User:Ta eis heauton/wwkt

This is a draft!

The Battles at the Taipale Front were intensive battles fought during the Winter War between Finland and Soviet Union from December 6th 1939 to March 13th 1940. The battles were part of a Soviet campaign to overtake the Finnish Mannerheim Line of defense in the Karelian Isthmus region to open a route to Southern Finland. Unlike the battles further north, at Taipale the opposing forces engaged in trench warfare, Soviet troops repeatedly attacking the Finnish defenses in what became a war of attrition. The Soviet forces were unable to break through at the Taipale front.

During the first month of the Winter War in December 1939 the eastern Taipale front was the main focus of the Soviet offensive at the Karelian Isthmus as the Soviet high command Stavka deemed the defenses there weaker than in the west. The Soviet goal was to penetrate the Mannerheim Line, gaining access to the town of Käkisalmi at the shores of the lake Lagoda, opening a route further to Finland.

The first battles at Taipale took place between December 6th and 27th 1939. Supported by heavy artillery fire, the 7th Army Right Wing Group lead by Vladimir Grendal repeatedly but unsuccessfully attacked the Finnish lines at Taipale, but also at Kelja and Kiviniemi, resulting in surmounting losses of troops. The Soviets had relied on their superior military equipment, attacking at the Isthmus only with the troops stationed around the city of Leningrad.

After the failure of the initial December offensives the Soviet forces took the month of January 1940 to regroup. Karelian Isthmus now became the main focus of the Soviet war effort. More troops were brought to the front, materials replenished, the command restructured and battle plans revised. The troops at the Karelian Isthmus were divided into two armies, 7th Army in the west and 13th in the eastern Taipale front. By the end of January Soviet troops had amassed a superiority of troops x to 1, tanks x to 1 and artillery x to 1 preparing for the offensive ahead.

The main Voroshilov offensive in February 1940 targeted the Summa region in the west. Taipale was still once again a scene of intense battles as the newly formed Soviet 13th Army lead by Vladimir Grendal tried to overrun the Finnish defenses between February 8th and xxx. The Soviet forces were unable to break through at Taipale front during the 105 days of Winter War, suffering heavy losses.

The offensive in the west was a success. Soviet 7th army overtook the Finnish defences at Summa, attacking Vyborg further north. As a result of an exposed and vulnerable position Finland was forced to seek peace. The Winter War ended in signing of the Moscow peace treaty in xxxx, and the Finnish forces at Taipale withdrew beyond the newly designated border to the north.

Background
On 5th October 1939 Soviet Union had sent a diplomatic message to Finland demanding negotiations on territory. On 12th October – the day the negotiations started in Moscow – Finland had started gradual mobilisation under the guise of "additional refresher training", deploying troops at the border. On 26 November 1939, an incident was reported near the Soviet village of Mainila, close to the border with Finland. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. The shots were a false flag operation looking for casus belli to start military operations.

Soviet Union had already started intensive mobilisation near the Finnish border in 1938–39. Soviet operational plans made in September had called for an invasion to start in November. The final battle plans were put together in haste during the first two weeks of November. At the start of the war Soviet Union did not have an overwhelming superiority of troops at the Finnish front or in the Taipale area. The Soviet main command had been very optimistic about the war, anticipating an easy victory. The plan was to overtake Finland in 12 days with just the troops of the Leningrad Military District area, employing the fast movement shown by Nazi Germany on their invasion of Poland just a few months ago. General Kirill Meretskov had assigned the Seventh army to attack at the Karelian Isthmus. Its objective to take Vyborg, then capture Finnish capital Helsinki before reaching the western Finnish port town of Hanko. The plan called the 7th Army to advance 20 km a day, almost the peace time marching speed of the infantry.

The Soviet 7th army located at the Karelian Isthmus had two main goals: to attack towards Vyborg in the west and Käkisalmi in the east, then continuing towards Southern Finland. The main roads towards the eastern strategic target of Käkisalmi passed Finnish Kiviniemi and Metsäpirtti municipalities along the Taipale river near lake Lagoda, with railroad crossing the river at Kiviniemi. Although only the easternmost part of the river was called Taipale, the whole 40 km region between the municipality of Kiviniemi and lake Lagoda has been colloquially known as the Taipale front.

Although the Soviets did not have vast number of troops compared to Finnish troops at the beginning of the conflict, they did have overwhelming material superiority. The Soviet army was new and modern, the pride of the nation. Up to that point they had not lost, having just scored an easy victory against Japan in Khalkhin Gol.

The Red Army had thousands of tanks and armored cars and absolute air power.

The Skirmish of Metsäpirtti
Soviet forces captured Metsäpirtti Joukot vedettiin taakse (R) Confrontation Marski + komentajat

The Finnish battle plan was to first employ defense in depth, then stop the oncoming Soviet troops at the main defense structures. The first Finns to meet the enemy south of the river would be the batallion strength guard troops Metsapirtti Unit, consisting of local men from the area. In case of an attack, their task was to slow down the enemy, inflicting damages while the area was evacuated of civilians and the main line of defense readied itself to meet the offensive. The Finnish troops had built forward trench positions at Umpilinna south of the river Taipale to help the task of the guard units.

Soviet Preparations
The original Soviet plan had called for the main offensive to take place in Western Karelian Isthmus. The distance from the border to the main defenses was shorter in the east, however, and the Soviet troops had met less resistance there, getting easily to the border. Following the Skirmish of Metsäpirtti Meretskov decided to move the main attack to the east.

The Soviet 7th Army Right Wing Group was set up for the operation. Lead by komkor Vladimir Grendal, the group comprised of Soviet 49th and 150th Infantry divisions stengthened with 19th Infantry Regiment from the 142nd Division. According to the Battle Order 11 5th of December 1939 the 90th and 142nd Infantry Divisions were to attack Kiviniemi, then the rear and back of the Finnish troops at Taipale. The 10th Armored Army was waiting in the rear ready to xxx forward through the opening in the Finnish defense.

Finnish Preparations
North of the river at the main Mannerheim Line of defense the Finns had stationed 10th Infantry division consisting of three infantry regiments JR28, JR29 and JR30. To the west near Kiviniemi was stationed Finnish 8th Infantry division, with regiment JR24 closest to the Taipale front and JR23 as a reserve.

Finns were short on critical equipment.

They had however managed to get to the border on time. The nightmare scenario had been an attack against unprepared troops.

Fortifications
The Finns had been preparing for the tense military situation since the 20s. It was clear for the Finnish high command that the outcome of a confrontation would be decided on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad, where Finns had slowly built the Mannerheim Line of defense since 1920s. These defensive fortifications were exaggerated by both Soviet and Finnish propaganda, calling them the Maginot Line of the north. Unlike the Maginot Line, however, Mannerheim Line was built based on the principles of flexible defense. The vast majority of the Mannerheim Line was merely composed of trenches, dugouts and other field fortifications, enabling fast renewal of the structures and swift movement of the troops. A lot of the structures relied on natural defenses.

At the Taipale coastal sector there was an existing series of concrete structures built in the 1920s during the original build-up of the Mannerheim Line. During the previous summer the upgrading of Mannerheim Line had focused around Summa area to the west. The defense around Taipale had been largely neglected as an unlikely route of attack. The Finnish 10th Division had been stationed at Taipale since 15th October 1939, working on improving the defenses. The division had found the old concrete structures – 16 casemates – dating from the 1920s and had extended these with new earthen fortifications. The builders had rather reluctantly managed to finish the trenches and open shooting positions by the end of October. In front of the defensive positions the troops had built anti-tank trenches, dragon's teeth, barbed-fire fences and minefields.

Taipale defense was built on 16 bases consisting of "150-200m wide trenches with shooting positions, connecting trenches leading to the back and dug-out shelters". The concrete structures of the newly printed and distributed upgraded fortification plans had not been built in the Taipale area, mostly due to lack of equipment and materials as the high command regarded Taipale of secondary importance. Behind the main front line there were fall-back positions and shelters which the Finnish regiment having a rotating resting turn would fervently build throughout the war.

Further north from the defensive line there was an additional factor. The Taipale sector close to Lake Lagoda was guarded by powerful fortified coastal artillery batteries of Järisevä and Kaarnaoja. These batteries would prove to be one of the crucial deciding factors in the battles to come.

The Crossing
The Soviet troops started preparing for crossing the river with an artillery bombardment in Koukunniemi and Neosaari south of the river 6th December. The last Finnish troops still south of the river quickly withdrew across the river at 11:00.

When the Soviet attack reached the black, fast flowing unfrozen river they tried to get across it at three points. Soviet 15th Infantry Regiment pulled up their rubber boats at the crossing at Terenttilä, but were subjected to heavy Finnish fire. Nevertheless, one of the companies managed to get across, establishing a bridgehead at the northern shore at Terenttilä. The second landing unit from 222nd upstream at Viistola did not succeed. Their boats were swept by the heavy current, taking them to the Finnisn xxx fire. The unit lost all but three of the 20 boats that had started the crossing. The third landing at Viisjoki furthest from the Finnish main line was the major success Soviets had been looking for. Despite a murderous artillery fire the units from 212nd and 19th Regiments managed to establish a beachhead and by the night, the sappers had built a pontoon bridge across Taipale.

Finns drew theior forward positions from Koukunniemi to the main line, and made several attempts to re-capture the positions without success. The Soviets managed to transition the 19thm 212th and 166HaupitsiReg. Near Terenttilä, the Finns were according to their own reports more siuccessful in clearing the bridgehead, declaring the Terenttilä forest clear of enemies. The Soviet reoports counter this, stating that xxx and xxx wsere still firmly at their positions north of the river.

The Soviet forces started 6th of December with artillery. Finnish troops at Neosaari withdrew across the river at 11:00

Go over the river in three points. Terenttilä Soviet 15JR. 15th got over to Terenttilä

222 at Kosela suora tuli kumiveneille, suuret tappiot 20 venettä> venettä, ei onnistunut Viisjoki Uittu 212 ja 19. Illalla ponttonisilta Finns withdrew the forward positions to the main line. Soviets got a bridgehead at Koukkuniemi. They moved there 19thJR 212JR and 166HaupitsiReg 28 Sihvonen määräsi vastahyökkäyksen ilman tulosta (Metsäpirtti) JR30 rintamalle, vastahyökkäys, failed II/JR28/6k putsasi Terenttilän kahdesti

Battle of Kiviniemi
Utter failure. Hyvä kuvaus Reesellä, Ven. joukot eivät tottele Suomalaiset räjäyttivät sillat 6.12. Käsky hyökätä 7.12 461JR > 35 AB > 90D Tykistö ei ehtinyt paikalle, ruuhkaa 461, suomalaiset ampuivat, sekasorto, vetäytyminen Huonosti tiedusteltu, Jakovlev määräsi ylityksen heti kaatuivat koskeen, upposivat 30 miestä pääsi vastarannalle. piileskelivät kellarissa, suomalaiset ottivat kiinni 13.12

Lopputulema

Furious Stavka
8.12 Stavkalle komento Yakovlev moskovaan Meretskoville alennus pääpainopiste lönteen Summaan Suomalaisille tsäänssi tuoda reservejä 23 rservistä, paikalla 8.12 aamulla

Securing the Bridgehead
Lisää joukkoja rantapenkkaa pitkin, ei yli TYykistöä Koukkuniemeen, uusia hyökkäyksiä, sillanpääaseman laajennus

Alcazar 10.12 gone By 13th a bidgehead (nenye, 74)

Second attack 15th to 17h December
Focus on Taipale, intensive artillery

Full strength, 49 13882men 150 14764men 39 Arm Brig panssarivaunut, 204Erp liekinheitinvaunut + tykistö

Artillery 3 hours

Artillery ineffective, good camouflage

Red army tactics poor, lack of coordination

Tanks lost the men, anti-tank guns picked the apart

advancement couple of 100 meters

Several new offensives

When the attacks stopped 18 tanks and countless men lost

Battle of Kelja
Focus on Kelja-Volossula

Crossing in foir places

Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated

Counterattack success but costly for Finns Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated

2000 Soviet dead

850 in the stone

Fighting stopped

Stavka furious: "Dig in, gnaw" Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated

Regrouping, January 1940
"By the first week of January 1940 it was clear that Meretskov’s initial plan had failed and that he, Stalin, and the Red Army high command had mas- sively underrated their enemy and overestimated the abilities of their own forces." Reese 832 The advances at the Isthmus battles had called casualties at what R Reese calls "First World War levels". Reese 831 "In January 1940, when it became clear to Stalin and Voroshilov that the forces of the Leningrad Military District would not be able to beat the Finns with their own resources, the Ministry of Defense began transferring units from other military districts. Rumors of the horrific bloodletting spread throughout the army and triggered such negative responses as one soldier’s gloomy observation: “We’re going to certain death. They’ll kill us all. If the newspapers said that for every Finn you need ten Russkies, they’d be right. They are swatting us like flies." Reese 843

Continuing attacks and reconnoissance missions
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Finnish preparations
The Finns had been preparing for the tensing of the military situation since the 20s. It was clear for the Finnish high command that the outcome of a confrontation would be decided on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad. The Finns had slowly built the Mannerheim Line of defense in the Karelian Isthmus. The fortifications were exaggerated by Finnish propaganda, calling it the Maginot Line of the north. Unlike the Maginot Line, however, Mannerheim Line was built based on the principles of flexible defense. The vast majority of the Mannerheim Line was merely composed of trenches and other field fortifications.

The 10th Finnish division had been stationed in the area since xxx and had managed to finish the trenches and shooting positions. In reality the Mannerheim Line at Taipale was a line of dugouts, trenches and open shooting positions, reinforced with lines of barbed wire, poanssariesteet kivistä with very few pillow boxes or concrete structures.

The main Finnish battle plan was to employ defense in depth. The first Finns to meet the enemy would be guard troops consisting of local men from the area arranged into Metsapirtti Unit. In case of war, their task was to slow down the enemy inflicting damages while the area in front of the Mannerheim Line was evacuated and the main line of defence readied itself for battle.

Soviet preparations
"At the end of December 1939, after replacing and reassigning many high- ranking officers including Meretskov, and putting Marshal Semen Timoshenko in charge, Stalin called for a new approach to the war, with far-less-ambitious goals." Reese 830 "Rather than attack in all areas, he concentrated the war on the Karelian Isthmus with the goal of breaking the Mannerheim Line and seizing Viipuri, using massed artillery and tanks to support infantry attacks."Reese 830

Second Battles of Taipale, February 1940
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Continuing hostilities in March
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Aftermath
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Consolidation
The 2/6th Independent Company had won a significant victory, but now had 23 wounded and was very low on ammunition. Frazier landed on the newly captured airstrip in his Piper Cub at 12:30. He rejected the airstrip as unsuitable for Dakotas, and oversaw the preparation of a new airstrip on better ground near Mission Hill. This was still a difficult approach, as aircraft had to land upwind while avoiding Mission Hill. Although it was not known if the airstrip would be ready, Hutchison flew in for a test landing there the next day, 21 September, at 15:30. He collected the wounded and flew them to Nadzab, and returned an hour later with a load of rations and ammunition. He also brought with him Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, the commander of the 21st Infantry Brigade, and his headquarters, who took charge of the area. Around 18:00, six more transports arrived.

Unlike the Japanese, who drastically altered their tactics for the upcoming battle, the American invasion plan was unchanged from that of previous amphibious landings, even after suffering 3,000 casualties and two months of delaying tactics against the entrenched Japanese defenders at the Battle of Biak. On Peleliu, American planners chose to land on the southwest beaches because of their proximity to the airfield on South Peleliu. The 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, was to land on the northern end of the beaches. The 5th Marine Regiment, under Colonel Harold D. Harris, would land in the center, and the 7th Marine Regiment, under Col. Herman H. Hanneken, would land at the southern end.