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United Nations Security Council Resolution 143 was adopted on July 14, 1960. After a report by the Secretary-General, acting under Article 99 of the Charter and a request for military assistance by the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) to protect its territory, the Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to provide the Government with such military assistance that the national security forces may be able to meet fully their tasks. The Council asked the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. Following the resolution the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC) was established to carry out the operative clauses.

The resolution was adopted with eight votes to none; France, the Republic of China, and the United Kingdom abstained.

Context
Colonized by Belgium in the 1880s, the Congo possessed plentiful mineral wealth, particularly in the southern provinces of Katanga (provincial capital Elisabethville) and Kasai (provincial capital Luluabourg). Founded 1906, the Belgian company Union Minière du Haut Katanga was given exclusive mining rights in Katanga until 1999. Following Congolese Independence on June 30, 1960, a high-level Secretariat Mission, including the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ralph Bunche, was sent to Léopoldville, the capital of the Republic of the Congo, to discuss plans for UN technical assistance.

On 11 July, 1960 Katanga proclaimed its own independence under Moïse Tshombé’s leadership. At the request of Mr. Tshombe, Belgium deployed paratroopers and strengthened its military bases in the Congo.

UN Involvement
On 12 July, 1960, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa-Vubu cabled Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold requesting military action. The cable made clear that the deployment of UN forces would counter external aggression and not "not to restore the internal situation". The Secretary General would call the Security Council to a night meeting on 13 July asking the Council to act "with utmost speed" on the request.

Debate
The two of the three operative clauses of the resolution would be subject to intense debate between the pro-Belgian Western members and the anti-colonialist third world members. The Soviet Union recognized the resolution as the minimum of an acceptable resolution. With three Soviet amendments to the Tunisian draft resolution being rejected, the resolution balanced between the two extremes.

First Operative Clause
The first operative clause called for the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. The Soviet Union, Poland, Tunisia, Ecuador, and Ceylon claimed that the Belgian deployment was an act of aggression and pressed for the unconditional withdrawal of Belgian forces. The United States representative rejected these claims. Along with Britain, France, and Italy, the US emphasized the humanitarian reasons behind Belgian intervention. Without the guarantee of law and order, the West did not expect Belgium to withdraw and saw the first clause as unnecessary.

Second Operative Clause
The second operative clause authorized the deployment of of a United Nations military force under the supervision of the Secretary-General. It would lead to the deployment of the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC) within 48 hours after the passing of Resolution 143.

First, it should be noted that it was the Secretary-General who, acting on behalf of the Security Council, would determine what those necessary steps were.18 In the person of the Secretary-General the UN was given a prominent role in managing the ongoing conflict. This would prove a crucial source of discontent in the later phases of the operation. Secondly, the UN declared that it was dealing with the Government of the Congo. Once the intra-state dimension of the conflict came to dominate the crisis, this provision would create a major obstacle. Thirdly, the Security Council ruled out any neutral assessment of the efficiency of the Congolese security forces. Instead, it undertook to provide assistance until such time as the Congolese Government deemed its security forces equal to the task. This formulation was shaped in relation to the external dimension of the Congo crisis. Once the internal dimension came to the forefront, this original formulation would pose a serious handicap. The UN’s resources were placed at the disposal of the Congolese Government, which would, however, soon become an ‘internal’ party to an intra-state crisis, and would use this provision to its own benefit in the civil war.

A strong disagreement soon emerged within the Security Council as to whether the first operative paragraph (i.e. Belgian withdrawal) depended on the second (i.e. UN guarantee of law and order). The Soviet Union, Poland,

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demonstrate the ‘imperialist’ tendencies of western policies. To this extent at least, the Secretary-General’s initiative met with little opposition. The international community was willing to ‘do something’.

‘Peacekeeping’ against foreign intervention

The original authorisation of ONUC14 came in response to official approaches by Lumumba and Kasavubu15 who made it clear that their request for aid was to counter external aggression and ‘not to restore the internal situation’.16 The ensuing resolution treated the Congo crisis as an inter-state conflict. Its first operative paragraph called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo. It identified the key problem as the unwanted presence of the troops of a member state within the territory of another independent state.17

The second operative paragraph would present considerable difficulties during the later stages of the mission: The Security Council,

2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in

consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the

Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the

efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United

Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the

Government, to meet fully their tasks; First, it should be noted that it was the Secretary-General who, acting on behalf of the Security Council, would determine what those necessary steps were.18 In the person of the Secretary-General the UN was given a prominent role in managing the ongoing conflict. This would prove a crucial source of discontent in the later phases of the operation. Secondly, the UN declared that it was dealing with the Government of the Congo. Once the intra-state dimension of the conflict came to dominate the crisis, this provision would create a major obstacle. Thirdly, the Security Council ruled out any neutral assessment of the efficiency of the Congolese security forces. Instead, it undertook to provide assistance until such time as the Congolese Government deemed its security forces equal to the task. This formulation was shaped in relation to the external dimension of the Congo crisis. Once the internal dimension came to the forefront, this original formulation would pose a serious handicap. The UN’s resources were placed at the disposal of the Congolese Government, which would, however, soon become an ‘internal’ party to an intra-state crisis, and would use this provision to its own benefit in the civil war.

A strong disagreement soon emerged within the Security Council as to whether the first operative paragraph (i.e. Belgian withdrawal) depended on the second (i.e. UN guarantee of law and order). The Soviet Union, Poland,

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Tunisia, Ecuador, and Ceylon argued that an act of aggression had occurred, and pressed for the unconditional withdrawal of Belgian forces. The US representative categorically rejected the charges of aggression,19 while the United States, Britain, France and Italy emphasised the humanitarian reasons for Belgian intervention, and held that contingency existed between the paragraphs. Unless law and order could be guaranteed, Belgium could not be expected to withdraw. In fact, the West found the first operative paragraph totally unnecessary.20 This was perhaps the first crucial moment when the strong anti-colonial voices of the Third World had overlapped with the views of the socialist bloc against the colonial powers which were for the time being backed by their strongest ally, the United States.

In the end, the resolution was passed without a clear Security Council position as to the problem of conditionality. The first operative paragraph did remain in the text. Without it, the Soviet Union would have resorted to a veto. From the Soviet perspective, this provision embodied the minimum of what it considered an acceptable resolution. On the other hand, Britain, France, Taiwan and the United States could have vetoed the resolution, had Hammarskjöld pressed for collective sanctions against Belgium. Three Soviet amendments to the Tunisian draft had already been rejected.21 The Security Council’s call to Belgium was therefore a balancing act between two extremes.

Rikhye maintains that Hammarskjöld dominated the decision-making process during the formulation of the original mandate.22 Through his efforts the major powers eventually came to agree on the somewhat ambiguous wording of ONUC’s mandate. On the one hand, to secure western support for the authorisation of the operation, Hammarskjöld insisted from the outset that the sole basis for UN jurisdiction was the request by the Congolese Government for UN assistance, and not a state of hostilities between two states.23 Hammarskjöld publicly maintained that Belgians would withdraw as soon as the UN force established law and order in their former colony. After all, Belgians had claimed that they intervened strictly because of their ‘sacred duty to protect the lives and honour’ of their fellow-citizens.24 For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the wording of the mandate alluded to the UN’s enforcement role. Both the Congolese Government and the Soviet Union had consistently accused Belgium of aggressive behaviour.25 In other words, the UN force had to do what the UN was constitutionally supposed to do against acts of aggression. Consistent with the Government’s request, ONUC had to ensure, by whatever means necessary, Belgium’s immediate withdrawal.

Consensual focus on external dimension: SC Resolution 145

The second SC resolution came within ten days of the first one.26 This resolution, too, dealt with the external dimension of the crisis. The main difference

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Questia School, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questiaschool.com

Publication information:    Book title: The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change. Contributors: EŞref Aksu - Author. Publisher: Manchester University Press. Place of publication: Manchester, England. Publication year: 2003. Page number: 102

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