User:Toussaint/ethnoreligious nationalism

The Jews, having been cast out from the land of their long-time nationhood, entrenched their nationhood further within their religion, and recursively entrenched their religion within their ethnicity. Thus, what has happened in Israel since the beginning of Jewish (re-)settlement in the area has been a process of deconstruction of the Jewish identity in Israel away from ethnicity (given that settlement was originally allowed by the British under "ethnic homeland" pretenses) and towards religion; this has manifested in demands for the reconstruction of the Third Temple. I think that as soon as Israel gets the Third Temple, even if it results in the replacement of the al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock - and that is likely to happen - the movement for the Israeli identity will start to become subreligious and more nationalistic, where the Jewish ethnicity and Jewish religion have already been fully resettled within their incumbent institutions in the country.

Getting the foot into the door
There are three currents within the "return to Israel" concept:
 * aliya to the state
 * settlement on the land
 * birthing to the native population (the deeper into the hinterland that such births and subsequent lives take place, the better).
 * Building (or rebuilding ancient) religious institutions further into the interior.

At best, all such action gets Jewish feet into the door of the area. Maybe this is what Ze'ev Jabotinsky foresaw when he viewed both sides of the Jordan River as his full and complete Jewish state, although I beg to wonder where the capital of such an overreaching state would be most strategically placed to service both sides. Getting the foot into the door wouldn't be enough, and couldn't be enough, which meant that Jabotinsky's views, if resolidified in the coming years, may take Israel beyond something like the Third Temple and its religious appeal.

Beyond the Third Temple
I see Israel becoming a more religion-bent state both long before and immediately after the realization of the Temple. The West Bank will be almost entirely replaced with Judea and Samaria being integrated as separate districts (and Jerusalem Governorate being integrated into Jerusalem District, the periphery of it being dominated by the Greater Jerusalem metropolitan area). Within this greater, more empowered religious construct centered in Jerusalem, newer wings of cultural and political evolution will develop, and will affect how Israel deals with other countries, particularly Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

As advocated by many religious groups in the country, a Sanhedrin or some other religiously-inclined upper house will be installed as a counterbalance to the legislative power of the Knesset. Beyond that, however, the focus will be directed upon Israel as being a more politically-potent, sociopolitically-entrenched power in the Levant.

Jewish majority
This may mean that some land and population would be exchanged in order to maintain a solid ethnoreligiously Jewish majority in whatever's left.

Religious
This may mean that the religion becomes the greater factor in Israeli governance. However, this may result in power grabs between the Jewish sects.

Ethnic
This may mean that ethnicity becomes the greater factor in Israeli governance, although this may sideline a great minority of immigrant Jews.

Religious
Rural and urban settlements for the national-religious natives would need encouragement from the government. This may result in confrontation with Arab Muslims, and may also leave current Israel proper with less-solidly Jewish concentrations to the local demopolitical benefit of Arab-Israeli residents in local politics. Furthermore, this is likely to sideline the Muslim religious institutions, if not do a greater degree of damage to them.

Ethnic
Aliyah would need encouragement from the government, resulting in a less-solidly religious push into the West Bank, although the rate of aliyah is diminishing and the usage of Jewish non-native immigrants for West Bank would mean that the Jewish settlers will develop a culture that is less "sabra" than the national-religious camp.

State of Judea
A separate religious state that would fund, support and defend settlement autonomous of the Israeli government. This would mean that Israeli loses out on the development of a more natively-entrenched Judaism and the recovery of religious sovereignty over Jerusalem's relics.

The end of Tsuris
It is possible that, with the centrification of the diaspora Jewish religion in Jerusalem and the expansion of the religious Jewish population to the nether region of the West Bank (thus forming a religious demographic backbone), the coastal population - particularly in the Gush Dan - will become further lax and settled, with more indigenous interpretations of Judaism and Jewish-derived religions being incubated away from the maligned galut mentality and the Eastward-moving settler mentality. This may be accomplished by moving the restless national-religious groups further east, allowing the Jews on the coast to cultivate their religion with less interference.

However, this removal of interference and obstacles from the ability to live in an ethnoreligiously-homogenous society results in a confirmation of Alan Dershowitz's Tsuris Theory of Jewish Survival, in which persecution and anti-Semitism from external forces are needed to keep the Jewish religion and identity alive and coherent. A removal may result in the further deprecation of religion's place in the Gush Dan as the national demographic backbone is placed in a much wider periphery, thus turning the Gush Dan's religious atmosphere into far more of a folk religion that is further removed from the pressing needs of the Gush Dan population; it also makes it easier for those who make aliyah to make the decision on whether to join the secular, urbane Israeli demographic in the Gush Dan or to make common cause with the alert national-religious demographic backbone in Judea. The descendants of the nationa-religious backbone, however, are more likely to be conflicted about whether to move further Eastward to continue the struggle towards an established, coherent Israeli identity or to let the older generation handle the struggle by themselves while the descendants head towards more peaceable pastures in the Gush Dan.