User:USDW05/Administrative law judge

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Change Wikipedia Page Name to Administrative Agency Adjudicators

Administrative law judges are administrative adjudicators who have been formally recognized by their employing agency as judges presiding over agency proceedings, with the monolith term derived from the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Cite). The framework of Butz v Economou also provided for the Supreme Court of the United States deeming the position and work of a “hearing examiner or administrative law judge” in agency adjudications “functionally comparable” to a judge. SCOTUS additionally recognized the importance of their “independent judgement” being solidified by the Administrative Procedures Act. However, in 2018, SCOTUS decided Lucia v SEC, ruling that the Administrative Law Judges of the agency were subject to the Appointments Clause. President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13843 that removed the examinations process through which ALJs were chosen and employed; rather, that all ALJ appointments were subject to the Appointments Clause under Article 2. EO 13843 stripped away the merit based hiring mechanisms and instituted mechanisms consistent with political control of agency adjudicatory outcomes.

Nevertheless, not all administrative law judges were covered by the APA protections anyway. Administrative Law Judges within the National Labor Review Board that are afforded all protections afforded by the APA. The Social Security Administration also employs Administrative Law Judges that are afforded specific, APA-like protections; those protections, however, are found within … Administrative Judges are agency adjudicators that don’t possess protections that guard their impartiality. Immigration Judges are particularly notorious examples of non-APA protected judges that adjudicate numerous types of hearings.

Authority and Review of Federal ALJs

The organic statute of an agency can indicate the agency’s administrative law judges’ scope of authority and detail the process of administrative and/or judicial review of ALJ decisions. Because each agency has a distinct organic statute, federal ALJ authority and review mechanisms differ by agency. For example, in U.S. v Arthrex (2021), the ruling posited a form of administrative review of previously unreviewable patent decisions issued by Administrative Patent Judges of the Patent and Trademark Commission.

Case Law

Butz v Economou

·      “There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is “functionally comparable” to that of a judge” (*513)

·      “We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts” (*514)

US v Arthrex (2021)

·      APJs of Patent and Trademark Commission in an inter partes review: a “hybrid proceeding” challenging the validity of a US Patent with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings”

o   APJs rejected the patent claim of Arthrex; no review from Director of USPTO; Arthrex appealed to Federal Circuit Court directly

·      Are APJs principal officers or inferior officers? If the former, can they be rendered inferior by severing the portion of the Patent Act that restricts removal?

o   Lack of review makes their power incompatible with appointment to an inferior office

o   The director of USPTO holds ultimate aux for review of final outcome (unlike the statutory delegation)

Axon v FTC (2023)

·      Axon held that ALJs of executive agencies cannot hear claims “challenging as unconstitutional the structure or existence” of the agency in question.

·      A concurring opinion filed by Justice Clarence Thomas reviews the constitutionality of agency adjudication.

Ortiz v US (2018)

·      In agency adjudication of private rights, ALJs are performing a judicial function within the agency.