User:Wellesemery/Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

Application of RICO laws
Since RICO's inception, the application of its laws has broadened resulting in several opportunities for the Supreme Court to interfere and give on specific language or instruction for how courts should handle future cases. One such issue courts have been advised of relates to foreign creditors and their ability to have RICO statutes successfully applied. In a Supreme Court slip opinion of Smigin v. Yegiazaryan (2023), Justice Sotomayor reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and specifically praised their "context-specific approach" in deciding whether or not the alleged injuries caused were domestic. Smagin also notes, "Application of the rule in any given case will not be self-evident," mandating this approach to each individual RICO case.

Further instruction on how RICO laws should be applied can be found in the Supreme Court's handling of Holmes v. Security Inventor Protection Corporation (1992). It found that since the civil statutes of RICO were based in the Clayton Act, which states that proximate causation must be shown. The Court then held, "proximate cause is required" for any successful civil claim. In a concurring opinion of Hemi v. City of New York (2010), Justice Ginsburg advised future civil plaintiffs of RICO statutes it would be helpful that "no other statutory scheme is in place to redress the injury at issue" Pierson (2013).

As the disparity between state and federal law increases, another issue in applying RICO statutes can be resolved. In Shulman v. Kaplan (2023), the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals held that a business cannot be granted relief for any injury if the business is not recognized as a legally protected business, regardless of its standing within its own state. Judge M. Smith states in his slip opinion following the ruling, "Looking at RICO as a whole, it is clear that Congress did not intend "business or property" to cover cannabis related commerce when the RICO statutes were adopted."