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Introduction & Context
In 2008, the Ecuadorian government adopted a constitution that acknowledged “the rights of nature.” Ecuador received international attention for becoming the first country in the world to recognize that ecosystems have the independent right to “exist and flourish.” The Ecuadorian constitution and its leaders have been criticized for building a constitution that enforces a hyper-presidency with no accountability for executive power.

Democratic socialist Rafael Correa was elected president in 2006 and introduced Ecuador to leftist policies. According to economists, Correa decreased poverty in his ten years of presidency through a developmental plan called “buen vivir,” translated as “good living." This plan stated that residents were meant “to live in harmony with nature and in equality with the state.” Correa’s administration decided to establish a new constitution. Constitutional law researchers have claimed that Correa’s constitutional agenda consisted of centralizing power in the executive branch and strengthening the government’s authority over economic development.

In April 2007, the Constituent Assembly, a group of 130 elected delegates, were instructed to create a constitution that upheld the standards of buen vivir. There existed controversy over how the constituent assembly was elected. Over 70 members from President Correa’s social democratic political party, PAIS Alliance, gained a seat amongst the 134 Constituent Assembly delegates.

The 2008 Constitution established the National Assembly as the unicameral legislature in Ecuador. With the new Constitution, as the primary state legislative body, the National Assembly could intervene in the economy and public management system without consulting provincial government leaders. The Senate was eliminated, which critics considered an essential component to preventing the concentration of power in one branch.

Through the 2008 Montecristi Constitution, constitutional law researchers theorize that Correa tried disguising autocratic power with a constitutional revolution. They claim that the Constitution accomplished this by expanding the power of the executive branch and promoting hyperpresidentialism.

The "Buen Vivir" Model
Under the subheading of Human Rights, the second title is “buen vivir.” The model of buen vivir requires the government and the people to employ an economic model that respects nature. This model rejected traditional Western ideals of capitalism and cooperations that previous versions of the Ecuadorian constitution held.

Although the model led to Correa’s popularity, academic critics claim buen vivir holds a vague definition and worships the idea of a utopia rather than a rational solution. They have called out the Constitution’s buen vivir for being performative because it does not keep the government accountable with its promise for a stable future.

For example, one of the introductory articles of the 2008 Constitution states that residents are guaranteed a “democratic society free of corruption.” Although most introductory articles are outlined as general principles, the rest of the Constitution does not specify the definition and prohibited levels of “corruption.” Corruption appears 12 times in the Constitution. In those 12 times, the text does not state the specific consequences of committing political corruption.

The Debate on an Autonomous Government Structure
The Constitution establishes that the federal government is broken down to a single presidential system with a limited legislative body. Article 3 of the Constitution states that Ecuador is home to a decentralized, autonomous government. Each provincial government is expected to meet the needs of its unique ecosystem and its citizens’ concerns. For example, Article 3 requires each provincial government to take accountability for the distribution of goods and services to their community.

Article 238 legitimizes the existence of several decentralized autonomous governments, which consist of municipal, regional and provincial councils. Yet their power is limited by “their competences and territorial jurisdictions.”

One might argue that Article 3 and 238 imply that Ecuador is centralized at the federal level, but is decentralized through the creation of autonomous provincial regions that must carry out individualized responsibilities. According to Article 266, provinces and regions are described as “autonomous districts” that must respond to the national jurisdiction system.

Some analysts have claimed that the 2008 Constitution led power to become highly centralized at the executive branch. Others might suggest that the State additionally employs the structure of decentralized provincial governments to rid itself of the responsibility of overseeing each province’s unique needs.

In Article 277, the State is supposed to follow buen vivir by producing goods, and providing public services to its citizens. This list of responsibilities leaves the reader wondering what kind of goods and services the State is responsible for distributing, given that each provincial government is already required to complete this responsibility as seen in Article 3. One might criticize the State for requiring each government to fulfill its provincial duties, while it is also expected to carry out this responsibility.

Article 4 also poses a possible conflict to Article 3’s establishment of Ecuador as a decentralized, autonomous government. Article 4 establishes that the Ecuadorian territory is a geographical whole, an irreducible state, and a unitary state. As an “irreducible state,” Ecuador could be deemed as one unit that cannot be broken apart by different rules or codes. Under Article 4, each provincial government would have to employ the same practices to gain food, establish a workforce, or create public services, despite being home to different geographical environments.

One could argue that Article 3 and 4 conflict because the federal government is meant to be “irreducible” (per Article 4) but also have different rules for each province to fulfill its citizens’ needs (per Article 3).

These articles present the question on whether a unified state means having a diverse set of codes. In practice, one could suggest that Article 3 rules out Article 4 in an autonomous government because it allows provincial governments to exhibit a degree of independence from the federal government. Within this national government, critics may pose the question on whether there exists a balance of power between the legislative and executive branches.

The Relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branch
The Constitution’s Article 84 explicitly states that the National Assembly is responsible for creating laws that guarantee the dignity of human beings. Per the Constitution, the government’s actions cannot endanger citizens’ rights. Yet the power to interpret rights is granted to the legislative branch whereas in most constitutions, this power is usually assigned to the judicial branch. This presents a conflict because the same officials who wrote the constitution have the authority to decide what rights classify as unconstitutional or possess a danger to citizens. The legislative branch is in charge of keeping itself accountable.

One might argue that this individual accountability leaves room for potential bias on behalf of the legislative branch in keeping itself responsible, and it leaves limited room for input from other branches.

According to Article 134, the ability to submit bills is divided between five percent of the National Assembly, the President, the Constitutional Court and other citizens. However, Article 135 states that only the President has the right to submit bills that “amend or eliminate taxes, increase public spending, or change the country’s political and administrative division.” This grants the President complete legislative power over the country’s currency because he does not have to consult other government branches. This article grants the President the ability to disregard the rest of the government in matters of fiscal development.

In each bill that the National Assembly writes, there are several requirements that must be fulfilled. According to Article 138, the word of the President is the final one because if he/she completely objects to the bill, the National Assembly may only revisit the bill after a year of the initial objection. If there are segments of the bill that the President objects to, the President has the right to alter the text of the bill. This “line item veto” shows how the Assembly has limited power compared to that of the President.

There is no bill or constitutional article that currently holds the President accountable to the limitations of his/her possible vetoes. There is also no bill or article that grants the Assembly the chance to veto a bill. Under Article 103, only the President can veto a bill.

Similarly, as seen in Article 139, if the President objects a bill, on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, the bill is then reviewed by the Constitutional Court. However, according to constitutional law researchers, Article 139 risks presenting a bias because, per Article 434, the President is part of the qualification commission that selects Constitutional Court judges. Article 139 establishes that even if the Court agrees that a bill is partly unconstitutional, the National Assembly must make changes that fit the President’s approval.

One particular aspect of the Constitution is that it sets a timeline for certain obligations. For example, Article 428 states that when a judge wants to challenge the constitutionality of a legal norm, the Constitutional Court only has forty-five days to rule on the constitutionality of this law.

Another example is found in Article 129, which states that the National Assembly usually has seventy-two hours to complete impeachment proceedings against the President. This may place a difficulty given that there are over 100 Assembly members, and meeting with each other to discuss and agree on a decision could take a relatively long time. The President, however, does not have the same strict time frame to dissemble the National Assembly. According to Article 148, the President has the right to dissolve the Assembly if they’ve failed to complete their responsibilities without a specific deadline. There is not the same accountability held for the President as there is for the Assembly.

One could suggest that deadlines have the effect of reducing power because it limits the time that judicial and legislative systems can complete their job and come to a proper decision. Having a short amount of time to complete a process tends to lessen the input of officials.

Legal scholars have argued that the creation of the Montecristi Constitution under President Correa’s presidency resembles “constitutional backsliding.” Constitutional backsliding refers to the practice of power being increasingly concentrated in the Executive branch, leading to a failing system of checks and balances.

Experts expressed worry that President Correa was at risk of becoming an autocrat because his powers could not be unwritten or regulated by any other government branch.

According to Article 150, in the event that the Vice President is absent, the Assembly can only elect their replacement from a “shortlist of candidates submitted by the Office of the President of the Republic.” Although citizens have the chance to elect the Vice-President, they do not get a say in the Vice-President’s replacement. Only the President can provide a list of replacement Vice-Presidents. In several instances throughout the text, the responsibility of appointing a government official is assigned to the Office of the President.

Similarly, although the Council for Public Participation and Social Control has the right to appoint the State Prosecutor, the Council must choose the Prosecutor based on the shortlist of candidates provided by the President’s Office, per Article 150. This procedure presents a possible bias because the State Prosecutor is responsible for defending the State and its adherence to the law.

According to Article 147, the President is also responsible for appointing the Ministers of State, also known as the members of the cabinet. Scholars could suggest that the members of the cabinet represent the interests of the President because they were chosen by him/her.

In Ecuador’s government, there exist Superintendents, also known as Superintendencies, who are picked from a shortlist provided by the President. Superintendencies act as “bodies of surveillance and intervention” of economic, social, and environmental activities to ensure citizens and operations abide by the law. The Superintendendies branch states that its working towards every citizen’s best interest and protection, abiding by the goal of buen vivir. As figures who can monitor public and private entities, Superintendents have the chance to be chosen by the liking of the President.

Notable Constitutional Changes since 2008
In 2011, President Correa called a referendum on the following: to limit the freedom of the press, to limit the due process in criminal cases, and to implement harsher punishment on cases involving animal cruelty, and gambling. The majority of his amendments were passed with over 50 percent approval rate from the legislative body.

Article 144 of the Montecristi Constitution states that the Presidential term lasts four years and the President can be reelected only once. President Correa encouraged the National Assembly to lift the Constitution’s term limit on any public official, allowing him to run for reelection starting in 2021. The action caused a public uproar because it appeared as though the President tried to circumvent the term limit he agreed to limit himself to. By 2013, President Correa had won his third election and had already circumvented the two-term limit of the Constitution. To justify his decision, he claimed that with the new constitution of 2008, his election in 2006 did not necessarily count.

One could say that the country seemed to be headed towards autocratic legalism when Correa tried to extend the length of his presidential term despite the constitutional limit.

In the 2017 election season, President Correa endorsed his long-term Vice-President, Lenin Moreno in the hopes that he would support Correa’s legacy and potential return to the presidency. In 2017, President Lenin Moreno provided Ecuadorian citizens with referendum questions that reversed the constitutional changes from Correa’s term. President Moreno gained public support for reversing Correa’s changes.

President Moreno added an amendment that limited all elected officials to a single re-election. It prohibited any citizen with a record of embezzlement or bribery to run for public office. Moreno also created an organization called the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control, a group of unelected officials in the executive branch that had the power to go above the National Assembly. Moreno established that his constitutional changes did not need the approval of the Constitutional Court and the changes were in place right away. The Court had to approve the constitutionality of this change. But, it failed to do so in the 20-day window, based on the deadlines presented in the Montecristi Constitution.