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Battle of Shire

The major and decisive war at the Shire front began on 28/12/88 with offensive operation of the 604th Core Army of the government and was con­cluded on 19/2/89 with the victory of the TPLF forces. The main battles were fought in four successive stages. During the first two stages the 604th Core launched offensive campaigns named Axum operation One and Two, while the third and fourth stages of the war at Shire were the time when the rebels launched offensive operations against the concentrated government forces at selekhlekha and Shire. But these were preceded by the government’s campaign to Adi Hagaray.

Axum Operation One

Axum Operation One was a joint operation between TRA and SRA (Sec­ond Revolutionary Army) and took place between 28/12/88 and 31/12/88 and its mission was to open the Shire-Asmara road so as to get a supply line to government forces deployed in and outside Shire. The 9th and the 16th army division were assigned to carry out the mission. On the other hand the 10th army division ofSRA and two additional brigades were deployed to launch an offensive operation from Rama. The government is also known to have rede­ployed 4000 prisoners of war which the TPLF had set-free a few weeks before the governments campaign.

On 28/12/88 the 16th Army Division was able to move forward up to about 12 km away from Chilla. However, on 29/12/88 this division was seriously attacked by the rebel forces and returned to selekhlekha after two days. Worse was the case of the 9th Army Division. It suffered from serious damages where according to the government report, it returned to selekhlekha on 31/12/88 with only 800 soldiers out of the 8,000 troops it had before the battle. The govern­ment then sent 2400 conscripts and the 103rd Commando Army Division with its four brigades from Mekelle to Shire. At the same time the 17th Army Divi­sion with its three brigades from Gondar and two additional brigades from Wello were sent to Mekelle.

The lifting of the 17th Army Division from Gondar reduced the defensive capacity of the 603rd Core Army and made the Gondar region vulnerable to rebels’ offensive. As the TPLF knew the government position in that direction it launched an offensive operation against the 603rd Core on 1/1/89 and having destroyed government forces stationed at Dabarq, Dabat, Gadebyu, Wugen and the surrounding area controlled the towns of Dabarq and Dabat on 3/1/89. During the war between the two forces, the people aligned with the TPLF and inflicted serious damages on government forces.

Axum Operation Two

After the failure ofAxum Operation One the TRA transferred its forward Headquarters from Mekelle to Shire. The Operation was planned to launch an offensive from selekhlekha and control the supply line, Axum-Rama-Asmara road.40 According to government reports TPLF forces deployed in the May Brazio-Aqab se’at front (8/2/89-9/2/89) were estimated to be three divisions, two heavy weapon companies and one division on reserve.

The government offensive operation began on 8/2/89. The 103rd Com­mando Army Division moved as a vanguard in the offensive campaign from Selekhlekha. Except for minor skirmishes with a small TPLF force, the com­mando force was able to control the road up to about 70 kms away from Axum during the first two days. However, during the evening of 9/2/89 the 1035th Brigade of the commando division retreated backwards after a fierce battle at Chila. Neither the commando division nor the 604th Core had information about this. Besides one battalion of the 1032nd brigade lost its proper direction and on its way to Zana it was besieged and completely destroyed by the rebel forces. This was again not known to the division command. During the Axum Operation Two government Mig and helicopter fighters rendered supplemen­tary operations to the ground forces.

On 10/2/89 the TPLF launched an offensive attack against the 22nd brigade of the 16th division along the Aqab se’at-May Brazio front. The core command made efforts to send reinforcement to the battle but failed because the three brigades of the 9th division which had been assigned to stay on re-serve to the core were not found in their respective positions.

At 10:45 a.m. the rebels intensifies their offensives against the 22nd brigade. The commander of the 604th Core then ordered the 103rd commando division to send one brigade backwards. But the whole division was eventually ordered to retreat backwards. Three brigades did so. The 135th brigade, however, did not receive the order and was subsequently vertically enveloped and destroyed by the rebel forces.

The rebels went on shelling the surrounding area to force the 22nd brigade to move towards the area where their combatants had taken position. The brigade on the way retreating backwards became the target of ambushed TPLF forces and was destroyed. Other government forces left their positions without orders from above. The commanders, political commissariats and military security officers tried to force them to stop retreating with “Zu-23” anti-aircraft guns but failed.

The 75th brigade of the same division was besieged while engaged in a battle on the left flank of the 103rd commando division, but was able to break the encirclement and retreat. Other reserve brigades of the 9th division retreated backwards together with the 103rd commando division. The 142nd

brigade which had been assigned to be on reserve along the right flank of the 103rd division was, however, intercepted and severely attacked by the rebels. Only one battalion of this brigade marched a long way broke the encirclement and saved itself.

During the war fought 8/2/89-10/2/89 government forces were so disorganized, that there was a breakdown in the command and control system. Almost in all directions government forces suffered from successive defeats and considerable losses in manpower and weapons. By 11/2/89 the whole force of the 604th core Army was confined Selekhlekha and Shire Endaslassie.

As the major battles of 8-10/2/89 were lost in favor of the TPLF, Legesse Asfaw, The “Overall Administrator” of Tigray fled to Addis Ababa. More interestingly enough Legesse went on commanding the TRA from Addis Ababa. In a meeting held on 14/2/89 Legesse Asfaw briefed the National Defense and Security council about government failure along the Shire frontline.

TPLF’S OFFENSIVE AND THE OFFENSIVE ON SELEKLEKHA AND SHIRE

After a comparative lull of three days (11-13/2/89) two major and decisive battles were fought at Selekhlekha and Shire. According to government reports TPLF’s forces deployed for the Selekhlekha confrontation included five divisions, two heavy weapon battalions and some zonal battalions (Zobawi

Shaleka).

On 13/2/89 when the core discovered a planned rebel offensive, it gave orders to the 16th division to station forces on a strategic hill near where its 128th brigade had taken position for it was believed to be a good way for the rebels to approach government forces. Three brigades of the 103rd commando division were put on reserve to the 4th Army Division in the Shire front. Gov­ernment reports show that despite efforts made to consolidate the defensive line, some key places in the Selekhlekha front were not strongly occupied.

During the night of 14/2/89, the TPLF forces started offensive operations along Afgh’gah, Qoyatsa and May Brazio directions. Threatened by continu­ous rebel offensives in that direction, the core commander and political officer gave orders that two brigades should move to reinforce the Agfah’gah posi­tion. However, the rebels moved through the gap created between the 4th and 16th divisions, intercepted the battalion stationed at Qoyatsa, destroyed it and managed to occupy Qoyatsa. From Qoyatsa the rebels effectively shelled the command center of the 120th brigade and controlled the Shire Afgahgah route.

While the war at the Selekhlekha was being fought at a higher degree of intensity Colonel Mengistu and some of his top government officials in Addis Ababa seemed to have understood the collapse of government forces at the Shire front and went on working out plans to save other neighboring adminis­trative regions.

Meanwhile developments at the Selekhlekha front continued to be in favor of the TPLF. The rebels launched an offensive against the 16th army division, which had been stationed in the defensive zone of Selekhlekha. During this time the three brigades of the 9th army division which had been assigned to be reservists to the 16th army division could not accomplish their mission be­cause of the closure of the Afgah’gah rout to Selekhlekha. Rather, these forces soon became targets of rebels offensive. Four brigades of this division found themselves besieged and despite fierce fighting in an attempt to break the en­circlement and re-open the Afgah’gah route they suffered from serious losses. In the afternoon of that day the rebel forces were not only quite successful in their complete control over the strategic places of Qoyetsa and the Afgah’gah chain of mountains but also started marching towards Shire.

During the war at Selekhlekha front heavy weapons and vehicles of govern­ment forces were either captured or destroyed by the rebel forces. Almost the whole command of the 16th army division was annihilated and the division came under the command of its Military Police Officer. The 9th army division too lost considerable forces including many of its brigade commanders and leading officers.

On the other hand TPLF’s control of the strategic places of Afgah’gah and Qoyatsa increased its combat capabilities because it could now easily con­trol the airport of Shire from a distance and also shell government forces sta­tioned at the hills around the town of Shire and successfully defend itself from air raids.

According to government sources except the 4th army division whose manpower was estimated to have been more than 5500(after its one battalion had been destroyed at Qoyatsa) the other three divisions were in a weak posi­tion at Shire both in terms of man power and possession of weapons. Remain­ing forces of the 9th, 16th and 103rd divisions were frustrated and disorga­nized after the successive defeats they faced earlier. Many of the companies of these divisions were commanded by the national servicemen at the battle of Shire. To make matters worse National Servicemen of the first and second batch refused to fight and requested to be demobilized because they had been brought to the battle front for only six months. Likewise the peoples militia recruited from Wello and Gondar complained that they should be released to go back to their families because they had been told by the government that they would be returned home after three months of service in the battle front.

The TPLF reported to have captured about 20,000 government troops and a considerable number of light and heavy weapons including two B.M. rocket launchers and 10 tanks. The government, on the other hand, lost many of its senior officers posted to the top level of command at the Shire front. Brigadier General Hailu Berawork and Brigadier-General Addis Agilachew TRA’s op­eration officer and commander of the 604th core respectively were killed at the battle of Shire while Brigadier-General Barata Gomoraw, Second-in-Command of the 604th core was captured by the rebels. Most of the division commanders were killed or captured by the rebels. A considerable number of the prisoners of war included the well-trained and experienced senior officers such as divi­sion commanders decided to join the TPLF forces and continued the struggle against the military government. Others were set-free and allowed to go back to government controlled territories.