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=The Political Long Wave=

The Political Long-Wave is a conceptual model that describes a particular pattern of political development experienced in modern societies over the last two centuries. The theory describes a trajectory followed by the political and social movements of the left and the right within developed, or strongly developing, industrial and post-industrial economies over the course of the four economic long-waves that have occurred so far. It also offers a theoretical explanation as to the causation of this pattern, based on theories of voting behaviour, party competition and class conflict.

Economic Background
The political long-wave arises as a result of the existence of economic long-waves, sometimes mistakenly known as Kondratiev waves. Kondratiev waves simply describe long-term price fluctuations. Long-wave economics is concerned with the wider macroeconomic situation and considers factors such as rates of economic growth, unemployment and interest rates in addition to trends in inflation. They bear some resemblance to the short-term business cycle, but occur over a longer, approximately fifty year period. Each long-wave typically contains six short-term business cycles – three in the upswing and three in the downswing. They are an international phenomenon.

Long-wave upswings last around twenty-five years, and are characterised by strong economic growth and low unemployment. Typically unemployment rates in upswings. have averaged around 3.5%, whilst economic growth rates have been at levels of 3.25 – 4.75%. Dips in the short-term business cycle tend to be short lived and/or shallow. Long-wave downswings last around twenty-five years, and are characterised by sluggish economic growth and high levels of unemployment. Typically unemployment in downswings has averaged over 8%, and economic growth has averaged around 2.5%. The economy is characterised by instability. The short-term business cycle is volatile and associated with damaging recessions, and short-lived unsustainable growth periods. Broadly speaking, the political long-wave supports a theory of economic long-waves that comes closest to that of the ‘wage push profit-squeeze theory’, associated with ‘regulation theory’ and the ‘social structure of accumulation school’. Long-waves can be explained as occurring on the following basis.

The long-wave upswing begins with a benign set of economic conditions. There is relatively low unemployment, low interest rates and inflation and little in the way of employer-employee conflict. As the upswing progresses though, the strong economic growth gives rise to tight labour markets, rising inflation, higher interest rates, increases in trade union membership and employer-employee conflict. By the end of three short-term business cycles, these trends are severely reducing investment and the rate of profit. This results in the onset of the long-wave downswing. The long-wave downswing begins with a difficult set of economic conditions. There are increasingly high levels of unemployment, high and unstable interest rates and inflation and still high levels of employer-employee conflict. As the downswing progresses though, the weak economic growth and high unemployment gives rise to looser labour markets, stable inflation, lower interest rates, and decreases in trade union membership and employer-employee conflict. By the end of two short-term business cycles, these trends are giving rise to an improved climate for investment. During the third short-term business cycle of the downswing, the economy make something of a recovery with improved rates of economic growth. This recovery eventually gives rise to the next long-wave upswing.

Periodicities

Using the above economic explanation, the following economic long-waves can be seen to have occurred. Each long-wave has lasted approximately fifty years and is characterised by an upswing and a downswing. Historical Wave		Upswing		Downswing

First				1803 - 1825		1825 – 1848	(UK only) Second                                   1848 - 1873			1873 - 1896

Third				1896 – 1920		1920 - 1948

Fourth			1948 – 1974		1974 - 2001

Given that each long-wave covers a considerable period of time, it is not surprising that they have given rise to distinct and recognised historical periods. Each upswing and downswing has had its own particular economic, social and political features. These result from the different levels of technology implemented, the type of political state in existence and the form of economic orthodoxy in place at the time. Hobsbawm’s four-part history of the modern era is heavily based on this feature of long-waves.

Historical Wave	Upswing		                 Downswing

First			                The Age of Revolution Second              The mid-Victorian Boom	                      The Great Depression The Golden Age of Liberalism The Age of Capital

Third                The Progressive Era		       The Inter-War Depression La Belle Époque The Edwardian Boom

Fourth	  The Post-War Boom		       The Landslide The Golden Age/Years

However, each long-wave has also created a political trajectory that is common to all four of the long-waves. In other words, the same pattern of political development has occurred on four occasions, and this pattern corresponds closely with the economic long-waves that have occurred. This is the political long-wave.

Trajectory

Each political long-wave has followed the same pattern, a pattern that has, so far, repeated itself on four occasions. The political long-wave has a six-stage trajectory. The trajectory starts at the beginning of each long-wave upswing.

UPSWING 1. Period of Consensus The first ten to twelve years of the political long-wave are generally marked by a ‘period of political consensus’. This period usually sees the dominant political parties occupying the political centre and competing over the same ideological territory. Above all it is a period in which centrist politics dominate the political agenda. The period of consensus sees a marked convergence between the major forces of the left and right in comparison with previous years. The exact nature of the consensus is determined by the final events of the previous political period, and can be of either a centre-right or centre-left nature.

2. Period of Progressive Change Each long-wave upswing eventually experiences a generalised and gradual shift to the left. The period of progressive change sees the left beginning to break with the previous centrist consensus. Initially, this leftwards movement tends to be of a moderate nature and is marked by a considerably increased level of support for the parties and movements of the left, and often sees the election of left-wing governments. 3. The Peak in Left-wing Radicalism The final few years of each upswing see a dramatic peak in left-wing radicalism both at the political level and the with regards to organized labour. It is a time of mass demonstrations, widespread political participation in grassroots movements, and a period when a plethora of new ideas, ideologies and movements arise, some confined to small groups of intellectuals and activists, but others reaching out to the mainstream left. For organised labour, this is a period of rapid union expansion together with a generalised strike movement that seeks concerted change and often produces high levels of success for organised labour.

DOWNSWING 4. The Period of Political Turmoil The beginning of the long-wave downswing sees a period of political turmoil as the right reacts to the left-wing radicalism, and an intense left-right battle becomes entrenched within the political process. This period is characterised by electoral volatility, making this period prone to political instability, especially since high expectations occur at a time when economic difficulties are setting in. This can be manifested in political polarisation, as voters and parties stretch across the entire left-right political spectrum, and further enhance the level of instability. Under such circumstances a new phase of party competition occurs, that of adversary politics. The left and right have moved apart and each attempts to gain ideological supremacy, and establish their own preferred political hegemony. In addition class struggle theories show that, although levels of industrial action are declining unevenly, disputes are increasingly protracted and hard fought, further adding to the sense of political turmoil. This period can last for ten-fifteen years and can see some dramatic shifts in policy when left and right parties replace each other in government. 5. The Rise of the Right Eventually the economic slowdown gives rise to a political climate that is characterised by conservatism, pessimism and caution. Priority is given to the economy over political and social issues. Economic reconstruction requires a minimum of political disruption and the period sees increased opposition to radical political change. Overall the political right benefits most, the previous surge to the left dissipates and a more conservative political climate dominates. Popular approaches to improving the general situation are often based on using previous ‘golden ages’ as a guide. 6. The Left Recovery and the Emergence of a New Consensus Towards the end of the downswing, the economy experiences a recovery. This helps engender something of a revival in centre-left politics and moderate levels of worker mobilisation at this time. The left attempts to adapt to the new economic agenda that developed in the previous period. However, this revival is often short-lived, not necessarily successful and of a far more moderate nature than that during the long-wave upswing. Finally, this period gives way to centrist politics and the beginnings of the new political consensus, as left and right seek to colonise the centre ground.

Explaining the Political Long-Wave

Three distinct factors can be seen to be influencing the nature of the political long-wave.

Voting Behaviour

The ‘political long-wave’ appears to be constituted by four distinct phases of voting behaviour: voter disengagement, issue voting, voting by economic performance, and a return to voter disengagement. It is these changes within the electorate that contribute to the altering political climate throughout the long-wave. The explanation for these changes appears to be largely a psychological one, rather than a result of structural changes.

Initially, voters are mostly concerned about improving their economic position, after the difficulties of the previous downswing. Politics is not a priority. Consensus politics prevails and the parties offer similar ideological programmes. Interest in politics is therefore limited, leading to political apathy - either low voter turnout, or an ‘unthinking’ partisan alignment.

Following a line of thought developed by Inglehart, the following developments in voter behaviour can be attributed to changing economic circumstances. Material prosperity during the upswing leads to greater confidence, increased optimism, reduced deference, more risk-taking and a wider interest in political and social issues. Interest in politics increases and voters begin to judge the parties on the policies they are offering, particularly on whether they are proposing a progressive political and social agenda for the future. This development benefits the political forces of the left. However, the rise in issue voting also leads to the possibility of greater electoral volatility and, when the downswing commences, political polarisation. This helps give rise to the period of political turmoil that follows, especially when the economy starts to deteriorate in the early downswing period.

A return to material uncertainties follows the economic deterioration of the downswing, and a political climate develops that is less conducive to progressive change, and largely concerned with economic matters and the importance of establishing an economic strategy for recovery. Material difficulties during the downswing lead to lower confidence, increased pessimism, increased deference, less risk-taking and a reduced interest in political and social issues Economic uncertainty causes voters to adopt a conservative outlook. Electors prioritise one issue in particular, and vote according to which party has the best strategy for economic recovery. This tends to benefit the parties of the right – since the left are often still preoccupied with political change.

Finally, the economic deterioration causes a general loss of interest in political change. Voters concern themselves with economic recovery and the left eventually adapts to the new situation by reducing its aspirations. Voter disengagement ensues, again characterised by limited political activity. That which does occur is likely to be defensive in nature, rather than advancing a new agenda. Political apathy, low voter turnout or low voter engagement becomes the norm. There is no drive for political change and centrist consensus politics commences at the end of the downswing.

Party Competition

Theories of party competition can be very useful for explaining the pattern of political change outlined in the political long-wave, in particular in explaining why the left and right are more likely to be in government during particular periods. The importance of left-right ideology and the median voter model need to be borne in mind at all times.

Anthony Downs maintained that the absence of leapfrogging within the left-right spectrum was a result of a political party’s need to demonstrate reliability, integrity and responsibility, whilst at the same time he downplayed the importance of ideology. The political long-wave offers an alternative explanation for the absence of leapfrogging. Ideology is central to the process of party competition, in particular the left-right dichotomy and its struggle over the distribution of power. Political parties have not simply adopted ideologies as a means of attaining office, as Downs maintained; rather ideology has been central to the political process in the modern era. Political parties may well need to demonstrate reliability, integrity and responsibility in the eyes of voters, but, as preference-shaping theories of party competition have elaborated, they also need to respect the ideological beliefs of their members, activists and the traditions within which they operate. Crucially this has been the left-right political divide and the competing attitudes towards the redistribution of power within modern societies. Most political parties emerged from ideological movements promoting the interests of a particular social class. Attachment to ideology was often a feature of political parties even before the democratic process had become established, not as an afterthought once democracy was up and running. An understanding of this allows a greater understanding of how party competition can reflect the changes occurring in voting behaviour and how these changes can be intensified.

Competing theories of party competition can be reconciled using the dynamic of the political long-wave. Early in the long-wave the median voter distribution is centrist and unimodal and this creates a political consensus, and preference-accommodating strategies to attract voters. The focus on a centrally-placed median voter by both the right and left perpetuates this position. However, as the long-wave progresses, the political spectrum polarizes as a result of changing voter behaviour, and a bimodal voter distribution develops with peaks on the left and the right. This leads to adversary politics, political turmoil and the adoption of preference-shaping policies, alongside preference-accommodating strategies, not so much because of the beliefs of party activists, but in an attempt to shift voters from one modal position to the other. This tends to increase political polarization, and can intensify ideological positions held on the left and right. This process thus produces adversary politics.

During the course of the downswing, the bimodal position gradually disappears as a unimodal approach one again becomes dominant. Initially, the median voter on the right of the spectrum becomes dominant and parties begin to converge in this direction. Preference-accommodating strategies become prevalent once again in the search for votes. When the economic recovery begins to become evident towards the end of the downswing, the median voter adopts a more centrist position. For the mainstream parties it is relatively easy to once again converge on this position and consensus politics then ensues. Parties then compete less on ideological positions, and more on which one is best able to mange the present political paradigm.

Class Struggle

Class struggle theories can be useful in explaining the pattern of change observed in the political long-wave. Socio-psychological arguments are of great importance, with levels of confidence and attitudes towards authority being crucial. In the long-wave upswing, low levels of unemployment improve the bargaining position of employees. Together with a structural expansion of a re-created working class this leads to a belief that progressive change can be effected, whilst a less deferential attitude in the workplace leads to increased support for socialist movements. This all adds to the leftward momentum experienced during the last two-thirds of the upswing. However, the higher levels of union density, strike effectiveness and worker mobilization together with an upsurge of left radicalism and socialist agitation eventually add to the sense of political turmoil and ideological polarisation. In contrast to the pattern elaborated by Marx, this is the most likely time for social revolution. The deterioration of the economy during the early long-wave downswing brings about more protracted and embittered industrial disputes, adding to the sense of political turmoil and crisis. High levels of unemployment and industrial restructuring fracture the strength of organised labour. Expectations and militancy decline and labour defeats add to the renewed confidence of the right. Employers gain the upper hand and add to the momentum of the right. This period of economic crisis results in a rapid decline for the revolutionary left. Increased economic insecurity, the search for strong leadership, and antagonism towards the revolutionary left lead to increased levels of support for the reactionary right. The end of the downswing sometimes sees short-lived revivals of worker mobilization. However, successes can easily be reversed and this appears to have little impact on the political process. A generation of workers grown use to the problem of job insecurity helps contribute to the period of consensus and conservatism that dominates the early part of the next upswing.

Overview It is thus possible to give a general overview of how and why the political long-wave is occurring. Upswing The initial period is characterised by consensus politics with voters converging on a centrist position. Memories of the economic difficulties of the recent downswing are still strong, and there is a desire not to damage the improving economic situation. As such, politics is characterised by centrist orthodoxies. However, the long-wave upswing is characterised by strong economic growth. This gives rise to high levels of employment and general prosperity. Eventually, people start to take this for granted, especially the emerging younger generation. Rising prosperity gives rise to a more optimistic outlook on the future, a less deferential outlook and a political climate where risk-taking becomes safer and more prevalent. Employees find it easier to improve working conditions, win strikes and join trade-unions. Higher revenues mean that the state has more money to spend on reducing poverty. Overall, a left-wing political climate emerges and becomes dominant. There is a desire for progressive change and a belief that the economy is now prosperous enough to eliminate poverty and produce a far more egalitarian society. Electorates vote for parties that will implement progressive change, and the parties of the left (and later some on the right) shift leftwards to accommodate this. In such an optimistic political climate, levels of voter engagement increase and grassroots political activity becomes more widespread. As this political and economic situation continues, sections of the left become more radical and revolutionary. Employee confidence rises to such a level that industrial action becomes commonplace. Sections of the left believe that revolution is imminent. Such a situation alarms sections of the right and the political spectrum begins to polarise. For some on the right, the political priority is now to halt the leftwards drift of society. Adversary politics begins to become established and party competition intensifies.

Downswing The onset of economic crisis further divides opinion. The far left expects revolution, the right blame the left for the crisis. Most people expect the crisis to be short-lived and a return to the previous prosperity. However, as the recovery proves to be limited and short-lived, political opinion begins to shift. The far left wants revolution and an end to the present economic and political structures, but other sections of the left place greater priority on defending previous gains, in an economic climate where resources are becoming more limited. For the political centre the priority is to find a means to restore prosperity using the existing political and economic orthodoxies. The right wants to reverse the leftward political drift and return to a more traditional approach to running politics. The political spectrum is polarised, there is much voter volatility and intense party competition. Political turmoil is commonplace. The worsening economic climate ensures that the political climate shifts to the right. There is increased competition over scarce resources, the future outlook is increasingly pessimistic and risk-taking diminishes. Voters become more deferential and look for strong leaders. People look to the past – when things were better – for solutions. Employees, fearful of unemployment, lower their aspirations. Strikes are more likely to be lost and high unemployment weakens trade unions. Lower revenues mean the state needs to reduce spending and implement cut-backs. With the future looking bleak, popular interest in politics diminishes and activity falls way, especially on the left. Voters become more conservative. Electorates vote for parties that prioritise economic recovery and political stability, and the parties of the right (and later those on the left) shift rightwards to accommodate this trend. In most cases, a new economic orthodoxy emerges to replace the one existing in the long-wave upswing, since it is almost invariably blamed for the crisis of the early downswing. Slowly voters begin to accept the new economic orthodoxy as it offers the prospect of economic recovery. Parties of the left and right begin to converge on the orthodoxy emphasising their own particular priorities. This, together with higher levels of political apathy and a decrease in voter volatility, leads to the emergence of a new political consensus. Parties of the left and right converge on the centre where the median voter has returned to. The emphasis remains on political stability and economic recovery.

Historical Chronology

First Long-Wave 1803-1825-1848 (UK only) Upswing Loyalist consensus (state, church and crown). Reformist movement, the rise of Liberal Radicalism, Liberal Toryism, Owenite socialism and co-operativism, emergence of trade-unionism and strike wave. Downswing Turmoil over electoral reform, rise and fall of General Unionism, demise of Owenism. Conservative revival, introduction of Poor Law, Chartism. Recovery Anti-Corn Law League – repeal of Corn Laws, New Model Unionism, Chartist revival, Radical Liberal revival. Second Long-Wave 1848-1873-1896 Upswing The mid-Victorian consensus (free-trade), 1850 compromise. The rise of left Liberalism, Radicalism and Radical Republicanism (abolition of slavery in USA), democratic and constitutional reform, the emergence of revolutionary anarchism, socialism and socialist trade-unionism, the First International and the Paris Commune, international strike wave. Downswing The collapse of the First International, demise of free-trade Liberalism, repression of the revolutionary left and socialism, collapse of trade-unionism. Rise of right-wing imperialism, protectionism, conservative nationalism and anti-semitism, right-wing Opportunists, end of Radical Reconstruction. Recovery The emergence of reformist socialism, New Unionism, Populism, short-lived Liberal revival. Third Long-Wave 1896-1920-1948 Upswing Capitalist consensus (Liberals and Conservatives) opposition to socialism, the ‘marriage of Iron and Rye’ The revival of Liberalism, Radicalism and Progressivism, the ‘Progressive era’, the rise of socialism, anarcho-syndicalism and communism, intense strike activity, revolution, factory occupations and insurrections, democratic reform. Downswing Far left - far right confrontations of the 1920s, battles over prohibition, creationism and racism, failed insurrections, the rise and demise of revolutionary Communism, demise of Liberalism, demise of Democratic socialism, short-lived governments, sporadic and intense strike activity, New Deal, Popular Front. The rise of the far right, Fascism, Nazism and Moderates, rightward-shift of Radicals, the defeat of the radical left, success of Conservatism Recovery The emergence of social democracy, short-lived trade union revival,

Fourth Long-Wave 1948-1973-2001 Upswing The social democratic compromise of the early post-war era, 1950s conservatism. The success of social democracy, civil rights movement, the Great Society, rise of the New Left, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and worker/student/youth militancy in the late1960s/1970s, May 68, New Social Movements – feminism, environmentalism, anti-racism, gay rights, strike wave. Downswing The collapse of social democracy and Keynesianism, anti-immigration and neo-Nazis, declining but still militant strike activity, left-wing terrorism, short-lived governments. The rise of the New Right and neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism, privatisation, free-market economics, decline of trade-unionism, the collapse of the international left. Recovery The emergence of the ‘third way’.

Left and Right

The political long-wave uses definitions of the left and right outlined by Bobbio. In general, the efforts of the left have been to create a more inclusive and pluralistic society in the three related spheres - the economic, political and social. In other words, the left attempts to create a more egalitarian society. The left can be progressive, aiming to enact gradual progressive changes in the distribution of social, political and economic power, thus creating a more pluralistic, more inclusive and more equal society. It can be more radical and aim to enact significant transformations in the distribution of social, economic and political power through rapid change. Its aim is to create a society that is considerably more inclusive, more pluralistic and more equal. Finally, it can be revolutionary aiming to enact a total transformation in the distribution of social, economic and political power through revolutionary means. The aim is to create a society that is as inclusive and equal as possible.

By contrast, the right has tended to prefer a greater degree of exclusivity and uniformity with regards to the three forms of power. The right can be conservative aiming to preserve the status quo in terms of the distribution of power. No significant changes in power distribution are considered or enacted. Given that the distribution of power is usually uneven within industrial/post-industrial societies, this usually amounts to support for a certain degree of political, economic and social exclusion and inequality. The right can also be reactionary, aiming to enact changes that result in a reversal of previous distributions of power. They destroy progressive measures by means of concentrating power within narrower confines than those previously existing, thus creating a less pluralistic and more unequal and exclusive society.

A Fifth Wave?

The world economy has taken a distinct upturn since the mild slowdown of 2001. The US economy had already experienced a reasonably strong recovery in the 1990s, but other parts of the world economy fared much worse, and a full-blown economic upswing did not occur internationally until 2001 onwards. Economic growth has been strong for most of the first decade of the 21st century. The 2008/9 credit crunch has put a temporary stop to this, but long-wave theory would expect a fairly rapid return to strong economic growth for the following decade. A severe and prolonged economic slowdown is not due until the mid-2020s, and until then strong economic growth should predominate in most years. However, rising inflation, interest rates and employer-employee conflict will be characteristic of the years approaching the mid-2020s.

The political long-wave model predicts that the six-stage pattern of political development that has already occurred over the last four long-waves will become evident for a fifth time.

The fifth long-wave has already experienced a period of prolonged political consensus. This has been variously named the post-Thatcherite or post-millennium consensus, and is most closely associated with the ‘third way’. It is characterised by an ideological agreement by the left and right over the desirability of a free-market economy and an accompanying enabling welfare state. This has been the dominant political paradigm for the last decade or so.

As yet (2011) there is no sign of a distinct international shift to the left – the period of prosperity has not existed for a long enough time period yet. However, the recent credit crunch may prove to be the first nail in the coffin of neo-liberalism. Governments around the world found it necessary to engage in massive state intervention to rescue the international finance system and other parts of the economy. The test of any system is how well it copes with the bad times, and neo-liberalism was clearly found wanting. There is, however, no popularly articulated alternative political economic theory attracting widespread support, and it is thus no surprise that the free-market survived the ‘credit crunch’, though its theoretical underpinnings are beginning to be widely questioned. This will no doubt play a part in the revival of left-wing politics as the long-wave upswing progresses.

It is difficult to discern the exact nature of the next left-wing revival, but opposition to neo-liberalism will undoubtedly be a key feature. Continuing concerns over the widening gap between the rich and the poor, differences between the developed and developing world and the problem of climate change will no doubt be important. An increased focus on direct democracy in the developed world will probably be evident as voters seek a greater say in the decision-making process. In the developing world, a new wave of democracy is a likely result of improved economic growth. It may well be the case that a significant element of the emergent left will be centred on the developing nations, as battles take place to secure reforms that were won in the developed world in previous historical periods.

References D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE. M.N. Cleary, & G.D. Hobbs, (1983) ‘The Fifty Year Cycle: A Look at the Empirical Evidence’, in Freeman, C. (ed.) Long Waves in the World Economy, London, Butterworths; Glismann, H.H., Rodemer, H. & Wolter, F. (1983) ‘Long Waves in Economic Development: Causes and empirical evidence’, in Freeman, C. (ed.) Long Waves in the World Economy, London, Butterworths; Ernest Mandel, (1975) Late Capitalism, London, NLB; J.J. van Duijn, (1983) The Long-Wave in Economic Life, London, George Allen & Unwin. Joseph A. Schumpeter, (1939) Business Cycles, New York, McGraw-Hill. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.238. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.238 M. Aglietta, (1979). A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, London, New Left Books; S. Bowles, D. Gordon, & T. Weisskopf, (1983) Beyond the Waste Land, Garden City NY, Doubleday; A. Glyn & R. Sutcliffe, (1972) British Capitalism, Workers and the Profit Squeeze, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books; A. Glyn, A. Hughes, A. Lipietz & A. Singh, (1990) ‘The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age’ in S.A. Marglin & J.B. Schor, (eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press; T. Weisskopf, (1979) ‘Marxian Crisis Theory and the Rate of Profit in the Post-War U.S. Economy’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 3: 341-78. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.270-291. Eric Hobsbawm, (1962) The Age of Revolution (Europe 1789-1848) London, Weidenfield & Nicholson; Eric Hobsbawm, (1975) The Age of Capital 1848-1875, London, Weidenfield & Nicholson; Eric Hobsbawm, (1994) The Age of Empire 1875-1914, London, Abacus; Eric Hobsbawm, (1994) The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, London, Michael Joseph. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.188-208. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.101-129. Ronald, Inglehart (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles amongst Western Publics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.167-182. Anthony Downs (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper & Row. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.137-161. D. Fraser, (2001) Long-wave economics and their impact on the political and social movements of the Left and Right, London, LSE, p.185-187. N. Bobbio, (1996) Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, Cambridge, Polity Press. 18 United Nations (2008) World Economic and Social Survey New York, United Nations.

Further Reading

Berry, B.J.L. (1991)	Long-Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behaviour, Baltimore & London, John Hopkins University Press. Breton, Y. Broder, A. & Lutfalla, M. (1997) La Longue Stagnation en France: L’autre Grande Dépression 1873-1897. Paris, Economica. Cronin, J.E. (1979)	Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain, London, Croom Helm. Cronin, J.E. (1980)	Stages, Cycles, and Insurgencies: The Economics of Unrest. In T.K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein (eds.) Processes of the World-System London, Beverley Hills. Fraser, D. (2001) ‘Long-Waves in Economics – Waves of Democracy’ Democratization, Winter 2001. Freeman, C. (1983) Long Waves in the World Economy, London, Butterworths. Goldstein, J. (1988)	Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age, New Haven, Yale University Press. Gordon, D. (1978)	Up and Down the Long Roller Coaster In U.S. Capitalism in Crisis. Economics Education Project of the Union for Radical Political Economics, New York. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1968) Labouring Men London, Weidenfield & Nicholson. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1962) The Age of Revolution (Europe 1789-1848) London, Weidenfield & Nicholson. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1975) The Age of Capital 1848-1875 London, Weidenfield & Nicholson. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1994) The Age of Empire 1875-1914 London, Abacus. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1994) The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991. London, Michael Joseph. Kalecki, M. (1943)	‘Political Aspects of Full employment’ Political Quarterly Part 4 pp.322-331. Kelly, J. (1998) Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, collectivism and long-waves. London & New York, Routledge LSE. Lloyd-Jones, R. & Lewis, M.J. British industrial capitalism since the Industrial Revolution, UCL Press, 1998. Mandel, E. (1975) Late Capitalism London, NLB. Mandel, E. (1980) Long Waves of Capitalist Development: The Marxist Interpretation Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Phelps Brown, H. A Non-Monetarist View of the Pay Explosion, Three Banks Review, March 1975, No. 105, pp.3-24. Rosenberg, H. (1943) ‘Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in Central Europe’ Economic History Review Vol. XIII No. 1&2. pp.58-73. Salvati, M. (1983) Political Business Cycles and Long-waves in Industrial 	Relations: Notes on Kalecki and Phelps Brown. In C. Freeman (ed.) Long-Waves in the World Economy. London, Butterworths. Screpanti, E. (1984)	‘Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies’, Review, 7, no.2, pp.509-548. Screpanti, E. (1987)	‘Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 25 No.1pp.99-124. Solomou, S. (1998)	Economic Cycles: Long cycles and business cycles since 1870. Manchester, Manchester University Press. van Duijn, J.J. (1983) The Long Wave in Economic Life. London, George Allen & Unwin.