User:Wesiripa heman/sandbox

Mitchell Green is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, where he sits on the steering committee of the Cognitive Science program, and the Executive Committee of the Graduate School. He is Editor-in-Chief of the journal Philosophia.

Education and career
Mitchell Green earned a B.A. in Philosophy with Honors at the University of California, Berkeley (1985), a B.Phil. in Philosophy from the University of Oxford (1987), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh (1993). His first academic post was at the University of Virginia (from 1993 to 2013), where he earned the rank of Professor. In 2013 he moved to the University of Connecticut. Green has held fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Humanities Center, the Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, and the American Council of Learned Societies. He has held visiting research positions at Singapore Management University (2008), the University of Münster (2015), and was a Mercator Fellow at the Ruhr University Bochum, in the Emmy Noether Research Group (2020-21). His teaching has been recognized with the Cavaliers Distinguished Teaching Award from the University of Virginia, and the David and Joan Reed Teaching Fellowship from the University of Connecticut.

Green has developed a MOOC entitled ‘Know Thyself’ for Coursera, as well as a podcast on the Himalaya platform entitled, ‘The Unconscious: Wisdom below the Surface’. In 2023, he will launch a new MOOC on the FutureLearn platform entitled ‘Environmental Philosophy: Addressing Humanity’s Most Urgent Challenges’.

Research work
His research focuses on philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and pragmatics. He has made influential contributions to speech act theory, the evolutionary biology of communication, to the study of empathy, self-knowledge, self-expression, attitude ascription, and the epistemology of fiction. Particularly influential are his accounts of self-expression as a form of communication in which agents signal and show their psychological states,[5][6] as well as his theorization of forms of communication that do not depend crucially on communicative intentions. Green's research has been the topic of two special issues of journals: Grazer Philosophische Studien hosted Sources of Meaning: Themes from Mitchell S. Green, edited by J. Michel (vol. 96, 2019); and Organon Filozofia hosted The Origins of Meaning and the Nature of Speech Acts, edited by M. Witek (vol. 28, 2021).

Books

 * The Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press, 2021. ISBN 978-0190853044
 * Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge Routledge, 2017. ISBN 9781138675995
 * Self-Expression, Oxford University Press, 2007 ISBN 978-0-19-928378-1
 * Engaging Philosophy: A Brief Introduction, Hackett Publishing Company, 2006. ISBN 087220796X.
 * Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person, edited with John Williams, including eleven previously unpublished essays. Oxford University Press, 2007 ); ISBN 0-19-928279-X edit

Encyclopedia articles

 * Speech Acts,’ in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Orig. 2007; revisions 2014.)
 * ‘Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Language,’ in T. Crane (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021.

Highly cited articles

 * 'Perceiving Emotions', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (2010), 45-61 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00185.x
 * 'Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle, and the Expression of Psychological States,’ Mind & Language 24 (2009): 139-163. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01357.x
 * ‘Direct Reference, Empty Names, and Implicature,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 419-48 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0021
 * ‘Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content,’ Linguistics & Philosophy, 23 (2000): 435-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005642421177
 * ‘Direct Reference and Implicature,’ Philosophical Studies, 91 (1998): 61-90 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004212614842
 * ‘Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse,’ Linguistics & Philosophy, 18 (1995): 83-112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00984962
 * 'Indeterminism and the thin red line' (with N. Belnap), Philosophical perspectives 8 (1994), 365-388 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214178
 * ‘How and What We Can Learn from Fiction,’ in G. Hagberg and W. Jost (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Literature (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 350-66.