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PLAN Z

Plan Z was the designation given to the secret plan for the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to make a dramatic flying visit to negotiate directly with the German leader, Adolf Hitler, at the height of the Sudetenland crisis in the late summer of 1938.

Background
Following the May Crisis war-scare in Central Europe in 1938, the British Government intensified its efforts to resolve the tension between Czechoslovakia and Germany over the largely German-speaking border regions of Czechoslovakia. With negotiations between the Czechoslovak authorities and the separatist Sudeten German Party (SdP) failing to improve the situation, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to Prague to attempt mediation. His Mission arrived in Czechoslovakia in early August but made no significant progress by the end of the month and the British Government came to the view that a direct appeal to Hitler might be required in order to circumvent the perceived hostility of the German Foreign Ministry headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop. When Lord Runciman refused to undertake that task, policy-makers in London looked for alternatives.

Development
The idea of Chamberlain himself visiting Hitler originated with the Prime Minister’s confidantes and political advisers Sir Joseph Ball, of the Conservative Party Research Department, and Sir Horace Wilson, Chief Industrial Advisor to the British Government, both enthusiastic advocates of the policy of appeasement. Policy-makers in London believed, in light of the perceived loss of face suffered by Hitler when appearing to back down in response to British and French warnings during the May Crisis earlier in the year, that further declarations of support for Czechoslovakia against a German attack were unlikely to have any impact. Hence the preference for a direct personal appeal to Hitler. The probable date for implementation - if it was decided to proceed with the plan - was 17 September. The British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Nevile Henderson, was called to London and informed of the proposal in strictest confidence on 30 August. Henderson, also a keen proponent of appeasement, expressed the view that the move could save the peace “at the eleventh hour”. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, was not involved in the initial development of the idea, as is evident from Chamberlain’s letter to his sister Ida on 3 September, in which he wrote that the secret plan under consideration was “so unconventional and daring that it rather took Halifax’s breath away”.

Continued British and French diplomatic pressure on Czechoslovakia’s President Edvard Beneš appeared to have been effective when, on 5 September, he presented the SdP with proposals, known as the “Fourth plan”, which essentially conceded demands for autonomy for the Sudetenland. However, since the SdP leader, Konrad Henlein, had received specific instructions from Hitler to avoid reaching a negotiated agreement, the SdP responded by breaking off contact with the Czechoslovak Government. A few days later, following a belligerent speech by Hitler on 12 September, paramilitary SdP units staged an uprising in parts of the Sudetenland. Action by the Czechoslovak police and army restored calm by 15 September and the SdP leadership, including Henlein, withdrew across the border to Germany.

Flying visits
When reports reached London on 13 September of an imminent German invasion of Czechoslovakia, preparations for Plan Z were immediately put in hand and the British Ambassador, Nevile Henderson, was instructed to make arrangements in Berlin for Chamberlain’s reception. He contacted the German Foreign Ministry the following morning and Hitler’s affirmative response was received later that day. Hitler’s briefly contemplated counter offer ("out of consideration for Chamberlain’s age") of travelling to London for the meeting or holding it on his official yacht, the Grille, was not pursued.



Early on 15 September, in the full glare of publicity, the Prime Minister - accompanied only by two advisers, his friend and confidante, Horace Wilson, and by William Strang, Head of the Foreign Office Central Department - flew from Heston Aerodrome in west London to Germany. At a time before the widespread use of air travel, Chamberlain’s gesture of making his first significant flight at the age of 69 in an effort to avoid the outbreak of war had a dramatic public impact via the press, on radio and, particularly, in cinema newsreels. The Prime Minister’s aircraft landed in Munich, where the small British party was joined by Henderson, who had travelled from Berlin. The group then continued by train to Kufstein in Tyrol and finally by car to Hitler’s Alpine headquarters, the Berghof, in Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden, in Bavaria, where the meeting took place. The British delegation was accommodated overnight in a hotel nearby and returned to London the following day. Addressing the cameras on arrival back at Heston Aerodrome, Chamberlain declared that he had a “frank” and “friendly” talk with Hitler and believed that each fully understood “what is in the mind of the other”. He also indicated that, after consulting his colleague in government and others, he would meet again with Hitler in a few days. “Only this time … it is his intention to come half-way to meet me. He wishes to spare an old man another such long journey.”



Over the next two weeks, the Prime Minister made two further flights to Germany. On 22 September Chamberlain, accompanied by a small group of advisers, travelled by plane to a second meeting with Hitler, on this occasion to Cologne and then by car on to Bad Godesberg - the chosen “half-way” point. In Bad Godesberg the two leaders and their respective teams were accommodated in different hotels on opposite banks of the Rhine. The following day, after tense and inconclusive meetings with Hitler, Chamberlain returned to London. He issued a statement denying the talks had reached “a complete breakdown” but it was now up to the Czechoslovak Government. Once again, the threat of war loomed large as Czechoslovakia mobilised its armed forces in response to German war preparations, France called up reservists and Britain mobilised the fleet.



Finally, Chamberlain flew back to Munich in Bavaria on 29 September. The previous day, fearing an imminent German attack on Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain again took the initiative by informing Hitler of his readiness to fly to Berlin in search of a settlement. He had in mind a four-power conference and also sought the support of Hitler’s ally, the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini. Hitler’s response - an invitation to a conference in Munich - arrived in dramatic fashion while Chamberlain was addressing the House of Commons. A note was passed along the benches to the Prime Minister who, upon reading it, announced he would be going to Munich the following day. The British delegation, including the Prime Minister, left Heston Aerodrome early the following morning. On arrival in Munich, the party travelled directly to the Führerbau, the Nazi headquarters in the centre of the city, where the conference took place. The Munich Agreement was signed in the early hours of 30 September. On his return to Heston Aerodrome later that day, Chamberlain flourished a piece of paper, signed by Hitler and himself, promising peace between Britain and Germany. Later, addressing a crowd from a window in his official residence at no. 10 Downing Street, Chamberlain declared that he had brought back from Germany “peace with honour”. He added: “I believe it is peace for our time”.

Consequences


During the initial talks at Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain acknowledged Hitler’s aim of bringing 3.5 million Sudeten Germans into Germany and signified his personal acceptance of the principle of territorial transfer, subject to the approval on his governmental colleagues.

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