User:TeeTylerToe/sandbox12

ideology over reality, p310 chile

President Clinton
On January 25, 1993, Mir Qazi there was a shooting at the headquarters of the CIA in Langley Virginia. killing two agents and wounding three others.

On February 26, Omar Abdel Rahman bombed the parking garage of the World Trade center, killing 6 people, and wounding a thousand. Of Rahman, the "Blind Sheik"'s seven applications to enter the United States, the CIA had given the OK six times. Haiti. Rwanda.

In Bosnia the CIA ignored signs within and without of the Srebrenica massacre. Two weeks after news reports of the slaughter, the CIA sent a U-2 to photograph it, a week later the CIA completed it's report on the matter. During Operation Allied Force, the CIA had incorrectly provided the coordinates of the Chinese Embassy as a military target resulting in it's bombing.

In France, the CIA had orders for economic intelligence, a female CIA agent was seduced by an agent of French internal security. Dick Holm, Paris Station Chief, was expelled. In Guatemala, the CIA produced the Murphy Memo, based on audio recordings made by bugs planted in the bedroom of Ambassador Marilyn McAfee placed by Guatemalan intelligence. In the recording, Ambassador McAfee verbally entreated "Murphy". The CIA circulated a memo in the highest Washington circles accusing Ambassador McAfee of having an extramarital lesbian affair with her secretary, Carol Murphy. There was no affair. Ambassador McAfee was calling to Murphy, her poodle. The CIA was still bucking the reigns of congress, Presidents, and DCIs that had ordered that ties of the CIA to harsh regimes that had stood for decades be broken. In Iraq, under Clinton's orders, the CIA was trying to form a coup. The plot was compromised, Saddam arrested over 200 of his own officers, executing over 80. Again this would be a case where the NSC wanted CI to give them answers they didn't have, and to make decisions for the NSC that neither the NSC, nor CI could make. Clinton wanted a coup in Iraq, and wanted him to be replaced by someone aligned with the US, but if that US friendly officer existed, neither the CIA nor NSC knew him. Harold James Nicholson would burn several serving officers and 3 years of trainees before he was caught spying for Russia. In 1997 the House would pen another report, which said that CIA officers know little about the language or politics of the people they spy on. The conclusion was that the CIA lacked the "depth, breadth, and expertise to monitor political, military, and economic developments worldwide." There was a new voice in the CIA to counterpoint the endless chant that the CIA was 5 years away from success. Russ Travers said in the CIA in-house journal that in 5 years "intelligence failure is inevitable". In 1997, the CIA's new director, George Tenet, though would promise a new, working agency by 2002. The CIA's surprise at India's detonation of an atom bomb was a failure at almost every level. After the 1998 embassy bombings by Al Qaeda, the CIA offered two targets to be hit in retaliation. One of them was a chemical plant where traces of chemical weapon precursors had been detected. In the aftermath it was concluded that "the decision to target al Shifa continues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan." It triggered the CIA to make "substantial and sweeping changes" to prevent "a catasrophic systemic intelligence failure." Between 1991 and 1998 the CIA had lost 3,000 employees.

Somalia
Half a million people had starved in Somalia when President Bush ordered US troops to enter the country on a humanitarian mission. As clans started fighting over the aid, the humanitarian mission quickly became a struggle against Mohamed Farah Aideed. The CIA station in Somalia had been shuttered for two years. The CIA was given an impossible mission in Somalia, as was the Military. Casualties came quickly and were high in the 8 man team the CIA sent. A post mortem carried out by now FISA member Admiral Crowe stated that the National Security Council had expected the CIA to both make decisions, and give them the intelligence to base those decisions on. The NSC couldn't understand why intelligence didn't advise them correctly on what to do. Clinton would enter the ranks of Presidents unhappy with the results of the CIA, Clinton's inattention to the CIA did not help the matter.

Aldrich Ames
Between 1985 and 1986 the CIA lose every spy it had in Eastern Europe. The details of the investigation into the cause was obscured from the new Director, and the investigation had little success, and has been widely criticized. In June 1987, Major Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, the chief of Cuban Intelligence in Czechoslovakia drove into Vienna, and walked into the American Embassy to defect. He revealed that every single Cuban spy on the CIA payroll was a double agent, pretending to work for the CIA, but secretly still being loyal to Castro. On February 21, 1994, FBI agents pulled Aldrich Ames out of his Jaguar. If there was a posterboy for failing upwards inside the CIA, he was it. In the investigation that ensued, the CIA discovered that many of the sources for it's most important analyses of the USSR were based on soviet disinformation fed to the CIA by controlled agents. On top of that, it was discovered that, in some cases, the CIA suspected at the time that the sources were compromised, but the information was sent up the chain as genuine. This prompted a congressional committee in 1994 to address what was widely seen as a fundamentally broken institution. The committee quickly became a quagmire. When the committee submitted it's toothless report, the CIA had 25 recruits entering it's 2 year training program. The smallest class of recruits ever. The CIA was dying a slow death on life support. As it had for most of it's existence, the CIA suffered from poor management, poor morale, and a lack of employees familiar with the people they were spying on.

Cia counter terrorism center created 1986

Bin Laden
Agency files show that it's believed Osama Bin Laden was funding the Afghan rebels against the USSR in the '80s. In 1991, Bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia protesting the presence of troops, and Operation Desert Storm. He was expelled from the country. In 1996 the CIA created a team to hunt Bin Laden. They were trading information with the Sudanese until, on the word of a source that would later be found to be a fabricator, the CIA closed it's Sudan station later that year. In 1998 Bin Laden would declare war on America, and, on August 7, strike in Tanzania and Nairobi. On October 12th, 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole. In 1947 when the CIA was founded, there were 200 agents in the Clandestine Service. In 2001, of the 17,000 employees in the CIA, there were 1,000 in the Clandestine Service. Of that 1,000 few would accept hardship postings. In the first days of George W. Bush' Presidency, Al Qaeda threats were ubiquitous in daily Presidential CIA briefings, but it may have become a case of the boy who cries wolf. The Agency's predictions were dire, but carried little weight, and the attentions of the President, and his defense staff were elsewhere. The CIA arranged the arrests of suspected Al Qaeda members through cooperation with foreign agencies, but the CIA could not definitively say what effect these arrests had hat, and it could not gain hard intelligence from those captured. The President had asked the CIA if Al Qaeda could plan attacks in the US. On August 6th, Bush received a daily briefing with the headline, not based on current, solid intelligence, "Al Qaeda determined to strike inside the US." The US had been hunting Bin Laden since '96 and had had several opportunities, but neither Clinton, nor Bush had wanted to risk their skin taking an active role in a murky assassination plot, and the perfect opportunity had never materialized for a trigger shy DI that would have given him the reassurances he needed to take the plunge. That day, Richard Clarke sent National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warning of the risks, and decrying the inaction of the CIA. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda hijacked 4 passenger jets, flying them into both of New York City's Twin Towers, as well as The Pentagon killing 2,996 people.

GWOT: The Global War on Terror
On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a 14 page secret directive to the CIA declaring total war on Al Qaeda, the CIA was to hunt, capture, imprison, and interrogate suspects in a global, no-limits manhunt. The CIA's history of using torture dungeons harkens back to the Vietnam Phoenix Program, and to interrogation programs run in the first days of the Cold War. Extraordinary Rendition was also not new to the Agency. Congress subsequently gave the CIA authorization to read, without a Judge's order, secret Grand Jury testimony, the records of private businesses, particularly banking information. On October 4, 2001, Bush signed off on an NSA program to eavesdrop on domestic American communications with suspected terrorists based on the doctrine of "hot pursuit". CIA officers would become the vanguard of the invasion of Afghanistan.

Operation Desert Storm
During the Iran-Iraq war, the CIA had backed both sides. The CIA had maintained a network of spies in Iran, but in 1989 a CIA mistake compromised every agent they had in there, and the CIA had no agents in Iraq. In the weeks before the Invasion of Kuwait the CIA downplayed the military buildup. During the war CIA estimates of Iraqi abilities and intentions flip-flopped and were rarely accurate. In one particular case, the DOD had asked the CIA to identify military targets to bomb. One target the CIA identified was an underground shelter. The CIA didn't know that it was a civilian bomb shelter. In a rare instance the CIA correctly determined that the coalition forces efforts were coming up short in their efforts to destroy SCUD missiles. Congress took away the CIA's role in interpreting spy-satellite photos, putting the CIA's satellite intelligence operations under the auspices of the military. The CIA created it's office of military affairs, which operated as "second-echelon support for the pentagon... answering... questions from military men [like] 'how wide is this road?'" At the end of the war, the CIA reported that there could be an uprising against Saddam, based on intelligence gained from exiles. Former DI, and current President Bush called on the Shiites and Kurds to rise up against Saddam, while, at the same time, withdrawing any support against Saddam. Saddam crushed the uprisings brutally. After the war, Saddam's nuclear program was discovered. The CIA had had no information about it.

Fall of the USSR
Gorbachev's announcement of the unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops took the CIA by surprise. What's more, Doug MacEachin, the CIA's Chief of Soviet analysis said that even if the CIA had told the President, the NSC, and Congress about the cuts beforehand, it would have been ignored. "We never would have been able to publish it." All the CIA numbers on the USSR's economy were wrong. Too often the CIA relied on people inexperienced with that which they were supposed to be the expert. Bob Gates had preceeded Doug MacEachin as Chief of Soviet analysis, and he had never visited Russia. Few officers, even those stationed in country spoke the language of the people they were spying on. And the CIA had no capacity to send agents to respond to developing situations. The CIA analysis of Russia during the entire cold war was either driven by ideology, or by politics. William J Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the CIA "talked about the Soviet Union as if they weren't reading the newspapers, much less developed clandestine intelligence." The CIA was even caught unprepared when the Berlin Wall fell. Once again, CNN had scooped the CIA. In the History of the Cold War, the CIA had only had 3 notable soviet spies, they had handed themselves to the CIA. Each one had been caught and executed.

One of the first acts of Bob Gates, the new DI, was National Security Review 29, a memo to each member of the Cabinet asking them what they wanted from the CIA. Starting in 1991 the CIA would see 6 years of budget cuts. Perhaps blind to the past, the CIA would close 20 stations, and cut it's staff in some major capitals by 60%. The CIA could still not shake the perennial analysis, that it was 5 years away from being able to perform it's basic duties satisfactorily.

Tricky Dick
In '71 the NSA and CIA were engaged in domestic spying. The DOD was eavesdropping on Kissenger. The White House, and Camp David were wired. Nixon and Kissenger were eavesdropping on their aides, as well as reporters. Famously, Nixon's Plumbers had many former CIA agents, including Howard Hunt, Jim McCord, and Eugenio Martinez. On July 7 1971, John Ehrlichman, Nixon's domestic policy chief, told DCI Cushman, Nixon's hatchet-man in the CIA, to let Cushman "know that [Hunt] was in fact doing some things for the President... you should consider he has pretty much carte blanche" Importantly, this included a camera, disguises, a voice altering device, and ID papers furnished by the CIA, as well as the CIA's participation developing film from the burglary Hunt staged on the office of Pentagon Papers leaker John Ellsberg's psychologist.

On June 17, Nixon's Plumbers were caught burglarizing the DNC offices in the Watergate. On June 23, DI Helms was ordered by the White House to wave the FBI off using national security as a pretext. The new DCI, Walters, another Nixon hack, told the acting director of the FBI and told him to drop the investigation as ordered. On June 26, Nixon's counsel John Dean ordered DCI Walters to pay the plumbers untraceable hush money. The CIA was the only part of the government that had the power to make off the book payments, but it could only be done on the orders of the CI, or, if he was out of the country, the DCI. The Acting Director of the FBI started breaking ranks. He demanded the CIA produce a signed document attesting to the national security threat of the investigation. Jim McCord's lawyer contacted the CIA informing them that McCord had been offered a Presidential pardon if he fingered the CIA, testifying that the break-in had been an operation of the CIA. Nixon had long been frustrated by what he saw as a liberal infection inside the CIA, and had been trying for years to tear the CIA out by it's roots. McCord wrote "If [DI] Helms goes (takes the fall) and the Watergate operation is laid at the CIA's feet, where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert."

On November 13, after Nixon's landslide re-election, Nixon told Kissinger "[I intend] to ruin the Foreign Service. I mean ruin it - the old Foreign Service - and to build a new one." He had similar designs for the CIA, and intended to replace Helms with James Schlesinger. Nixon had told Helms that he was on the way out, and promised that Helms could stay on until his 60th birthday, the mandatory retirement age. On February 2, Nixon broke that promise, carrying through with his intention to "remove the deadwood" from the CIA. "Get rid of the clowns" was his order to the incoming CI. Kissinger had been running the CIA since the beginning of Nixon's presidency, but Nixon impressed on Schlesinger that he must appear to congress to be in charge, averting their suspicion of Kissinger's involvement. Nixon also hoped that Schlesinger could push through broader changes in the intelligence community that he had been working towards for years, the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, and spinning off the covert action part of the CIA into a separate organ. Before Helms would leave office, he would destroy every tape he had secretly made of meetings in his office, and many of the papers on Project MKUltra. In Schlesinger's 17 week tenure, he would fire more than 1,500 employees. As Watergate threw the spotlight on the CIA, Schlesinger, who had been kept in the dark about the CIA's involvement, decided he needed to know what skeletons were in the closet. He issued a memo to every CIA employee directing them to disclose to him any CIA activity they knew of past or present that could fall outside the scope of the CIA's charter. This became the Family Jewels.

The CIA would be caught flatfooted by the Yom Kippur war, and the Greek Colonel coup, and later war in Cyprus. Portugal coup caught flatfooted, and Indian atom bomb test.

Congressional Investigations
Acting Attorney General Laurence Silberman learned of the existence of the family jewels, he issued a subpoena for them, prompting 8 congressional investigations on the domestic spying activities of the CIA. Bill Colby's short tenure as DCI would end with the Halloween Massacre. His replacement was George H.W. Bush. At the time, the DOD had control of 80% of the intelligence budget. With Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense communication and coordination between the CIA and the DOD would suffer greatly. The CIA's budget for hiring clandestine officers had been squeezed out by the paramilitary operations in south-east Asia, and hiring was further strained by the government's poor popularity. This left the Agency bloated with middle management, and anemic in younger officers. Yet again, with employee training taking 5 years, the Agency's only hope would be on the trickle of new officers coming to fruition years in the future. The CIA would see another setback as communists would take Angola. William J. Casey, a member of Ford's Intelligence Advisory Board, would press Bush to allow a team from outside the CIA to produce Soviet military estimates as a "Team B". Bush gave the OK. The "B" team was comprised of hawks. Their estimates were the highest that could be at all justified, and they painted a picture of a growing Soviet military when the reality was that the Soviet military was shrinking. Many of their reports found their way to the Press.

Carter
Carter's new DI would become a pariah inside the agency, he fired 852 employees with low performance evaluations. Early in the administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski ordered a covert media campaign following the '75 opening of the free movement of people and ideas into and out of the Iron Curtain, funding communication in the USSR. Carter ordered the CIA to gather intelligence on the South African government during the Apartheid. The ANC, the strongest enemy of Apartheid was backed by the Soviet Union. A large concern was that the US didn't want to be painted as racist, supporting the SA regime. Then, the Rhodesian secret police arrested three CIA agents, with SA fingering a fourth, forcing the CIA to pull out of South Africa. The CIA missed the invasion of Afghanistan.

Schzoid man
Nixon running a parallel intelligence service and backchannel negotiations through general walters, p319-320

303 committee
p295

Acension and Paralysis, Angleton and Israel
Ashes, page 238-239

After touring vietnam in '64, DI McCone and sec def McNamara had different views of the US position. McCone believed that as long as the ho chi minh trail was active the US would struggle.

Johnson had disdain for assassinations, coups, and covert action, and he paid the CIA little interest, relying on biweekly written reports that he read sporadically.

DI McCone had statutory control over all intelligence committees, but in reality, but the military had near total control of the DIA, the NRO, the NSA, and many other aspects. Importantly, President Johnson almost completely ignored the CIA. In effect, the military controlled the 2/3rds of the CIA budget laid out for covert action. McCone, the unspoken hero of the cuban missile crisis, submitted his resignation in the summer, but Johnson would not accept it until after the election.

On August 4th, SecDef McNamara gave President Johnson the raw translation of intercepted korean transmissions directly from the NSA which, ostensibly, reported to DI McCone, rather than to McNamara. It would later be determined that the transmission took place before the weapon discharges that night which leads to the conclusion that the transmission refers to the events of the attack the day before, and that, although Destroyers Maddox, and Turner Joy fired hundreds of shells at intermittent radar contacts, they were firing at false returns. p.242

The CIA is a US Government Agency that develops foreign intelligence analysis, gathers foreign intelligence, and collates analysis, and foreign intelligence from all government sources creating a single independent clearinghouse designed to disseminate relevant analysis, and foreign intelligence collected throughout the Government to selected consumers within the government including the Executive, and Legislative branches of the government, and sections within various Government Agencies.

To meet the crisis, and at President Truman’s request, ORE began preparing a Daily Korean Summary that reported military developments and related international diplomatic and political events. The first issue appeared on 26 June 1950. Soon after, a special staff within ORE was created to monitor and report on Korean events

The Review received high-level distribution but consisted solely of what analysts pieced together augmented by news accounts. In addition, ORE fielded a constant stream of official requests, many of which originated in the NSC, State Department, military services, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. ORE seldom declined requests from outside customers and increasingly catered to a working-level audience, losing its influence with policymakers. Many considered ORE a large, unwieldy organization with too many ill-defined functions and a host of independent intelligence products uncoordinated with other government offices. Increasingly, ORE neglected the national estimates function, prompting the NSC to conclude in 1949 that “the principle of the authoritative NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] does not yet have established acceptance in government.” Each department still depended more or less on its own intelligence estimates and established plans and policies accordingly that did not go beyond their own premises. In the years before the outbreak of the Korean War, the main analytical arm of the CIA produced eleven regular publications with only one addressing strategic or national intelligence questions.

Many observers inside and outside the Agency had noted these omissions. Indeed, a January 1949 report from an independent panel comprised of intelligence professionals Matthias Correa, Allen Dulles, and William Jackson, noted deficiencies in the CIA’s coordination of intelligence activities and the lack of correlation and evaluation involved in ORE’s national intelligence products. The fragmented nature of collection and analysis in the CIA and throughout the rest of the federal national security structure failed to provide needed insights to inform policy

Smith saw the CIA’s allegedly poor performance as related to both growing pains, a lack of budget and personnel, and equally poor organization and coordination. At his first meeting with the NSC on 12 October, he announced intentions to implement most of the reforms suggested in the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report to include realigning intelligence production, reforming the Intelligence Advisory Committee, integrating collection responsibilities, regrouping support staffs, and strengthening coordination mechanisms. Smith immediately restored the IAC to its intended place as the principal forum for discussing interagency problems, and jurisdictional conflicts, and as the final review committee for national intelligence estimates. The new DCI became an early, active, and vocal proponent of the CIA on Capitol Hill and at the White House. Smith pushed for massive budget increases to finance the rebuilding of the organization, for hiring thousands more intelligence officers, and for funding more operations, not just in support of war in Korea but worldwide.

perhaps nowhere did they have as much impact as in the Agency’s analytical offices. Working with William H. Jackson, Smith determined three major areas of improvement in the execution of CIA’s mission: the need to insure consistent, systematic production of estimates; the need to strengthen the position of the DCI relative to the departmental intelligence components; and the need to delineate CIA’s research and analysis function. At his first meeting with the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 20 October, he noted that the CIA had the primary responsibility for insuring that surprise or intelligence failure did not jeopardize national security — as happened at Pearl Harbor or with the outbreak of the Korean War. In addition, the CIA had to consolidate and coordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country based on all available information. Smith stated that the national intelligence estimates produced by the CIA should command respect throughout the government, and to make sure this came to past, he announced the formation of the Office of National Estimates (ONE). He appointed as its chief former OSS Research and Analysis Branch veteran Walter Langer, who took office on 13 November 1950, five days after the appearance of NIE 2, and two weeks before NIE 2/1 addressed prospects for Chinese intervention. While Smith envisioned an operation of 1,000 people, Langer prevailed in his proposal for a smaller office to consist of a group of senior officers, never more than 50 in number, who came from a variety of academic and scholarly backgrounds. ONE would have two parts, one composed of analysts who would draft the estimate, and a board of seniors who would review and coordinate the finished estimate with other departments. The process change insured that the ONE final product benefited from coordination with all interested parties. After November 1950, ONE could approach other intelligence agencies and government departments directly, reaching out to counterparts for an interchange of ideas and information. Smith also insured that the IAC would perform a final review process with each NIE before it advanced to the policymaker. ONE would also create a list of intelligence issues for collection and frequent analytical reporting to guarantee that standing requirements always received the Agency’s attention and policymakers never lacked up-to-date assessments. Between 1950 and 1952, ONE’s major effort was dominated by production of estimates related to the Korean War, particularly those involving analyses of Soviet intentions

Immediate predecessors, 1946–47
The Office of Strategic Services, which was the first independent U.S. intelligence agency, was created for World War II. It was broken up shortly after the end of the war by President Harry S. Truman on September 20, 1945 when he signed an Executive Order to make the breakup 'official' as of October 1, 1945. The rapid reorganizations that followed reflected not only routine bureaucratic competition for resources but also exploration of the proper relationships between clandestine intelligence collection and covert action (i.e., paramilitary and psychological operations). In October 1945, the functions of the OSS were split between the Departments of State and War:

The three-way division lasted only a few months. The first mention of the "Central Intelligence Agency" concept and term appeared on a U.S. Army and Navy command-restructuring proposal presented by Jim Forrestal and Arthur Radford to the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee at the end of 1945. Despite opposition from the military establishment, the United States Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), President Truman established the National Intelligence Authority in January 1946; it was the direct predecessor to the CIA. The National Intelligence Authority and its operational extension, the Central Intelligence Group, (CIG) was an interim authority established under Presidential authority which was disestablished after twenty months. The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined "nucleus" of clandestine intelligence, were transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO).

OSS Chief General Donovan wrote to President Roosevelt on Nov 18, 1944, stating the need for a peacetime "Central Intelligence Service"; the letter was prompted by a query from General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff about the nature of the role of the OSS in the military establishment. Following this, Roosevelt ordered his chief military aide to conduct a secret investigation of the OSS's WW2 operations. Around this time, stories about the OSS began circulating in major papers including references to this OSS follow-on being an "American Gestapo". The report, heavily influenced by an FBI that saw itself as the future of American foreign intelligence, was starkly, and vividly negative, only praising a few rescues of downed airmen, sabotage operations, and it's deskbound research and analysis staff; the pronouncement of the report was that any "use [of the OSS] as a secret intelligence agency in the postwar world [would be] inconceivable", but the Joint Chiefs had been ordered, presumably under pressure from the press articles, by the president to shelve their plans for a Central Intelligence Service even before the April release of the report.

On September 20, 1945, as part of Truman's dismantling of the WW2 war machine, the OSS, at one time numbering almost 13,000, would be eliminated over the span of ten days. The Assistant Secretary of War, though, would grant the service a reprieve six days later, reducing it to a skeleton crew of roughly 15% of it's peak force level, forcing it to close many of it's foreign offices. Part of the reprieve was a change in the name of the service, from the OSS to the Strategic Services Unit.

The Soviet Union's expansionism was a quick reminder to Truman of the urgency of having foreign intelligence, by way of his Military Chief of Staff. Two weeks later, Truman would christen Admiral Souers as the newly formed Central Intelligence Group's "Director of Centralized Snooping." The Joint Chiefs of Staff soon wanted the CIG's help disrupting Soviet supply lines in Romania. In October 1946, the CIG would smuggle prominent Romanians into Austria, including Romania's former Foreign Minister with the aim of propping up the National Peasant Party to resist the Soviet occupation. The Soviets would soon arrest a key CIG agent, and expose the American Military's ties to the National Peasant Party in the press.

One of the Greatest successes of American Central Intelligence would be simply huge, person to person transfers of suitcases of money through intermediaries to bolster the political fortunes of pro american parties in governments, such as the government of Greece, and Italy. Much of the money came from the Marshall plan, as a condition of accepting American funds.

Office of Policy Coordination

Frank Wisner was the Executive Director of the OPC, and he was the ringleader of the CIG's covert actions, including it's covert funding operations.

History
The Central Intelligence Agency was created on July 26th, when Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law. A major impetus that would be cited over the years for the creation of the CIA was the unforeseen attack on Pearl Harbor, but whatever Pearl Harbor's role, in the twilight of World War II it was clear in government circles that there was a need for a group to coordinate government intelligence efforts, and the FBI, the State Department, and the War Department were all jockeying for that new power.

General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, head of the OSS, wrote to President Roosevelt on Nov 18, 1944, stating the need for a peacetime "Central Intelligence Service" "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." , and have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad." . The letter was prompted by a query from General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff about the nature of the role of the OSS in the military establishment. Following this, Roosevelt ordered his chief military aide to conduct a secret investigation of the OSS's WW2 operations. Around this time, stories about the OSS began circulating in major papers including references to this OSS follow-on being an "American Gestapo". The report, heavily influenced by an FBI that saw itself as the future of American foreign intelligence, was starkly, and vividly negative, only praising a few rescues of downed airmen, sabotage operations, and it's deskbound research and analysis staff; the pronouncement of the report was that any "use [of the OSS] as a secret intelligence agency in the postwar world [would be] inconceivable", but even before the report was finished the Joint Chiefs had been ordered, presumably under pressure from the press articles, by the president to shelve their plans for a Central Intelligence Service even before the April release of the report.

On September 20, 1945, as part of Truman's dismantling of the WW2 war machine, the OSS, at one time numbering almost 13,000, would be eliminated over the span of ten days. A reprieve, though, would be granted six days later by Assistant Secretary of War, reducing it to a skeleton crew of roughly 15% of it's peak force level, forcing it to close many of it's foreign offices; at the same time the name of the service was changed from the OSS to the Strategic Services Unit.

Its creation was inspired by the successes of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which was dissolved in October 1945 and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. Eleven months earlier, in 1944, William J. Donovan, the OSS's creator, proposed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create a new organization directly supervised by the President: "which will procure intelligence both by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."

Souers
jan 24 1946

vandenberg
june 10 1946 lawrence houston, general counsel, without the consent of congress, CI could not legally spend money Vandenberg vreated the Office of Special Operations july 17 1946 CI became an "operating agency" by presidential powers, rather than congress

Vandenberg was cooling his heels as CI director waiting for his appointment to be the first commander of the new Air Force. Late in his tenure, he made note of the fledgling human intelligence capability of the CIA, and of the new dangers that oceans no longer could protect the nation from, notes that would both be echoed later in the clinton administration, and by President Bush after 9/11.

RADM Roscoe Hillenkoetter
may day 1947 Under Hillenkoetter, CI employee morale was terrible, and the chain of command went directly from Hillenkoetter's subordinates to the army, or the state department. Even the CIA's own histories disparage his tenure. Congress received secret intelligence briefings from a lawyer in private practice, Allen Dulles, rather than from anyone in CI.

CIA
National Security Act July 26 1947 CIA created september 18 "correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence, and to perform 'other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security'" Covert Actions were informally governed by the National Security Council Lawrence Houston echoed his warnings that the CIA had no legal authority without congress to the new director Hillenkoetter wanted the CIA limited to intelligence gathering

Secretary of Defense called Hillenkoetter into the pentagon to discuss "the widespread belief that our intelligence group is entirely inept"

Office of Special Operations commander Colonel Donald "wrong-way" galloway
"a strutting martinet who had reached the apex of his talent as a west point cavalry officer teaching equestrian etiquette to cadets" In the morass of Hillenkoetter and galloway's leadership galloway's deputy, stephen penrose wrote secdef forrestal "cia is losing it's professionals, and is not acquiring competent new personnel" at the very time "when, as almost never before, the government needs an effective, expanding, professional intelligence service."

CIA's successes: sigint, front organizations, funding anti-communist political parties. exfiltrating foreign statesmen.

CIA's weaknesses: human intelligence, counter-espionage