User:Yagasi/Sandbox

Some sources that support obligation of States to prevent genocide
 * 1) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ General List № 91, Judgment of 26 February 2007
 * 2) Dominic McGoldrick (2009). "State Identity and Genocide: The Bosnian Genocide Case". In International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice. Edited by Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Michael Bohlander. ISBN 978-90-04-17587-7
 * 3) Irwin Cotler (2011). "Combating State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide: A Legal and Moral Imperative". In Confronting Genocide. Edited by René Provost, Payam Akhavan. pp. 131–150. ISBN 978-90-481-9839-9
 * 4) Andreas Zimmermann (2011). "The Obligation to Prevent Genocide: Towards a General Responsibility to Protect?". In From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma. Edited by Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, and others. pp. 629–645. ISBN 978-0-19-958881-7
 * 5) Rivkin, David B.; Casey, Lee A. (July 26, 2015). "The Lawless Underpinnings of the Iran Nuclear Deal". The Wall Street Journal

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Islamic Republic of Iran
The U.S. and Iran cut off diplomatic ties in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution and the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, where 52 Americans were held hostage for more than a year. After Barack Obama's inauguration, he personally authorized talks with Iran in order to reach out to this country.

The FATF has been "particularly and exceptionally concerned" about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing. Iran was included in FATF blacklist. In 2014 Iran remained a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran has continued to violate its international obligations regarding its nuclear program.

Iran insists that its nuclear program is "completely peaceful and has always been carrying out under supervision of the IAEA". Some analysts argue that "Iranian actions, including the evidence of work on weaponization, the development of long-range ballistic missiles, and the placement of the program within the IRGC" indicate that Iran's arsenal is not virtual.

According to policy documents published by the Obama administration, it believes in the efficacy of traditional Cold War deterrence as the remedy to the challenge of states acquiring nuclear weapons. Another assumption of the administration is that the Iranian regime is "rational" and hence deterrable. Dr. Shmuel Bar, former Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, has argued in his research that the Cold War deterrence doctrine will not be applicable to nuclear Iran. The inherent instability of the Middle East and its regimes, the difficulty in managing multilateral nuclear tensions, the weight of religious, emotional, and internal pressures, and the proclivity of many of the regimes toward military adventurism and brinkmanship give little hope for the future of the region once it enters the nuclear age. By its own admission, the Iranian regime favors revolution and is against the status quo in the region. Shmuel Bar has characterized the regime as follows:
 * "Since its inception, it has been committed to 'propagation of Islam' (tablighi eslami) and 'export of revolution' (sudur inqilab). The former is viewed by the regime as a fundamental Islamic duty and the latter as a prime tenet of the regime’s ideology, enshrined in the constitution and the works of the Imam Khomeini. Together they form a worldview that sees Islamic Iran as a nation with a 'manifest destiny': to lead the Muslim world and to become a predominant regional 'superpower' in the Gulf, the heart of the Arab world, and in Central Asia."

A quite different approach to Iran has been proposed by The Economist:
 * "The disastrous presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the failed Green revolution—which sought to topple him in 2009—and the chaotic Arab spring have for the moment discredited radical politics and boosted pragmatic centrists. The traditional religious society that the mullahs dreamt of has receded... Although this hardly amounts to democracy, it is a political marketplace and, as Mr Ahmadinejad discovered, policies that tack away from the consensus do not last. That is why last year Iran elected a president, Hassan Rohani, who wants to open up to the world and who has reined in the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps."

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has declared on September 4, 2014 that the way forward for his regime is to ramp up its "eqtedar" (might). Ayatollah Jalal Ganje'i, a dissident ayatollah based in Paris, has explained that Iranian regime intended to achieve this by one of two ways: to expand regional influence through the export of terrorism, officially described as "export of revolution" or to develop nuclear weapons.

The fighters from Hezbollah and Quds forces have been publicly operating in several foreign territories. Iran and pro-Iranian proxies have been military involved in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and other regional nations. Iranian state TV has been showing the pictures of the commander of Quds force in foreign territories and pointing to the Islamic Republic’s indispensable power and influence in the Middle East. Iranian leaders have been attempting to reassert their power and supremacy in the region more publicly and sending the signal to other states that "Iran is in fact the sole regional power to rely on rather than the United States and Western allies." Iran has also developed a close and cooperative relationship with Cuba and Venezuela against the U.S. Having limited military capabilities and substantial distance from the region, Iran, in case of a conflict with the U.S., would be able to launch an asymmetrical offensive against the U.S. "through surrogate terrorist states and paramilitary organizations."

IAEA inspection
According to resolution 1929 and other resolutions of the UN Security Council Iran is obliged to cooperate fully with the IAEA on issues "which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA..." On 11 November 2013 the IAEA and Iran signed a Framework for Cooperation (FC) binding both parties to cooperate and resolve all present and past issues in a step by step manner. The FC initially consisted of six measures to be completed within three months, but in February and May 2014 the parties agreed about additional sets of measures. Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol which could grant the IAEA complementary authority and enable the inspectorate "to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities." Under those circumstances, the Agency reported it will not be able to provide "credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran"

The implementation of interim Geneva Accord has involved transparency measures and enhanced monitoring to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. It was agreed that the IAEA will be "solely responsible for verifying and confirming all nuclear-related measures, consistent with its ongoing inspection role in Iran". IAEA inspection has included daily access to Natanz and Fordow and managed access to centrifuge production facilities, uranium mines and mills, and the Arak heavy water reactor. These and other verification steps did not explicitly commit Iran to accept challenge inspections, but they did commit Iran to "provide increased and unprecedented transparency into its nuclear program, including through more frequent and intrusive inspections as well as expanded provision of information to the IAEA."

Thus, there have been two ongoing diplomatic tracks — one by the P5+1 to curb Iran’s nuclear program and a second by the IAEA to reveal the extent of Iran’s past nuclear activities. Iran is cooperating with one and thwarting the second. According to Blaise Misztal from the Bipartisan Policy Center, "Though these P5+1 and IAEA tracks are procedurally separate — they are being negotiated individually and the JPA does not explicitly require Iran to comply with FC, nor vice versa — they do share a legal nexus: the UNSC." Although the IAEA inquiry has been formally separate from JPA negotiations, Washington said a successful IAEA investigation should be part of any final deal and that may be unlikely by the deadline of 24 November 2014.

It is hard for the IAEA to be confident that there is not a weapons program if it doesn’t know the past and what was accomplished. The expert on Iran's nuclear program David Albright has explained that history is important since the "infrastructure that was created could pop back into existence at any point in secret and move forward on nuclear weapons."

Iranian and IAEA officials met in Tehran on 16 and 17 August 2014 and discussed the five practical measures in the third step of the FC agreed in May 2014. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, made a one-day visit to Tehran on August 17 and held talks with President of Iran Hassan Rouhani and other senior officials. After the visit Iranian media criticized the IAEA while reporting that President Rouhani and the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Salehi both tried "to make the IAEA chief Mr. Amano understand that there is an endpoint to Iran’s flexibility." The same week Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan said that Iran will not give IAEA inspectors access to Parchin military base. Yukiya Amano has noted previously that access to the Parchin base was essential for the Agency to be in position to certify Iran's nuclear programme as peaceful. Tehran was supposed to provide the IAEA with information related to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport calculations until August 25, but it failed to address these issues. The two issues are associated with compressed materials that are required to produce a warhead small enough to fit on top of a missile.

2013