User:Will.gibson23/sandbox

Pre-French colonization
Marabouts have been prominent members of Wolof society since the arrival of Sufi brotherhoods from the Maghreb in the 15th century. Their advanced knowledge of the Quran and esteemed reputation have often allowed them to act as traders, priests, judges, or magicians in conjunction with their roles of community religious leaders Additionally, because of their ability to read and write, village chiefs would frequently appoint marabouts as secretaries or advisers as a means to communicate with neighboring rulers.

The marabouts’ expanding influence in politics paired with their unique allegiance of the Muslim community eventually posed a real threat to the chiefs who had appointed them. In 1683, rising tensions between chiefs and the Muslim population led to a Muslim revolt in the Wolof kingdom of Cayor, which concluded with the installation of a marabout as Damel. In the years following the revolt, relations between marabouts and Wolof chiefs remained relatively calm until a period of militant Islam in the Wolof states in the middle of the 19th century. Militant marabouts primarily of Tukulor(l origin, called "warrior marabouts," completely rejected the authority of local chiefs and sought to install a theocratic Muslim state. As the authority of chiefs and royal armies were undermined by propaganda and military force used by the warrior marabouts, Muslim resistors turned to local marabouts for guidance and protection from their oppressors. After three decades of war and conflict, the warrior marabouts were gradually ousted from the Wolof states as French colonists began to take a tighter hold on the region. As confidence in the leadership abilities of chiefs and rulers declined as a result of the conflict, marabouts emerged as the most trusted and revered source of leadership in Wolof communities.

Post-French colonization
French colonizers had difficulties adjusting to ruling over Muslim societies. Particularly in West Africa, constructing institutions of colonial rule that didn't favor certain constituencies while neglecting others proved to be a tricky task. The French opted for forms of indirect rule through the local aristocracy in an effort to maintain order and keep administrative costs down, but found that many subjects detested these colonial chiefs and rulers and tended to gravitate towards their local marabouts. Marabouts were admired for their transparency and righteousness as they were known to renounce political powers, while ensuring economic, social, and religious stability within their communities. Since the judgment of marabouts is so influential, the success or failure of a politician would be almost entirely contingent on the support of more prominent marabouts. Because of this, politicians would try to appease marabouts by agreeing to promote their Sufi brotherhood's best interests in turn for their endorsement, with some politicians believing that winning an election would be impossible without the support of a marabout. This political dynamic, based on patronage and exchanges, would lead to a somewhat of an alliance between marabouts and the French colonizers. Along with endorsing certain politicians in exchange for favors, French colonial administrators sought out marabouts and heads of Sufi brotherhoods to act as intermediaries between colonial administrators and West African Muslims to ensure appropriate allocation of power and resources to avoid any potential conflict.

Post-independence
After Senegal gained its independence from France in 1960, marabouts and leaders of Sufi Brotherhoods (also marabouts), or the Khalife-Général, have continued to play influential roles in Senegalese politics. Some question the utility of having clientelist relationships between marabouts and government officials in a modern democracy. The new "grandson" generation of marabouts has cultivated a more independent and secular political outlook and have proven that they are willing to question the authority of their predecessors. In Senegal's 1988 presidential election, Khalife-Général Abdou Lahatte Mbakke supported Abdou Diouf for reelection. Both as public endorsement and as a reward for installing new roads and street lamps in Touba while in office, the Khalife-Général declared a ndiggël (a binding command issued by the Khalife-Général to all members of the Mouride Brotherhood) that proclaimed that all men must vote for Diouf. Although multiple Khalife-Général have issued 'ndiggël politique ' in support of a presidential candidate in previous elections, several marabouts of the "grandson" generation openly rejected the command by voting for the opposition instead. These marabouts believed that the ndiggël violated their secular political rights, which was a sentiment shared among many other Mourides in Touba.

In 1997, a rural council of Touba Mosquée in Senegal issued a set of new taxes meant to fund an ambitions development project in the holy city. City merchants promptly voiced their displeasure of the new taxes and threatened to kick the rural council, whose members were all appointed by the Mouride Khalife-Général, out of the city. Although tax revolts are not uncommon elsewhere, this incident was particularly noteworthy as the merchants' blatant refusal exhibited a departure from typical state-society relations in Senegal. Declining economic performance in Senegal will likely lead to more taxes in the future, which means political actors have to adjust or fundamentally alter their clientelist relationships with marabouts and Khalife-Général.