User:Vedisobe/Buddhism and violence

Current Text:

"Thailand

See also: Buddhism in Thailand

In Southeast Asia, Thailand has had several prominent virulent Buddhist monastic calls for violence. In the 1970s, nationalist Buddhist monks like Phra Kittiwuttho argued that killing communists did not violate any of the Buddhist precepts.[44] The militant side of Thai Buddhism became prominent again in 2004 when a Malay Muslim insurgency renewed in Thailand's deep south. At first Buddhist monks ignored the conflict as they viewed it as political and not religious but eventually they adopted an "identity-formation", as practical realities require deviations from religious ideals"

Kittivuddho (see, Kittiwuttho, spelling in translation varies) was a staunch follower of the Thai Sangha - the religious organization that leads the Buddhist movement in Thailand. The Sangha (does the Thai Sangha have a page? I should link to it if yes) offers validity to the Thai government. If the ruling body shows fealty to the Sangha, then their actions are seen as legitimized and moral via the association. Likewise, the Sangha receives power and influence through the recognition of their partnership with the ruling government (Satha-Anand)

Thailand and World War I.

In the 1900s, the outbreak of World War 1 impacted then King of Siam, King Rama VI (link to him). Rama VI had studied and trained with the military in London, and thus felt it necessary to show his support for the allied forces. Thailand would not have been affected by the fighting in the West, nevertheless, Siam sent a voluntary cohort of 1,200 troops. Although they arrived too late to participate in the fighting, Rama VI received critical feedback from Abbot Phra Thep Moli Sirichantoe.

The Abbot's critique of Rama VI's decision - published in a book criticizing military knowledge as "evil" (Satha-Anand), was likewise counter-critiqed by the Supreme Patriarch (Rama VI's uncle). The Supreme Patriarch brought attention to the concept of sacrifice in Buddhist teachings, and thus likened it to the sacrifice soldiers must make in defense of their homeland. In so doing, he used the teachings of Buddha to justify the violence necessary to protect a nation or culture in times of war, and the need to prepare for war in times of peace.

The Supreme Patriarch likened the King's decisions to the necessary role of the leader or protector of a group or family to take the risk in leading others. The Supreme Patriarch quoted an ancient saying, "When a herd of cattle is fording a stream, if the leading ox leads straight, all the oxen will follow straight.” (Satha-Anand) Additionally, he compared the role of king or leader to that of a parent, who must ensure a child takes bitter medicine in times of illness. In so doing, he supports his argument that the King knew better than the Abbot, or than the citizenry, in his choice to supply soldiers to the Western Conflict in World War I.

This arguments, based in ancient proverb and justified through Buddhist relations of sacrifice, directly strike against the ancient story of Temija - a past life of Buddha that was shocked and appalled by the use of violence by governing leaders. While the story of Temija teaches against the use of violence in forms of punishment, the Supreme Patriarch instead utilized the concepts of sacrifice put forth through other Buddhist teachings to justify the use of violence by leaders, even to the point that violence for the sake of the nation would be viewed as virtuous. (Satha-Anand)

 1940s-1950s Thailand: 

Thailand following the onset of World War II and into the Cold War was in the midst of a sociological upheaval. The introduction of small arms during the second World War through the 1940s and 1950s lead to a surge of violent crime. Not only was violent crime on the rise amongst the population, but Thailand was fighting a border war with then "French Indochina" (now, the Indochinese Union). Additionally, Thailand was mired within the Pacific War, and these marked the first modern wars Thailand had been involved in since the late 1800s. (Soontravanich)

1970s Thai Buddhism:

In the 1970s, Kittivuddho - a prominent Buddhist monk with influence in Thai culture - stated in an interview with Caturat (a news magazine from the period) that killing communists is, "not de-meritorius". Kittivuddho's assertion that the killing of Communists is forgiveable for Buddhist's reflects earlier philosophies from Asanga and Buddhaghosa. Against the assertions sixty years prior of Phra Thep Moli, Kittivuddho did not see acts of violence and killing as a demerit within certain contexts.

These remarks followed the 1973 student-led uprising, as well as the creation of a Thai parliament and the spread of communism in neighboring East Asian countries. The fear of communism shaking the social forms of Thailand felt a very real threat to Kittivuddho, who expressed his nationalist tendencies in his defense of militant actions (Satha-Anand). He justified his argument by dehumanizing the Communists and leftists that he opposed. In the interview with Caturat he affirmed that this would not be the killing of people, but rather the killing of monsters/devils (Satha-Anand). He similarly asserted that while killing of people is prohibited and thus de-meritorious in Buddhist teachings, doing so for the "greater good" will garner greater merit than the act of killing will cost.

"He taught us to kill. Venerable sirs, you are likely to be suspicious about this teaching. I will tell you the sutta and you can investigate: (It is) the Kesi-sutta in the Kesiya-vagga, the sutta-nipitaka, anguttara-nikaya, catu-kaka-nipata. If you open (this text) venerable sirs, you will find that the Lord Buddha ordered killing." (Gillberg)

Kittivuddho's statements in the 1970s reflect the argument made in defense of King Rama VI by the Supreme Patriarch following the events of WWI. Kittivuddho, likewise, justifies his approval of the killing of communists by claiming that in so doing, the soldiers who commit these acts will gain greater merit than they will lose from the act. Like the Supreme Patriarch, he utilizes the concept of sacrifice for the sake of defending, "the country, the religion, and the institution of monarchy." (Satha-Anand) Feelings of patriotism and the sense of national security are valued more highly than human lives in Kittivuddho's argument. Since defending the nation becomes the highest priority, or highest "value" for Thai Buddhist philosophy, the act of killing is seen as a sacrifice made by the killer, but one that is justified. By manipulating the literal definition of the words within Buddhist scriptures, Kittivuddho was able to support his position (Satha-Anand).

"The social dimension of religion has a militant side in which making merit and good works apply to war-affiliated activities" (Jerryson,

Thailand in the 2000s

Religious tensions in Thailand are directly related to the state's choice to represent Buddhism as the de facto state religion (Jerryson, 2012). The Thai monk is no longer only a Thai practitioner of Buddhism, but a figure for the Thai state. As the Thai monk has become an icon representative of the Thai nation state, the refusal to acknowledge and/or the mistreatment of other religious practitioners in Thailand has resulted in strained relationships between religions. As such, when

Particularly in the early 2000s, conflict between Malay Muslims (citizens and militants) began to rise in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, particularly between Thai Buddhist and Thai-Chinese Buddhists. (Jerryson)

This rise in militant interactions rose with prominent events in 2004, and continued to build. On April 28th, 2004, the Thai military assaulted the Khru Se Mosque, resulting in over 100 deaths of militant Malay Muslims. That same October, peacefully protesting Malay Muslim citizens were met with intense police brutality, wherein the Thai military fired upon and suffocated as many as 80 Malay Muslim citizens (Jerryson)

It was found by Amnesty International in 2007 that militant action by Buddhists in Thailand against Malay Muslims was on the rise (Jerryson).

The philosopher Asanga asserted that it was of low karmic value to kill a "depraved bandit". Likewise, the philosopher Buddhaghosa found it to be justified killing an amoral person as being "less blameworthy".

Gethin 2004: 171–172 buddhaghosa

(Jenkins 2010–11: 307). asanga

Outline Plans Below:

Review Leading Section - what changes do we need to make?

Leading Section is too short, doesn’t give full overview of article’s current structure.

Conduct research to answer following questions:

What role does Buddishm play in Buddhist countries?

When or how did these nations adopt Buddhism?

What does Buddhist violence look like in these nations?

How does violence behave in Buddhism?

General Notes:

A lot of run-on sentences in this article. Need to be broken up, language can be simplified for additional clarity.

'''

The section on Thailand is very small compared to other sections and should be expanded.'''

wow Im dizzy

The section, "Politicized Buddhism" weirdly separates the sections about specific nations, and should be relocated to either come before all of them, or after all of them.

Furthermore, section "Politicized Buddhism" is really long and wordy. Need to check for run on sentences and potentially break up texts with images or quotes to make it easier to read/more accessible.

"

Politicized Buddhism, the formation of ethnocracy and the civil war[edit]
edits added to page except below:

In 1956, the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) released a report titled "The Betrayal of Buddhism,"  inquiring into the status of Buddhism on the island. The report argued that Buddhism had been weakened by external threats such as the Tamil invaders mentioned in the Mahavamsa and later Western colonial powers. It also demanded that the state restore and foster Buddhism and give preferential treatment to Buddhist schools. The same year, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike capitalized on the ACBC report and its recommendations as the foundation for his election campaign, using it as the 'blueprint for a broad spectrum of policy', which included introducing Sinhala as the sole official language of the state. With the help of a significant number of Buddhist monks and various Sinhalese Buddhist organizations, Bandaranaike became prime minister after winning the 1956 elections. Bandaranaike had also campaigned on the basis of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, drawing influences from the writings of Dharmapala and the Mahavamsa and arguing that it was the duty of the government to preserve the Sinhalese Buddhist nature of the island's destiny. Once in power, Bandaranaike implemented the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, which would make Sinhala the country's official language, and hence all official state transactions would be conducted in Sinhala. This puts non-Sinhala speakers at a disadvantage for employment and educational opportunities. As a result, Tamils protested the policy by staging sit-ins, which in turn prompted counterdemonstrations by Buddhist monks, later degenerating into anti-Tamil riots in which more than one hundred people were injured and Tamil businesses were looted. Riots then spread throughout the country, killing hundreds of people. Bandaranaike tried to mitigate tensions over the language policy by proposing a compromise with the Tamil leaders, resulting in a 1957 pact that would allow the use of Tamil as an administrative language along with Sinhala and greater political autonomy for Tamils. Buddhist monks and other Sinhalese nationalists opposed this pact by staging mass demonstrations and hunger strikes.^121 In an editorial in the same year, a monk asked Bandaranaike to read the Mahavamsa and to heed its lessons: "[Dutthagamani] conquered by the sword and united the land [Sri Lanka] without dividing it among our enemies [i.e., the Tamils] and established Sinhala and Buddhism as the state language and religion." In the late 1950s, it had become common for politicians and monks to exploit the Mahavamsa narrative of Dutthagamani to oppose any concession to the Tamil minorities.^122

With Buddhist monks playing a major role in exerting pressure to abrogate the pact, Bandaranaike acceded to their demands on April 9, 1958, by tearing up "a copy of the pact in front of the assembled monks, who clapped in joy." Soon after the pact was abrogated, another series of anti-Tamil riots spread throughout the country, leaving hundreds dead and thousands displaced^123. Prior to the 1958 riots, the rhetoric of monks contributed to the perception that Tamils were the enemies of the country and of Buddhism. Both Buddhist monks and laity laid the foundation for the justifiable use of force against Tamils in response to their demand for greater autonomy by arguing that the whole of Sri Lanka was a promised land of the Sinhalese Buddhists and that it was the role of the monks to defend a united Sri Lanka. Tamils were also portrayed as threatening interlopers, compared to the Mahavamsa account of the usurper Tamil king Elara. Monks and politicians invoked the story of the Buddhist warrior king Dutthagamani to urge the Sinhalese to fight against Tamils and their claims to the island, thereby providing justification for violence against Tamils. As Tessa J. Bartholomeusz explained, "Tamil claims to a homeland were met with an ideology linked to a Buddhist story that legitimated war with just cause: the protection of Sri Lanka for the Sinhala-Buddhist people."^124 In order to appease Tamils amidst the ethnic tension, Bandaranaike modified the Sinhala Only Act to allow Tamil to be used in education and government in Tamil areas, and as a result, a Buddhist monk named Talduwe Somarama assassinated him on September 26, 1959. The monk claimed he carried out the assassination "for the greater good of his country, race, and religion."^125 It has also been suggested that the monk was guided in part by reading the Mahavamsa.^126

Successive governments after Bandaranaike implemented a similar Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist agenda at the expense of minorities. In 1972, the government rewrote its constitution and gave Buddhism "the foremost place [in the Republic of Sri Lanka]" and made it "the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism." With another pact in 1965 that sought to establish greater regional autonomy for Tamils being abrogated (some members of the Buddhist clergy were at the forefront in opposing the pact) and the implementation of a discriminatory quota system in 1974 that severely restricted Tamil entrance to universities, Tamil youth became radicalized, calling for an independent homeland to be established in the Tamil-dominated northeastern region of the island. In 1977, anti-Tamil riots spread throughout the country, killing hundreds of Tamils and leaving thousands homeless. A leading monk claimed that one of the reasons for the anti-Tamil riots of 1977 was the Tamil demonization of the Sinhalese Buddhist epic hero Dutthagamani, which resulted in a justified retaliation. Another anti-Tamil riot erupted in 1981 in Jaffna, where Sinhalese police and paramilitaries destroyed statues of Tamil cultural and religious figures; looted and torched a Hindu temple and Tamil-owned shops and homes; killed four Tamils; and torched the Jaffna Public Library, which was of great cultural significance to Tamils. In response to the militant separatist Tamil group LTTE killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers, the largest anti-Tamil pogrom occurred in 1983, leaving between 2,000 and 3,000 Tamils killed and forcing from 70,000 to 100,000 Tamils into refugee camps, eventually propelling the country into a civil war between the LTTE and the predominately Sinhalese Buddhist Sri Lankan government. In the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, Buddhist monks led rioters in some instances. Cyril Mathew, a senior minister in President Jayawardene's cabinet and a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist who, in the year preceding the pogrom, reaffirmed the special relationship between Buddhism and Sinhalese and the Buddhist nature of the country, was also responsible for the pogrom. In the months following the anti-Tamil pogrom, authorizations for violence against Tamils began to appear in the press, with Tamils being depicted as interlopers on Dhammadipa. The Mahavamsa narrative of Dutthagamani and Elara was also invoked to justify violence against Tamils. The aftermath of the pogrom spawned debates over the rights to the island, with the "sons of the soil" ideology being called into prominence. A government agent declared that Sri Lanka's manifest destiny "was to uphold the pristine doctrine of Theravada Buddhism." This implied that Sinhalese Buddhists had a sacred claim to Sri Lanka while the Tamils did not, a claim that might call for violence. The Sinhalese Buddhists, including the Sri Lankan government, resisted the Tamil claim to a separate homeland of their own, as the Sinhalese Buddhists maintained that the entire country belonged to them. Another government agent linked the then Prime Minister Jayewardene's attempts to thwart the emergence of a Tamil homeland to Dutthagamani's victory over Elara and went on to say, "We will never allow the country to be divided,"  thereby justifying violence against Tamils.

In the context of the increasing Tamil militant struggle for separatism, militant Buddhist monks founded the Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV), or "Movement for the Protection of the Motherland," in 1986, which sought to work with political parties "to maintain territorial unity of Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Buddhist sovereignty over the island." The MSV used the Mahavamsa to justify its goals, which included the use of force to fight against the Tamil threat and defend the Buddhist state. In 1987, along with the MSV, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, a militant Sinhalese nationalist group that included monks) took up arms to protest the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which sought to establish peace in Sri Lanka by requiring the Sri Lankan government to make a number of concessions to Tamil demands, including the devolution of power to Tamil provinces. The JVP, with the support of the Sangha, launched a campaign of violent insurrection against the government to oppose the accord, as the Sinhalese nationalists believed it would compromise the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

From the beginning of the civil war in 1983 to the end of it in 2009, Buddhist monks were involved in politics and opposed negotiations, ceasefire agreements, or any devolution of power to Tamil minorities, and most supported military solutions to the conflict. This has led Asanga Tilakaratne, head of the Department of Buddhist Philosophy in the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies in Colombo, to remark that "the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists are... opposed to any attempt to solve the ethnic problem by peaceful means; and they call for a 'holy war' against Tamils". It has been argued that the absence of opportunities for power sharing among the different ethnic groups on the island "has been one of the primary factors behind the intensification of the conflict." Numerous Buddhist religious leaders and Buddhist organizations since the country's independence have played a role in mobilizing against the devolution of power to the Tamils. Leading Buddhist monks opposed the devolution of power that would grant regional autonomy to Tamils on the basis of the Mahavamsa worldview that the entire country is a Buddhist-promised land that belongs to the Sinhalese Buddhist people, along with the fear that devolution would eventually lead to a separate country.

The two major contemporary political parties to advocate for Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism are the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), or "National Heritage Party,"  the latter of which is composed solely of Buddhist monks. According to A. R. M. Imtiyaz, these groups share common goals: "to uphold Buddhism and establish a link between the state and religion, and to advocate a violent solution to the Tamil question and oppose all forms of devolution to the minorities, particularly the Tamils." The JHU, in shunning non-violent solutions to the ethnic conflict, urged young Sinhalese Buddhists to sign up for the army, with as many as 30,000 Sinhalese young men doing just that. One JHU leader even declared that NGOs and certain government servants were traitors and should be set on fire and burned due to their opposition to a military solution to the civil war. The international community encouraged a federal structure for Sri Lanka as a peaceful solution to the civil war, but any form of Tamil self-determination, even the more limited measure of autonomy, was strongly opposed by hard-line Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist groups such as the JVP and JHU, who pushed for the military solution. These groups, in their hard-line support for a military solution to the conflict, without any regard for the plight of innocent Tamil civilians, have opposed negotiated settlements and ceasefire agreements, demanded that the Norwegians be removed as peace facilitators, demanded the war be prosecuted more forcefully, and exerted influence in the Rajapaksa government (which they helped to elect), resulting in the brutal military defeat of the LTTE with heavy civilian casualties. The nationalist monks' support of the government's military offense against the LTTE gave "religious legitimacy to the state's claim of protecting the island for the Sinhalese Buddhist majority." President Rajapaksa, in his war against the LTTE, has been compared to the Buddhist king Dutthagamani by the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists.