moves towards the main gate. From a tower, a Breda machine gun makes fire, but it is silenced by a shot of RPG-2 made by the comandos. After having burst a smaller gate with a grenade attack, they open the main gate. At this time there is no more resistance in Samory, and the defense is mounted.

An unexpected difficulty is that the radios were out of action, and contacts with other teams now have to be made directly. In Samory is stored a large quantity of weapons and vehicles, including 15 recon light armored vehicles, 50 jeeps and more than 100 GMC trucks. Also massive amounts of heavy machine guns, bazucas, mortars, pistols, machine guns, Kalashnikov and Simonov rifles, and many ammunition. Largest buildings are burned. Meanwhile, government military are seeking to enter the field to arm themselfs. During three and a half hours, the compound is defended by comandos. The soldier comando Mamadou Saliu Diallo reveals itself very good with the RPG-2, destroying alone 16 government vehicles that arrive loaded with personnel, and killing several dozen enemy soldiers. However, there is a lack of courage in combat and inability of the elements of FLNG, and it must be the comandos to make the greatest effort. As a result of the shootout, the comandos account already two dead and six injured (including the commander), some of which are made by a shot of RPG-2 poorly executed by men of the Front. Acomplished the task of seizing the compound, Sisseco divides the MIKE team. The Portuguese comandos will withdraw, while the FLNG men, commanded by Major Thierne Diallo, and accompanied by the commander Assad and a journalist of the magazine "Jeune Afrique", Siradiou Diallo, do the defense following the instructions of the official Portuguese, to later join INDIA team.

Returning to the Yacht Club, the comandos are intercepted by a GMC truck full of Konakri soldiers, who jump to the ground and begin to make fire. The small group of Portuguese comandos divides itself to the left and the right, responding to the enemy's fire. Sisseco fires a shot of RPG-2 pointed to the fuel tank of the GMC, destroying the vehicle and putting the enemy soldiers in retreat. One of the injured comandos is again hit in a leg. Again at the harbour, the group is retrieved by inflatable boats, taking two dead, two seriously injured and four light injured, including Sisseco. MIKE team mission is complete, causing an estimated 100 killed to the enemy.

01h40. ZULU team, composed of marines and comandos, lands of LFGs Dragão and Cassiopeia in ten inflatable boats. During the journey, some boats are hampered by fishing nets that had not been seen, causing some delay. Reaching land at 02h15, the team is divided into three groups. One of the groups, led by 1st lieutenant Cunha e Silva, aims to a prison on the outskirts of the city where the PAIGC keeps Portuguese POWs. One is the lieutenant Antonio Lobato, the PoAF pilot who, after an emergency landing in his T-6G, was made prisoner of the PAIGC in 1963. During the seven years of captivity, the oldest Portuguese POW made two attempts to escape who were close to success. His experience is described in his book "Freedom or Evasion."

"The distant firing of guns interferes in my sleep almost like a dream. I hear with intensity, with the idea of rapprochement, now is silent for a moment, now is reduced, as if the weapons were endowed with sound supressors. This cycle of high and low sounds, goes on for long enough for me to take aware that I am not dreaming and that something more serious is happening.

My first idea is of one more attempt at coup d'etat against the bloodthirsty Sékou Touré, in the wake of so many others that I was having knowledge over the years. The imagination leds me to the thank the victory to them and my release. The guns are not silent but increasingly louder. The sensory acuity becomes so intense that I'm certain that those weapons go to prison, it is a fact. Console me the thought that a coup d'état, one of the things we really should do is release the prisoners.

I do not have time to continue with my fantasies: a huge noise in the roof of the prison stifles the shooting which is now more intense, even here behind me. Instinctively, I trow myself to the floor, in a corner trying were I am lying in breaststroke protecting the head with the arms. I stay few seconds in this position: a grenade or bazuca, blow the window of my dungeon. The shooting continues, but the a voice override the of weapons and shouts: "Lobato!" The same sensory acuity that in limit situations never left me made me have strenght tells me that it is our people and I trow myself through the breach open on the wall by the explosive. As soon as I put feet on the ground, someone out the middle of the night guesses who I am and asks where are the others. With his small group we make exactly the same route I did on the day of my arrival to this prision and I guide them to the door of the room where there are stacked twenty three Portuguese soldiers.The door is opened and twenty-three prisoners, youths, in total ignorance of what is happening, do not leave immediately. We need the elements of the group forward into the room to hasten the exit. With everyone gathered in the space that served as a recreation, the commander instructs me to keep everybody in column until reaching the destination, which he does not reveal. At the time of departure, one of the soldiers refused to accompany us, but the spontaneous reaction of all, prevented a second time to express its intention. It's a desertor in whom neither the enemy believed. "

26 Portuguese POWs are released, and go in silence to the beach, guided and escorted the assault group. On the way they are attacked by Guinean troops, which are put to flight by marines. Until they reach the beach:

"Keeping the accelerated march, we end up arriving at a beach where inflatable rubber boats led us towards the high seas. In few minutes we dock at a ship anchored a few miles from the coast. It's around four thirty in the morning. The crew of LFG Dragão does not hide its joy to receive us on board, but at the same time not mask a pious amazement at our thinness. Sailors to the bones, react to this detail distributing food and drinks. Someone who I suppose to be the commander, cut me of the group and takes me with him to another area of the ship. A Marine appears with a huge steak that he puts in front of me. " Lancero 11-04-2007, 12:06 PM part 3 (continues)

The second group of Zulu assault team, composed of comandos and commanded by sub-lieutenant Falcon Lucas, aims to attack the headquarters of the PAIGC in the city. In the raid, neutralizes a number of sentinels, killing several elements of the PAIGC, and destroys the 5 buildings and 6 cars that were in the enclosure. The third assault group, composed of 21 marines and a guide for FLNG, commanded by 2 º lieutenant Benjamin Abreu, aims to Villa Silly, the secondary residence of Sékou Touré, to eliminate him physically, and to the Peoples Milícia of Conakry, 100 meters below. The Villa Silly is composed of two houses (the residence itself and the house of the guards), and closer to the goal the group is divided into two sections of attack (one for each house) and a section of protection. The two sentinels were killed on the door, without even having time to use their PPSh, which are collected. One section, led by sub-lieutenant Falcon Lucas, penetrates successively in all divisions of residence without finding anyone. Sékou Touré is not where it is supposed. The houses are destroyed with shots of bazuca and hand grenades, causing a fire. It's also destroyed the private car of the Guinean dictator. The group continues to Peoples Milícia. The 22 men penetrate the enclosure jumping a wall of two meters high to avoid detection. The attack starts with two RPG-2 shots against the two barracks, causing several deaths and injuries, and a short-circuit that triggered a fire. Then, the marines attacked the interior of the barracks with defensive hand grenades. The troops inside try to mount an opposition, without success, to the firepower of the marines, reinforced by a bazuca and a RPG-2, and armed with a dozen RPD Degtyarev, in addition to the AK-47. Three cars and a motorcycle carrying eight militiamen enter the compound, but soon were stopped, dying all the occupants and burning the vehicles themselves. A GMC truck was destroyed with two grenades. One of the sentinels in the main gate makes fire but ends up being dominated and its machine-pistol captured. After regrouped, the 22 men leave the site to meet the group of 1st lieutenant Cunha e Silva. The compound of the Milícia is in flames and 60 militiamen out of combat, 30 of them dead. 50 meters away, three more enemies were detected and killed. From within the camp tries to exit a Volkwagen, wich is destroyed and its driver killed. The driver had documents that are consulted - it was a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite the good results, the team fails one of the three: find and eliminate Sékou Touré. But the prisoners were released, the headquarters of the PAIGC destroyed, and the Milícia very damaged. Despite the tough battles (especially in the prison of La Montaigne, in the headquarter of PAIGC and in the Milícia) this team had no dead or wounded. Back on the boats by 04h30, the ZULU team become the reserve maneuver of the Commander of the operation. 01h05.On board of LDG Bombarda, 300 yards from the Peronné beach, commanded by the captain-lieutenant Aguiar de Jesus (always calm smoking his cigarette), two boats leave with the HOTEL team, with a mission to capture the radio. The team consists of 9 comandos, under the orders of Jamanca, and includes an element of FLNG, the electronic engineer Tidiane Diallo, who knows the place. Incomprehensibly, once landed, the team did not exit the beach. Disorientation by the engineer, or indecision of the Guinean official, the team did not leave the place of landing until they received orders to reembark. However, the radio will eventually be achieved. Meanwhile two waves of inflatable boats put ashore the other teams from Bombarda: ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF. All teams, composed of comandos and FLNG, follow to their objectives, guided - not always well - by the Front. The targets are government facilities, which are taken without difficulty. Only in the Gendarmerie headquarters is found significant resistance. On reaching the place, the team ECHO, commanded by Captain João Bacar, and reinforced by GOLF, BRAVO and DELTA, a total of 50 men, delay the regroup of the troops, and a column of gendarmes is preparing to leave. The vehicles are attacked, leaving 4 destroyed and the enemy suffered a number of casualties. ALFA team, formed by ten elements, it's close to the Presidential Palace and is seen by the guards, who flee at high speed. The team reviewed the interior of the large building not finding anyone. 01h40. Coming of LFG Hydra, the SIERRA team leaves the inflatable boats. It consists of paras and comandos (38) and elements of FLNG (6), under the command of Captain Lopes Morais, a para. Its aim is the airport which also serves as a base for the Air Force of Guinea Conakry, to destroy the Mig fighter and ensure that there is not a air threat to the operation. One of the elements of the Front is a former air traffic controller of the airport. They begin to hear explosions throughout the city even before starting the progression towards the goal. The progression is in a rushed pace, imposed by the commander, despite his injured knee result of a recent jump. Captain Lopes Morais feels some resistance to progress in the military who followed more back and send one of its men to investigate why. At 02h00, he announced to the LFG Hydra: 02h00 - The son of bitch of lieutenant fled with 20 of my men: betrayed me miserably. It is the desertion of lieutenant Januário and his men, which will meet the forces of the PAIGC to express their desire to join the movement.And thus falls one of the main objectives of the operation: it is now impossible to deny the involvement of Portugal in the events. All the effort of concealment of forces and equipment was in vain. And it is also a major blow to SIERRA team, which then sees reduced to half its size. Aboard LFG Orion, the commander Alpoim Calvão ordered the ship to change its position, joining LDG Bombarda and LFG Hydra, and sends the POPE team to land, which has the task to cut the isthmus that separates Conakry I to Conakry II.

SIERRA team continues towards goal. From the airport by radio, captain Lopes Morais will inform the Hydra: 02h15 - I'm at goal. Airport surrounded by barbed wire. 02h25 - I runned the runway and did not see any Mig. Meanwhile, they hear clarins and noise of engines in neighboring military camp Alpha Ya-ya. 02h28 - I heard the noise of gun trucks going by. Week in the knee, captain Lopes Morais stays with three men in the middle of the taxi-way and sends Justo and the 2 ° sergeant Teixeira to seek the Mig.Their back 20 minutes later, stating that at the end of the runway are three old propeller aircraft and there is another dirt runway. Captain backs to a place where two Caravelle aircraft, from Air Afrique, and four Fokker F-27 Friendship. Justo wanted to destroy them, but captain Morais did not authorized. 02h30 - I searched the hangars and there are not any Mig. 03h00 - I am surrounded by two armored personnel carriers and many troops. From the LFG Orion, Alpoim Calvão send the SIERRA team back to the place of disembark. In the same time is reported from the teams on land that, according to the soldiers taken prisoner, the Mig were sent to the aerodrome of Labé due to a ministerial reshuffle. A failure of intelligence. This is a serious setback for the operation because the forces will be seriously jeopardized by the possible entry into action of MIG. The only anti-air weapons available are the cannon Bofors of 40mm on the boats. In a limited airspace as is the case, 10 guns have a reasonable chance of hiting the aircraft, but the ships are easy targets for air strikes. Alpoim Calvão gives SIERRA the team order to destroy the runway before withdrawing, but they no longer have the mortar and mines of fragmentation to be able to do. The team reembark the Hydra by 04h15. Missed the destruction of the Mig, there was still hope to find Sékou Touré. At 04h30, most teams had already completed its mission and were reembarked, except the forces of FLNG would remain on the ground. The situation was as follows:

- Sea domain assured - Objectives against the PAIGC mostly achieved - POWs free - Land domain still in dispute, but a big chace of sucess (all ZULO team was free for operational reserve and so was the Special Marines Comapany n.º 21) - Sékou Touré nou found - Migs not found and air domain not assured

This was the most important factor and the risk of air strikes too serious. No portuguese ship should be sunk. Moreover, it was important to avoid any trace of the Portuguese presence (at the time it was not known that the Januário intended to join the PAIGC). The commander Alpoim Calvão takes the decision to complete the operation by ordering the return of the teams to the ships as soon as their tasks are fulfilled. The FLNG also failed: the movement had not the expected supports, and the popular uprising had not occurred. The Portuguese forces had done their part, causing major damage to the communist regime of Sékou Touré, and left the FLNG in a very favorable position to take power in the capital. The elements of the Front who want to reembark with the Portuguese forces do it. Others choose to stay and continue the fight. At 05h00, only lacks to reembak some teams of LDG Montante. Therefore, the order is given to force TU 27-2-1, formed by LFG Hydra and LDG Bombarda, to withdraw as soon as possible from the zone of action. At 6:00 a.m., it is ordered to LFGs Cassiopeia and Dragão to collaborate with the reembark of troops still on the ground. With the birth of the sun, in all vessels the anti-air positions were put on combat alert.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montantecon1.jpg

Morning of Nov. 22. In the Bay of Conakry, ships await the latest troops to reembark. Onboard of the Montante, troops rest with the city attacked in sight.

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http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/montantecon2.jpg

At 07h40, in a position next to the Palace of the People, are fired four shots from a 82mm mortar in the direction of the Montante, badly targeted. The LFG Dragão changes position, placing itself between the Montante and land to shield the troops that reembark. The two vessels make fire from 40mm on the position ashore. Four shots are sufficient and the ships were never attacked again. At 08h05, Dragão joins the Orion to receive material from blood transfusion for injured, and transfer the pilot Antonio Lobato

"The Dragon, moved from the invisible, begins to move cautiously in the direction of another vessel anchored nearby. Magistralmente operated, there is in a position to facilitate my transfer. Helped by a Marine, I step to board Orion. It is here that emanate all orders for the forces in the field. I was immediately led to the brain of Operation Mar Verde. In the bridge, Alpoim Calvão looked concerned at the sky, aware that he had on his hand the lives of 400 men, the return of seven ships and the success of the operation. He welcomed me warmly, but it seems he was waiting for me just to make a question "The Mig's, will they appear ?..." By virtue of my profession that is both my ideal, during all these years of captivity, I was naturally sensitive to noise from the sky. Less than half a dozen times I listened to the characteristic turbines of a jet fighter. On two of those occasions, on visits by Sékou Touré to the region, I observed, through the bars of my cell, a pair of Mig's flying too high and conducting very soft maneuvers. It is not normal this kind of flight when accompanying the visit of a president, much less when this is a President exhibi of power. Thus I founded my answer, "the Mig's are not coming". I do not know if my words relaxed him or not, but still, in view of the huge cordon of people that at 08h00 filled the bay, looking astonished at the invaders ships anchored in the waters of the capital, the Commander waits half a dozen missing."

At 08h10, is ordered the vessels to form in rhombus, more appropriate against air strikes. The inicial evasive course: 240.

"Everyone had eyes on the beach, expecting to see emerging the group still missing. After about an hour of tension, a group of half a dozen men run along the sand, under the gaze of a crowd astonished by such boldness. Immediately, a boat is launched to water and the 2 ° Lieutenant Rebordão de Brito burst to collect the latest wave of invaders It's around 09h00. Vessels take course to freedom." (Antonio Lobato)

"At nine o'clock in the morning, I had the city in my hands. What I lacked was the air support. "(Guilherme de Alpoim Calvão)

The naval force takes the path of return to Portuguese Guinea, without delays, maintaining however the highest degree of anti-aircraft readiness. They arrive the next day to the island of Soga, where harbour at 15h30. That night none of the former Portuguese POWs sleept: they are too busy celebrating! Suffering only 3 dead and 3 seriously injured, the troops had in fact overthrown the regime of Sékou Touré in the capital, destroyed a significant part of his armed forces (including all its Navy), released 26 Portuguese POWs and 400 Guinean political prisoners, and inflicted about 500 dead to the enemy. The following targets were achieved:

Presidencial Palace Interior Minister headquarters Gendarmerie headquarters Lansana Beavogui house Sayfoullah Diallo house Gendarmerie barracks Foreign Afairs Minister headquarters Post Offices and Telephone Services Shipyards (PAIGC and Guinea Konakri) Boulbinet radio station Union Barracks of the Soviet military advisors 6th Avenenue Police station Former studio of Guinea Radio Gendarmerie mobile batallion Files of the Parti Democratique de Guinée Other security services and the prision Samory military field Power plant Central Bank (BCG) Conakry I Federation Popular Conakry Milicia Villa SillyOf the 26 targets, only the airport was intact. One of the biggest difficulties was the fact that much of the information (about 30%) obtained for the preparation of the operation was incorrect. For lack of timely information, the Mig escaped. Only one flew over Conakri, at high altitude and without even showing signs of wanting to attack the ships. It was latter knowned that the pilots of Guinea-Conakry were still receiving instruction and were not able to perform combat actions. They also failed to eliminate Sékou Touré. The information that he would be in Villa Silly had it's origin in a source of the Federal Germany secret services infiltrated at the Presidential Palace. But, while not all the goals have been achieved, the results of operations was very positive. Even if they had not achieved anything else, only for the release of Portuguese POWs already made Operation Mar Verde worth executing.

http://forumarmada.no.sapo.pt/docs/FA-Marverde/pdgs.jpg The POWs on bord the LFG Dragão gaijinsamurai 11-04-2007, 12:21 PM Very informative. Thanks for posting this, Lancero. Lancero 11-04-2007, 03:21 PM Part 4 - The epilogue

Not occuring the expected uprising in the whole country, the forces of FLNG were incapable of overthrowing the regime, facing the counter-attack of Sékou Touré, with troops called from the rest of the country, and a contingent of Cuban troops. The fighting lasted several days, suffering the FLNG numerous deaths and 100 of its members were taken prisoner. The Guinean dictator ultimately return to have the city under its control. Prisoners reported Operation Mar Verde and reveal the names of the mentors. It follows the international scandal, skilfully exploited by the regime of Guinea-Conakry. Lisbon denies any involvement in the events, but the Security Council of the UN had a emergency meeting and passed two resolutions against Portugal: one condemning the operation Mar Verde, and another sending a commission of inquiry to Conakry. Nigeria offers the dispatch of a contingent of troops to prevent new portuguese attacks. Sékou Touré asks military aid to the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union responded sending a naval force consisting of three vessels, which is now based in Conakry, and that is known as the West Africa Patrol and the UN calls for the portuguese withdrawal of Bissau. The US are furious with Portugal. Kissinger explodes: "This damn this dictatorship only brings us problems! '. Seeing the speed with which the USSR took advantage of the situation, and knowing the investment of US mining companies in Guinea-Conakry, the president Nixon attaches to the country food aid valued at 4.7 million dollars. And sends a confidential letter to Sékou Touré regretting the incidents. The following day, the White House is surprised by the Guinean dictator, which makes public the letter, thanking it as "a message of sympathy and support against the serious criminal assault of Portugal." For its part, the Federal Republic of Germany cut diplomatic relations with Guinea-Conakry, as a result of the death of a German diplomat during the events in the Guinean capital. From a diplomatic point of view, the results of Operation Mar Verde are counterproductive because bring into evidence the international isolation of Portugal, and have significantly affected the Luso-American relations. An officer in Spínola's staff told the Washington Post:

“We must pursue the guerrillas. But if we do what the Americans do in Cambodia and Laos, the world calls against us - including the Americans"

The USSR and Cuba increase considerably the material aid to the PAIGC, and the USSR built a naval base in Conakry, denounced by Portugal less than a year later. The Soviets compensate for the loss of four Komar offering to Guinea-Conaktry equal number of P6, and six coastal patrol boat. The US noted that the USSR had become much more adventurous in West Africa and that Portugal was likely to "face the Soviets alone."

In Guinea-Conakry, following the operation, the prosecution is implacable. The rebels are executed without mercy, like all who are subject to suspicion. Thousands of people are killed. Their bodies are dismembered and arms and legs fill the streets of Conakry, hanging from trees, lamps and road signs. The population lives in terror. “Four bodies swing under the Tombé bridge, in the motorway at the entrance of Conakry. In front of the bodies, decomposing under the merciless January sun, dance women displaying, at the ends of long poles, the sexual organs of the condemned "(Jean Paul Alata in Prison for Africa)

The desertion of lieutenant Januário and the twenty men that followed him, leaving the SIERRA team, it is of short duration: its enterance to the PAIGC is not accepted and they are executed in Conakry.

Whatever has been the politically negative aspects, from the military point of view, Operation Mar Verde showed how a small group of well-trained troops can launch the chaos in a country with surgical strikes of special forces. The Portuguese troops executed their missions without the usual specific training in special operations raids since only became aware of the operation hours before departure. Unlike the enemy and allies of FLNG, they had to fight with weapons that were very different from those normally used. This was only possible because they were extremely well trained troops and experienced. The Armed Forces, under the guidance of a except militry as Alpoim Calvão, showed an initiative and a surprising capacity for intervention by a small country and who at the time was faced with a good dose of international isolation. With extremely limited resources, they carried out an ambitious operation, and in same situation, if it was made by other powers (such as the US or the UK, for example) usually involve the use of massive resources. The example would be followed in much smaller dimension by South Africa, with the commando raids against neighboring countries. Operation Mar Verde was also a source of inspiration for the book "Dogs of War", by Frederick Forsyth.

Following the operation, in 1970, the participants and the prisoners of war released in Conakry pledged to fulfill a pact of silence. That pact was broken by a few, among them the very operational commander, Alpoim Calvão, which even published a book on the events. Other works relate this operation, and the public television station, RTP, made a documentary in the 90's. However, the official position of the Portuguese state continues to be that Operation Mar Verde never existed. In 1995, in statements to the RTP, the then President of the Republic of Guinea-Conakry praised the operation, seeing it as a missed opportunity to free the country from the yoke of Sékou Touré.And said that the Portuguese military did what it is a natural desire of the armed forces of any country: release their prisoners of war. END GETSOME 11-05-2007, 02:50 PM Very interesting read thanks. superbuzzmetal 11-05-2007, 04:57 PM Great read thanks a lot mate, this would be great for a war movie p-) OldRecon 11-06-2007, 02:31 PM Interesting read. Also somewhat intriguing to me in relation to this story is the allegations of a former Norwegian desserter from 2 REP in the early 1970's of taking part in an operation with a coy of 2. REP against Guinea Conakry some time around 1970-72, that according to same source went awry (apparently his coy. commander was rather green and uncertain of himself and proved unable to cope with the strain). This same ex-Legionnaire had according to himself also taken part in a combat jump in Tchad around 1970 with a follow up punitive expedition against rebel village after first ambushing the rebels. vBulletin® v3.6.7, Copyright ©2000-2008, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.

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Associação Nacional de Cruzeiros BATALHAS E COMBATES da Marinha Portuguesa

Conakry - 22 de Novembro de 1970 Saturnino Monteiro em «Batalhas e Combates da Marinha Portuguesa» (Vol.VIII)

Bibliografia: Calvão, Alpoim, De Conakry ao M.D.L.P., Editorial Intervenção, Lisboa, 1976, p. 64 Conversas do autor com os Comandantes Alpoim Calvão, Rebordão de Brito, Lago Domingues e outros.

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It associates? National of Cruises BATTLES And COMBATS of the Portuguese Navy Conakry - 22 of November of 1970

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The subversive war?m type of war where if aims at to get the definitive control of territ?o for interm?o of ac? of you engage in guerilla warfare actuando in its interior. Preventing sistematicamente the confrontation with it will be? superiors and restricting its actua? the attacks of surprise in the most diverse localities and itiner?os, you engage in guerilla warfare them basically look for to convince popula, them he will be? governmental and the pr?io half Government of territ?o of that this n?disp?de to dominate them and that, consequentemente, later or more early n?ter?utro rem?o to sen?submeter?suas exig?ias of car?er pol?co. How?vidente, so that them it will be? governmental they can gain a war subversive?ecess?o that they are capable to neutralize you engage in guerilla warfare them. For this they exist, theoretically, tr?linhas of ac? estrat?ca poss?is: the first one consists of locating and to destroy you engage in guerilla warfare them atrav?do direct combat with them; second it consists of cutting comunica?s between them you engage in guerilla warfare and the bases, situated in pa?s generally neighboring, that they supply them; third it consists of neutralizing these bases for interm?o of ac?s military, press? econ?cas or diplom?cos arrangements. S?ue any of these lines of ac, except for in circunst?ias special?uito dif?l of p?em pr?ca. It locates it? of you engage in guerilla warfare them by means of informa?s, of observes? a?a or of the intensive patrolling of the land rare?onseguida. Exactly after located a group of guerrillas?uase always imposs?l aniquil?o, a time that in few minutes exhausts and is moved away for far, or if hides or mixes popula. For?imo, when you engage in guerilla warfare them if they feel pursued particularly in one given zone, they remove for its situated bases in territ?o foreign and a?e they remake, to come back to later appear in same or noutra zone. To cut comunica?s between them you engage in guerilla warfare and its bases tamb?n???l, in first place because?raticamente imposs?l to exert an efficient vigil?ia on the terrestrial borders that can reach hundreds or same thousand of quil?tros; in according to place, because you engage in guerilla warfare them, in that it touches feeds it, s?normalmente you supplied for the pr?ias popula?s of the territ?os where actuam, being indifferent that these fa? voluntariamente or under coac. To destroy the bases of you engage in guerilla warfare them situated in pa?s neighboring?sem d?da, the process theoretically more r?do and more efficient to obtain its it neutralizes. But this implies the possibility of eclos?de an armed conflict of great propor?s with these pa?s, risk that small parents, as was the case of Portugal, n?podia to run given to its weak military potential and econ?co and its international isolation. Of that it was said if to poder?nferir, seen?rimeira, that Portugal n?tinha the lesser possibility to gain a subversive war in the Guin?em Angola or Mo?bique. Por?de is treated simplista conclus?demasiado. In the reality, even so either practically imposs?l to locate and to destroy a substantial part of them you engage in guerilla warfare that they actuam in the interior of data territ?o?oss?l, since that if it makes use of the half adjusted military, to exert on them a press?constante that finishes for hindering its movements consideravelmente and inside keeping of razo?is limits the resultant inconveniences of its ac. Although n?seja poss?l to become imperme?is the terrestrial borders?oss?l, atrav?da occupies? in for?de certain points, of the intensive patrolling of certain tro, of the use of pisteiros and of it observes? a?a, consideravelmente to make it difficult the ticket of weapons, muni?s and staff for the interior of territ?o. Proceeding to the aldeamento from popula?s and making use of good servi?de informa?s?oss?l for limiting the contacts of those with the guerrillas and, consequentemente, for making it difficult the supplying of these. In summary, although to n?ser poss?l p?termo quickly to a war of you engage in guerilla warfare for half military?erfeitamente poss?l to limit its effect for form to allow that the social progress econ?co and of territ?o continues as in peace time. Of this it consists to gain a war militarily subversive. There? it was what it happened in Angola and Mo?bique, but that s?uito hardly it could have happened in the Guin?dada extens?das its terrestrial borders in rela? ?xiguidade of its territ?o, and its dense vegetal covering. To notice that in Green Handle and S?Tom??houve subversive wars because dom?o of the sea and the air of that we disp?amos became impratic?l to support from the exterior a guerrilla who eventually formed itself in any of its islands. In princ?os of 1969 it is known in Bissau that the Guin?onakry had received from the Ussr tr?vedetas-torpedeiras of the classroom Komar. e the PAIGC four vedetas-torpedeiras of the classroom P6.. the first ones was ships of 75 tons, armed with two pe? AA of 25 mm and two m?eis superf?e-superf?e; second they were ships of 66 tons, armed with two pe? 25 AA of rnm and two pipes lan?torpedos. Some and others could reach the 40 a superior speed n? How?vidente, was about one amea?grave for n? During the night these could vedetas arrive the Bissau without being detected and to sink in few minutes a transport of troops or any another load ship that l?e found. Soon ap?a operates? Nebulosa. (August of 1969) commander Alpoim Calv? what was specialized in diver-combat engineer, idealized a new operates? destined to eliminate in such a way of one seated the vedetas-torpedeiras of the PAIGC as of the Guin?onakry. In accordance with its plan, one of our LFG's would be come close sub-repticiamente, during the night, of the port of Conakry and would place in?a v?as equips of men-r?que would go to fix mines-lapa in the hooves of vedetas. Made this?FG would return, that would disappear without leaving track. Some hours later the mines would blow up and those would go to the deep one without that it ningu?pudesse to know exactamente what had happened! As he would be to wait, Brigadier General Spinola approved with enthusiasm the ideia. Calv?foi the Lisbon, obtained the support of the head of the General staff of the Armed (vice-admiral Reboredo and Silva), that probably ter?nformado the Minister of the Navy (vice-admiral Crespo Pear tree), and it followed later for the frica of the South, folloied for a inspector of the DGS, in order to try to get a?s mines-lapa necess?as for operates, a time that our Navy n?as possu? Obtained these, it brought them for Lisbon as if they were personal luggage e, seguidamente, ordered them for the Guin?br > Was now treated to get a actualizado plan of the port of Conakry, of that tamb?n?existia none in Lisbon or Bissau. To decide the problem Calv?prop?ao commander commander of the Mar?ma Defense of the Guin?comodoro Luciano Bastos) that a LFG disfar?a was to make a recognition the Conakry during the night. He agreed that one and to middle of September of 1969 Alpoim Calv?embarcou in the Sagit?o, of that capit?tenente Camacho was commander De Campos, and directed themselves for the Jo?Vieira island, where the ship was disfar?o for form to give impress?de that it belonged to the PAIGC. He was tamb?combinado that if the LFG if crossed with any other ships or embarca?s during the passage for Conakry guarni would s?pareceriam in the exterior the African elements of its. A handle rifleman with bon?e capit?tenente would represent the commander. E thus was fact, obtaining the motor boat to arrive the Conakry for the zero hours of day 17 of September without raising suspicion, although to have itself crossed for the way with diverse guineenses fishing boats! Giving one it comes back wide to present itself ahead of the city as if it came of the south, the Sagit?o entered in the canal that separates the Loos islands of pen?ula of Conakry about the two hours. Ent? using the radar, they had been located with severity posi?s of the diverse acost?is wharves. One hour later the motor boat was directed for sa. But, unexpectedly, the generator was damaged and the ship was obliged to anchor, what rude submitted the nerves of its members of the crew to one test. Happily it damages quickly was repaired it and Sagit?o p? to continue trip and to return the Bissau without newness. Indubitavelmente one of most audacious and most succeeded opera?s of recognition taken the handle for our Armed. Livened up for?to of visita. the Conakry Calv?resolveu to widen the?ito of operates? that it was to planear. Because n? to make one raide?ela city, whose it approaches? he seemed t?f?l, and, simultaneously, to destroy vedetas and to free the 26 Portuguese prisoners who l?e found? It was a ideia that since h?uito germinated in its mind and that now poss?l was figured to take?r?ca. E soon was hurried to present the proposal the Sp?la. It immediately agreed the commander-head to extends? of the objectivos of it operates, the one that he had been given to the Green name of c?go Mar, but understood that, j?ue if went to enter?iva for?em Conakry, ent?que if used to advantage to destroy tamb?as instala?s that the PAIGC had there! The truth?ue the successive widening of the objectivos alcan? still n?ia to be for here.

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Pr?ma p?na.

It associates? National of Cruises BATTLES And COMBATS of the Portuguese Navy Conakry - 22 of November of 1970 (it continues)

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Since 1964 it had contact between the Portuguese authorities, as much of Lisbon as of Bissau, with the FLNG (Front de Lib?tion National Guin), one of the main parties of oposi? illegal passenger to the regimen desp?co of Sekou Tour?A to break of the arrival of Brigadier General Ant?o de Spinola?uin?sses contact had been intensified. Was its inten? to assist the FLNG to establish bases of guerrilla in ours territ?o in order to foment a subversive war in the interior of the Guin?onakry that took?eposi? of Sekou Tour? ?nstaura? of a regimen that in them was favor?l, this?que put charges?ac?s military who the PAIGC came efectuando against n?a to leave of that Pará? However projecto was avan? with much lentid?por if to be afraid that it could cause serious complica?s international. Was ent?que Calv?teve commander the ideia to use to advantage the projectado one has attacked the Conakry for, with the aid of will be? of the FLNG (that it would have that to organize), to try to tamb?levar the handle a coup d etat in that city that lead?iquida? immediate of the regimen of Sekou Tour?E, one more time, it got the immediate support of the j?nt?general Sp?la. Met definite finally the four objectivos of operate? Mar Green: to destroy the vedetas-torpedeiras; to free the Portuguese prisoners; to make unusable instala?s of the PAIGC in Conakry; to substitute the government of Sekou Tour?or a government of the FLNG. How much the n? it extends it? of the initial objectivos of it operates? it was an error. The form of leading the handle tamb?n?nos seems that he has been more aconselh?l. We think that the form more correcta to destroy vedetas enemy would be atrav?da places? of mines-lapa, as initially foreseen, efectuada for diver-combat engineers from one or two submarine. The truth, for? ?ue?to alcan?o seems to justify the plan that was adoptee. One das bigger difficulties, al?de to conserve the most rigorous secret, was to congregate na Guin?ortuguesa the combatants da FLNG who if found refugee no Senegal, G?ia, Mountain range Lioness, Lib?a and Costa do Ivory. To decide the problem, Alpoim Calv?foi for diverse times Paris, Geneva and other cities in order to contactar the controllers of the FLNG and to combine with them the places, the dates and the signals of recognition to use in the retraction of those elements. Ap?cada one of these contacts, went pr?io it in a LFG, during the night, to preset place e, in rubber small boats, collected the men of the FLNG, in its majority old military of the colonial ex?ito franc?ou of the ex?ito da.Guin?onakry. Opera?s dif?is and prudish under the point of view of sails? that the high professional compet?ia and arrojo of the commanders of our motor boats had put?rova. measure that the combatants of the FLNG went arriving?uin?eram taken for the Soga island, donde n?mais sa? in order to keep the secrecy of it operates? in sight. In the related island, where they had been construidos quarterings, they had been the same ones submitted to trainings intensive under guides? of Portuguese instructors. All this process had place between January and November of 1970. In middle of November of 1970 it was everything practically ready for p?em march operates it? Mar Green, lacking only to get necess?a authorizes? of the central government. For this, ordered Calv?foi commander the Lisbon the 14, being carrying of a letter-credential of general Spinola for the Chairman of the board (professor Marcelo Caetano), to who exp?de alive voice prop?to and the plan of operates. Seduced for the perspective of a success that took off it of the alley without sa? what was the war of the Guin? trying to convince it pr?io itself of that ac would be poss?l to effect one? of t?grande spread without leaving track, Caetano authorizeed its immediately execu? since that n?fosse left in Conakry smallest vest?o of ours participates.

CONAKRY - 1970

How much the n? decis?de Marcelo Caetano?no m?mo, much discut?l. It wants was well or unsuccessful, the attack the Conakry could give place to one reac? on the part of the Ussr of frankly negative consequ?ias for n? Refor?do military support and pol?co to the movements that lead the subversive wars in the Guin?em Angola and Mo?nbique, or same the?ep?ica support of the Guin?onakry for one ac? of it retaliates? large-scale, they were real risks that, in ours opini? n?se justified to run, over all having in account that the theater of opera?s of the Guin?ra a theater of opera?s indiscutivelmente secund?o in the set of the defense war of Overseas. Of any form, the taken decis?fora and the data were lan?os. For dezanove and cinquenta of day 20 of November it released of the Soga island, under the superior command of capit?tenente Alpoim Calv? a for?naval constitu? for the LFG's (Motor boats of fiscalize? great) Orion (capit?tenente Faria Dos Santos), Cassiopeia (capit?tenente Domingues Lake), Drag?/i > (first-lieutenant Martinho Duke) and Hidra (first-lieutenant Fialho G), e for the LDG's (great Motor boats of landing) Bombard (capit?tenente Aguiar de Jesus) and Sum (first-lieutenant Coast Leather strap), where went embarked them will be? of the FLNG, about 200 men, the company of African commands (to capit?Bacar Jul?e the DFE21, tamb?africano (first-lieutenant Wedge and Hisses). Ser?portuno to relate that two officers, one of the Navy and another one of the Ex?ito, to the being given knowledge to them of the nature of operate, they had put retic?ias forts. Thought they who n?era leg?mo to attack of surprise one pa?com who Portugal was officially in peace (although this to pa?permitir that in them was being made the war from its territ?o) and that tamb?n?era leg?mo to use Portuguese troops with foreign uniform and without any signal of identifies? staff (what, there? he happens with frequ?ia in the subversive war). After all, they had finished both for yielding?exorta?s of Sp?la and Calv? that, as born military who were, much less understood that the?or war nature a viol?ia act that n?pode to be practised with extreme escr?los without running great risks.

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Sailing with the one support avi?P2V5 of the FAP (Portuguese For?A?a), our for?naval obtained to prevent the meeting with any another ship and to arrive?imedia?s of?vinte Conakry without being detected hours of 21 of November of 1970, one s?do, with the Moon you give to be born and the mar??uito pr?ma of the preia-sea, or either in condi?s ideal for the success of it operates. 3 twenty and twenty, shortly afterwards to have been sighted the lighthouse of the Loos islands, the ships had received order to exhaust and to follow for the anchorages that them had been destined. Shortly afterwards the hour of the landing was promulgated: one and thirty of sunday, day 22.

CONAKRY - 1970

The LFG Orion, where went embarked Calv commander? the NNW of the break-sea anchored significantly that protects the port of Conakry about half mile of it. A group of ships constitu? for the LFG's Cassiopeia and Drag?/i > and for the Upstream LDG was to anchor the north of the city. One another group constitu? for the LFG Hidra and the LDG Bombard it was directed for south of that one. The embarked troops had been organized in equip, assigned for letters of the NATO alphabet, to each one of which had been atribu? a objectivo I specify. One of the basic points of the ideia of maneuver was to eliminate more before nothing the vedetas-torpedeiras of the Guin?onakry and of the PAIGC, n?s?or this being one of the main objectivos of operates, but tamb?para to guarantee dom?o of the sea, essential factor so that it could be led by ahead. Of its destrui? she was in charge equips it VICTOR, composed for catorze African riflemen special under the command of as-lieutenant Rebord?de Brito, the bra?direito of Alpoim Calv?e the man always chosen for the tasks dif?is and of bigger responsibility. Ranks in?a the rubber small boats, equip it embarked in them in the most absolute sil?io and, for midnight and forty and five, it left the Orion and it was directed for the break-sea. Folloied for some of its men, Rebord?de Brito scaled it e, with aux?o of bin?lo, looked for to locate vedetas. For? in the dock berth of the bananeiro wharf, where it thought encontr?as, it only obtained to delimit what it it seemed to be... a frigate! But nor therefore one became upset, limiting itself to say it for its friends: - After all, it seems that we have of in having them with a frigate! If to calhar we go to l?icar all! But they tamb?n?h?de to leave from there! E came back toward the small boats firmly made use to take the frigate?bordagem! Skirting for the south the break-sea, VICTOR equips it directed itself for the dock berth of the bananeiro wharf. Penetrating in, p? ent?o lieutenant Rebord?de Brito to evidence after all with al?o that what P6. of ones the PAIGC moored more assumes to be a frigate n?era than the set formed for four vedetas of bra?dado?outras and having atr?de itself one barca?de landing. Of the other side of pont?a that they met come alongside they were to tr?.Komar them. of the Rep?ica of the Guin?onakri, tamb?amarradas of bra?dado ones?outras. In it a sentry pont?divisava itself, who seemed to be to sleep. Brought alongside tamely the small boats, grumete Abu Camar?proximou of the sentry without being pressentido e, with punhalada, he eliminated it. The remaining elements had precipitated of equip on vedetas P6. and Komar. e for the hatchways of the covers and the houses of the engines come?am to shoot for its interior garnet of m? that they had killed all how many they were on board and they had given to origin the inc?ios v?os. S?nt?uma machine gun, installed in the roof of a armaz?sobranceiro?oca, opened fire on the riflemen. But these, the covered one of escurid? some fast wounds had been run awayed for the small boats, suffering only, and had initiated the return?i>Orion, leaving seven vedetas in flames. Few passed minutes these blew up, raising itself of the place where if they found two enormous fire balls! A blow of m?cl?ico skillfully executed, the one that corresponded a success the one hundred percent.

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one and forty had released of the Drag?/i > and of the Cassiopeia ten rubber small boats carrying equip it ZULU, person in charge of if taking possetion of a situated military complex about 7 quil?tros the NE of Conakry. In the way some of the small boats are embara?am in arma?s of fish, for that s?s two and fifteen had arrived the land. Ent?a was divided equips in tr?grupos. The first one was directed for pris?La Montaigne, where if they found withheld 26 Portuguese military, who had been freed after a short but violent combat with the respective guard. It can be imagined joy of these military that, dived had months and years in the darknesses of the captivity, saw to confide suddenly, as that for enchantment, the doors of the freedom! As the group attacked instala?s of the PAIGC, destroying five edif?os and v?as viaturas, and abated diverse militant that l?e found. The third group took?ua counts to the field of mil?as and the Silly Village, alternative resid?ia of Sekou Tour?ue if it found kept strong. Both had been busy ap?violentos combats, where the defenders had suffered heavy decreases. Of the Upstream LDG they had broken you equip them?CAR?DIA and MIKE. The first one, using rubber small boats, abicou to the quarter of Republican Guarda, that, ap?um hard combat, obtained to become, freeing about 400 pol?cos prisoners that l?e found, many of which had caught immediately in weapons.

CONAKRY - 1970

To disembark with bigger rapidity the others two you equip, the commander of the Sum decided to come alongside directamente to the wharf of the Yacht Club, what it obtained with an excellent maneuver. It equips it?DIA was directed for the el?rica central office, that occupied after having neutralized the respective guard. Seguidamente cut the light for the city in order to dive this in escurid?e to increase confus?e the desorienta? between them it will be? of Sekou Tour?Eram ent?duas and fifteen. It equips it MIKE took the way of the military field of Samory, that occupied without resist?ia. For? shortly afterwards it had to stop combat with a motorized column that was a refugee to the place, but that it finished for being destro?a. Of this form, for the four of the manh?todos objectivos that had been atribu?s?equipas that they had disembarked of the side north of Conakry they had been alcan?os?usta of low fast of our part and weighed decreases of the part of advers?o. Of the south side, for raz? fortuitous, the things n?correram t?bem. one had released of the Bombard two rubber small boats with equips in charge HOTEL of if taking possetion of the sender of radiodifus? For? ap?o landing, its commander, a natural 2 second lieutenant of the Guin?ortuguesa, was desorientou and been nailed in the land without knowing what to make. However, in two vacant of rubber small boats, had disembarked equip they ALPHA, BRAVE, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF, that had occupied without diverse difficulty of greater objectivos estrat?cos in the interior of the city. But in the quarter of the Gendarmerie strong resist?ia was found, that finished for being dominated. In the?ito of these ac?s was destru? a column of tank that if prepared to leave one quarter. Perhaps in pal?o presidential, such as had happened in the Silly Village, n?foi found Sekou Tour?que for mere had been dislocated in this night for the interior of the Pará? For the streets groups of popular our troops and the troops of the FLNG vitoriavam. Of the LFG Hidra she released, for the midnight and one room, equips it SIERRA, that had for miss?ocupar the airport of Conakry and destroying avi? of ca?.Mig., of production sovi?co, that she assumed herself to l?starem and whose neutralizes? he was another one of the considered factors essential so that she operates it? she could be crowned of?to. The landing had place for the half one and, as foreseen, directing itself equips it immediately, in sped up march, for the airport, that if found about one quil?tro and half the point where the small boats abicaram. Unexpectedly, during the passage, a natural lieutenant of our Guin?que was part of equips, turned into a desert, leading obtains twenty men! (He consisted later in Bissau that the related lieutenant had been ordered to execute for Sekou Tour?n?se knowing under that excuse.) Although to have been with its for?consideravelmente reduced, the commander of equips SIERRA, capit?paraquedista Lopes Moral, continued in front and occupied the airport without finding resist?ia. S?ue Migs., its main objectivo, n?se found l?Por raz? fortuitous they had been transferred some days before to another one aer?omo in the interior the Pará? Inten? of Calv?era commander to continue in Conakry at?ue the FLNG firmly was installed in the government. But for such age indispens?l that dom?o of air n?estivesse in the m? of advers?o. Therefore, when having knowledge of that Migs. n?tinham been destru?s and that, consequentemente, could attack our ships when breaching of the day, decided to give for finda operates it? e commanded the reshipment. For this its decis?contribuiu tamb?o fact to have evidenced that the implata? of the FLNG in Conakry, as much pol?ca as to militate, was sufficiently inferior?ue its controllers divulged. The retraction of you equip them that four and the forty were in land had in?o about and was conclu? about the nine, therefore j?om day clearly, processing itself in the generality without any worthy incident of men. By seven and forty four mortar shots had been made only of land on the Sum that n?a had reached. Ready interven? of the Drag?/i >, that donde made some shots for the place had broken the morteiradas ones, decided the subject. In that it touches to the elements of the FLNG that had taken part in operates, those had been collected all that had desired it. Some as much, that had taken part in the assault to the military complex, had preferred to continue in land, together to the prisoners that they had freed, and had continued to resist during v?os days the counterattack lan?o for the Cuban troops and fi? the Sekou Tour?indas of the interior. The t?temido attack a?o of Migs. n?chegou to materialize itself. But high one was sighted one of them flying that n?fez any men? of wanting to attack our ships. One knew later that the guineenses pilots still met in phase of trainings and n?eram capable to use avi? in ac?s of combat. Da?ue the return of our for?naval?lha Soga, where twenty five of the following day arrived?dezasseis and, has passed without any incident.

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Under the point of view purely to militate, this?de organizes, operational, t?ica and t?ica log?ica, estrat?a, operates it? Mar Green constituted a spectacular success, taking care of to the severity with that gliding and it was executed, to them reduzid?imos ways that it used, to small n?ro of decreases suffered for our troops (only 3 dead and 3 serious wounded) when compared with the suffered ones for advers?o (about 500 died) e, over all, for the fact to have taken?estrui? of all the vedetas-torpedeiras and?iberta? of all the Portuguese prisoners who were in Conakry. Under the point of view of great estrat?a (part of pol?ca national related with the war), n?pode to leave of being considered a failure, a time that one of its main objectivos, substitutes it? of the government of Sekou Tour?or a government of the FLNG, n?foi obtained. However, how much it failure n?esse to poder?er been providencial. If Migs. had been destru?s?uito prov?l that Alpoim Calv?se had left to be in Conakry at?ue was installed a government of the FLNG there and that this requested the competition, still that disfar?o, of the troops and of prepares? Portuguese of the Guin?ara to assure the control of the remaining portion of territ?o, what she could have dragged Portugal for an open war of the traditional type with the Guin?onakry. In this in case that it would be to wait that the Ussr supplied to these great amounts of war material and made to converge to consider?is l?fectivos of Cuban troops. Most certain?ue we acab?emos for suffering a humilhante defeat that would n?poderia to leave of negative afectar the moral of popula? metropolitan and of the troops who were to fight in Angola and Mo?bique. Such as the things if had passed, the Portugu?p Government? to assume posi? of that he was entirely other people's to the event, reac?s, as much of the ONU as of the Ussr, had been less violent of the one than it would be to wait and the subject, to the end of few months, fell in the esquecimento! N?obstante, we think, and as official n?muitos of them Will be? Armies, that posi? assumed for Marcelo n?ter?ido Caetano worthiest nor more correcta. Ours to see he would have been prefer?l that assumed the Portugu?tivesse Government public the paternity of operates, affirming that its objectivos had been solely destrui? of the vedetas-torpedeiras of the PAIGC (that in them it was attacking the Guin?e frees it? of the withheld Portuguese military in Conakry (contrariamente to the stipulated one for the International law); ?entativa what how much of coup d etat taken the handle for them will be? to the FLNG if he deals with only the exploitation of a chance of the exclusive responsibility of this. Given?to to militate that he operates it? he constituted, its divulges? would have had certainly a frankly positive effect psicol?co, as much in rela? ?opula? of the Metr?le as in rela? ?tropas that they were to fight in the other overseas prov?ias. After all everything this if lost due?alta of stature pol?ca of Marcelo Caetano. To hinder that the Portuguese could carry through new it has attacked the Conakry Sekou Tour?ediu protec? naval of the Ussr, that sent for l?uas Russian frigates with guarni?s. Ser?portuno to call aten? of the reader for the fact of that the attack the Conakry of 22 of November of 1970 was?ca it operates? carried through for our armed since the battle of the handle of S?Vicente (1833) with implica?s of order estrat?ca, this?com possibility to modify the course of the war. Was tamb?a?ima ac? naval where the Portuguese had taken off left of dom?o of the sea to try to gain a war. How?vidente, the great figure of the attack the Conakry was commander Alpoim Calv? one of the not?is Portuguese military sailors of them we?imos s?los, whose ac?s in the Guin?os rudes and ind?tos make to come?embran?aqueles knights of other times, always ready to fight in land or the sea, without looking at the difficulties nor?scassez of ways, and that they had been the main workers of the Imp?o, imp?o that, as all the imp?os, had necessarily to finish one day, but that well it could and it must have had a less sad end.

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Bibliography: Calv? Alpoim, Of Conakry to the M.D.L.P., Interven Editorial, Lisbon, 1976, p. 64 Colloquies of the author with Commanders Alpoim Calv? Rebord?de Brito, Domingues Lake and others.

Battles and Combats of the Portuguese Navy

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