User:WhinyTheYounger/sandbox

By country

 * France: As of 2024, CHIMs are not performed in France, though there is no regulatory barrier to doing so.

Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Control Commission
Japanese Supreme Court case that ruled National Diet malapportionment was unconstitutional, but has not been complied with by the government.

Sources:

BGR Group research

 * New Republic: Scheiber 2010
 * Barbour twice vetoed a popular “tax swap” plan that would have replaced Mississippi's grocery tax with a tobacco tax; between 2004 and 2010, BGR had received over $2 million from tobacco companies. (This source also talks about the vetoes in the context of a conflict of interest )
 * Also discusses McCullough piece on Kemper Project
 * New Republic: Bullock 2012
 * BGR employees worked with Stuart Stevens to promote Sali Berisha, the former Prime Minister of Albania under whom the Albanian Civil War of 1997 broke out. Berisha won the subsequent 2005 elections that were marred by irregularities and oversaw what many critics, including former U.S. ambassador John Withers, viewed as serious degradation of Albanian democracy.
 * Politico: Meyer 2019
 * "Republican-leaning" firm
 * Sean Duffy joins after resigning from Congress, head financial services practice
 * Clients include: Comcast, Pfizer, Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, South Korea, CreditSuisse, MassMutual
 * CIC 2016
 * Bloomberg 2020
 * "BGR Group, a mostly Republican firm, and Monument Advocacy each had a 9% increase over 2018, earning $29.46 million and $8.94 million, respectively."
 * RFE 2020
 * In late 2020, BGR entered contract with Delyan Peevski, "amid accusations he is undermining democracy and inflaming corruption in the East European nation."
 * Peevski previously hired BGR in 2017 to lobby against application of Magnitsky sanctions against him (campaign led by Tsvetan Vasilev ultimately unsucessful. Vasliev wanted by Bulgaria and claimed "Peevski and former prosecutor Sotir Tsatsatov were behind the government’s campaign against him")
 * JFP 2019
 * CNN2007
 * Bush in 2007 keen to show support for al-Maliki government in Iraq; US IC had doubts of his ability to govern
 * BGR widely publicized criticisms of al-Maliki, including through mass emails, according to one Bush admin official; they promoted their client and rival to al-Maliki, former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
 * This put BGR at odds with the White House, despite close political ties
 * Allawi's account was managed by Robert Blackwell, former deputy NSAdv and a Bush envoy to Iraq who helped form Allawi's 2004 interim government
 * Newsweek2007
 * ABC2009
 * https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/10/19/promoting-serbia-for-a-price/87b2959d-003b-41fa-990d-7ca6b9ccd83c/

Text from Kemper Project:


 * The Kemper Project received an estimated $270 million in Department of Energy funds after the Southern Company's plan for the proposed Orlando Gasification Project bunked when Florida decided the state was not interested in more coal plants. These transferred funds were moved from Florida to Mississippi in December 2008, after Haley Barbour's Washington D.C. lobbying firm, the BGR Group, pushed for the reallocation. Southern Company has been a BGR client since 1999, having spent a total of $2.6 million with the firm, according to federal lobbying disclosure documents. Southern Company alleges that Governor Barbour did not help them receive any additional funding at all. The BGR Group website has deleted all connections with Southern Company from its website.

Cuba brigade crisis

 * Duffy, "Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade"
 * 67 Duffy argues it would not have caused significant controversy if it had not occurred in "the volatile political environment" of the Carter admin's 3rd year, "as the Administration's management of relations with the Soviet Union came under mounting attack."
 * Cyrus Vance said it substantially hurt the SALT II ratification process.
 * 68 Idaho Senator Franck Church traditionally blamed for excesses of the controversy — he publicized the brigade's discovery and lniked it to the senate's approval of SALT II.
 * Duffy argues that Church's actions were "only the final, consummating links in a chain of missteps" by other officials, namely, Brzezinksi, Stansfield Turner, Carter, and Cyrus Vance.
 * 69 State and IC were confused about "whether the brigade was a new phenomenon and whether it was objectionable to the US" because of inadequate intel and records of US-Soviet disputes over Cuba.
 * "The fundamental reason" the issue became such a storm was because of the political environment, the "general aura of controversy" re: Arms control and US-Soviet relations that "had put the Carter Administration on the defensive." The upshot was the image of the US as "one of painful confusion"
 * Background: 17k Soviet troops remained in Cuba following the Cuban missile crisis. US assessed that several thousand left during 1963, but was uncertain of true numbers nor what their missions were.
 * 71 the remaining troops kept a low profile and eventually Kennedy and successive administrations assumed that the Soviets had left completely. IC assumed that Soviet military advisors, sent in variously thru the 60s and 70s, were the only ones left.
 * Binder NYT 1979
 * Intel officials said that US "received indications of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba through overhearing the Russian word “brigada” in radio monitoring in 1975 and 1976"
 * 5 The Soviets were highly skeptical that the affair was primarily the result of U.S. domestic politics; they believed the administration was seeking an excuse to back away from SALT II.
 * 7 "By 1979, the Carter administration was shifting from an emphasis on building relations with the Soviets to a strong emphasis on U.S. defense." SALT II efforts faced strong opposition in the Senate.
 * 12–14 Cuba was a major concern of Sen. Richard Bernard Stone of Florida because of the political power of Cuban exiles in his state and the close relations he had with the community. He was generally very sensitive to information regarding the Soviet presence in Cuba and any policy perceived as strengthening the country's position. He was up for reelection in 1980, which made him even more sensitive to these issues. Stone was informed of a "fully armed Soviet brigade based on Cuba" by a source on the morning of July 17, 1979, as he entered the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing room.
 * 15 In a closed hearing later that day, he pressed the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, on the brigade. Brown maintained that he had no inteligence indicating an increased military presence on Cuba. Stone was not satisfied and sought further comment from Secretary of State Vance.
 * 19–20 US intelligence had mentioned Soviet military presence on the island at various points in the 1970s. Brzezinski ordered in March 1979 a review of intelligence on the Soviet forces in Cuba, in response to increased concern over Cuban involvement in the Caribbean and Central America. The NSA did not fully process all traffic intercepted from Cuba due to personnel limitations and competing priorities; in response to Brzezinksi's request, analysts did not review all intelligence. Their report subsequently noted that there was a military presence greater than previously understood. Senator Stone was informed of this conclusion, and he raised the issue in the July hearing.
 * 21 In August, intelligence satellites were successfully maneuvered to capture an exercise planned by the brigade in mid-August.
 * Oberdorfer WaPo 1979
 * https://www.deseret.com/1993/7/4/19054607/last-of-ex-soviet-combat-brigade-leaves-cuba
 * https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1979/10/15/pouring-salt-on-the-cuban-crisis
 * https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-09-12-mn-2964-story.html
 * https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-other-cuba-crisis-rocked-russia-america-23887
 * External links section?
 * Partially declassified CIA documents
 * https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-other-cuba-crisis-rocked-russia-america-23887
 * External links section?
 * Partially declassified CIA documents