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Scholars have identified two competing implications of bureaucratic drift. Some believe that delegation is a necessary part of the American government,  and that bureaucratic drift is a risk that must be weighed when delegating implementation powers. Other scholars believe that delegation of power to bureaucracy is both unconstitutional and happens too frequently. Further, the risk posed by bureaucratic drift is disruptive enough to American politics that delegation must be reconsidered.

Bureaucratic Drift is a theory in political science that explains how policy enactment delegated to bureaucracy deviates from its original mandate.

Overview
Legislation is produced by elected officials, but is implemented by unelected bureaucrats, who sometimes act under their own preferences or interests. The difference between a bureaucracy's enactment of a law and the legislature's intent is called Bureaucratic Drift. It is often treated as a principal-agent problem, with the House, Senate and Presidency acting as principals and bureaucracy acting as the agent. The government seeks to control bureaucratic drift in a number of ways, including Congressional Oversight and procedural controls. Bureaucratic drift is sometimes contrasted with Coalition drift, where elected officials limit their own authority over an agency to safeguard against potential changes in coalition (i.e. the House, Senate and Presidency) preferences in the future.

Bureaucratic drift is described by public choice theory, sometimes by means of spatial modeling.

There is debate within this theory as to the cause and solutions to bureaucratic drift, and even to the theory's validity. Some believe that bureaucracy's distance from public preference actually has a beneficial effect upon the legislative body that created it.