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Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign
The Anti-Spiritual-Pollution Campaign was a political campaign spearheaded by conservative factions within the Communist Party of China that lasted from October 1983 to December 1983. In general, its advocates wanted to curb Western-inspired liberal ideas among the Chinese populace, a by-product of nascent economic reforms begun in 1978.

Spiritual Pollution has been called "a deliberately vague term that embraces every manner of bourgeois import from erotica to existentialism," and is supposed to refer to "obscene, barbarous or reactionary materials, vulgar taste in artistic performances, indulgence in individualism" and statements that "run counter to the country's social system" according to Deng Liqun, the Party's Propaganda Chief at the time of the campaign.

The campaign reached a climax in mid November 1983 and largely faded into obscurity into 1984 after intervention from Deng Xiaoping. However, elements of the campaign were rehashed during the "anti-Bourgeois liberalization" campaign of the late 1980s against liberal party general secretary Hu Yaobang.

Origins
The campaign against spiritual pollution can be said to have its origins in the Twelfth Party Congress held in September 1982, during which Deng Xiaoping stated his intention to continue China's march towards economic modernization and liberalization, a process that he initiated in 1978. Attempting to maintain balance between the conservative and moderate factions in the Party, Deng tempered his emphasis on continued economic development with a call to build up China's "socialist spiritual civilization" so as to preserve its socialist ideological orientation and protect it against the unwanted societal impacts of "bourgeois liberalism," which had begun trickling in since the policy of opening up began in 1978. During the Party Congress, Hu Yaobang warned that "capitalist forces and other forces hostile to our socialist cause will seek to corrupt us and harm our country," and exhorted Party members to hold true to communist ideals and discipline.

The Twelfth Party Congress also laid the foundations for the establishment of a new constitution, approved by the National People's Congress in December of the same year. The constitution rejected ultra-left ideology of the Mao era, and provided for greater protection of citizens' dignity and civil liberties, and advocated for an orderly, institutionalized and accountable system of justice. The new constitution carried significant caveats, however; it specified, for instance that citizens' freedom of privacy and correspondence were protected, except in cases where it was of interest to the state.

Following the revisions to the constitution at the end of 1982, critical academic discourse grew. Scholars called for greater respect for human dignity and freedoms, and for a reconciliation of socialist and humanist ideals. By the spring of 1983, calls for a more humanist society were reaching a crescendo, with scholars very openly criticizing the excesses of the socialist dictatorship.

Although some Chinese officials, including Deng Liqun, saw some value in the writings of the humanist intellectuals, by the June 1983, fears were growing that criticism of this nature had the potential to severely undermine the political and ideological basis for the Communist Party's legitimacy.

In June 1983, Zhao Ziyang delivered an address at the opening of the Sixth National People's Congress warning against the growing liberal tendencies in academic and artistic circles, and criticized such trends as being representative of a decadent ideology at odds with the goals of socialism. Zhao linked trends in writing and artistic circles to rising instances of crime, murder, rape, and corruption, blaming the growing crime rate on "political and ideological apathy." He called on law enforcement to commence a strike-hard campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries and criminal activities.

Following Zhao's speech, conservative Party journals began linking the recent crime wave with the scholarly discourse on humanism. The editors of Red Flag, for instance, declared that "Various kinds of crime are bound to occur where the influence of bourgeois extreme individualism...is still present. [...] If we speak of 'mercy' and 'humanism,' it will be a great dereliction of our duty...to the cause of socialism."

The Campaign
In October 1983, during the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping identified several types of individuals and intellectual trends as undermining the party's objectives. On the left, he targeted the remnant leftist ideas of the Cultural Revolution, and those who rose to power by following Lin Biao or the Gang of Four. To appease the conservative factions, he then turned to criticize intellectuals and party members who had focused their attention on questions of humanism. Deng criticized humanism as "un-Marxist", saying it "leads youth astray." Deng emphasized the need to combat "spiritual pollution" brought about by liberalization.

Although Deng attempted to warn Party comrades against taking extreme measures to rectify problems on the right or the left, almost immediately after the speech, the state-run press began publishing shrill attacks on the bourgeoisie liberal ideas of humanism, and condemning the spiritual pollution that such liberal influenced engendered. Deng Liqun, a prominent conservative in the party, was rumored to have been behind the attacks on humanism and spiritual pollution.

Spiritual pollution was described as taking many forms, including but not limited to excessive individualism, an obsession with money, the practice of "feudal superstitions", and the proliferation of pornography. Western hairstyles, clothing, and facial hair were also criticized as being symptomatic of spiritual pollution.

In December 1983, less than two months after the campaign began, Deng Xiaoping intervened to end the campaign against spiritual pollution.

The Intellectual Aspect: The Debate on Humanism and Alienation
The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign came as a response to an unprecedented public intellectual discussion that heated up in the early 1980s on the question of "alienation" and "humanism".

Context
Humanistic thoughts had long been sidelined by the official discourse in the post-1949 China. As early as in the 1940s, in the Yan'an Rectification Movement, Mao had criticized the idea of what he called "theory of human nature (人性论)" and "love of human (人类之爱)" manifest in the literature by arguing that not until the elimination of class, there can never exist such "all-inclusive love" among human, which is merely an idealistic notion that denies class distinction and speaks for the bourgeoisie. Fifteen years later, starting in another ideological mass campaign that began in 1957, different critiques that had a humanistic tinge among which most noticeable "On Human Nature (论人性)" by Ba Ren (巴人) and “On 'Literature is the Study of Human'” by Qian Gurong (钱谷融) also incurred criticism from the party with the accusation that their advocacy of humanity as the center of literature creation is, again, agitating for "the individualism of the bourgeoisie".

Criticisms on this line didn't cease to emerge until the end of the Cultural Revolution when the public sphere began to reflect on the suppression of human dignity not only in the Cultural Revolution but also throughout the past few decades of socialist experiments. As Wang Jing argues, “What was remembered was not only personal wounds inflicted upon each individual by the Revolution and the Gang of Four--a cliche that outlived its appeal by the mid-1980s--but also the repressed memory of the early history of Marxism, specifically, the humanist epistemology of the young Marx epitomized in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” :10 A public intellectual debate, as part of a larger movement of cultural reflection, had thus heated up. It was estimated that from 1980 to 1982, there emerged on newspapers 400 plus articles discussing the question of humanism.

The debate emerged at the time when there were three strains of Marxists as identified by Bill Brugger and David Kelly. There were "orthodox Marxist-Leninists," commonly found among power holders in the high establishment; "revisionists," widely regarded by the West as reformists or progressives; and the young humanist Marxists, recognized by a continuously critical voice. : 45 All of them, while facing external challenge from the liberals, also experienced internal ideological fragmentation inside the broader Marxist framework : 4, which was in dire need of an "overall guiding ideology," : 139 hence the room for the stirring of humanism.

Central Issues Contested
The debate can be roughly divided into two lines of thoughts between what is often referred in Western academia as “the alienation school” represented by Wang Ruoshui (Chinese: 王若水) and Zhou Yang (Chinese: 周扬), and the official discourse represented by Hu Qiaomu (Chinese: 胡乔木), then the member in charge of ideological micro-management in the Central Politburo.

While the two sides both mainly presented their arguments through interpreting original texts by Marx or Engels, they offer two different distinctly views on the continuity of Marx’s works. One source that the alienation school often cited was the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in which Marx developed the theory of alienation, but this work is often regarded by the anti-humanism side as a immature work by Marx, whose theory of alienation later developed into the theory of surplus value, and is therefore not creditable as Marx’s own thoughts. The anti-humanism school thus claimed that there is an epistemological break between the young and the old Marx that undermines the authenticity of the other side's reference to Marx as a whole. : 175

"Point of Departure"
One of the core questions at the center of the debate is which is the "point of departure" for Marx--humans or social relations? This line of arguments started with Wang Ruoshui’s assertion that “man is the starting point of Marxism” in one of his signature works. For Wang, as long as the man being [endorsed] here is a “realistic, social, practical” man--that is, one as a member of a given class in a class society, as opposed to the over-generalized, abstract men in a Feuerbachian sense whose class distinctions are ignored--Wang’s conception of Marxism would stand. Hu Qiaomu, in opposition to this idea, argued instead that “social relations” rather than “abstract human” should be the starting point. For Hu, the clarification from the humanist Marxists regarding human as “practical human” is still invalid, for as long as one needs to explain human as “a practical man who engage in real-life activities,” one has to start from one’s concrete “social relations” rather than “man” itself. Yet for Wang, not all social relations are “the realization of human essence”--those that are alienated are not. Wang also challenged the specious dilemma Hu has artificially created--that is, one has to choose between either choose social relations or humans as the "point of departure," which Wang believes can co-exist in a dialectically united manner.

Based on Wang's argument, Bill Brugger and David Kelly, in their Chinese Marxism in the Post-Mao Era, interpret it as the idea that "A marxist view of human nature should be not pre-social in the manner of the social contract theorists but trans-social" : 161. According to his view, they add, "we do not come into the world as persons with God-given rights or as utility-maximizing packages," but "with propensities for self-realization and for the achievement of a society where that self-realization may flower"--"the datum of progress is ass teleological as it is deterministic" : 163. This interpretation is supported by Wang's own words:"What is 'self-realization'? To explain this, we must first understand ... 'potential' and 'realization.' This ... can be traced back to Aristotle: in modern times Hegel ... explained it .... The challenge and development of things are a process from 'potential' to 'realization'; or, in other words, from possibility to reality. Egg is egg, and chicken is chicken. How can an egg become a chicken? ... The [fertilized] egg ... itself contains the internal cause for becoming a chicken. Therefore, an egg is a 'potential' chicken, while a chicken is a 'realized' egg. : 163-164"

Reconcilability with Marxism: Humanism as Comprehensive Worldview or Merely Ethics?
Another central question is to what extent are Marxism and humanism reconcilable. For Wang and Zhou, Marxism is not equivalent to humanism but it includes the latter; for Hu, the two are distinctively different. At the center of Hu’s argumentative framework is a dichotomy he created between humanism as a “historical, world outlook” and humanism as a system of “ethical principles and moral codes”. While the former is “fundamentally conflicting” to Marxism, the latter, in so far it is based on the historical materialist framework of Marxism, can be regarded as a “socialist humanism” that can be accepted and popularized. Wang, again, vehemently opposed such artificial dichotomy. For Wang, “humanism is essentially a set of values,” one that cannot be separated from worldview and one whose task, beyond that of a worldview, is to make value judgement of the world for the sake of transforming it, rather than merely an interpretation.

Essentially, according to Bill Brugger and David Kelly's reading of Wang, it is this "need for humans to transform society according to human ends" that qualifies humanism to be not necessarily an idealistic worldview. Wang drew from examples of various Western thinkers ranging from Thomas More to John Locke, all of whom shared an idealistic worldview and recognition of humanism, to argue "humanism takes on different forms in different kinds of society" but "there is a humanism in general". He classifies these theorists as materialists, however, according to their "recognition that humans were the products of society", and as humanists as well because of their "conclusion that society had to be changed as a consequence" : 162-163. Ultimately, Marxism and humanism are compatible for Wang in the sense that there is no necessary linkage between humanism and idealism both as worldviews; humanistic can be a worldview that is materialistic as well.

Alienation
When it comes to alienation, the central question becomes to what extent can this concept be applied--in particular to a socialist society. Hu, again, created a dichotomy between alienation as a “basic principle,” “theory,” and “methodology,” and alienation as “a concept that reflections certain phenomenons in a certain historical periods”. While Marx rejects the former definition, Hu argues, he uses the latter also in a very limited sense, referring only to a society with intense class antagonism, in particular a capitalistic society. Therefore, according to Hu, alienation can never exist in a socialist society, and the growing application of such concept to certain phenomenons in society is merely an abuse.

In sharp contrast, both Wang and Zhou believe that even though “a socialist society is much superior to a capitalist one,” alienation can also happen in a socialist society. More specifically, both of them acknowledged the existence of three sorts of alienation--intellectual, political, and economic. Intellectually, alienation is manifest through people’s cult of Mao in the previous era, which runs the risk of being dogmatic and detached from the popular masses; politically, the ever-growing state apparatus is susceptible to the corruption, turning from “the servants of society into the masters of society”, a prospect that Marx and Engels warned against; economically, the state’s well-meaning attempt to enhance economic growth, while disobeying “objective economic laws”, can also be dangerous and counterproductive in a long term.

Speaking of possible remedies, Zhou concluded that the origin of alienation is not the socialist system (制度, Zhidu) but merely certain problems within the “establishment” or “institutional structure” (体制, Tizhi), which he called for reform.

Significance and Legacy
In Brugger and Kelly's conception, the critical elements within the alienation school's theories "have played an important historical role" : 169 and that "humanism was in fact taking a new turn in Wang Ruoshui's hands". : 165 In Wang's vision, the notion of freedom was "no longer a utopian vision to be realized in the far-off future state of communism," but had come to resemble the democratic institutions of Western countries, a more concrete goal that can be strived for in the present. : 165 Since roughly 1985, Wang "has increasingly made him sound like a champion of bourgeois constitutionalism" through close analysis of young Marx. : 5 Because of the ideological undertone his view has, Wang came to provide an "important intellectual support" for students who participated in the pro-democracy demonstrations in late 1986 and early 1987. : 5

More broadly, for Brugger and Kelly, the party's silencing of the humanist discourse--as represented by the launch of the campaign and the hardline tone set by Deng's and Hu's speeches--embodied the loss of the last chance for a "genuinely critical Marxism" : 5 to flourish in China and, in other words, for the Party to construct an orthodox interpretation of Marxism as well. : 169 Had the Party adopted and re-packaged it as the official ideology, Brugger and Kelly argue, it could have avoided the occurrence of another "series of abortive mass campaigns" such as the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign, all of which resembled the destructive, counterproductive movements of the past. : 5

Limitation and Critiques
Zhou Yang's view that the presence of alienation shows merely a malfunction of socialism rather than the inherent shortcoming of the system itself became one of the major targets of critiques from later scholars. In her High Cultural Fever, Wang Jing criticized Zhou’s “failure to critique alienation from within”. :18 For Wang Jing, the fact that the alienation school remains theoretically limited stems from their belief that “de-alienation could be achieved simply be resorting to the objective emancipatory means implemented by a revitalized socialist system and an enlightened Party leadership,” (18) while in fact, as Wang Jing suggests, the party which has the monopoly over the materials and course of production might be the real problem (17).

The alienation school’s approach also faced challenge from David Kelly, though on a more positive note. For Kelly, who wrote as early as in 1987, there seemed to be a “moral conviction” among intellectuals like Wang Ruoshui to develop within the framework of Marxism itself a remedy to the calamities in the fanatical periods of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Wang Ruoshui’s focus was therefore more on “values rather than institutions” with the demands he made “designed to minimize conflict with the four basic principles”.undefined

清除精神污染是[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A 中国共产党]的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BF%9D%E5%AE%88%E6%B4%BE 保守派]人士在1983年发起的政治运动，主要针对文艺界、思想界. 目的是抵制下列行為：在[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A4%BE%E6%9C%83%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9%E7%A4%BE%E6%9C%83 社會主義社會]中找到[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%A9%AC%E5%85%8B%E6%80%9D%E7%9A%84%E5%BC%82%E5%8C%96%E8%AE%BA 异化]現象、倡導[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BA%BA%E9%81%93%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89 人道主义]、接受非[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%A6%AC%E5%85%8B%E6%80%9D 馬克思]經濟理論、提倡藝術美學的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1%E4%B8%BB%E7%BE%A9 自由主義]傾向. “清除精神污染”是社會主義異化論風波的發展和深入 ，標誌著[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E5%A4%A7%E9%9D%A9%E5%91%BD 文化大革命]後出现分化的政治思想及文化各派別的緊張關係. 簡稱“清污”的清除精神污染运动的政治活動，著重在相關政治理論等作品是否能送审通过的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%AE%A1%E6%9F%A5%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6 言論审查]上；而處理「什麼該清、什麼不該清」的政治過程，後來也影響到中國共產黨內部各派別的爭論，和對[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%83%A1%E8%80%80%E9%82%A6 胡耀邦]處理手法的評價.

背景與時代意義：文革後的思想解放及限制
清除精神污染標誌的是[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E5%A4%A7%E9%9D%A9%E5%91%BD 文化大革命]后在共產黨內部的短暫的思想及意見自由解放後再次受到言論檢查的內部處理，後在也影響了在1989年[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%AD%E5%9B%9B%E9%81%8B%E5%8B%95 六四運動]中對[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A8%80%E8%AB%96%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1 言論自由]的要求，其中六四運動學生的訴求就包括要批判1983年的清除精神污染運動，並讓中國公民能夠享有出版非官方媒體的自由並中止對媒體的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%A8%80%E8%AB%96%E6%AA%A2%E6%9F%A5 言論檢查].

思想解放
[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E5%A4%A7%E9%9D%A9%E5%91%BD 文化大革命]后，中国大陆社会出现了一段思想解放时期. [./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8D%81%E4%B8%80%E5%B1%86%E4%B8%89%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%A8%E6%9C%83 十一屆三中全會]確立以經濟建設為中心，“解放思想”和“實事求是”的指導思想，要求 “多方面地改变同生产力发展不适应的生产关系和上层建筑，改变一切不适应的管理方式、活动方式和思想方式，因而是一场广泛、深刻的革命”. 政治、經濟指導思想上的鬆動帶來了文藝、新聞、理論界的相對自由. 对文革的反思（“[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BC%A4%E7%97%95%E6%96%87%E5%AD%A6 伤痕文学]”）与对自由的宣扬成为了一种社会思潮.

文藝界
当时流行的“伤痕文学”意為批判过去极左路线给人们心灵、家庭、社会所造成的伤痕. 《苦恋》是伤痕文学中高层次的代表作，是军人作家白桦写的一个电影剧本，发表在 1979年9月出版的文学刊物《十月》上，後翻拍為電影. 主人公在文化大革命中更备受折磨. 他女儿在逃亡國外前曾反问父亲：“您爱这个国家，苦苦恋着这个国家，可这个国家爱您吗？”主人公无法回答，以“一个硕大无比的问号”為劇終.

新聞界
此时的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E6%97%A5%E6%8A%A5 人民日报]是以[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%83%A1%E7%BB%A9%E4%BC%9F 胡绩伟]为社长的中共改革派的阵地. 胡绩伟从1979年开始，他就黨報應該堅持“党性”還是“人民性”的問題提出了一系列的看法，认为“人民性高于党性”、“党性来源于人民性”、“没有人民性，就没有党性”.

1980年8月15日，人民日报发表作者名为「汝信」的文章《人道主义就是修正主义吗？——对人道主义的再认识》，对所谓的“人道主义”给予肯定. 这篇影响力较大的文章发表后，人道主义成为了一个学界经常讨论的话题.

理論界
以[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%89%E6%98%8E%E6%97%A5%E6%8A%A5 光明日报]1980年10月連續三天登載的若干政治改革文章為例，知識份子開始可以發表敏感尖銳的政治改革建議. 如严家其《改革政治制度，需要研究政体问题》，吴明瑜《研究世界政治是改革的需要》，鲍彤《对官僚主义的认识不能停留在过去的水平上》.

有限度的思想解放
尽管解放思想成為改革方向，但是解放程度依舊是在控制之下. 如在1979年理論務虛會上的过激言词，西单墙引发的群众情願後，鄧小平發表了《坚持[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%9B%9B%E9%A1%B9%E5%9F%BA%E6%9C%AC%E5%8E%9F%E5%88%99 四项基本原则]》的长篇讲话，同時逮捕異見人士[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%AD%8F%E4%BA%AC%E7%94%9F 魏京生]. 在[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B3%A2%E8%98%AD%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6 波蘭事件]後，1980年12月中央工作会议接受了“缓改革”的建议. 在经济改革中，坚持计划经济，坚持“指令性计划”，一些坚持“商品经济”看法的经济学家受到批评，同時加强了对意识形态的控制. 突出的事例是对《苦恋》的批判和对青年诗人[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8F%B6%E6%96%87%E7%A6%8F 叶文福]的批评. 1981年1月23日，[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%83%A1%E4%B9%94%E6%9C%A8 胡乔木]在中国社会科学院的讲活中開始批評胡绩伟的“黨性和人民性”的言論，成為了清除精神污染運動前奏. 当时高压环境下，流行歌曲也被成为“靡靡之音”的“黄色歌曲”. 1982年，人民音乐出版社还专门出版了一本名为《[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%80%8E%E6%A0%B7%E9%89%B4%E5%88%AB%E9%BB%84%E8%89%B2%E6%AD%8C%E6%9B%B2 怎样鉴别黄色歌曲]》的小册子.

清除精神污染的活動主要是以審查制度的批評及執行為主，主張取消審查制度的被視為是鼓勵不當的精神污染，而清除所謂精神污染的作法都是以內容審查後不予發表或演出的方式進行. 在稿件是否能刪改通過審查發表於[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%A7%E5%88%8A 內刊]，成為清除精神污染的主要工作.

运动的酝酿
1983年3月7日，[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%91%A8%E6%89%AC 周扬]纪念马克思逝世一百周年学术报告会上发表题为题为《关于马克思主义的几个理论问题的探讨》的演讲稿，该演讲稿实为[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E5%85%83%E5%8C%96 王元化]、[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%8E%8B%E8%8B%A5%E6%B0%B4 王若水]、[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%A1%BE%E9%AA%A7 顾骧]三人起草. 第二天，报告会组织方突然要求延长两天，理由是中宣部有反对意见. 之后的两天会议中，出现4个针对周扬的批判发言. 3月10日，中共当时的意识形态主管[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%83%A1%E4%B9%94%E6%9C%A8 胡乔木]到周扬家谈话，夏衍、贺敬之、郁文、王若水等在场. 胡乔木当场未有对文章发表批评意见，但实际上回去后对他人提出他的异议.

并不知情的王若水等人，认为胡乔木没有反对意见. 于是1983年3月16日，[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%91%A8%E6%89%AC 周扬]的文章在人民日报发表，当天中宣部长[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%82%93%E5%8A%9B%E7%BE%A4 邓力群]批评王若水不应该发表文章.

3月26日中宣部会议上，邓力群宣读宣布中宣部为《人民日报》刊登周扬文章一事给书记处的报告，认为文章错误的主要负责人是周扬、秦川、王若水三人. 报告决议应该组织力量，撰写“学术讨论会上持不同观点的文章”，要求将王若水调出《人民日报》，批评周扬的不负责态度. 会议上，周扬与胡乔木直接发生言语冲突. 经过此会，胡乔木实际上清除了文革以来《人民日报》内的改革派，控制了《人民日报》.

在之后的几个月里，胡乔木、邓力群与周扬、秦川、王若水多次争辩，未有结果. 4月20日，胡乔木、邓力群曾把反对周扬文章的研究材料上报中共中央书记处，受到[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%83%A1%E8%80%80%E9%82%A6 胡耀邦]的阻拦. 胡认为，讨论应该限制在学术层面. 于是胡乔木和邓力群绕过书记处直接找[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%82%93%E5%B0%8F%E5%B9%B3 邓小平]. 在获得邓小平肯定后，二人组织批评材料. 9月7日上午，邓小平通知邓力群协助整理二中全会讲话稿，邓力群带上[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%BE%9A%E8%82%B2%E4%B9%8B 龚育之]、[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%83%91%E6%83%A0 郑惠]、[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8D%A2%E4%B9%8B%E8%B6%85 卢之超]等人为邓小平组织材料撰写讲话稿.

在中共[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%AC%AC%E5%8D%81%E4%BA%8C%E5%B1%8A%E4%BA%8C%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%A8%E4%BC%9A 第十二届二中全会]上，与会者讨论通过《中共中央关于整党的决定》，要求“同[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%B5%84%E4%BA%A7%E9%98%B6%E7%BA%A7 资产阶级]腐朽思想和制造精神污染的行为作斗争”，[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%99%88%E4%BA%91 陈云]发表了“不搞精神污染”的讲话. 会议的最后一天10月12日上午，邓小平使用之前邓力群准备的讲话稿《党在组织战线和思想战线上的迫切任务》，特别提出“思想战线不能搞精神污染”. 下午的会议上，邓力群、胡乔木发言，批评王若水，尤其是人道主义和异化论. 为了让与会者容易理解“异化”，会议组织者从《[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A4%A7%E8%8B%B1%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91%E5%85%A8%E4%B9%A6 大英百科全书]》找到异化的内容，印发给与会者. 由于上午邓小平刚刚批评过精神污染，与会者大多对邓力群方的发言表示赞同. 之后在会议本已结束的情况下，针对“清除精神污染”的讨论会又开了2天.

运动过程及结束
1983年10月19日，报纸开始报导[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%9D%8E%E5%85%88%E5%BF%B5 李先念]在全国工会十大上的致词，其中提到职工应当“抵制和克服各种精神污染”. 10月22日《人民日报》头版头条用大字标题刊登文章《保持工人阶级本色，抵制各种精神污染》次日，《人民日报》的社论也谈到了“精神污染”.

10月24日，中央书记处发出了《转发邓小平同志、陈云同志讲话的通知》，把“不搞精神污染”提升为“清除精神污染”. 当天《人民日报》头版首要位置有两条新闻：“中共中央召开党外人士座谈会，彭真受党中央委托就整党和清除精神污染做重要讲话”、“王震在中国社会主义学院成立大会上指出，清醒认识当前思想理论战线形势，坚决防止和清除各种精神污染”.

10月25日，《人民日报》头版头条新闻《王震在两个会议上传达邓小平同志的指示，高举马克思主义社会主义旗帜，防止和清除思想战线精神污染》，提及“清污”是邓小平提出的. 其后《人民日报》上满布“清污”新闻. 由于词语使用过于频繁，以致《人民日报》排字房的“精神污染”四个字的铅字不够当天报纸排版使用.

胡乔木、邓力群以权力迫使周扬接受新华社记者采访，谈邓小平反对“精神污染”问题的看法的方式，检讨自己的错误. 1983年11月6日，此采访发表，不久后周扬病重入院.

清除精神污染主要在理论界和文艺界中进行，在该运动中，很多[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%96%87%E8%89%BA 文艺]作品遭到批判. 最重要的一部作品是[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%99%BD%E6%A1%A6_(%E4%BD%9C%E5%AE%B6) 白樺]的《[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%8B%A6%E6%81%8B%E9%A3%8E%E6%B3%A2 苦戀]》（又名《太陽與人》）.

在清污运动中，[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A7%91%E5%B9%BB%E5%B0%8F%E8%AF%B4#.E7.A7.91.E5.B9.BB.E5.9C.A8.E4.B8.AD.E5.9B.BD 科幻小说]在行政上被定性为 “精神污染”，受到直接正面的打击. “资产阶级自由化思潮和商品化的倾向，正在严重地侵蚀着我们的某些科幻创作”. “极少数科幻小说，已经超出谈论‘科学’的范畴，在政治上表现出不好的倾向”. [./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%92%B1%E5%AD%A6%E6%A3%AE 钱学森]曾多次表示，科幻是个坏东西，因为科学是严谨的，幻想却没有科学的规范. 出版管理机关多次发文禁止刊发科幻小说，相关杂志纷纷停刊整顿.

在活动的高峰期，《[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%9E%AD%E6%9C%9B 瞭望]》周刊封面因为刊登世界冠军的女子体操运动员在高低杠上的动作，在一些地方当作“黄色照片”被收缴. 有地方将一岁小孩不穿衣服的照片定性为“淫秽照片”.

11月14日，胡耀邦、赵紫阳在中央书记处对“清污”正式发表讲话，提出限制清除精神污染. 1983年11月中旬的一个晚上，时任中国青年报社社长的[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BD%98%E4%B8%96%E5%85%89 佘世光]拜访胡耀邦，谈及“清污”现状，胡表示担忧. 佘世光回报社后立即布置撰写评论员文章《污染须清除，生活要美化》，11月17日刊登. 此社论及后来的数篇文章，对清除精神污染运动提出批评. 从10月12日到11月17日，清污运动的高潮期持续了27天. 12月20日，胡耀邦在中央书记处会议上总结，称邓小平的清污决定是对的，但是在下级执行时出现了偏差. 12月31日，中共中央发出《关于在清除精神污染中正确对待宗教问题的指示》. 这实际上标志着“清除精神污染”运动的结束.

鄧小平談為什麼要進行清除精神污染
1983年10月12日，在中共十二届二中全会上，邓小平作了题为《党在组织战线和思想战线上的迫切任务》的讲话. 邓小平在讲话中说：

影响

 * 胡乔木等人并没有罢手，1984年1月3日，胡乔木做题目为《关于人道主义和异化问题》演讲，主题同样是批评周扬等人，此内容之后在《人民日报》发表.


 * 胡績偉于1983年10月，向中央提出了辞去《人民日报》社长职务的请求.


 * 胡耀邦在“清除精神污染”运动过后，继续在不同场合如接洽日本外宾时提及运动的过度扩大化，引起邓小平的不满，更得罪陈云等保守派. 1986年邓小平开始认为“如果说这几年我有什么错误的话，就是把胡耀邦这个人看错了. ”胡耀邦最终在[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8F%8D%E5%AF%B9%E8%B5%84%E4%BA%A7%E9%98%B6%E7%BA%A7%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1%E5%8C%96 反对资产阶级自由化]运动中下台.

评价

 * 作家[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B7%B4%E9%87%91 巴金]在“清除精神污染”运动爆发后惊呼：“‘文革’又来了！”
 * 运动开始之初，坊间流传一句顺口溜：“精神污染是个筐，什么都往里面装. ”以此讽刺运动从“不能搞”变成“清除”，波及社会经济和百姓生活爱好.
 * 陈洁在[./https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%85%89%E6%98%8E%E7%BD%91_(%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD) 光明网]上发文，表示“清除精神污染”运动使刚刚蓬勃发展的中国科幻作品一蹶不振. 他说：“1978年，其兴也勃，1983年，其亡也忽. 虽然1980年代后期，新一代科幻作家开始成长，并时有佳作，但再也没有恢复到1978年的 ‘举国繁荣’，直到今天”.

Progressive Confucianism
Progressive Confucianism (Chinese: 进步儒学; pinyin: jìn bù rú xué) is a term of philosophy coined by Stephen C. Angle in his book Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: Toward Progressive Confucianism (2012). Progressive Confucianism refers to a contemporary approach of Confucianism that aims to promote individual and collective moral progress. Progressive Confucianism explores themes such as political authority and legitimacy, the rule of law, human rights, civility, and social justice and bears similarities with other contemporary “progressive” social and political movements.

Origin
In 2012, Stephen C. Angle, Professor of Philosophy and Mansfield Freeman Professor of East Asian Studies at Wesleyan University, first put forward the idea of Progressive Confucianism. Angle's conception of Progressive Confucianism is built upon the 20th-century intellectual movement of New Confucianism.

New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan's notion of "self-restriction" (Chinese: 自我坎陷) had a profound influence on Angle, who shares Mou's commitment to liberal democracy and builds upon Mou's idea to develop a framework that goes beyond New Confucianism. Mou Zongsan did not speak concretely on human rights. Progressive Confucianism upholds human rights and promotes gender equality, thus pushing forward the anti-oppression and anti-authoritarian regime established by New Confucianism.

Progressive Confucians reject the label of "liberal" Confucianism. As a school of Confucian political philosophy that shares some liberal values, Progressive Confucianism goes beyond a hybrid of Confucianism and liberalism. People who argue against liberalism in China for the reason that liberalism was not originated in Chinese may find Progressive Confucianism appealing. Accordingly, Progressive Confucianism is able to reach a wider audience than "liberal" Confucianism: both an international audience who cares about Chinese culture and a Chinese audience for internal criticism.

Progressive Confucianism is a continuation of the Confucian tradition and it accepts the challenges posed by contemporary society. Political theorist Leigh Jenco characterizes Progressive Confucianism as something that does not stay at the level of "a disingenuous 'discovery' of [liberal] values in early texts such as Mencius," what Angle and other Progressive Confucians intend for is to "'reconceptualize popular authority in ways that both reflect, yet critically reconstruct, certain Confucian commitments.'"

"Self-Restriction"
"Self-Restriction" (Chinese: 自我坎陷) is an essential notion Angle adopts from Mou Zhongsan to set the theoretical foundation for Progressive Confucianism. In Angle's conception, Mou identifies two kinds of reasoning, one "ethical" and "subjective," serving as "an innate moral consciousness that has the ability to directly intuit the basic moral nature of the cosmos," while the other "analytical" and "objective," operating as "a cognitive, analytical consciousness that works by distinguishing subject from object." : 27 One's morality and political values emerge from these two kinds of reasoning, respectively. Mou is concerned with the prospect that politics would be "swallowed" by morality--that is, the case the latter "analytical," "objective" reasoning, which determines one's political view, is overwhelmed by the former "ethical," "subjective" reasoning which cultivates one's personal virtue, as shown by the often occurrence in Chinese history that leaders who "claim to have highly developed moral insight" inflict upon their own moral view upon others, leading to unpleasant consequences. :24 As a check on this usurpation by morality, the notion of "self-restriction" is therefore endorsed by Mou as an approach in which ethical reasoning, aided by "a certain kind of political structure," 'restricts itself' in order to more fully realize itself, and thereby allows for an independent realm of political value to exist". : 28 In particular, as Angle explains, Mou's conception is not that "a constitution, laws, and rights are merely compatible with Confucianism, but are [rather] required by Confucianism if it is to fully realize its own goals." : 29

Rule of Law
Similar to Zhang Shizhao and Mou Zongsan, Angle is concerned that politics will be “swallowed” by morality. In the classical Confucian society of China, an over-emphasis on morality resulted in absolute moral authority, which gave rise to the oppression that prevented people from cultivating their own moral values. In order for individuals to fully live up Confucian virtues, some objective, public structures (like laws) are needed.

Angle adopts the term "self-restriction" to draw a connection between morality and the rule of law. Joseph Chan, a professor of political philosophy at Princeton University explains the idea of "self-restriction": "In the sphere of politics, rather than acting according to one’s ethical reasoning and judgment, one 'is bound by laws and works within political processes.'” Thus, Progressive Confucianism takes on the view that "Confucians must be open to, even as their virtues should seek to moderate, the contestation accompanying the world of 'politicians and lawyers.'"

Sor-hoon Tan, Professor of Philosophy at National University of Singapore points out that Confucian "ritual (Chinese: 礼)" works together with the rule of law and plays a unique role in shaping a harmonious community. Tan notes that "litigation inclines people toward selfishness by requiring them to think in terms of themselves as being opposed to others, thus undermining trust and reducing the chances of harmonious association thereafter." Contrary to laws using "coercive sanctions and punishments," Confucian ritual "operates through transformative influence." In order to achieve the harmonious state desired by Confucianism, the external rule of law and the internal regulation of rituals need to form an organic whole in guiding people's behaviors.

Human Rights
Angle's understanding of Confucian human rights is based on Zhao Tingyang's normative concept of "all-under-Heaven" (Chinese: 天下). "Viewing the world from the perspective of the world…requires us to arrive at the universal world perspective through an inclusive process, rather than universalizing a single perspective.” According to political theorist Leigh Jenco, "such human rights may not come directly or solely from prior Confucian values," thus making room for expanding Confucian virtues and protecting human rights in the Confucian background.

Progressive Confucianism and human rights open up a dialogue between China and the West. Mary Sim, Professor of Philosophy at College of Holy Cross, challenges "the connection between human rights and Western philosophy." Sim argues that a Confucian approach to human rights has both theoretical and practical importance. Compared to the western notion of the "state of nature" and "veil of ignorance" thought experiments, the grounding of Confucian human rights is in "real relationships in which we join our lives and the moral communities (beginning with the family) on which our agencies depend." This approach also "promises a fresh assessment of Western claims and priorities."

Gender and Sexuality
Unlike Mainland New Confucian scholars such as Jiang Qing, who insist that maintaining traditionally defined gender roles are fundamental to social stability, Progressive Confucianism is open to the notion that some aspects of the Confucian human role may be contingent and flexible. In "Progressive Confucianism and Human Roles," Angle criticizes one-sided or overly rigid understanding for roles and rationality because "such interpretations fail to capture crucial insights of Confucianism, and they undermine the possibility of Confucianism's playing a positive role in the modern world." Progressive Confucianism suggests that a critical and charitable reading of Confucian texts provides a basis for feminist movements and LGBT+ rights.

The fluid nature of yin-yang cosmology may support gender fluidity. Ann Pang-White, Director of Asian studies at The University of Scranton and the editor of The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, suggests that "yin-yang cosmology when appropriately understood does not necessarily support a rigid oppositional split of 'femininity/female/women versus masculinity/male/men.' Rather, since all things embrace both yin and yang, all things embody some degree of both femininity and masculinity."

At the same time, Confucianism has its own reasons to support same-sex marriage. "Based on the premise that homosexual desires are natural" and "the advancement of reproductive technology" in the modern era, Sin-Yee Chan, Professor of Philosophy at University of Vermont, contends that "homosexual couples can maintain a Confucian family."

Criticism
Criticism of Progressive Confucianism ranges from the etymological to the philosophical. Bao Wenxin, a researcher at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, argues that given the layers of meaning embedded in the Chinese word "progressive (进步)," the label of Progressive Confucianism may be a vague one. Bao points out that other than Progressive Confucianism, the term "progressive" is adopted by other schools of political philosophy, such as conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. In contemporary China, "progressive/progress" is predominantly owned by Chinese Marxist philosophy and it is a term widely used in the writing of Chinese Communist Party membership application. At first glance, Chinese readers might find it hard to tell what kind of progress Progressive Confucianism refers to. More conservative Confucians, such as Jiang Qing, push back against Progressive Confucianism's more malleable view of traditions and inclusive nature. Meanwhile, Marxists and supporters of the CCP would object to Progressive Confucianism's support for liberal democracy.