User:YellowMonkey/diembin

Hue Phat Dan
The celebrations had been bankrolled by the regime of his brother Ngo Dinh Diem. This was organised through a national committee which asked the population to donate money to Thuc's jubilee. Buddhists complained that they were forced to give a month's wages to the celebration.

The order to enforce the law on the Buddhists was attributed to Thuc. Despite protestations from Ho Dac Khuong, the Saigon representative to the central provinces, the order was enacted upon consultation with Saigon. Villages in the central region had converted en masse to Catholicism, with priests allowed special access to government facilities and funds. The designation of Buddhism as an "association" prevented it from acquiring land for the construction of pagodas.

A 1958 rarely enforced law known as Decree Number 10 was invoked on May 7 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of Buddhist flags on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. The invoking official was the deputy province chief in charge of security, a Catholic named Major Dang Sy. Dang Sy was charged with maintaining public security and was commander of the Hue garrison. The application of the law generated Buddhist indignation on the eve of the most important religious festival of the year as Catholics had a week earlier been able to display Vatican flags to celebrate the 25h anniversary of the appointment of Thuc as archbishop. Thousands of Buddhist flags had already been foistered out homes and pagodas in preparation for Vesak. As a result, the authorities tore down the Buddhist flags. Thousands of Buddhists defied the ban on Vesak the following day. More than 500 marched across the Perfume River and congregated at Tu Dam Pagoda before a 3000 strong demonstration in the city centre, calling for religious equality as government security officials surrounded the area with armoured personnel carriers and civil guardsmen. The signs were in both English in Vietnamese to convey he message to western bystanders. Despite the ban on religious flags, the Vatican flags hoisted on the bridge from the Catholic celebration was never taken down. The leading Buddhist activist monk Thich Tri Quang addressed and exhorted the crowd to rise up against Catholic discrimination against Buddhism. He called the Buddhists to congregate outside the government radio station in the evening for a rally. Tension swelled throughout the day as demonstrators chanted and displayed anti-government slogans and the crowd grew. They expected to hear a speech from the Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang, but the speech was withdrawn from broadcast by the government censor. Armed forces were called in to disperse the discontented crowd. After two explosions shook the ground, the crowd thought that the troops had resorted to bombs. Dang Sy fired into the air and his men responded by launching grenades into the crowd as fire hoses were unleashed on the demonstrators. His troops fired directly into the crowd. IN the end eight had been killed and four severely injured. Two of the dead, both children, had been crushed underneath armoured personnel carriers. Some had been mutilated and decapitated.

Diem and his government alleged that a Vietcong had caused the incident by setting off the initial explosion, sparking a stampede. He initially refused to take any disciplinary action against the local authorities, claiming that they had acted properly. The government claimed that only percussion grenades had been used, not lethal fragmentation grenades. The force of the explosion case doubt on whether the Vietcong would have had access to sufficiently powerful explosive. Another conspiracy theory that was spread at the time was that a CIA agent had used high powered explosives to incite sectarian tension and destablise the Diem regime. Eyewitnesses disagreed, citing amateur footage, which showed government troops firing on the crowd. An inspection by a local doctor declared that there was no evidence of the fatal injuries being inflicted by Vietcong plastic bombs. He was subsequently jailed. Diem refused to be swayed, and ordered the bodies buried without autopsy. Thich Tri Quang spent the nide riding through the streets of Hue with a loudspeaker, accusing the government of firing on the demonstrators. US Ambassador Frederick Nolting, known for his appeasement of Diem, attempted to spread the responsibility. He said that all parties were responsible, alleging that the demonstrators had tried to take over the radio station, the government for bringing the army, which opened fire and "agitators" for throwing the explosives. When the government refused to assign responsibility, Nolting called it "objective, accurate and fair."

At 11 am on May 9, Dang Sy announced to nearly 800 youthful pro-Buddhist demonstrators that "oppositionist agitators" had forced troops to take severe measures in maintaining order in the face of Vietcong agitation. The youthful protestors showed their anger at such an improbable explanation by marching around the old citadel quarter of Hue, chanting anti-Catholic and anti-Diem slogans. A government organised counter-demonstration under the leadership of Diem's brother and political operator Ngo Dinh Nhu attracted almost nobody to meeting to condemn the "Vietcong terrorist act." Thich Tri Quang, who had travelled throughout the country protesting against religious inequality and the flag ban, began rallying the Buddhists in Central Vietnam. He called them to attend a public mass funeral for the Hue victims scheduled for May 10. Such an emotion charged spectacle would attract thousands of spectators and place pressure on Diem's regime to grant reforms. The government placed a curfew and put all armed personnel on around the clock duty to "prevent VC infiltration". A confrontation was averted when Thich Tri Quang persuaded the populace to lay down their flags and slogans and observe the nine o clock curfew. The following day, the tension increased as a corwd of around 6000 Buddhists attended Tu Dam Pagoda for the funerals and meetings. Dang Sy was present with ARVN troops and armed police keeping a close watch. Slogans and speeches calling for religious equality and anti-government sentiment were prevalent. Thich Tri Quang called on Buddhists to use unarmed struggle and follow [Gandhian principles, saying "Carry no weapons; be prepared to die. . . follow Gandhi's policies". After Dang Sy echoed Buddhist calls for compensation and expressed sorrow for the victims, the meeting dissolved without violence.

On May 10, Thich Tri Quang proclaimed a five-point "manifesto of the monks" that demanded freedom to fly the Buddhist flag, religious equality between Buddhists and Catholics, compensation for the victims' families, and end to arbitrary arrests and punishment for the officials responsible. The provincial chief himself agreed that the Diem should compensate the familese of the dead and wounded.

On May 13, a committee of Buddhist monks formalised their request to Diem for thw five demands. Although the signatories had couched the declaration in "requests" they had expectations that these would be met. On May 15, a delegation of six monks and two laymen met Diem to present the document. After the meeting, the monks held a press conference at Xa Loi Pagoda, the foremost pagoda in Saigon. It was to be the first of many in which they attempted to publicise their cause to the foreign press corps. He agreed to meet with a Buddhist delegation, but increased tension by talking down to them. Initially Diem refused to pay compensation, believing it was a sign of weakness. Diem stated that there was no discrimination in South Vietnam and claimed that all religions had been treated equally with respect to the flag issue. In regard to the classification of Buddhism as an association under Decree 10, Diem said that it was an administrative oversight that would be fixed. It was not done during the last six months before Diem was assassinated. Diem labelled the Buddhists "damn fools" for demanding something that according to him, they already enjoyed. The government press release detailing the meeting itself used the expression "damn fools".

Diem's two brothers in Hue were divided on the appropriate course of action. Ngo Dinh Can, the unofficial chief of the city, told Diem that his standing in the central region was so low that not even a cat would turn out to meet him. Can advised his elder brother to pay reparations, apologise publicly and reach out to the Buddhist majority by making appearances at pagodas. When Diem was informed of this comment, he laughed and said "my brother has lost his courage." Thuc on the other hand, urged Diem to crush the Buddhists, saying that they would come "crawling on all fours".

After the fall of the Diem regime in a coup on Novmeber 1, 1963, a trial was held under a government lead by Nguyen Khanh against Dang Sy. Some of the accusations were that Dang Sy's men had fired on the crowd and crushed the victims with armoured cars, or that the grenades had been launched at his orders and caused the deaths. Dang Sy was put under pressure to reveal that Thuc had personally given him the order to shoot the Buddhists, but he refused to testify against Thuc, who was living in exile in Rome. He was condemned to life imprisonment and ordered to compensate the victims' families. His lawyer contended that the court had been unable to establishe the nature and source of the lethal explosions. Catholic General Tran Thien Khiem, who had helped Khanh in his January 1964 coup and was Defense Minister, later claimed that Khanh had rigged the trial to gain Thich Tri Quang's support. In 1970, the Catholic newspaper Hoa Binh ran a conspiracy theory claiming that CIA agents used a secret and new explosive to foment trouble for Diem's regime which had deteriorating relations with the United States.

Early bieu tin
As the demonstrations continued, US Ambassador Frederick Nolting, known for his appeasement of Diem, managed to extract concessions from Diem after long negotiations on May 18. He agreed to make a modest compensation package of USD7000 for the families of the victims as a reconciliation gesture. Diem also agreed to dismiss Xi and those in Hue responsible for the shootings. However, the publicly stated reason for this action was that the officials had failed to maintain order, rather than their killings of the protestors. Despite this, Diem maintained that his government was not responsible for the deaths, resolutely blaming the Vietcong. It was enough to satisfy Nolting, who went on his vacation. His absence allowed the remaining Americans under William Trueheart, Nolting's deputy, to scupper his appeasement policy. Despite this, Nolting agreed with Diem in the belief that the Buddhists were communists. Nolting also suggested that Diem appoint a commission of inquiry headed by a prominent Buddhist.

The probability of reform was considered to be remote, as Diem and Nhu considered the Buddhists to be a front for promoting the cause of the Vietcong. They felt that the Buddhists supported neutralism in foreign policy and would seek an accommodation with the communists. They pointed to the gains made in Cambodia and Ceylon by Buddhism, two countries intensely disliked by the Diem regime. Both advocated a non-aligned position in the Cold War. Diem's Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan accused the Vietcong of exploiting Buddhist unrest and declared that Diem could not make concessions without fuelling further demands. The Vietnam Press, a Diemist mouthpiece, published a government declaration confirming the existence of religious freedom and emphasizing the supremacy of the country's flag. Diem's National Assembly affirmed this statement, but words alone were not enough to quieten the Buddhists. On June 1, Diem's authorities announced the dismissal of the three major officials involved in the Hue incident: the province chief and his deputy, and the government delegate for the Central Region of Vietnam. The stated reason was that they had failed to maintain order, rather than wrongdoing. By this time, the situation appeared to be beyond reconciliation.

In the meantime, Xa Loi had become a centre of Buddhist dissident organization. There the monks produced and mimeographed pamphlets attacking Diem's policies for dissemination, organised mass meetings, demonstrations and hunger strikes. They compiled daily news items to motivate followers and campaigned among relatives in the civilian public sector and the armed forces. The Hue shootings were kept on the agenda by a memorial service at the An Quang Pagoda in the Chinese district of Cholon which was addressed by prominent members of the sangha. Hundreds of sangha then formed a procession to take the memorial tablets back into Xa Loi in the city centre. On May 30, more than 500 monks demonstrated in front of the National Assembly in Saigon. The Buddhists had evaded a ban on public assembly by hiring four buses and filling up and pulling the blinds down. They drove around the city before the convoy stopped at the designated time and the monks disembarked. They unfurled banners and sat down for four hours before disbanding and returning to the pagodas to begin a nationwide 48 hour hunger strike organised by the Buddhist patriarch Thich Tinh Khiet.

On June 1, further demonstrations were scheduled in Hue and the nearby central coast city of Da Nang as rumours spread that the Buddhists would begin to adopt violent means. At 10.30 am in Hue, one contingent had gathered outsid ehte provincial chief's headquarters where a government response to the Buddhist demands was promised. Another crowd expected to reach 10,000 had begun gathering at Tu Dam pagoda. They were cornered by armed ARVN paratroopers and M-113 armored personnel carriers. They dispersed at 5.30 in the evening upon orders from the monks. In Da Nang, a prospect of a confrontation loomed when 72 members of the sangha marched towards the mayor's office in the morning. The police and soldiers armed with submachine guns surrounded them and cleared the whole area within three blocks of the protest. The standoff ended without incident.

do ga
Attention turned back to Saigon when around 500 youthful Buddhist laypeople protested in front of the Government Delegate's office while 300 troops stood by. The crowd and a government official with a loudspeaker exchanged taunts and accusations. When the official claimed that Vietcong were among the crowd and attempting to cause trouble, the troops aimed their firearms at the protestors. When the crowd taunted the soldiers as "stupid killers", they fixed bayonets and donned gas masks before charging the protestors and pelting them with tear gas grenades. Deaths and injuries were averted when a Buddhist leader urged the protestors to retreat to a pagoda and receive medical treatment from tear gas or go home. When the entrance to the pagoda was blocked with barbed wire, some protestors simply sat on the ground and continued praying. After three hours, troops wearing gas masks forcibly dispersed the crowd.

The situation was worse in Hue, where Diem had banned demonstrations and ordered his forces to arrest those who engaged in civil disobedience. At 1pm, some 1500 protestors attempted to march towards Tu Dam Pagoda in Hue. A confrontation ensued as the protestors attempted to cross the Ben Ngu bridge. Six waves of ARVN tear gas and attack dogs failed to disperse the crowds. Sound trucks boomed above the scene urging the Buddhists, primarily high school and university students who had arrived on bicycles, to go home. This was met by jeers when the government speaker blamed the trouble on the Vietcong. The worst incident cmae at 6.30 pm when the security forces dispersed the crowd by emptying vials of brownish-red liquid was doused on the heads of praying protestors resulting in 67 being hospitalised for chemical injuries. These consisted of severe blistering and respiratory ailments. The crowd responded angrily to what they suspected was the use of poison gas. The incident was a public relations disaster for Diem. Rumours circulated that three people had died, and Newsweek reported that police had lobbed blister gas into the crowd. Rumours citing reliable sources claimed that Diem was planning a military showdown.

By midnight, tensions were high as a curfew and martial law was enacted. US consul John Helble believed that the ARVN troops had used tear gas and in a report to the embassy noted that "possibly another type of gas which caused skin blisters" was used. Helble reported that the substance, although unidentified, had raised concerns by the State Department that poison gas was used since the symptoms were not consistent with standard tear gas. If this were the case, the United States told Diem that his regime must disavow the actions of the troops ad punish those responsible. If Deim did not, the United States threatened to publicly condemn and distance itself from his administration.

William Trueheart, who was in charge of the US embassy in Saigon while Ambassador Frederick Nolting was on holiday confronted Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan about the allegations of the usage of blister gas on June 4. Thuan appeared to be astounded and asked Trueheart what as blister was. Trueheart explained that the symptoms of the victims were consistent with those of mustard gas and passed on the US threat to denounce the chemical attacks. Thuan started an inquiry into the usage of chemical weapons on the protestors. An investigation attempted to exonerate the Diem regime of the most serious allegations of poison or mustard gas. It concluded that only tear gas was used. A further commission chaired by General Tran Van Don concluded that the tear gas was left behind by French colonial forces in the 1950s. These came in glass containers in the form of a liquid which was transformed into gaseous vapour upon activation by acid. The injuries were attributed to the acid failing to activate the liquid into gaseous form. US Army chemists in Maryland confirmed that he tear gas had come in canisters dating back to Frecnh World War I stocks. With the US also complaining about the use of troops in qulling protestors, the government complained that the Hue police were not trained in riot control like their Saigon counterparts. Diem's authorities requested that the Americans airlift 350 military police from Vung Tau in the far south into Hue, but the Americans refused.

hop ban truoc
Diem's response during this period began to generate disquiet among the ARVN and public servants, as well as increasing the optimism of his communist enemies. Some army officers were reluctant to repress the demonstrators since their men were predominantly Buddhist and may have revolted. Rumours of dissent in the public sector and speculation of a coup began to surface. Diem's communist opponents also took the opportunity to seize the initiative. On May 29, Ho Chi Minh announced his conditions for peace in an interview with a Soviet newspaper. He called for free elections in South Vietnam and a US withdrawal. Senior North Vietnamese communist officials authorised an intensification in their military buildup and send more cadres to infiltrate South Vietnam. In the meantime, the Vietcong had launched a major summer campaign aimed at destroying the Strategic Hamlet Program. Also in June, Mao Zedong secretly promised assistance to Hanoi, claiming "You can pay the Chinese debts whenever you are ready and it is all right even if you don't pay."

The protests escalated, with Xa Loi Pagoda, the centre of Buddhism in Saigon, being used for press conferences and organization of anti-government protests. Diem was angered by the press attention given to the monks and continued to claim that he had the support of the Buddhist community and that only a small number of Vietcong disguised as monks were causing trouble. The US was worried that the religious tension gave the impression that they were supporting a bigoted dictatorship, pressured Diem to reconcile. He reluctantly agreed on June 4 to create a government committee headed by Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho to deal with the issue and offered to meet the Buddhist leaders to discuss the five demands. The committee also included Thuan and the Secretary of the Interior Bui Van Luong. Diem's committee began meeting with Thich Thien Minh, who had been dispatched from Hue to represent the General Association of Buddhists. In the meantime Thich Thien Minh's colleagues were on hunger strike at Tu Dam Pagoda as the central city was paralysed by roadblocks and cordons of ARVN troops around the building.

At first, both sides gave ground. Diem would "remove . . all uniformed personnel from [the] vicinity of pagodas" in return for a ceasing of Buddhist demonstrations. Both sides agreed to cease criticising each other, a "standfast on propaganda". On the issue of flags, Diem pledged to allow the display of Buddhist flags on religious holidays if they were accompanied by the national flag in return for Buddhist recognition of the superiority of the national flag and its display on national holidays. Inside the pagodas, no government restrictions on flags applied. Diem said that religious equality was already "guaranteed under the constitution", but vowed to "undertake corrective action" if it could be specified where this was not occurring. Diem disclaimed responsibility for Decree Number 10, saying that it come into effect before his rule, and put the onus on the National Assembly to repeal it. He offered more compensation, but continued to disclaim responsibility for the Hue shootings. After this meeting, Thuan and the government committee met with Thich Thien Hoa, who represented the southern Buddhists. A six hour discussion produced similar results to the negotiations with Thich Thien Minh.

The agreement was announced, with Thuan stating that the troops had lef the vicinity of the pagodas and that military officials were no avoid unnecessary displays of force. On the evening of June 6, Diem delivered a radio address to the people of Hue which astonished them by calling for reconciliation and admitting that his officials had made errors. However the next day, the "standfast on propaganda" was broken when government airplanes dropped leaflets over Hue denouncing Thich Tri Quang on allegations of troublemaking and calling on Thich Tinh Khiet to control his followers. Government officials in Saigon accused "extremist monks" at Xa Loi Pagoda of subverting the truce, alleging that they had circulated tracts urging demonstrations against Diem. Diem's officials further claimed that the Buddhists were guilty of bad fiath in appealing to the International Red Cross for assistance for the fasting monks in Hue. The agreement was further undermined by Ngo Dinh Nhu, younger brother and chief advisor of Diem, who favoureda hard line. Through the National Revolutionary Movement, a government front, Nhu urged all South Vietnamese to unite behind Diem. According to his declaration, the constitution guaranteed religious freedom and only the Buddhists were seeking special treatment. His fiery wife Madame Nhu, further inflamed the situation with a strident attack through her Women's Solidarity Movement. She described Buddhist protestors as traitors "controlled by communism" and added that the government should "expel all foreign agitators whether they wear monks' robes or not". She further cautioned Diem to "keep vigilance on . . . those inclined to take Vietnam for [a] satellite of [a] foreign power". This angered the Buddhists and the US government, but Madame Nhu refused to back down, telling American journalist David Halberstam that it was "embarrassing to see people so uncultured claiming to be leaders" in reference to the Buddhist monks. When Trueheart met Diem to discuss the matter at Gia Long Palace, Washington had authorised him to renounce such comments by the Nhus if it would deter future outbursts. Trueheart told Diem that Madame Nhu had violated the propaganda truce and that the US would "disassociate" itself from Diem's regime if the comments were not condemned. Diem refused to do so, saying that the populace must know that "extremists" had exploited the problems. Diem also refused to use his presidential emergency powers vested in the constitution to repeal Decree Number 10. He was convinced that no lasting settlement was possible until the Buddhists "found themselves isolated". US Secreatary of Sate Dean Rusk was upset, cabling the Saigon embassy stating that "Madame Nhu's intolerant statement . . has greatly increased [the] difficulty of [[the] U.S. role as [a] supporter of [the] GVN [government of Vietnam]." On June 10, deceptively encouraging news came from Hue when the Buddhists at Tu Dam Pagoda ended their hunger strike and returned home. The police withdrew from the scene, leaving an appearance of calm. This was to be rudely dispelled ont eh following day as the Buddhist crisis became imprinted into the minds of a global audience.

THICH QUANG DUC
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Hòa thượng

Accounts of the life of Thich Quang Duc are derived from information disseminated by Buddhist organizations. These record him as being born in the village of Hội Khánh, in Vạn Ninh district of Khánh Hoà province in central Vietnam. He was one of seven children born to Lâm Hữu Ứng and his wife Nguyễn Thị Nương. At the age of seven, he left worldly life to study Buddhism under Hòa thượng Thích Hoằng Thâm, who was a maternal uncle and spiritual master. Thích Hoằng Thâm raised him as a son and took the name Nguyễn Văn Khiết. At the age of fifteen he took the samanera (novice) vows and was ordained a monk at the age of 20. After ordination, he travelled to a mountain in Ninh Hoa, vowing to live the life of a solitary hermit for three years practicing Buddhism. He was to return in later life to open the Thiên Lộc Pagoda at the site. Thereafter, he began to travel around central Vietnam expounding the dharma. After two years, he moved into retreat at the Sắc Tứ Thiên An Pagoda near the south central coastal city of Nha Trang. In 1932, he was appointed to be an inspector for the Buddhist Association in Ninh Hoa before becoming the inspector of monks in in his home province of Khanh Hoa. In his period spreading Buddhism in central Vietnam, he built fourteen temples. In 1934, he travelled into southern Vietnam to continue his activities and travelled throughout all the provinces of the southern region. He also spent two years in Cambodia studying the Buddhist texts of the Theravada tradition. In his time in the south, he oversaw the construction of a further seventeen temples. This meant a total of 31 new temples, the last being the Quan Thế Am (Avalokiteshvara Pagoda) in Phú Nhuận district in Gia Định province on the outskirts of Saigon. The street on which the temple lies is now named in his honor. He was also appointed to serve as the Chairman of the Panel on Ceremonial Rites of the Congregation of Vietnamese Monks. He also appointed as abbot of the Phước Hòa Pagoda, which was the initial location of the Association for Buddhist Studies of Vietnam. When the office was relocated to the Xa Loi Pagoda, the main pagoda in the capital of Saigon, Thich Quang Duc resigned in order to spend more time on personal Buddhist practice.

His last words before his self-immolation were documented in a letter he had left.

Before closing my eyes and moving towards the vision of the Buddha, I respectfully plea to President Ngo Dinh Diem to take a mind of compassion towards the people of the nation and implement religious equality to maintain the strength of the homeland eternally. I call the venerables, reverends, members of the sangha and the lay Buddhists to organise in solidarity to make sacrifices to protect Buddhism.

Another monk had offered to burn himself, but Thich Quang Duc's seniority prevailed.

The intact heart relic was taken to be a symbol of compassion and Thich Quang Duc has subsequently been revered by Buddhists as a bodhisattva and accordingly is often referred to as Bồ Tát Thích Quảng Đức.

On June 10, a Buddhist spokesperson informed the US correspondents that "something important" would happen on the following morning on the road outside the Cambodian embassy. Most of the reporters disregarded the warning, since the Buddhist crisis was now over a month and was considered. Malcolm Browne, the Saigon bureau chief of the Associated Press was one of the few, along with Halberstam, to turn up.

Thich Quang Duc had arrived as part of a procession that had begun at a nearby pagoda. Around 350 monks and nuns, preceded by an Austin sedan marched in two phalanxes, carrinyg banners printed in both English and Vietnamese. It denounced the Diem government, its policy towards Buddhists and demanding that it fulfil its promises of religious equality.

Thich Quang Duc emerged fromt eh car along with two other monks. One placed a cushion on the road while another opened the trunk can and took out a five gallong gasoline can. As the marchers formed a circle around him, Thich Quang Duc calmly seated himself in the traditional Buddhist meditative lotus position on the cushion. His colleague emptied the pink coloured liquid contents of the five gallon gasoline container over his head as his fingers rotated a string of wooden prayer beads and recited the words "Nam mo A Di Da Phat" ("homage to Amitabha Buddha") before striking a match and throwing it on himself. Black and yellow flames consumed his robes and flesh as black and oily somke emanated.

Police who tried to reach him could not break through the circle of Buddhist clergy while one of their law enforcement colleagues threw himself to the ground. The spectators were mostly stunned silent, but some wailed and several began praying. Many of the monks and nuns prostrated themselves before Thich Quang Duc along with some shocked pedestrians. In English and Vietnamese, a monk repeatedly declared in a microphone "A Buddhist priest burns himself to death. A Buddhist priest becomes a martyr." After around ten minutes, Thich Quang Duc toppled forward onto the street and the fire subsided. A group of monks covered the smoking corpse with yellow robes, picked it up and tried to fit it into a coffin, but the limbs could not be bent and one of the arms protruded from a wooden box as he was carried to the nearby Xa Loi Pagoda in central Saigon. There his charred heart was displayed in a glass chalice. Students unfurled bilingual banners outside the pagoda reading "A Buddhist priest burns himself for our five requests." By 1.30 pm, around one thousand monks had congregated inside Xa Loi to hold a meeting while a large crowd of pro-Buddhist students had formed a human barrier around it. The meeting soon ended and all but a hundred monks slowly left the compound. Nearly one thousand monks accompanied by laypeople returned to the cremation site while the police lingered nearby, ready to keep order. The police response was that around 6 pm, thirty nuns and six monks were arrested for holding a prayer meeting on the street outsid e Xa Loi Pagoda. They then encircled the pagoda, blocking public passage and giving the impression that an armed siege was imminent. In the evening, thousands of Saigonese claimed to see a vision of the Buddha's face in the sky as the sun descended. They claimed that the Buddha was weeping.

Browne's photographs quickly spread across the world wire services and leapt

The self-immolation was regarded as a turning point in the Buddhist crisis and the critical point in the collapse of the Diem regime. Although Diem's decline and downfall had already begun, the self-immolation is universally seen as the pivotal point in Buddhist crisis. The historian Seth Jacobs asserted that Thich Quang Duc had "reduced America's Diem experiment to ashes as well" and that "no amount of pleading could retrieve Diem's reputation" once Browne's images were ingrained into the psyche of the world public. Ellen Hammer described the event as having "evoked dark images of persecution and horror corresponding to a profoundly Asian reality that passed the understanding of Westerners." John Mecklin, an official from the US embassy noted that the photograph "had a shock effect of incalculable value to the Buddhist cause, becoming a symbol of state of things in Vietnam." The CIA's William Colby opined that although Diem "handled the Buddhist crisis fairly badly and allowed it to grow. But I really don't think there was much they could have done about it once that bonze burned himself."

US President John F. Kennedy, whose government was the main sponsor of Diem's regime, learned of the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc when he was handed the morning newspapers when he sitting in bed and talking to his brother and attorney-general Robert F. Kennedy on the hone. Kennedy was reported to have interrupted their conversation about segregation in Alabama by exclaiming "Jesus Christ!" into the phone. He later remarked that "no news picture in history has generated so much emotion around the world as that one." US Senator Frank Church, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee claimed that "such grisly scenes have not been witnessed since the Christian martyrs marched hand in hand into the Roman arenas."

In Europe, the photos were hawked on the streets and Communist China distributed millions of copies of the photo throughout Asia and Africa as evidence of "US imperialism". One of Browne's photos remains affixed to the sedan in which Thich Quang Duc drove to his self-immolation and is part of a tourist attraction in what is now Ho Chi Minh City commemorating the event. For Browne and AP, the pictures were a marketing success. Ray Herndon, the UPI correspondent who had forgotten to bring his camera was slated in private by his employer. UPI estimated that 5,000 readers in Sydney, then a city of around 1.5-2 million, had switched to AP news sources. For Diem's part, his mouthpiece Times of Vietnam intensified their attacks on the US journalists and the Buddhists. Headlines such as "Xa Loi politburo makes new threats" and "Monks plot murder" were printed. One article questioned the relationship between the monks and the press by allegation why "so many young girls are buzzing in and out of Xa Loi early" and going to allege without evidence that they were brought in for sexual purposes for the reporters.

The location chosen for the self-immolation raised questions as to whether it was a coincidence or a deliberate symbolism that Thich Quang Duc had burned in front of the Cambodian embassy. William Trueheart and embassy official Charles Flowerree felt that the location was selected to show solidarity with the Cambodian government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. South Vietnam and Cambodia had strained relations with Sihanouk accusing Diem of mistreating Vietnamese and ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists in a speech on May 22. The Diem mouthpiece Times of Vietnam had published an article on June 9 which claimed that Cambodian monks had been encouraging the Buddhist crisis. The Times asserted that it was part of a Cambodian plot to extend its neutralist foreign policy into South Vietnam. Flowerree noted that Diem was "ready and eager to see a fine Cambodian hand in all the organized Buddhist actions.

Despite the shock of the western public, the practice of Vietnamese monks self-immolating was not uncommon. Instances of self-immolations in Vietnam had been recorded in past centuries, usually to honor Gautama Buddha. The most recently recorded case was in North Vietnam in 1950. The French colonial authorities had tried to eradicate the practice since their conquest of Vietnam in the 19th century, but had not always been successful. They did managed to keep one monk away from his intended flames in Hue, but he managed to succeed in starving himself. During the 1920s and 1930s, Saigon newspapers reported multiple instances of self-immolations by monks in a matter-of-fact style. The practice had also been used in China. In the city of Harbin in 1948, a monk seated himself in the lotus position on a pile of sawdust and soybean oil and self-immolated in protest against he treatment of Buddhism by the communists of Mao Zedong. His heart remained intact as did that of Thich Quang Duc.

Madame Nhu exacerbated the volatile situation in an interview for CBS television when she sneered, "What have those so-called 'Buddhist leader' done? . . .All they have done is to barbeque a bonze." She further claimed that the Buddhist were unpatriotic since the fuel used was imported. Madame Nhu was the wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's younger brother and adviser. Since Diem was a bachelor, she was regarded as the de facto First Lady as she and her husband lived in the Presidential Palace. Even American sympathisers of the Diem regime were appalled by her remarks, and Diem's refusal to denounce it. Critics charged that even though she had a right to her own opinions, since she was Diem's sister-in-law, lived in the palace and held a seat in the National Assembly, it was natural to assume that she spoke for the government in the absence of a Presidential disavowal. Marguerite Higgins, the foremost supporter of Diem in the American press corps in Saigon conceded that "Anyone capable of so insensitive and callous a remark, surely qualified as the villainess in a scenario of torture, persecution, and worse." In a later interview, when she was confronted about her choice of words, Madame Nhu smiled and stated, "If I had it all to do over again, I would say the same thing." She said that she liked its "shock value."

The Americans in Saigon often found the burning to be surreal and made jokes about "bonze fires" and "hot cross bonzes" almost as an escape mechanism from the bewilderment. In one instance, the young son of an American officer based at the Saigon embassy doused himself with gasoline and set himself on fire. He was seriously burned before the fire was extinguished and later could only offer the explanaition that "I wanted to see what it was like."

Diem made a radio address at 7 pm, asserting that he was profoundly troubled by the death of Thich Quang Duc. He appealed for "serenity and patriotism" and announced that negotiations would resume with the Buddhists. He claimed that negotiations were progressing well and in a time of religious tension emphasized the role of the Catholic philosophy of personalism in his rule. He alleged that extremists had twisted the facts and asserted that the Buddhists can

count on the Constitution, in other words, me.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam responded to the appeal put on a show of solidarity behind Diem to isolate dissident officers. Thirty high-ranking officers headed by General Le Van Ty declared their resolve to carry out all missions entrusted to the army for the defense of the constitution and the Republic. The declaration was a veneer which masked the plotting that was present in the background. Some of the signatories were to become personally involved in Diem's overthrow and death in November. Generals Duong Van Minh and Tran Van Don, the presidential military advisor and chief of army who were to lead the coup were overseas and were spared the charade of signing.

A date was set for the funeral of Thich Quang Duc, and four thousand people gathered outside Xa Loi Pagoda only for the ceremony to be postponed. On June 19, his remains were carried out of Xa Loi to a cemetery sixteen kilometres south of the city for a recremation. Following the signing of the Joint Communique, attendance had been limited by agreement between Buddhist leaders and police, with only around 400 monks attending.

The secret police had intended to confiscate Thich Quang Duc's ashes but two monks had escaped with the urn, jumping the back fence and finding safety at the US Operations Mission next door.

In late June, Diem's government charged that Thich Quang Duc was drugged in order to achieve his suicide. It also accused Browne of bribing Thich Quang Duc into the self-immolation. Prochnau, p. 309.

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After the self-immolation, the US put more pressure on Diem to re-open negotiations on the faltering agreement. Diem had scheduled an emergency cabinet meeting at 1130 on June 11 to discuss the Buddhist crisis which he thought was winding down. Following Thich Quang Duc's death, Diem cancelled the meeting and met individually. Trueheart warned Thuan of the desperate need for an agreement, saying that the situation was "dangerously near breaking point" and expected Diem to meet the Buddhists' five point manifesto. Rusk warned the Saigon embassy that the White House would publicly announce that it would no longer "associate itself" with the regime if this did not occur. Diem made a radio address that he was profoundly troubled by the death and asserted that Buddhism was protected by the constitution and that he was its personal guardian.

Ban them
Diem reluctantly ordered his government committee to resume negotiations with the Buddhist leadership. These became more high profile with the arrival of Thich Tri Quang and patriarch Thich Tinh Khiet from Hue to negotiate with Diem's committee. With no immediate upsurge in demonstrations following the self-immolation, Diem assumed that the Buddhists were out of ideas. Diem took the Buddhists' initiation of negotiations to be an expression of weakness. Trueheart warned Diem that without meaningful concessions, the US would publicly repudiate his regime. Diem said that such a move would scupper the negotiations. After a delay of one day due to the need of the frail eighty-year old Thich Tinh Khiet to rest from the long journey south, Diem's committee met the Buddhist on June 14. The Buddhists pushed for revocation of the stipulation that only local officials could authorise flag displays. Pagodas had been regarded as communal property of the hamlets for centuries and the Buddhists insisted that they be put under religious administration. The Buddhists lobbied for Diem to immediately amend Decree Number 10 by Presidential Decree as allowed in the constitution, rather than wait for the National Assembly to do so. The National Assembly had announced a committee would be established on June 12 to deal with the issue. Tureheart recommended that the Interministerial Committee accept the Buddhist's position in a "spirit of amity" and then clarify the details at a later point. During the negoationts, Thich Tinh Khiet issued a nationwide plea to urge Buddhists to avoid any actions that could endanger the the talks while Diem ordered government officials to remove all barriers around the temples. By the end of the evening, substantial progress on the issues of the flags and Decree Number 10 had been announced.

One June 16, an agreement between the committee and the Buddhists was reached. An agreement had been reached pertaining to all five demands, although the terms were vague. Diem smugly asserted that it contained nothing that he had not already accepted. The "Joint Communique" asserted that the national flag "should always be respected and be put at its appropriate place." The National Assembly would consult with religious groups in an effort to removed them "from the regulations of Ordinance No. 10" and to establish new guidelines appropriate to their religious activities. In the meantime the government committee promised a loose application of the regulation. It also promised leniency in the censorship of Buddhist literature and prayer books and the granting of permits to construct Buddhist pagodas, shoolc and charitable institutions. Both sides agreed to form an investigative committee to "re-examine" the Buddhist grievances and Diem agreed to grant a full amnesty to all Buddhists who had protested against the government. The agreement stated the "normal and purely religious activity" could go unhindered without the need for government permission in pagodas or the headquarters of the General Association of Buddhists. Diem also promised an inquiry into the Hue shootings and punishment for any found guilty, although it denied government involvement. In an attempt to save face, Diem signed the agreement directly under a paragraph declaring that "the articles written in this joint communiqué have been approved in principle by me from the beginning," which he added with his own handwriting. The Communique was also signed by the members of the committee: Tho, Thuan and Luong as well as the members of the Buddhist delegation.

The joint communiqué was presented to the press on June 16, and Thich Tinh Khiet thanked Diem and exhorted the Buddhist community to work with the government in what he optimistically predicted would be a new era of religious harmony. He expressed his "convition that the joint communiqué will inaugurate a new era and that . . . no erroneous action from whatever quarter will occur again." He also declared that he protest movement was over, and called on Buddhists to return to their normal lives and pray for the success of the agreement.

Despite this, Trueheart was sceptical about its implementation, noting "If we find Diem in a mood to freeze up, rather than move forward, then I think his days are numbered and we must begin to make moves." The troubles had become a public relations issue for Diem beyond his country, with speculation about a US-Diem rift being discussed in American newspapers following the self-immolation. The New York Times ran a front page headline on June 14 citing leaked government information that diplomats had privatedly attacked Diem's handling of the crisis. It also reported that General Paul Harkins, the head of the US advisory mission in South Vietnam to order his men not to assist ARVN units that were taking action against demonstrators. The US at the time considered telling Vice President Tho that they would support him replacing Diem as President. This occurred at the time as the surfacing of rumours that Vietnamese Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Do Khac Mai had began gauging support among his colleagues for a coup.

The communiqué was put in doubt by an incident outside Xa Loi Pagoda on the following day, shortly afer nine o'clock in the morning. A crowd of around 2000 people were confronted by police who still persisted in ringing the pagoda in spite of the agreement. A riot eventually broke out and police attacked the crowd with tear gas, fire hoses, clubs and gunfire. One protestor was killed and scores more injured. Moderates from both sides urged clam while some government officials blamed "extremist elements". An Associated Press story described the riot as "the most violent anti-Government outburst in South Vietnam in years." Jacobs, p.150

The agreement would only be meaningful if it was put into action, regardless of Thich Tinh Khiet's announcement to his disciples that it heralded a new era. This required the monks to return to their normal lives and government and its officials to implements its promises. Many protestors arrested in the past remained in jail contrary to the communiqué's promises. After the deadly riot occurred only a day after the signing of the communique, the crisis steepened as more Buddhists began calling for a change of government and younger monks such as Thich Tri Quang began to come to the forefront, blaming Diem for discontent that was hindering the effort against the Vietcong. The Buddhists were suspicious of the government and began to step up the production of critical pamphlets and began translating articles critical of Diem in the western media to distribute to Vietnamese. As the promises continued to fail to be materialised, the demonstrations at Xa Loi and elsewhere continued to grow.

Thich Tinh Khiet sent Diem a letter after the funeral of Thich Quang Duc, asserting that the government was not observing the communiqué and that the condition of Buddhists in South Vietnam had deterioirated. Tho denied the allegation, but it was the statements of Nhu that were more telling. He told a reporter that "If anyone is oppressed in this affair, it is the government which has been constantly attack and whose mouth has been shut with Scotch tape." He criticised the agreements through his Republican youth calling on the population to "resist the indirections [sic] of superstition and fanaticism" and warned against "communists who may abuse the Joint Communique". A US State Department report concluded that the religious disquiet was not fomented by communist elements but that communists were "waiting expectantly in the wings for a propitious moment to capitalize on developments." In the meantime the government had quietly informed local officials that the agreements were a "tactical retreat" to buy time before decisive putting down the Buddhist movement. Diem's regime stalled on implementing the release of Buddhists who had been released for protesting against it. This lead to a discussion within the US government to push for the removal of the Nhus, who were regarded as the extremist influence over Diem, from power. Henry Cabot Lodge was also announced as the new US ambassador effective in late August, replacing Nolting, who had been considered too close to Diem.

In July, Diem's government continued to attack the Buddhists. It accused Thich Quang Duc of being drugged before being set alight. Tho speculated that the Vietcong had infiltrated the Buddhists and converted them into a political organistiooan with Interior Minster Luong alleged that cabinet ministers had received death threats.

Danh lon ngay 7 thang 7
The international pressure on Diem grew after a Buddhist ceremony at Saigon's Chanatareansey Pagoda on the morning of Sunday July 7. Known as Double Seven Day, it was also the anniversary of Diem's ascension to Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam in 1954. The previous night had started in a festive mood as military officers had received decorations from Diem at a ceremony. Among the audience were Generals Tran Van Don and Duong Van Minh, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the most respected officer respectively. They had returned from Thailand as observers to SEATO exercises where they had been informed about regional disquiet over Diem's policies towards the Buddhists. An altercation broke out between Nhu's plainclothes policemen and a grou pof US journalists which included David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Malcolm Browne, Peter Arnett and CBS's Peter Kalischer. The pressmen had been alerted to a Buddhist demonstration and after an hour long ceremony, the Buddhist filed out of the Pagoda into a narrow alley along the street, where they were ordered to stop by plainclothes police who obstructed their path. The Buddhists did not resist the police but New Zealander Arnett of the Associated Press and Browne, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his photograph of the self-immolation fThic Quang Duc, began taking phots of the confrontation. The police thereupon punched Arnett in the face, knocked him to the ground, kicked him with their pointed toe shoes and smashed his camera. Halberstam, who won a Pulitzer for his coverage of the Buddhist crisis, was tall man, standing around 20 cm taller than the average diminutive Vietnamese policemen. He waded into the fracas swinging his arms and reportedly saying "Get back, get back, you sons of bitches, or I'll beat the shit out of you!" Nhu's men ran away without waiting for a translation, but not before Browne had clambered up a power pole and taken photos of Arnett's bloodied face. The police smashed Browne's camera but his film survived the impact. Others were hustled and rocks were thrown at the journalists. The photo of Arnett's bleeding face were circulated in US newspapers and hardened public feelings against Diem in the wake of the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc.

Later in the day, the police collected Browne and Arnett from the AP office in Saigon and took them to what they described as a "Safe house". The police interrogators said that they would be arrested but were coy about the charges. One was that of assaulting two police officers, but hints were dropped that more serious offence such as organising illegal demonstrations were being considered. Speaking in French, Arnett thought that they mentioned the word esppionage. After they were temporarily released in the evening, the whole Siagon press corps stormed the US embassy.

William Trueheart, the acting head of the US embassy filed a report to Washington asseting that the uniformed policemen had tacitly helped the plainclothed counterparts, but he also had "no doubt that [the] reporters, at least once [the] fracas had started, acted in [a] belligerent manner towards [the] police." The reporters were indignant and stridently accused the Diem regime of causing the altercation. In a heated meeting at the embassy, they demanded that Trueheart deliver a formal protest to Diem. Trueheart angered them by refusing to do so and blaming both sides for the confrontation.

Browne, Halberstam, Sheehan and Kalischer wrote a letter to US President John F. Kennedy complaining that he regime had begun a full-scale intimidation campaign of "open physical intimidation to prevent the covering of news which we feel Americans have a right to know." Since the embassy was unwilling to provide government protection against police aggression, they appealed directylt to Kennedy.

The protests did not garner any Presidential sympathy and resulted in trouble from their media employers. UPI's Tokyo office criticised Sheehan for trying to "make Unipress policy" on his own when "Unipress must be neutral, neither pro-Diem, pro-Communist or pro-anybody else." The editor of the Enw York Times told Halberstam that he was out of line to send cables to the White House without authorisation. Browne and Arnett were called in for questioning the following day, accompanied bya British embassy offfical who was assisting Arnett.

Diem's address on Double Seven Day worsened the mood. He blithely announced that the "problems raised by the General Associaiton of Buddhists have just been settled." He reinforced his by attributing any lingering problems to the "underground intervention of international red agents and Communist fellow travellers who in collusion with fascist ideologues disguised as democrats were surrepticiously seeking to revive and rekindle disunity at home while arouseing public opinions against us abroad." The fascists were believed to be a reference oteh conspiratorial Dai Viet who had been his long term enemies, but his address attacked all those who had criticised him. Diem no longer trusted anyone outside his fanily and considered himself to be a martyr. H157-158

Three young Buddhist clergy, the oldest being 21 burned themselves and kept the crisis on the international agenda. This was accentuated by Diem's continued blockage of pagodas and beatings of unarmed monks and nuns.(150-152)

Further demonstrations came in July after Diem announced that the official government report had determined that Vietcong were responsible for the hue deaths. During a demonstration in Cholon's Giac Minh Pagoda, police clubbed hundreds of monks and laypeople and took them to jail in trucks marked with US aid logos. Three more Buddhists self-immolated in late July and early August and Notling ended his days and ambassador. Madame Nhu continued to asail the Buddhists, stating "once this affair is finished, Buddhism will die in this country". "If they burn thirty women, we shall go ahead and clap our hands."

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Tan cong Chua Xa Loi
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On the evening of August 18, ten senior generals of the Army of the republic of Vietnam met to discuss the situation of the Buddhist crisis and decided that the imposition of martial law was needed. The generals wanted to disperse the monks from Siagon and return them to their original pagodas in the provinces.

Seven of the generals were summoned to Gia Long Palace on August 20 Nhu for consultations. They presented their request to impose martial law and discussed how to disperse the monks form organising protests in Saigon. Nhu sent the generals to see Diem. The president listened to the group of seven, lead by General Tran Van Don. The group also included Army Chief of Staff General Tran Thien Khiem and General Nguyen Khanh, commander of the II Corps in the Central Highlands. Khiem and Khanh were the two who were responsible for helping to put down the attempted coup in 1960. Also present was General Le Van Kim, head of the military academy and Don's brother-in-law, General Do Cao Tri, commander of I Corps which ruled the northernmost region around Hue. The final two men present were the favourites of the Diem regime. General Ton That Dinh, the brash paratrooper who at 37 was South Vietnam's youngest ever general, was the commander of the III Corps surrounding Saigon. General Huynh Van Cao was the commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta and the only one of the septet that was not involved in plotting against Diem.

Don claimed that Communist had infiltrated the monks at Xa Loi Pagoda and warned that ARVN moral was deteriorating because of the civil unrest. He claimed that it was possible that the Buddhist could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Hearing this, Diem agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day, without consulting his cabinet. Troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed at the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in the place of General Le Van Ty, who was abroad having medical treatment. Don noted that Diem was apparently concerned with the welfare of the monks, telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were authorised with the signature of Don, who had no idea that military action was to occur in the early hours of August 21 without his knowledge.

With the approval of Diem, Nhu used the declaration of martial law to order armed men into the Buddhist pagodas. Nhu purposely chose a time when the American Embassy was without a leader. Frederick Nolting had returned to he United States and his successor Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. was yet to arrive. Since the high command of the ARVN worked closely with the American military advisers deployed in the country, Nhu used the combat police and ARVN Special Forces of Colonel Le Quang Tung. Tung took his orders directly from Nhu. The men were dressed in regular army uniform; Nhu as to pass off the raids as regular military action. Nhu's motive was to shift the responsibility of a violent operation that was anger many Vietnamese and the Americans to the army. In doing so, he intended to dent the public and American confidence in the senior army command that were plotting him. Nhu hoped that the majority Buddhist populace and Americans would be less inclined to support the generals in staging a coup. In the past, Nhu's Machiavellian tactics in playing the generals against one another had kept conspirators off balance and thwarted coup attempts.

Thich Tinh Khiet, the 80 year old Buddhist patriarch, was seized and taken to a military hospital on the outskirts of Saigon.

The new American ambassador Lodge was in Honolulu for last minute briefings with Nolting when news filtered through of the pagoda raids. He was given directions to proceed directly to Saigon, and arrived after sunset on August 22. The State Department denounced the raids as a "direct violation by the Vietnamese government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists."

Squads of Special Forces and combat police flattened the gates and smashed their way into the pagoda at around 12.20am, as Xa Loi's brass gong was clanged to signal the attack. Nhu's men were armed with pistols, submachine guns, carbines, shotguns, grenades and tear gas. The red bereted Special Forces were joined by truckloads of steel-helmeted combat police in army camouflage uniforms. Monks and nuns who barricaded themselves behind wooden shields were attacked with rifle butts and bayonets. The gong of the pagoda was drowned out by the burst of automatic weapons fire, the sound of exploding grenades, shattering glass and human screaming. One monk was thrown from the balcony down to the courtyard 6 meters below. Nhu's men vandalised the main altar and managed to confiscate the intact charred heart of Thich Quang Duc, the monk who had self-immolated in protest against the policies of the regime. The Buddhists managed to escape with a receptacle with the remainder of his ashes. Two monks jumped the back wall of the pagoda into the grounds of the adjoining US Aid Mission, where they were given asylum. The commander of the III Corps of the ARVN, ton That Dinh soon announced military control over Saigon, cancelling all commercial flights into the city and instituting press censorship.

The violence was worse in Hue, where the approach of government forces were met by the beating of Buddhist drums and cymbals to alert the populace. The townfolk left their homes in the middle of the night in an attempt to defend the city's pagodas. At Tu Dam Pagoda, monks attempted to burn the coffin of a monk who had self-immolated. Government soldiers, firing M1 rifles, overran the pagoda nad confiscated the coffin. They also demolished a statue of Gautama Buddha and looted and vandalised the pagoda. An explosion was set off by the troops, which levelled much of the pagoda. Many Buddhists were shot or clubbed to death.

The most determined resistance to the Diem regime occurred outside the Dieu De Pagoda in Hue. As troops attempted to stretch a barbed wire barricade across the bridge leading to the pagoda, the crowd tore it down with their bare hands. The crowd then fought the heavily armed military personnel with rocks, sticks and their bare fists, throwing back the tear gas grenades that were aimed at them. After a five hour battle, the military finally won control of the bridge at dawn by driving armoured cars through the angry crowd. The defense of the bridge and Dieu De had left an estimated 30 dead and 200 wounded. Ten truckloads of bridge defenders were taken to jail and an estimated 500 people were arrested in the city. Seventeen of the 47 professor Hue Uiversity who had resigned earlier in the week in protest against the firing of the rector Cao Van Luan, a Catholic priest and opponent of Diem's brother Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc were also arrested. The total number of dead and disappearances was never confirmed, but estimates range up to several hundred.

The United States became immediately embroiled in the attacks following the escape of the two monks over the back wall into the adjacent US Operations Mission building. Saigon's police chief, disguised in a Republican Youth uniform, cordoned the building. He ordered all Vietnamese inside to leave the area and threatened to storm the building when the Americans denied him entry. Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau rushed to the scene to stop any physical confrontation, but demanded the Americans turn over the monks. William Trueheart, the deputy of the recently relieved US ambassador Frederick Nolting arrived at the scene. As the leading American diplomat in Vietnam in the transition between ambassadors, Trueheart refused to take action until he received instructions from Washington. He warned Mau against violation the diplomatic immunity of the USOM. Trueheart knew that handing over the monks would imply American approval of the regime's action. The confrontation soon died down, and the US State Department ordered Trueheart not to release the two monks and to regard the USOM building as having the same immunity as that of the embassy. More monks went on to find sanctuary in the US embassy which became known as the "Buddhist Hilton".

At 6 am, Diem came on the airwaves of Radio Saigon, stating "Under Article 44 of the constitution, I declare a state of siege throughout the national territory. I confer upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the responsibility to restore security and public order so that the state may be protected, Communism defeated, freedom secured, and democracy achieved." Under the instatement of martial law, the army was given blanket search-and-arrest powers and empowered to ban all public gatherings, restrict press freedom and stop the circulation of all "printed material and other documents harmful to public order and security. Government sources claimed that in Xa Loi, An Quang and various Theravada pagodas, soldiers had found machine guns, ammunition, plastic explosives, homemade mines, daggers, and Vietcong documents.

Police were ordered to shoot those who defied the 9 pm to 5 am curfew. Troops in full camouflage battle dress guarded every major intersection and bridge with automatic weapons and rifles with fixed bayonets. The empty pagodas were now ringed by troops and armored cars. Censorship was enacted on all outgoing news, and reporters had to give their stories to travellers flying to foreign countries. The telephone service in the homes and offices of all US military and embassy staff was disconnected. The 14,000 US military advisers throughout the country were under orders to stay in their homes, and all leaves had been cancelled.

The driving force behind the government assault on the Buddhists appeared to come from senior military commanders acting without consulting civilians. The Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan and Interior Minister Bui Van Luong were caught off guard by the attacks. The initial perception was that the military establishment had suddenly cracked down on the Buddhists because they were deemed to be a threat to the war effort. The government propagated a theory which held that the military felt compelled to action after pro-Buddhist student unrest on Augst 17 and 18. In Hue, student protestors had turned on an ARVN officer after he fired into their path. The attacks were also preceded by a large rally at Xa Loi Pagoda] where some monks had called for the overthrow of the Diem regime and denounced the anti-Buddhist states of the de facto first lady Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu. These arguments were dismissed by observers, along with government claims that the raids were spontaneous. Diem had long distrusted his generals and frequently played them against each other in a divide and conquer paradigm to weaken any coup attempts. The army also contained substantial numbers of majority Buddhists, heightening scepticism that thwy would have attacked the pagodas and monks in such a violent manner. The synchronised military operations throughout the country, the speed at which banners were erected declaring the ARVN resolve to defeat communism and doctored propaganda photos purporting to show Vietcong infiltration of the Buddhists suggested that the actions were long premeditated. Few South Vietnmese officers had known in advance of the raids. To maintain secrecy, special printing presses had produced propaganda materials only hours before the raids.

The initial government line was that the regular army had taken the actions. South Vietnamese Army radio broadcasts bore the influence of Nhu's abrasive tone in directing the Republican Youth to cooperate with the government. Nhu accused the Buddhists of turning their pagodas into headquarters for plotting anti-government insurrections. He claimed that the Buddhist Intersect Committee operated under the control of "political speculators who exploited religion and terrorism." The new US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., believed that Diem remained in control although Nhu's influence had risen to unprecedented levels. He thought that Nhu's divde and conquer tactics had split the military into three power groups lead by Generals Don and Dinh and Colonel Tung. Don was believed to not have the allegiance of Dinh and Tung, who took their orders directly from Gia Long Palace. The two loyalists were reputed to have detested one another but had support from various loyalist elements. Lodge predicted that if the army deposed Diem, fighting qould break out within the ARVN.

The CIA went on to report that the ARVN officers resolutely denied any involvement in the pagoda raids. They held that Tung's Special Forces had disguised themselves in ARVN uniform before attacking the pagodas. Further unsubstantiated rumours had spread within the army that the Americans, who traine dthe Special Forces, ahd helped to plant the attack. The ARVN leaders were unsure of how to proceed and Don called a staff meeting on the morning of August 23 to discuss impending demonstrations against the raids by university students and the anger of junior ARVN officers about the pagoda attacks. Minh noted that the ongoing present of armed miltary personnel had alieneated society by creating an "aura of suppression. Later in the day, Don privately met with CIA agent Lucien Conein and reiterated that the Americans were mistaken in believing that the ARVN was responsible. Don insisted that Diem remained in control although Nhu had to approve all of the generals' meetings with Diem. Don insisted that Nhu had orchestrated the raids in the fear that the generals had too much power. He asserted that Nhu used the cover of martial law to discredit the generals by dressing the Special Forces in ARVN uniforms. Don insisted that he was unaware of the plans and was at JGS with Khiem when he received a radio message informing him of the assaults. Police Commisioner Tran Van Tu, supported by Tung's men were in charge, and by the time Don arrived, the mission had been completed. Kim had also had his own meeting with Rufus Phillips at the US embassy. He bitterly confided that Nhu had tricked the army into imposing martial law and becoming his "puppet." Kim asserted that Dinh, Dona nd the other gernals were not aware of the raids in advance. Kim revealed that the arms and explosives that Nhu asserted were found in the pagodas were planted. As a result the Vietnamese people had expressed anger at the army and their US backers, strenghtneing Nhu's position.

On August 23, the first day that Lodge spent in Saigon, he immediately visited the two monks who had taken refuge in the USOM building. Lodge ordered that vegetarian food be made available for them. The meeting was a useful public relations exercise in showing where American government policy stood towards Diem and Nhu's attacks on the Buddhist.

The pagoda raids stoked widespread public disquiet in the previously apolitical Saigon public. On midnight of August 22, Generals Don, Dinh and Khiem had informed Nhu that student demonstrations were planned for three consecutive days. They recommended that the schools be closed, but when Nhu took them to see Diem, Diem refused to close the schools. Diem decided that the students would be allowed to protest. As a result, Students at Saigon University boycotted classes and rioted, which was met by arrests, imprisonment and the closure of the university. This was repeated at Hue's University. When high school students demonstrated, Diem arrested them too. More than 1000 students from Saigon's leading high school, most of them children of Saigon public servants were sent to re—education camps.

His foreign minister Vu Van Mau resigned, shaving his head like a Buddhist monk in protest. When he attempted to leave the country on a religious pilgrimage, Diem had him jailed. Tran Van Chuong, the Ambassador the United States and father of the defacto first lady Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, resigned in protest. Chuong charged Diem with having "copied the tactics of totalitarian regimes." Madame Chuong, who was South Vietnam's observer at the United Nations resigned and spoke of mass executions and a reign of terror under Diem and Nhu. She predicted that if Diem and the Nhus did not leave Vietnam then it would be inevitable that they would be killed. The Voice of America announced hta thte Chuong had resigned in protest, but this was denied by Saigon, which asserted that they were sacked. Diem's officials claimed that Chuong's last telegram had been so critical of the regime that it was determined to be "inadmissible in form and substance". After years of complaining privately about his ambassaor, Diem dismissed him.

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Vuot bien 1954
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Operation Passage to Freedom was the term used by the United States Navy to describe the mass exodus of Vietnamese who fled the communist North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) for South Vietnam (the State of Vietnam, later to become the Republic of Vietnam). This occurred in the wake of the Geneva Accords of 1954 which allowed a 300 day grace period ending on May 18, 1955 in which people could move freely between the two halves of Vietnam before the border was sealed at the 17th parallel. The partition was intended to be temporary, pending national elections in 1956 that were intended to result in reunification. In all, between 800,000 and one million north Vietnamese fled communist rule in the north, while a much smaller number of Vietminh fighters moved north into the communist zone. The mass migration of northerners was facilitated primarily by the French air force and naval vessels. American vessels supplemented the French in evacuating northern Vietnamese to Saigon, the southern capital. The operation was accompanied by a large humanitarian relief effort primarily bankrolled by the United States in an attempt to absorb a large tent city of refugees that had sprung up outside Saigon. Politically, the migration was a public relations coup for the United States, depicting the flight of Vietnamese from the perceived oppression of communism to the free world in the south under American auspices. From a Vietnamese perspective, the period was marked by a propaganda campaign on behalf of South Vietnam's Catholic Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. It appealed for Catholics to flee impending religious persecution under communist rule, and around 60% of the north's 1.5 million Catholics responded. It boosted the Catholic power base of Diem; whereas the majority of Vietnam's Catholics previously lived in the north, they were now in the south.

Background
At the end of the Second World War, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh had proclaimed independence for Vietnam as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945. A struggle with the French started in November 1946 when they attempted to reassert control over French Indochina with an attack on the northern port city of Haiphong. The DRV was diplomatically recognised by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Western powers recognised the French backed State of Vietnam, nominally led by Emperor Bao Dai but with a French trained Vietnamese National Army which was loyal to and supplemented the French colonial forces. After eight years of fighting, the French were surrounded and defeated in a mountainous northern fortress at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. France decided to withdraw from Indochina, which was finalised in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Under the terms of the agreement, Vietnam was the temporarily divided at the 17th parallel until national elections in 1956 to elect a government that would govern a reunified country. The communist Vietminh were left in control of North Vietnam, while the French endorsed State of Vietnam under Bao Dai controlled the South. French forces were to gradually withdraw from Vietnam as the situation stabilised.

Exodus
Under the Geneva Accords, people on either side of the border were to be given the opportunity to move to the other half of the country if they so desired. Article 14(d) of the accords stipulated that

Any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so.

This allowed for a 300 day period of free movement ending on May 18, 1955. At the time, the parties at Geneva had given little thought to the logistics of the population resettlement, assuming that the matter would be minor. Ngo Dinh Diem, Prime Minister of the south, expected no more than ten thousand refugees. General Paul Ely, the French Commissioner General of Indochina expected around thirty thousand landlords and buisinessman would move south and proclaimed that he would take responsibility for the transport of any Vietnamese who decided to move to territory controlled by the French Union (such as the SoV). Pierre Mendes-France, the Prime Minister of France and his government had planned to provide for around 50,000 displaced persons.

The predictions were extremely inaccurate. As notice of the possibility of relocation spread through the communist controlled north, thousands of predominantly Catholic northerners descended on the capital Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, both of which were still in French control, seeking evacuation. This lead to anarchy and confusion as they fought over limited shelter, food, medicine and places on the ships and planes that were southbound for Saigon. By early August, there were over 200,000 waiting in Hanoi and Haiphong to be evacuated.

Evacuation
The French navy and air force, depleted after the Second World War neither anticipated nor were able to deal with so many refugees. France asked Washington for assistance, and the United States Department of Defense ordered the United State Navy to mobilise a task force for evacuation. Accordingly, Task Force 90 (CTF-90) under the command of Rear Admiral Lorenzo Sabin was inaugurated. US servicemen renovated and transformed cargo vessels and tank carriers to house the thousands of Vietnamese who would be packed into them. This was frequently done en route to Haiphong from their bases from Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The first US vessel to participate in the mass evacuation was the Menard, which left Haiphong on August 17 with 1924 refugees for a 1600 kilometre, three day journey into the southern capital. It was followed on the next day by the Montrose, with 2100 passengers. Both were built originally as attack transport vessels. On August, the US policy extended so that at the discretion of CTF-90 and the Chief Miliatary Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnamese and French military personnel could also be evacuated on US vessels. To cope with the swelling amount of sea transport coming into the south, CHMAAG established a refugee debarkation site at Vung Tau, a coastal port at the entrance of the Saigon River. This relieved congestion in the Saigon refugee camps and decreased the navigational problems in travelling up the river to Saigon. A further setback occurred when a typhoon struck in the vicinity of Haiphong, destroying almost half of the refugee staging area. By September 3, after only two weeks, the US Navy had evacuated 47,000 northerners. Such was the rate of evacuation that the South Vietnamese government ordered that only one shipment of no more than 2,500 passengers were to arrive in Saigon or Vung Tau until September 25. The pressure in the south was eased somewhat as incoming numbers fell due to Vietminh propaganda campaigns or forcible detention, combined with the rice harvesting season, which had prompted some to delay their departure. In October 20, the French authorities who were still in control of the ports decided to waive fees on US vessels engaged in the evcuation.

During the three hundred day period, US and French vessels made more than 500 journeys.

According to a COMIGAL report, French airplanes made 4280 trips, carrying a total of 213,635 refugees. A total of 555,037 people were recorded as having been transported by sea in 505 trips. The French Navy accounted for the vast majority, with 388 while the US Navy made 109. English, Taiwanese and Polish ships made two, two and four journeys respectively. In all, official figures reported 768,672 people who migrated under military supervision. The official figures recorded more than 109,000 people as having journeyed into the south of their own accord, some outside of the 300 day period. These occurred either by crossing the river dividing the zones on makeshift rafts, sailing on improvised craft into a southern port, or trekking through Laos. As of 1957, a total of 928,152 refugees were claimed by the South Vietnamese government, of which 98.3% were ethnic Vietnamese. 85% were engaged in farming or fishing and 85% were Catholics, while the remainder were Buddhists or Protestants. The data excluded approximately 120,000 military related personnel and claimed that only 4,358 people moved north. This was attributed to migrant workers from rubber plantations who returned north for family reasons. An independent study by Bernard B. Fall determined that the US Navy carried around 310,000 refugees. The French were credited with around 214,000 airlifted refugees, 270,000 seaborne refugees, 120,000 and 80,000 Vietnamese and French military evacuees respectively. It was believed that a large number of the 109,000 refugees who went south by their own means, hitchhiked on French transport that was going south for other purposes not related to the migration operation. Fall noted that the figures were likely to have been overestimated, since there were cases of fraudulent reporting on the part of the new arrivals. Some refugees would travel south, register themselves, smuggle themselves on vessels returning north for another shipment of humans and return and re-register to claim multiple aid packages. Likewise, with instances of entire villages moving south, the authorities frequently took the word of the village leaders as to how many people were in their delegation. Often the chiefs would inflate the population figures to claim a greater ration of supplies. The mass exodus did not disrupt the north to a great extent since whole villages often left, instead of half a village leaving and leaving the remainder of the community in disarray. Fall estimated that around 120,000 Vietminh troops and their dependents went north. Most of these were attributed to Vietminh orders base upon military reasoning, with some being ordered to stay behind for future guerrilla activities. The northward movement was facilitated by vessels leaving from assembly areas at Ca Mau in the southernmost point of Vietnam and Qui Nhon. The vessels were from communist nations such as Poland, as well as empty French ships heading back north to fetch more southward refugees. The Vietminh were also active in politically converting the Montagnard indigenous people of Vietnam, whose land in the south were settled by incoming northern settlers. The communists spread propaganda with broadcasts in indigenous languages and infiltration of the mountainous areas. According to a study by Michigan State University, some 6,000 tribespeople left with the communist to go north, accompanied by some Vietminh who had adopted the indigenous culture.

The United States provided emergency food, medical care, clothing and shelter at reception centres in Saigon and elsewhere in the south. American funds through the United States Operations Mission was responsible for 97 of the refugee aid. The United States was followed by France, United Kingdom, Australia, West Germany, New Zealand and The Netherlands.

With most of the refugees being Catholic, the voluntary agencies which were prominent in helping the US and French governments in their humanitarian efforts were Catholic. The National Catholic Welfare Conference and Catholic Relief Services contributed over USD35m and sent hundreds of aid workers to South Vietnam. US clerics such as Joseph Harnett spent more than a year in Saigon supervising the establishment of humanitarian and religious projects. Harnett's CRS supervised the establishment and maintenance of orphanages, hospitals, schools and churches. His volunteers fed rice and warm milk to one hundred thousand refugees on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of blankets donated by the American Catholic organistations served as beds, roofs against monsoonal downpours and as temporary walls in mass housing facilities.

The United Nations Children's Fund also made contributions, with technical assistance and by distributing merchandise, foodstuffs and various other gifts.

Propaganda campaign
The United States also played a large part in a propaganda campaign run by the Central Intelligence Agency to enhance the size of the exodus away from the communist north. The CIA campaign was regarded as one of the most audacious in the history of covert operations. The program was managed and directed by Colonel Edward Lansdale, who masqueraded as the assistant US air attaché in Saigon while leading a covert group that specialised in psychological warfare. Lansdale had advised Diem that it was imperative to have as many people in the south as possible when the time came for the national reunification elections. When Diem noted the limited capabilities of the south to absorb refugees, Lansdale assured him that the US would bear the burden. Diem authorised Lansdale to launch the relocation campaign. According to the historian Seth Jacobs, the campaign "ranked with the most audacious enterprises in the history of covert action."

Lansdale employed a variety of stunts in order to compel more northerners to move south. South Vietnamese soldiers in civilian clothing were sent into the north to spread rumours of impending doom. One such story was that the Vietminh had done a deal with Vietnam's traditional enemies China that had allowed two Chinese divisions to invade the north. The story reported that the Chinese were raping and pillaging at the permission of the Vietminh. Lansdale also hired counterfeiters to produce bogus Vietminh leaflets on how to behave under the communists; explaining to them to create a list of their material possessions so that they would be more easily confiscated, fomenting peasant discontent. Soothsayers were hired to predict disaster under communism, and prosperity in the south for those who went there. The most inflammatory rumour was that Washington intended to launch an attack to liberate the north as soon as all anti-communists had fled to the south. It claimed that the Americans would use atomic bombs against the north and that the only way of avoiding death in a nuclear holocaust was to move south. Lansdale had pamphlets printed which depicted Hanoi with three circles of nuclear destruction superimposed on it.

Lansdale in particular targeted the northern Catholics, who were known for their strongly anti-communist tendencies. His staff printed tens of thousands of pamphlets with slogans such as "Christ has gone south" and "the Virgin Mary has departed from the North" and alleging anti-Catholic persecution under Ho Chi Minh. Posters depicting communists closing a cathedral and forcing the congregation to pray in front Ho, adorned with a caption "make your choice" were pasted around Hanoi and Haiphong. Diem himself went to Hanoi while the French were still garrisoned there to encourage Catholics to move. The campaign resonated with northern Catholic priests, who told their disciples that a communist government would end freedom of worship, that sacraments would no longer be given and that anyone who stayed behind would endanger their souls. The migration helped to strengthen Diem's support base. Before the partition, the majority of Vietnam's Catholic population lived in the north. After the borders were sealed, the majority was now under Diem's rule. The Catholics implicitly trusted Diem due to a common religion and were a source of loyal political support. One of Diem's main objections to the Geneva Accords, which the State of Vietnam refused to sign, was that it deprived him of the Catholic regions of North Vietnam. With entire Catholici provinces moving south en masse, in 1956 Saigon had more Catholics in its Diocese than Paris or Rome. Of Vietnam's 1.45m Catholics, over a million lived in the south, 55% of which were northern refugees.

The Vietminh also engaged in counter-propaganda in an attempt to deter the exodus from the north. Evacuees reported being ridiculed by the Vietminh, who claimed that they would he sadistically tortured before being killed by the French and American authorities in Haiphong. They depicted the American sailors of CTF-90 as cannibals who would eat their babies and predicted disaster in the junles, beaches and mountains of South Vietnam. The Vietminh contended htat it was too great a risk and would be futile, asserting that they would win the 1956 reunification elections.

Media and public relations
The United States reaped public relations benefits from the mass exodus in South Vietnam, which was used to depict the allure of the "free world". This was enhanced by the relatively miniscule amount of people who voluntarily moved north into the communist zone. The event put the spotlight on Vietnam to an extent which it had not done before. Many prominent news agencies sent highly decorated reporters to cover the event. The New York Times despatched Tillman and Peggy Durdin, while the New York Herald Tribune sent the Pulitzer Prize-winning war reporters Marguerite Higgins and Homer Bigart. Future US embassy official John Mecklin covered the event for Time Life. The press reports presented highly laudatory and emotional accounts of the mass exodus Vietnamese away from communist north into the south. Life called the mass migration "a tragedy of almost nightmarish proportions . . .Many [refugees] went without food or water or medicine for days, sustained only by the faith in their heart." The Americans revelled in what was a mass migration of unprecedented levels of success.

The hyperbole by the mainstream press paled in comparison to that meted out by the American Catholic press. The event was given front page coverage in America's diocesan newspapers. The accounts were invariably sensationalist and demonised the communist Vietminh as religious persecutors who committed barbaric atrocities on Catholics. San Francisco's Monitor told of a priest whom the Vietminh "beat with guns until insensible and then buried alive in a ditch". Milwaukee's Catholic Herald Citizen described two priests who had been chained together and "suffered atrocious and endless agony". Our Sunday Visitor called the "persecution" in Vietnam "the worst in history", alleging that the Vietminh engaged in "child murder and cannibalism". Newark's Advocate posted an editorial cartoon titled "Let Our People Go!", depicting mobs of Vietnamese refugees attempting to break through as blood-laced fence of barbed wire. Other papers depicted the Vietminh blowing up churches, torturing children and machine gunning elderly Catholics. One paper proclaimed that "the people of Vietnam became a crucified people and their homeland a national Goglotha."

Social integration
The arrival of the refugees presented various social issues for South Vietnam. The refugees needed to be integrated into society with jobs and homes, otherwise long periods in tents and temporary housing would sap morale and possibly foster pro-Communist sympathy. Diem had to devise programs to ease the new citizens into the economic system.

Diem established the Commissariat for Refugees, commonly referred to by its Frecnh initials COMIGAL. Bui Van Luong, a family friend and devout Catholic, was appointed as the head of the resettlement agency. It worked in cooperation with the United States Operations Mission, the non military wing of the American presence and the Military Assistance Advisory Group. These were supplemented with American Catholic aid agencies and an advisory group from Michigan State University where Diem had stayed while in exile in the early 1950s. With more than four thousand new arrivals per day, the northerners were housed in tents at a hippodrome, before buildings such as schools, hospitals, warehouses, places of worship. Eventually, temporary villages were built and by mid 1955 most of the one million refugees were living in rows of temporary housing along highways leading east and north out of Saigon.

The next objective was to integrate the refugees into South Vietnamese society. At the time, there was a lack of cultivatable land in secure area. In early 1955, much of the Mekong Delta was in Vietminh hands, while other parts were held by the private armies of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects. Saigon was controlled by the organised crime gang Binh Xuyen, who had been given control of the police after purchasing a license from Emperor Bao Dai. It was not until later when the Vietminh had moved north and Diem had dispersed the sects and gangs that the new arrivals could be sent to the countryside. The urban areas were secured when the Binh Xuyen were defeated in the Battle for Saigon in late April and early May by the Diem's forces. Lansdale had managed to bribe many of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai military commanders to integrate into Diem's Vietnameese National Army, but some commanders fought on. It was not until early 1956 that the last Hoa Hao commander Ba Cut, was captured in an Army of the Republic of Vietnam campaign by General Duong Van Minh to allow peace in the countryside. This allowed COMIGAL to send expeditions to survey the rural land for settlement.

COMIGAL sent inspection teams around South Vietnam to find areas that were able to accommodate the new arrivals according to their professional skills; land suitable for farmers, favourable coastal areas for fishing and areas near population centres for industrially oriented arrivals. COMIGAL would then set up plans for settlement subprojects to the USOM or to the French Technical and Economic Cooperation Bureau to gain approval and funding for the subproject. The bureaucracy was relatively low, with most applications taking less than a fortnight to finalise paperwork and receive approval. Each subproject was given a nine month deadline for completion.

When suitable areas were found, refugees, usually in groups of between one and three thousand (based on an assumption of five people per family), were trucked to the site and began creating the new settlement: digging wells, building roads and bridges, clearing forests, bushes and swamps and constructing fishing bessels. Village elections were held to form committees that would liaise with COMIGAL on behalf of the new settlement.

COMIGAL provided them with farm implements, fertilisers and farm animals. In all 97% of the refugee relief was American. By mid 1957, 319 villlages had been built. Of these, 288 were for farmers and 26 for fishermen. The refugees were settled predominantly in the Mekong Delta, with 207 villages. 50 were created further north, while 62 were built in the central highlands. In total 92,443 housing units were constructed, supplemented by 317 and 18 elementary and secondary schools respectively. 38,192 hectares of land were cleared and some 2.4 million tons of potassium sulfate fertiliser were distributed. At the end of the year, Diem dissolved COMIGAL, declaring that its mission had been accomplished.

Difficulties and criticism
The program still had some loose ends which manifested themselves later. Many refugees had not been integrated economically and were living from government handouts. Critics noted that the refugees were not integrated but became a special-interest group that fostered resentment. The COMIGAL officials had decided not to split up refugees belonging to the same village, hoping to maintain social continuity. Many of the Catholic villages were effectively transplanted into southern territory. This was efficient in the short run but meant that they would never assimilate into southern society. They had little contact with the Buddhist majority and often held them in contempt, often flying the Vatican flag instead of the national flag. Diem, who had a reputation for heavily favouring Catholics, granted his new constituents a disproportionately high number of government and military posts on religious grounds not merit. He continued the French practice of defining Catholicism as a "religion" and Buddhism as an "association", which restricted their activities. This fostered a social divide between the new arrivals and their fellow countrymen and women. While on a visit to Saigon in 1955, the British journalist and novelist Graham Greene reported that Diem's religious favouritism "may well leave his tolerant country a legacy of anti-Catholicism." In 1963, simmering discontent over Diem's religious bias exploded into mass discontent during the Buddhist crisis. After the Buddhist flag was prohibited from public display for the Vesak celebrations commemorating the birth of Gautama Buddha, his forces killed nine protestors after opening fire. As demonstrations continued through the summer, ARVN special forces ransacked pagodas across the country, killing hundreds and jailing thousands of Buddhists. The tension culminated in Diem being overthrown and assassinated in a 1963 coup.

The indigenous population in the central highlands complained bitterly about the intrusion of ethnic Vietnamese onto their land, and resulted in a greater audience for communist propaganda in the frontier regions.

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dao chinh 1960
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Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi had fought for Diem against the Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicated in the Battle for Saigon in 1955. Thi's performance in 1955 so impressed Diem that he thereafter referred to him as "my son". Dong had been a veteran of the First Indochina War and at age 28 was regarded by American military advisers as a brilliant tactician and the brightest military prospect of his generation.

At 0300, the paratroop battalions occupied the military headquarters in Saigon, the radio station and the main military airport at Tan Son Nhut. However, they did not take over the entire communications network.

The rebels wanted Nhu and his wife out of the government, although they disagreed over whether to kill or deport the couple.

The paratroopers' first assault on the palace met with surprising resistance. Only thirty palace guards stood between the rebels and Diem, but they managed to repel the initial thrust and kill seven rebels who attempted to scale the fence surrounding the palace grounds. Thereafter they cordoned off the palace and held fire.

As dawn broke, civilians began massing outside the palace gates, verbally encouraging the rebels and waving banners demanding Diem's overthrow. Many suburban ARVN troops rallied to the insurgents and Diem appeared lost. According the Nguyen Thai Binh, a political rival forced in to exile, "Diem was lost. Any other than he would have capitulated." The rebels hesitated. Some like Dong felt the opportunity was there to storm the palace and captured Diem. Thi on the other hand, was worried that Diem could be killed in the confusion. Thi felt that despite his shortcomings, Diem was South Vietnams' best possible leader and thought that enforced reform was the best outcome.

However Durbrow urged Diem to negotiate with the paratroopers.

Phan Quang Dan, the most prominent political critic of Diem, who had been disqualified in the 1959 legislative election after winning his seat by a ratio of 6-1, became the rebels' spokesman. He spoke of the political mismanagement of the war against the Vietcong and its refusal to broaden its political base as the reason for the revolt.

Thieu from Bien Hoa. Fifth Division under Colonel Tran Thien Khiem brought in tanks.

Diem promises: an end to press censorship, less ogvernment control over the economy.

Dan was arrested in one of Diem's first orders after restablishing command. He was imprisoned and tortured.

In the wake of the failed coup, Diem blamed Durbrow for what he felt was a lack of US support, and his brother Nhu went on to accuse the ambassador of colluding with the rebels. Durbrow protested that he had been "100% in support of Diem". Diem's friend Colonel Edward Lansdale who as a CIA agent had helped to entrench Diem in 1955, ridiculed Durbrow's defence from his current job in The Pentagon and called for the Eisenhower administration to recall him. The new commander the Military Assistance Advisory Group Lieutenant Colonel Lionel McGarr agreed with Lansdale. The rift between American diplomatic and military representatives in South Vietnam began to grow. This was mirrored in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Diem. The paratroopers had been regarded as the most loyal of the ARVN's units. Diem intensified his policy of promoting officers on loyalty rather than competence.

Hammer 154-155

The trial of those arrested for suspected involvement in the coup did not occur until mid 1963. Diem scheduled the prosecution in the middle of the Buddhist crisis in an attempt to intimidate the population against further dissent. Nineteen officers and 34 civilians were accused of complicity in the coup and called before the Special Military Court.

The Americans were given an unsubtle warning from Diem's officials not to interfere. The official prosecutor declared that he had documents proving that a foreign power was behind the failed coup but claimed that he was not free to publicy name the nation in question. It was later revealed in secret proceedings that he narrowed his charges to two Americans: George Carver, later revealed to be an officer of the CIA but then was identified only as and employee of the United States Operations Mission (an economic mission), and Howard C. Elting, described as the deputy chief of the American mission in Saigon.

One of the prominent civilians summoned to appear before the military tribunal was a well known novelist who wrote under the pen name of Nhat Linh. He was the Dai Viet leader Nguyen Tuong Tam, who had been Ho Chi Minh's foreign affaris minister in 1946. Tam had abandoned his post rather than lead the delegation to Fontainebleau and make concessions to the French colonial forces. In the two and a half years since the failed putsch, the authorities had not taken the conspiracy claims seriously enough to arrest Tam, but when he learned of the trial Tam did not attempt to defend himself and copmmitted suicide by cyanide. He left a death note stating "I also will kill myself as a warning to those people who are trampling on all freedom" in reference to the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc in protest against Diem's persecution of Buddhists. The suicide was greeted with a mixed reception. Although some felt that it was in line with a Vietnamese tradition of choosing death rather than humiliation, some in Tam's party considered his actions to be romantic and sentimental.

The brief trial opened on July 8. The seven officers and two civilians who had fled the country when the coup failed were found guilty and sentenced to death in absentia. Five officers were acquitted while the reaminder were sentenced to prison terms from five to ten years. The leader of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dan (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) Vu Hong Khanh was given six years in prison. Phan Khac Suu, a former Diem government minister was sentenced to eight years, mainly for calling on Diem to reform as part of the Caravelle Group. Dan, the spokesman was sentenced to seven years. Fourteen of the civilians were acquitted, including Tam.

Hammer 131-133

One of the underlying reasons was that many ARVN officers were members of other anti-communist nationalist groups such as the Dai Viet (Great Vietnam) and the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party). These parties had been established around World War II and the VNQDD had run a military school near the Chinese border with the assistance of their Nationalist Chinese counterparts, the Kuomintang (which was the Republic of China which now rules Taiwan). Diem and his family had crushed all alternative anti-communist nationalists, and his politicisation of the army had alienated the forces. Officers were promoted on the basis of political allegiance rather than military competence, and many VNQDD and Dai Viet trained officers were denied such promotions.

"We consider it overriding importance to Vietnam and Free World that agreement be reached soonest in order avoid continued division, further bloodshed with resultant fatal weakening Vietnam's ability [to] resist communists."

Most of the rebel soldiers had been told that they were going to attack the palace in order to save Diem from a mutiny of the Presidential Guard. Only one or two officers in any given rebel unit knew what was actually going on.

The acutal leaders were Dong and his brother-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trieu Hong and Hong's uncle Hoang Co Thuy. The coup was organised with the help of some VNQDD and Dai Viet members, civilians and officers among them. 132

General Nguyen Khanh climbed over the palace wall on the second day to reach Diem. He gained a reputation on that day of having to helped Diem but in later years was criticised for having a foot in both camps. Critics noticed that Khanh had been on good terms with the rebels and had only joined when it was apparent that Diem had gained the upper hand.

They were granted asylum by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

133

In May, Nhu said "The least you can say . . is that the State Department was netural between a friendly government and rebels who tried to put that government down . .  and the official attitude of the Americans during that coup was not at all the attitude the President would have expected."

Khiem was promoted to general and made Army Chief of Staff.

August 24 cable
DEPTEL 243, also known as Department Telegram or Telegram 243 or Cable 243 or mostly commonly as the August 24 cable, was a high profile message sent on August 24, 1963 by the US Department of State to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US ambassador to South Vietnam. The cable

came in the wake of the midnight raids of August 21 by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem against Buddhist pagodas across the country in which hundreds were believed to have been killed. The raids were orchestrated by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and precipitated a change in US policy. The cable declared that Washington would no longer tolerate Nhu remaining in a position of power and ordering Lodge to pressure Diem to remove his brother. In the case that Diem refused, the Americans would explore alternative leaders for South Vietnam. In effect, the cable authorized Lodge to give the green light to ARVN officers to launch a coup to replace Diem if he did not willingly remove Nhu from power. The cable marked a turning point in US-Diem relations and was described in the Pentagon Papers as "controversial". The historian John W. Newman described it as "the single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War."

The cable also highlighted an internal split in the Kennedy administration, with anti-Diem officials in the State Department prevailing over generals and Defense Department officials who remained optimistic that the Vietnam War was proceeding well under Diem. This was underlined by the manner in which the cable was prepared before being transmitted to Lodge.

BACKGROUND

The cable came in the wake of the midnight raids of August 21 by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem against Buddhist pagodas across the country in which hundreds were believed to have been killed and more than a thousand monks and nuns arrested. The pagodas were also extensively vandalised. Initially, the raids coincided with the declaration of martial law on the day before. A group of generals of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had asked Diem to give them extra powers to fight the Vietcong but secretly wanted to manoeuvre for a coup. Diem agreed, so that Nhu's Special Forces could take advantage and attack the Buddhist pagoda while disguised as regular ARVN forces. The raids were instigated by Nhu's Special Forces and Secret Police.

At first, there was confusion as to what had occurred. Nhu had ordered the phone lines into the US embassy and the US Information Service to be cut. A curfew was imposed on the streets, and it was initially believed that the regular army had orchestrated the attacks. The Voice of America initially broadcast Nhu's version of the events, which held that the army was responsible. This infuriated the ARVN generals, since many Vietnamese listened to the program as their only source of non-government, non-propaganda news. Through CIA agent Lucien Conein, General Tran Van Don communicated to the Americans that Nhu had created the impression that the ARVN were responsible in order to increase dissent among the lower ranks and weaken support and to discredit the generals in case they were planning a coup.

The cable stated a change in US foreign policy, noting that the Special Forces of the Army of the Repuublic of Vietnam loyal to Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and not the regular army were responsible for the attacks.

On a Saturday afternoon, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and CIA director John McCone on vacation, the message was drafted by a group of State Department officials. President John F. Kennedy was on vacation, and told the officials to get other officials to approve the message. Believing that Kennedy had already approved the cable, administration advisors subsequently approved it. Secreatary of State Dean Rusk was the only cabinet member to sign the document, believing that Kennedy had already informally approved it. The cable signalled the start of more frenetic plotting by ARVN officers in the belief that the US would not interfere and would support a military junta. The plotting culminated in a November 1 coup lead by General Duong Van Minh, in which Diem and Nhu were overthrown, assassinated and the consequences thereof.

Cable
The opening paragraphs of the cable stated

It is now clear that whether military proposed martial law or whether Nhu tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its imposition to smash pagodas with police and Tung's Special Forces loyal to him, thus placing onus on military in eyes of world and Vietnamese people. Also clear that Nhu has maneuvered [sic] himself into commanding position.

US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available.

If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.

The cable went on to instruct Lodge to inform Diem that the US could not accept the raids and to call for strong action to address the Buddhist crisis. Lodge was told to tell the military officers that

....US would find it impossible to continue support GVN militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of Nhus from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism.

The cable also informed Lodge of the need to exonerate the ARVN from responsibility of the pagoda raids. It asked Lodge to approve a broadcast by the Voice of America laying the responsibility at Nhu. Lodge was further requested to examine and search for alternative leadership to replace Diem.

Response of Lodge
Lodge replied the next day and endorsed the strong position but proposing to skip an attempt to approach Diem to suggest that Nhu be removed. Lodge advocated only stating the US position to the generals and in effect to encourage the ARVN to stage a coup. Lodge's cable stated

Believe that chances of Diem's meeting our demands are virtually nil. At the same time, by making them we give Nhu chance to forestall or block action by military. Risk, we believe, is not worth taking, with Nhu in control combat forces Saigon. Therefore, propose we go straight to Generals with our demands, without informing Diem. Would tell them we prepared have Diem without Nhus but it is in effect up to them whether to keep him.

Infighting
The decision to authorise the cable prompted significant infighting in the Kennedy administration. This began on a Monday morning meeting at the White House on August 26. Kennedy was met with angry comments by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, all of whom denied authorising the cable. Kennedy was reported to have said "My God! My government;s coming apart." Taylor felt insulted by the final line of the cable which asserted that only the "minimum essential people" had seen its contents. During an acrimonius exchange at a midday meeting, he condemned the cable as an "egregious end run" by an anti-Diem faction. Hilsman rebutted Taylor by asserting that Kennedy and representatives of departments and agencies had approved the message. Years afterward, Taylor decalred

The anti-Diem group centered in State [department] had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances.

Talyor claimed tha the message was reflective of Forrestal and Himlsman's "wll-known compulsion" to remove Diem.

Kennedy could no longer stand the arguing among his officials and shouted "This shit has got to stop!". Kennedy was angry at hilsman an dForrestal for what he deemed to be incompetence and Harriman for indiscretion. When Kennedy criticised Forrestal for proceeding without the explict approval of McCone, Forrestal offered to resign Kenneday sharply replied "You're not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around."

In the end, the cable was not retracted despite the disagreement. Ball refusd to back down, maintaining that "the evil influence of the Nhus" overrode all other factors. Ball described Diem as "an offense to America." McCone did not advocate a change in policy despite disagreeing with the process in which the telegram left Washington. Taylor said that "You can't change American policy in twenty-four hours and expect anyone to ever believe you again." Kennedy walked around the meeting table and asked each of his advisers whether they wanted to change course. None were willing to tell him to retract his telegram.

BUU HOI
In 1962, Buu Hoi had been elected to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. With the support of Third World countries, he had defeated the American backed candidate from the Republic of China.

His father Ung Uy headed the Private Council of the Imperial Family. Ung Uy was the Minister of Rites at Bao Dai's court until May 9, 1945.

Born in 1915, Buu Hoi was a native of the former imperial capital of Hue. He was a great great grandson of Emperor Minh Mang, who had ruled Vietnam from 1820 until 1841. Minh Mang had been a staunch Confucianist who was known for his ultraconservative philosophy which was manifested in a shunning of the western world, technological and scientific innovation. He also was known for his strident hostility to the intrusion of Catholic missionaries into Vietnam as well as Buddhism, which were considered as undermining the mandate of heaven of the Emperor. Minh Mang's father was Emperor Gia Long, who had united Vietnam under its current state. Gia Long had reunited the nation under the newly formed Nguyen Dynasty with the help of French volunteers recruited by the Jesuit Catholic missionary Pigneau de Behaine after over two centuries of north-south division and multiple wars between the Nguyen Lords in the south and the Trinh Lords in the north.

Buu Hoi was also a Confucianist, instilled with a sense of duty to family and service to the nation. In contrast to his ancestors, Buu Hoi was also a secular-minded Buddhist, and his mother later became a Buddhist nun under the religious name Thich Dieu Hue.

Proposed by Mendes France in Washington.

Buu Hoi did his secondary schooling at the Lycee Albert Sarraut, a prestigious French established school for the upper class in Hanoi, the colonial capital. He then studied for a degree in pharmacy at the University of Hanoi and simultaneously audited courses at the Faculty of Medicine. He had developed an interest in science from his youth, noting that this was "because of the desire of his mother and partly because of his own belief in the human value of science." He was just twenty years old when he was awarded his degree.

He subsequently left Vietnam in 1935 to study in Paris and was never to return as a resident. There Buu Hoi had befriended Ngo Dinh Nhu, the younger brother of Ngo Dinh Diem while in France. Nhu was a staunch advocate of a Catholic doctrine known as personalism and later became known for his efforts in running the clandestine Can Lao Party (Personalist Revolutionary Party). The Can Lao was a Catholic part which supplied the autocratic Diem's power base and acted as a security apparatus to crush dissent in South Vietnam. This formed a bond between the two men which saw Buu Hoi later serve in the diplomatic corps and as a scientific advisor for Diem.

Only a few days after his arrival in Paris, an event occurred which he credited with further motivating him to pursue a scientific career. A family acquaintance Marie-Louise Gasc, a journalist, took him to a tea party hosted by Jena Perrin, Nobel laureate in physics. There Buu Hoi met Louis de Broglie, a French aristocrat and Nobel prize winner of physics known for his work in the wave particle duality of quantum physics. He met other contemporary greats of French science including Frederic and Irene Joliot-Curie. He recollected "What impressed me then the most was that all that concentration of science was parallelled by an equal concentration of kindness and universal open-mindedness."

At Sorbonne University, he followed the regular curriculum toward his doctorate. He studied for a "License es Science" degree while working as an Intern of Pharmacy at the Paris Hospitals. After a short period in the Institute of Chemical Physics under Perrin, he began his doctoral research in organic research. He was admitted to the laboratory of Pauline Ramart-Lucas to study the spectrophotometry of organic compounds.

Buu Hoi's career was briefly interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. He volunteered in the French Army and served until the Fall of Paris to Nazi Germany in May 1940. He then found himself in Toulouse in the southern zone under the fascist puppet Vichy France government. With the help of the physicist Paul Langevin whom he had met at Perrin's party, he was able to re-enter the Nazi occupied northern France and return to Paris. HE became a member of the research staff of the National Center of Scientific Research (CNRS) in 1941, and upon the Liberation of France was appointed "Maitre de conferences" at the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique by the Provisional Government of Charles de Gaulle.

At around the same period in 1944, Buu Hoi met Antoine Lacassagne, Director of Biological Research at the Radium Institute. At the time Lacassagne was establishing and interdisciplinary team for exploring the possibilities and uses of a hypothesis by Otto Schmidt which became known as the electronic theory of hydrocarbon carcinogenesis. One of the effects of the Nazi occupation was that the foreign scientific literature that reached France was almost entirely German. As a result, this exposed Lacassagne to what to be the scientific foundation of his highly fruitful collaboration with Buu Hoi. At the time, the electronic theory of molecular structure was in its formative years and was not considered as a vehicle by biologists for explaining phenomena. Lacassagne's past work in radiobiology, steroid hormones and polycyclic hydrocarbon carcinogens made him aware of the importance of subatomic particles and structural pattern of polynuclear compounds. Lacassagne saw promise in the pospect of Schmidt's hypothesis in attempting to explain carcinogenesis by a combination of elements of electron quantum theory, geometry and checmial structure. This required an interdisciplinary approach. Buu Hoi's training in organic chemistry provided him with a wide range of tools to apply in the exploration of the genesis of cancer.

The rapport between the 60 year lod and Lacassagne and Buu Hoi, less than half his age, was immediate. They began publishing joint research immediately despite Buu Hoi not formally joining the Radium Institute until 1947. This occurred when he became head of the newly established Department of Organic and Medicinal Chemistry and "Maitre de Recherches" at the CNRS. After thirteen years, Buu Hoi and his team moved from the Radium Institute to larger facilities at the Institute of Chemistry of Natural Substances in 1960. The new quarters was part of the National Centrer of Scientific Research laboratory group at Gif-sur-Yvette, about 24 km from Paris. He reached the pinnacle of the CNRS supported research hierarchy in 1962 with a promotion to Director of Research ("Exceptional" class). Around 1967, he established further research groups under his guidance; one at Orleans at the Marcel Delepine Center and a second at the Lannelogue Institute at Vanves on the southern outskirts of Paris.

The scientific discoveries of Buu Hoi spanned a wide range. He was trained as an organic chemist and achieved international recognition in his own right in the field, but he was able to span to into other fields. This was attributed to his intuitive intelligence and a vast memory which was credited with his ability to grasp the essence of a biological problem sometimes only vaguely related to organic chemistry. He came to be regarded as the most original and productive scientists in exploring the structure activity relationships of polynuclear carcinogens. His research spread beyond chemical carcinogenesis. He also published widely in organic chemistry, pharmacology, therapeutics, epidemiology and biochemistry. He started his research career with investigations on chaulmoogric and hypocarpic acids in his Polytechnique laboratory. At the time, these were the only products used for treating leprosy. Within a few years, he had established himself as an international authority in the chemotherapy of the disease. He delineated the tole of the cyclopentene ring and its double bond and of the chain length in determining the toxicity and leprostatic activity of these compounds. Although from the time of his 1944 meeting with Lacassagne onwards he was preoccupied with the study of chemical carcinogenesis, he continued to devote substantial effort to the chemotherapy of leprosy and the associated chemotherapy of tuberculosis.

The overwhelming amount of Buu Hoi's contributions are in the field of chemical carcinogenesis and the synthesis of related organic chemical compounds. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, he had extensive collaborations with the quantum chemistry personnel of the Radium Institute on various aspects of the electronic theory of carcinogenesis. Buu Hoi was the first to propose the involvement of noncovalent forces. Together with Lacassagne and Rudali, in the 1940s he became the first to describe the phenomena of synergisma dn antagonism between carcinogens. He demonstrated this by using hydrocarbons on the skin of mice and later extended this to hepatic and other carcinogens. Starting in 1947, he collaborated with Zajdela and Lacassagne in exploring the relationships between the structure and carcinogenic activity of polynuclear compounds. The study spanned a groundbreaking scale and depth. These involved the fundamental ring systems and derivatives of 1,2-benzanthracene, the dibenzopyrenes, steranthrenes, anthanthrene, 1,2,3,4-dibenzanthracene, a variety of benzo and dibenzofluoranthenes. This was extended to large-molecular-size and "hypercondensed" hydrocarbons, ring opening and partial hydrogenation. During his study of dibenzopyrenes, he discovered a molecular arrangement involving the framework of aromatic hydrocarbons. His studies of the carcinogenic azulenophenalenes led him to question the role of aromaticity. Aside from his studies with aza-replaced hydrocarbons, benz- and dibenzacridines and –carbazoles, he also synthesised and tested a number of new structural types of heteroaromatics with reference to the nature, nuimber and position of the heteroatoms. These included the naphtho and benzo derivatives of pyridocarbazole and beta-carboline, heteroaromatics with sulfur, arsenic or selenium replacements. These were either alone or in association with nitrogen, as well as sulfur and nitrogen containing pseudoazulenes. A series of hydrocarbon-like polynuclear lactones were explored with the intent of establishing a connection between polynuclear aromatics and aflatoxins. Such studies of heteroatomic polynuclears led him to propose a "newer picture" of a carcinogenic hydrocarbon, helping the generalise the classical K-region hypothesis.

He sontributed to studies on the carcinogenicity of 4-nitroquinoline-N-oxide derivatives, the production of plant tumors by a nitrosamine. He also studied metabolism and protein binding of polynuclears and the effect of the binding o DNA replication and transcription, testing the effect of various carcinogens on the hatching of shrimp eggs. From the mid 1960s onwards, Buu Hoi increasingly turned his focus to the structural facets of polynuclears which determine their ability to induce microsomal enzyme synthesis, in particular involving zoxazolamine and dicoumarol hydroxylation. Aside from his study of fundamental organic chemistry, chemical carcinogenesis and chemotherapy of leprosy and tuberculosis, Buu Hoi's team also conducted research into a wide range of issues of biological and therapeutic interest. Tehse included the sysnthesis and testing anti-inflammatory non-steroid compounds, substituted sex hormones, anti-coagulant substances and their potentiation, antidiabetic agents, treatment of hypertension by methyl-DOPA, antioxidants and the chemophylaxy of aging and the toxicity of dioxine among others.

In 1947, Ho Chi Minh named him as the Rector of the Univerisyt of Hanoi.

He was a science divsor to Diem, and was appointed in 1960 as the Director of the Atomic Energy Establishment of Vietnam. In this capacity, he was a key figure in the establishiment of an Atomic Energy Research Center. This was primarily geared towards the medical and agricultural uses of atomic energy and a reactor was opened in Da Lat. Several countries of the third world awarded him honorary distinctions.

"The passing of Buu Hoi leavese void difficult to fill. He pioneered in several scientific fields and left and imprint on a number of others. His soaring intellect survives in the unparalleled span of his contributions."

He was regarded as an idealist with somewhat romanticist notions.

While in Paris, Buu Hoi had not limited his activities to scientific research. Unlike his cousin Emperor Bao Dai, he was willing to fight for Vietnamese independence. He had worked with Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh formed Democratic Republic Vietnam which sought to establish independence from its formation in September 1945. His international reputation, generated by his scientific achievements, lent prestige to Ho's government. Buu Hoi broke off links in 1950, when the Communists imposed a dictatorship on the resistance movement, resulting in many non communist nationalists breaking away.

In late 1947, Empress Nam Phuong arrived in France to lobby Buu Hoi to help ratlly nationalists behind Bao Dai. Buu Hoi said he would be willing only on the condition that the Emperor would unite with the resistance in order to help the Ciet Minh from being exclusively communist. Bao Dai refused to do so.

In 1949, on behalf of the royal family who had taken part in the Fontainebleau Conference, he released a statement

"The former Imperial Family of Viet Nam regards with profound sadness the spilling of blood which is taking place in Viet Nam because of the refusal of the French authorities to negotiate with the national government of President Ho Chi Minh . . . . it should denter into relations with the government of President Ho Chi Minh in order to seek with it a peaceful solution of the conflict based on justice and fraternity."

At the same time, his father left the French controlled areas to live unde rHo Chi Minh's control. Hammer (1954), p. 228.

He railed against partition, predicting that it would likely lead to the indefinitate maintenance of the "[French] expeditionary corps in the non-Communist zone." As it turned out, American troops were deployed to what was to become the Republic of Vietnam.

In the early 1950s, Buu Hoi travelled to the United States. After the disruption of the Second World War, the president of the American Chemical Society had asked a colleague to resume contact with French chemistry circles by selecting three men regarded to be the outstanding chemists in France. Buu Hoi was one of the three selected by the ACS. At the time he was director of research in organic chemistry at the Radium Institute in Paris. Buu Hoi accepted the invitation of the ACS to deliver a series of lectures in the United States. There, in the autumn of 1951, he also travelled to the Maryknoll Seminaries in Lakewood, New Jersey to offer his support to Ngo Dinh Diem in his quest to form an independent Vietnamese government.

He was a professor famous for his work in biochemistry and his research on cancer and leprosy.

In August 1954, Buu Hoi returned to South Vietnam for a visit. Diem had been named Prime Minister of what was then the French backed State of Vietnam. Vietnam was supposed to be reunified after national elections in 1956 following a temporary partition and transitional phase. Diem was in trouble as the generals of the Vietnamese National Army disobeyed him and the national police were controlled by the Binh Xuyen, an armed criminal syndicate. Parts of the Mekong Delta were controlled by the private armies of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects. Diem's government had little authority even in the centre of Saigon.

The youth of Saigon flocked to listen to Buu Hoi speak and newspapers reported that he was feted as a national hero. People saw him as a respected national figure, a professor who exuded wisdom and was above politics at a time when South Vietnam was in chaos. Buu Hoi went to meet Pham Cong Tac the pope of the Cao Dai and his entourage in their stronghold of Tay Ninh west of Saigon near the border with Cambodia. He went to a secret meeting with the Cao Dai's general Trinh Minh The at his base on Nui Ba Den (Black Lady Mountain). Buu Hoi went on to meet the Hoa Hao in the Delta city of Can Tho and later met with Binh Xuyen leaders in Cholon. His prestige allowed many disparate and warring groups to receive him with respect. He further met with labor groups, army officers and representatives of the educated class. Later when the Saigon press was censored and partly shut down, he outlined his vision for Vietnam in the Paris magazine L'Express.

His popularity was higher than any present or recent politician among a public disenchanted with the disunity and lack of government. The phenomenon of a political disinclined scholar above politics saw him compared to Paderewski of Ploand after the First World War and Weizmann, the first President of Israel. He outlined a program which sought to have South Vietnam strengthened against communism and integrated into South East Asia.

Buu Hoi advocated a new "government of national solidarity" in Saigon that incorporated the religious sects. This contrasted to Diem, who wanted to have unchallenged power with the sects in a subservient position. He felt that this that this would foster reconciliation between non-Communist nationalists in the south. Buu Hoi opposed a military buildup in the south, reasoning that the best defense against insurrection came from fostering popular participation in the administrative and economic institutions of the state. He favoured neutralism in South Vietnam's foreign affairs while remaining on positive terms with France and the United States. He argued that the colonial era and Vietnam's natural place in Asia was to join other nations such as India in a policy of non-alignment. He hoped that both North and South Vietnam could be admitted to the United Nations.

Diem rejected these moderate policies, believing that a militantly anti-Communist stance was the solution for South Vietnam. This coincided with a fact finding mission by Dmeocratic Party Senator Mike Mansfield, a strong Diem supporter. Regarded as the leading Vietnam authority in the Senate, he advocated a suspension of US aid if Diem was removed. Buu Hoi had received support for his ideas from the sects, army and labor groups. L'Express, the newspaper in Paris which printed his ideas, was considered to be friendly with French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France. As a result, the US State Department interpreted it as a French manoevre to replace Diem with Buu Hoi. Strongly disapproving of Buu Hoi's foreign policies, the Sate Department warned Mendes-France that US policy would change if Buu Hoi or someone like-minded became Prime Minister.

In 1958, Buu Hoi resumed work for Diem on the international front. He was charged with attending to the Indian, Canadian and Polish diplomats from the International Control Commission that were charged with monitoring the Geneva Accords which partitioned Vietnam in 1954. He was also assigned the job of securing diplomatic links and greater recognition of the Republic of Vietnam on the international arena. He was named as South Vietnam's ambassador to various countries and several bodies of the United Nations. In addition, he was named as the director of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Center that was constructed near the central highlands resort town of Da Lat. It was to be South Vietnam's first nuclear reactor.

In early 1953, Buu Hoi travelled as a private citizen to the office of the Vietminh in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. Depsite leaving the Vietminh three years earlier, his nationalist credentials allowed him to secure an audience. At the time he was the elected president of an association of some 25,000 Vietnamese workers and soldiers stranded in France after the Second World War. He had also been a delegated to the conference at Fontainebleau, the collapse of which had helped to spark the First Indochina War in 1946. Buu Hoi was accompanied by Jacques Raphael-Leygues, a Radical Socialist politician. Before departing Paris, Buu Hoi had been authorised by French President Vincent Auriol to propose the opening of direct negotiations with France. He left a letter in Rangoon to be delivered to Vietminh leaders, prophetically predicting that this would be the last opportunity for them to deal with France directly without third part interference. He predicted that the United States would eventually intervene with force unprecedented in Vietnam if the situation was not resolved. Neither the French nor the Vietminh made further efforts to pursue negotiations. Years later, Rench officials blamed domestic political feuds and the lack of support from some sections of their government. The Vietminh blamed logistical difficulties on their tardy and minimal reply. The result was that after the French were defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in early 1954, Vietnam was partitioned at the Geneva Conference.

The Buddhist crisis erupted in the summer of 1963 after the shooting by authorities of nine Buddhists who were protesting a government ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. As civil disobedience and demands for religious equality by the Buddhist majority against Diem's Catholic government grew, Diem's forces repeatedly attacked Buddhists. In June, Buu Hoi wrote to Nhu to urge Diem to further dialogue with the Buddhists and create a Ministry of Religious Affairs. As Diem remained intransigent on demands for religious equality and bringing those responsible for the Hue shootings to justice, his forces used chemicals on Buddhist protestors in Hue. The turning point was the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc on June 11 at a bust Saigon intersection, which was a public relations disaster for Diem. As the impasse continued, Buu Hoi's mother, who had been a Buddhist nun for many years, travelled from Hue to Saigon. The Buddhist leaders had announced that the mother of South Vietnam's most distinguished scientist and diplomat and member of the royal family, intended to burn herself to death to highlight oppression against Buddhists. The tension grew, and eventually in July, she made an appearance at a press conference at Saigon's Xa Loi Pagoda, to repeat the threat. Outside, Nhu's men had organised a "spontaneous" demonstration where government supporters had been bussed in. Concerned for his mother and the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, Buu Hoi returned home in attempt to mediate between the Buddhists and Diem and Nhu. Rumours began to circulate stating that the Americans wanted to have Buu Hoi inserted in a newly created post of Prime Minister, in order that the Ngo family's rule would be diluted. He spent many hours talking with the Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang at Xa Loi to ensure that his mother would not actually self-immolate. The negotiations were fruitless and were futile. Shortly after midnight, the Special Forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam loyal to Nhu raided pagodas across the country, vandalising, looting and in some cases detonating them, arresting around 1400 monks and nuns. A few hundred laypeople had disappeared, presumed killed (or summarily executed afterwards) while trying to repel the invaders from the temples. Buu Hoi went to Gia Long Palace at the end of August to take leave and return to his laboratory. At the time, the United Nations had been strongly condemning the actions of Diem's regime. When Nhu told him "Tu me laisse dans la merde" (in French:"You have left me in the s***"), Buu Hoi agreed to defend Saigon at the UN in New York on the condition that a fact-finding mission would be allowed to enter the country and freely see the truth for themselves.

Buu Hoi arrived in New York in mid September. The American public had a highly unfavourable view of South Vietnam, due to the self-immolations and pagoda attacks. U Thant, the Buddhist Burmese who was the Secretary General of the United Nations sharply criticised Vietnam, saying that there was no country so chaotic and deteriorating. The campaign against the Diem regime was overtly lead by Ceylon, but Saigon felt that Cambodia had been stirring up animosity among the Asian countries, having already broken off diplomatic relations after the raids. The UN session started on September 17 and Buu Hoi met with US Ambassador to the United Nations Charles Yost two days later. Buu Hoi contended that the Buddhist movement had transformed into a political movement to overthrow Diem and claiming that media reports transmitted to America were inaccurate. Yost asserted that irrespective of what was happening, the situation was intolerable and that Diem had to address it. Buu Hoi thought that implementing the five point plan that Diem had signed in June but not implemented was the key. Buu Hoi admitted that discrimination in Vietnam was real. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US Ambassador in Saigon, described Buu Hoi's proposed solution as "oversimplified".

Buu Hoi outlined a plan to the Americans's UN representatives to avoid a full-scale debate on South Vietnam in the General Assembly. He revealed that South Vietnam would reject a formal inquiry mission as interference in domestic affairs, but would try to seize the initiative to invite a fact finding mission. He reasoned that such a delegation would spark a rapprochement in Vietnam and would delay debate and condemnation by the Assembly until the mission had tabled its report. Privately he asked the Americans to tell Thich Tri Quang that he would do nothing to hurt the Buddhist cause.

Buu Hoi also visited the US Department of State in Washington where he was given a mixed reception. Harlan Cleveland, the assistance secretary for international organization affairs thought that his "sophisticated" plan and his stature as an intellectual and diplomat would boost his cause. Undersecretary Averell Harriman and Assistant Secretary Roger Hilsman, well known Diem critics, were less enthusiastic. Buu Hoi's attempt to break the deadlock in relations since the pagoda raids failed to convince Harriman, who removed his hearing aid when Buu Hoi suggested that the pro-Diem former US ambassador Frederick Nolting still had a positive role to play. When Hilsman criticised the treatment of the Buddhists, Buu Hoi asserted that the movement had become political and that the Buddhists had forced Diem into a fight for survival. He said that Buddhist elders deplored the alleged politicisation of the movement. Buu Hoi also parried US calls for Diem to remove Nhu, regarded as the corrosive influence in South Vietnam form power. He asserted that Nhu was a great talent but also noted that a Prime Minister should be appointed.

At the UN, the Ceylon delegate had begun to push for a resolution expressing serious concern about "the continuing violation of human rights in Vietnam." Since South Vietnam was not a member and had no right of reply, Buu Hoi and his team lobbied African and Asian countries behind the scene. Buu Hoi was also the South Vietnamese ambassador to six African nations. The result was that a polemical address by Ceylon on October 7 did not gather further response and a Soviet Union threat to use the International Control Commission to investigate the South's domestic affairs never materialised. The General Assembly voted unanimously to cut short the debate and accept the invitation to send a fact finding mission. Buu Hoi had managed to avert censure of his country and an unwanted debate on the role of the US there. Lodge expressed disappointment at why the US delegation helped to avoid a debate that would have condemned Diem. Despite Buu Hoi's assurances that the mission would be free to move around the country and was not a stalling device, Lodge was adamant that Diem would never allow them to see anything unfavourable.

On October 28, Buu Hoi opened the Atomic Energy Center in Da Lat in his role as the director general of the Office of Atomic Energy. Diem said of his work "In the non-aligned world, we have more friends now, thanks to the diplomatic bases laid by Professor Buu Hoi in Africa."

On October 31, he performed his last public duty in South Vietnam. Buu Hoi visited Nhu along with two Buddhist monks and ask him to intervene with Diem to set free "all Buddhist dignitaries, laymen and students till under detention." Nhu "promised to obtain from the president a favourable answer to this request." Diem and Nhu were executed two days later after being overthrown in a coup. Buu Hoi left Vietnam after the coup to resume his scientific research. He only returned on the occasion of the funeral of his mother, who had died from natural causes.

Buu Hoi was decorated with many honors and awards during his scientific career. He was a multiple laureate of the French Academy of Sciences, the French Academy of Medicine and the French Ministry of Education. His work in cancer research specifically yielded awards from the French National Institute of Helath and Medical Research and the French League Against Cancer. Despite working for almost his entire academic career in France, he also received awards from the Academy of Sciences of The Netherlands]] and received funding from the US National Cancer Institute.

He was a member of the Panel of Experts for Leprosy of the World Health Organization and an honorary member of several medical societies. He was decorated with a number of French Government awards: commander of the Legion of Honor, commander of the Order of Public Health, commander of the Order of Research and Invention and a Knight of the Academic Palms.

He died of a heart attack on January 8, 1972, his native country still divided and ravaged by civil war. It was only a few weeks after the passing of his research colleague Antoine Lacassagne, ending a prolific partnership described by Cancer Research as a "heroic and important chapter of the study of carcinogenesis". It went on to say that "his death robbed French science of one of its most illustrious figures". He had totalled almost 1100 scientific publications. His body was laid in state for five days in a sanctuary at Rue Gassendi in Paris, where it French and Vietnamese alike paid their respects.

A 1972 obituary by the journal Cancer Research rated Buu Hoi as "probably the most prestiguous intellectual that Vietnam has produced since the French conquest of the country about 100 years ago [Vietnam was entirely conquered by France in 1883]– a somewhat legendary personage to many of his countrymen."

He warned the French against erecting and supporting "artificial governments."

Buu Hoi's stature also allowed him to develop contacts with French President Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle favoured neutralising Vietnam in the early 1960s and with the support of Buu Hoi advised his ambassador in Saigon Roger Lalouette to float the concept with Diem and Nhu. The theory that Nhu had been secretly with Hanoi in the period leading up the coup is often discussed by historians.

CONEIN
In 1954, he began working under Colonel Edward Lansdale. Lansdale had been dispatched to Vietnam in June following the defeat of France at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The pair were to engage in psychological warfare in an attempt to weaken the Vietminh. At the time, Vietnam was to be temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel following the Geneva Conference pending elections in 1956 to reunify the country under a common government. In the meantime, the border was to be open for 300 days to allow people to move between the communist and the non-communist south. Lansdale had advised Ngo Dinh Diem, Prime Minister of the south that it was imperative to have as many people in the south as possible when the time came for the national reunification elections. According to the historian Seth Jacobs, the campaign "ranked with the most audacious enterprises in the history of covert action." Conein was responsible for operations in the north. He employed a variety of stunts in order to compel more northerners to move south. South Vietnamese soldiers in civilian clothing were sent into the north to spread rumours of impending doom. One such story was that the Vietminh had done a deal with Vietnam's traditional enemies China that had allowed two Chinese divisions to invade the north. The story reported that the Chinese were raping and pillaging at the permission of the Vietminh. He also hired counterfeiters to produce bogus Vietminh leaflets on how to behave under the communists; explaining to them to create a list of their material possessions so that they would be more easily confiscated, fomenting peasant discontent. Soothsayers were hired to predict disaster under communism, and prosperity in the south for those who went there. The most inflammatory rumour was that Washington intended to launch an attack to liberate the north as soon as all anti-communists had fled to the south. It claimed that the Americans would use atomic bombs against the north and that the only way of avoiding death in a nuclear holocaust was to move south. Conein had pamphlets printed which depicted Hanoi with three circles of nuclear destruction superimposed on it. On the military side of the operations, Conein was instructed to sabotage the transportation network. Conein and his colleagues laced the oil supply of Hanoi's tram network with acid, and concealed explosives in the piles of coal that were used as fuel for railway locomotives. Conein proposed blowing up the Standard Oil and Shell storage tanks located at Haiphong, but his superiors turned down his plan on the grounds that "we'll need them when we go back."

Conein and his team also formed secret squads of Vietnamese anti-communists to infiltrate North Vietnam and harass the Vietminh contrary to the Geneva Accords. The two squads were split into two groups named the Hoa and the Binh. They trained at the Clark Air Field, and American base in the Philippines and infiltrated back into the north aboard US navy vessels. They hid their arms and ammunition along the banks of the Red River as well as Hanoi cemeteries by organising fake funerals and sealing the munitions in coffins. The squads were meant to foment low scale unrest that could be exploited for psychological purposes. The missions was largely a failure and most of the operatives were caught and tried, giving the communists to denounce the United States and the South for subversive activities.

According to Tran Van Don, Conein was "the only American I could really trust."

Eccentric, boisterous, uncontrtollable but deeply sensitive and thoroughly professional. Conein inspired confidence in his Vietnamese contacts with his Asian style emphasis on faith in personal ties.

Born in Paris, Conein immigrated to the United States with his widowed mother by boat at the age of five. He settled in Kansas City with his maternal aunt, the wife of a First World War doughboy. Despite growing up in America, he retained his French passport. He enlisted in the French Army at the start of the Second World War, but deserted when France fell in May 1940. He managed to escape from Europe to the United States, where he joined the OSS, the predecessor of the CIA. After being trained, he was parachuted back into France to work with a French resistance unit. When the war ended on the European front, he was transferred to Asia to join a company of French and Vietnamese commandos who were harassing Japanese installations in northern Vietnam. He entered Hanoi after Japan's defeat with the OSS team that dealt with Ho Chi Minh and other Vietminh leaders. During his first trip to Vietnam, he had befriended many young Vietnamese officers and political figures. They later became his informants. He also married his third wife, a Eurasian.

Conein had also infiltrated saboteurs and other covert agents into Eastern Europe and also trained royalist paramilitary forces in Iran..

Conein's only physical scars from his perilous career were two missing fingers that were cut off by the fan of an automobile engine that he was attempting to repair. The mishap occurred in West Germany, when he was out with the wife of a colleague. He attributed the lost fingers as his punishment for being involved in an illicit love affair. E howard Hunt, a former CIA colleague considered hiring him for the group that eventually bungled the Watergate burglary and sparked the forced resignation of President Richard Nixon. Conein late said, "If I'd been involved, we'd have done it right."

The lost digits resulted in Conein being codenamed "Mordecai" by American journalists who feared that Nhu had wiretapped them. This was a reference to the three fingerd Mordecai Brown who was pitcher for the Chicago Cubs baseball team.

Coneine was reassigned to Vietnam in early 1962, where he masqueraded as an advisor to South Vietnam's Interior Ministry in Saigon. The cover allowed him to roam the country and gather intelligence on dissidents against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. His task was delicate, as he had to be careful that his reports on close friends such as General Tran Van Don were not leaked to Diem and Nhu by the regime's American sympathisers. He also had to keep under the radar, lest Nhu liquidated him and blamed the death ont eh Vietcong.

He was a heavily built man with a V-wedge hairline with bushy eyebrows arching over twinkling eyes.

Trained with the Special Operations Executive in England.

He then went to the China-Burma-India theatre for a short time.

When the war ended, he returned to the United States and joined the CIA. He served in Germany until 1953. In October 1954, he relocated to Saigon to help Diem's new government. He then left to join th eUS Army's Special Forces, only to retire in 1961.

He once said that the CIA stood for "criminals, idiots and asses", calling it a "cookie factory" because "there's nothing but fruits and nuts in the goddamn place."

Lansdale secretary regarded Conein as someone who viewed himself as a daring and handsome buccaneer, recalling "He never saw a mirror he didn't like."

He operated under the codename of "Black Luigi" or "Lulu" and wore a military uniform signifying the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was assigned by CIA's William Colby as the liaison on the Strategic Hamlet Program. He was the only American not on a list of possible coup makers that Nhu had given to Don. Conein often met Don and other officers in a dentist's office, under the cover of having work done on his teeth.

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THO
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The new government under Tho plagued by infighting. According to Tho's assistant Nguyen Ngoc Huy, the presence of Generals Tran Van Don and Ton That Dinh in both the Government and the Military Revolutionary Council paralysed Tho's government. Dinh and Don were subordinate to Tho in the civilian government, but as members of the MRC they were superior to him. When Tho gave an order in the civilian framework with which they disagreed, they would go into the MRC and give a counterorder.

The provisional government lacks direction in policy and planning and soon collapsed.

Under Diem, Tho was in charge of overseeing South Vietnam's land reform program, as the minister of agarian reform Nguyen Van Thoi answered to him. As both men were wealthy landowners, they had little incentive for the program to succeed. The US embassy received angry criticism of Thoi's intransigence to implementing the policy, stating "he is most certainly not interested in land distribution which would divest him of much of his property."Jacobs

He retired thereafter, having enriched himself during his period in government.

As the Buddhist crisis continued to put pressure on the Diem regime, Nhu and Diem began to shun their cabinet members because they presented arguments contrary to the family thinking. Many ministers attempted to resign but Tho was credited with persuading them to stay in office. As he himself increasingly found the situation intolerable, tho also considered resigning but the dissident generals urged him to remain. They were worried that mass resignations would arouse suspicion that a coup was imminent.

His government put a halt to the Strategic Hamlet Program advocated by Nhu. Under Diem, Nhu had trumpeted it as the solution to South Vietnam's difficulties with Vietcong insurgents, believing that the mass relocation of peasants into fortified villages would isolate the Vietcong from their intended peasant support. He admitted that contrary to Nhu's claims, only 20% of the 8600 existing strategic hamlets were under Saigon's control whereas the rest had been taken over by the communists. Those hamlets that were still tenable were to be consolidated whereas the remainder were dismantled and the peasantry returned to their ancestral land.

The approach of Tho's government in dismantling from both sides of the argument. Some felt that he was not tough enough in removing pro-Diem elements from authority, while others felt that the magnitude of the public sector turnover was excessive and bordering on revenge. A number of indiscriminate arrest were made without charge for suspected corruption or Diemist oppression, and later most of the detainees were released. Dinh and General Mai Huu Xuan, tehnew police chief, were in control of the interior ministry. They were alleged to be competing with another in arresting people and then releasing them in return for bribes and pledges of loyalty. On the other hand, not all officials under Diem could be automatically considered pro-Diem yet calls came for further removals of the old guard. The government was criticised for now firing more district and provincial chiefs appointed by Diem, which would have caused aa breakdown in order and caused chaos. One high profile case was the non removal of General Do Cao Tri, the commander of the ARVN I Corps who had gained prominence for his role in the particularly stringent crackdown on Buddhists in the central region around Hue. In the end, he was simply transferred to the II Corps directly south of the I Corps region.

It was reported by Saigon newspapers which had opened following the end of Diem's censorship that the junta was paralysed as it had given equal power to all twelve generals in the MRC. Each had the power of veto and were able to stonewall policy decisions. Tho was also subjected to strong attacks by the press, who accused him and his cabinet of being "tools" of the MRC. His past with Diem was also called in question, with media allegations circulating that he had supported the repression by Diem and Nhu of the Buddhist. Tho claimed that he had countenanced the Xa Loi Pagoda raids orchestrated Nhu, attempting to prove that he would have resigned were if not for Minh's pleas to stay. He was also derided for the personal benefits that he gained from the land policy under Diem. Minh defended Tho's anti-Diem credentials by declaring that Tho had taken part in the planning of the coup "from the very outset" and that he enjoyed the "full confidence" of the junta.

On January 1, 1964, a Council of Notables comprising sixty leading citizens selected by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao had its first meeting. Its job was to act as an advisory body for the military and civilian wings of the government in reforming the consitution, human rights and legal system. Tho publicly stated that he expected a "rational attitude" coupled with "impartial and realistic judgments" and said that it was part oft heprovisional ogovernment's search to "clear the way for a permanent regime, which our people are longing for." The council consisted almost entirely of professionals and academic leaders and no represenatitives of thepeasntry or the labor movement. It soon became engaged in endless debate and never got around to its initial task of drafting anew constitution. Tho later admitted that the Council was not representative and had been a failure. He claimed that their desire to not be rubber stamp like Diem's National Assembly had degenerated into a debating council.

A cholera outbreak hit South Vietnam in early January in the lead-up to Tet, the lunar new year. This reinforced deteriorating economic conditions as the price of rice and other commodities had risen. Strikes and student demonstrations had crippled the government.

There was a spike in Vietcong activity in the wake of the coup and the military dislocation of troops into urban areas caused by it. New information came to light after the coup and the increasingly free discussion that it generated, revealing that the military situation was far worse than was estimated by Diem's agents. The incidence of Vietcong attacks continued to increase as it had doen during the summer of 1963, the weapons loss ratio had worsened and the rate of Vietcong defections had fallen. Units participating in the coup had to be returned to the field quickly to forestall a possible major communist offensive. It was discovered that falsification of the difficulties of the war dy Diem's officials had lead to miscalculations which began to manifest themselves after his death.(PP)

The freeze on US economic aid and the suspension of the Commercial Import Program and other capital works that had been implemented in response to the repression of the Buddhist crisis and the attacks by Nhu's Special Forces on Xa Loi Pagoda were lifted.(PP)

Tho was blamed for intransigence in the implementation of Diem's land reform program. Tho was a large scale landlord and had little incentive to implement the program. A report submitted to the US Embassy noted that "he is most certainly not interested in land distribution which would divest him of much of his property.

Tho called for the Buddhists to be crushed "without pity" at a farewell dinner for US Ambassador Frederick Nolting. He said that Buddhism was not a religion at all and went on to claim that anybody could become a Buddhist monk but tah years of training were required to become a Catholic priest. When the Thai ambassador disagreed and pointed to his previous monastic training, Tho taunted him in front of the other diplomats.

dao chinh 1964
In mid-Decmeber he was moved from the II corps in the Central highlands to the I Corps, the northernmost of the military regions centred around Hue and Da Nang. This was contrary to Khanh's request for a transfer to the Mekong Delta close to Saigon where most of the fighting was taking place. In an interview with Robert Shapelen, Khanh made no attempt to hide his annoyance at not being given a more important job. With respect o the 1963 coup, he cryptically commented "It is too soon yet to tell the whoel story, but someday I will tell it to you."

Khanh also cited the large size of the junta as a factor in the slowing down of the operation of the government.



About a month before Minh's junta was overthrown, Khanh was approached by one of the principle tacticians in the removal of Diem, General Do Mau. A Colonel at the time of the previous coup, Mau had been head of military security under Diem. Although he did not explicitly command troops, Mau had a thorough knowledge of the backgrounds of most of the ARVN officers and their strengths and weaknesses. This had allowed him to help engineer the previous coup. The junta respected Mau, but their fears about his shrewdness led them to place him in the relatively powerless post of Minister of Information. Mau's closest aides were posted further away from any real power. Mau began to search for officers to replace the junta, searching for exiles in Cambodia and France as well as those who had returned to Vietnam after the overthrow of Diem. The most important link in Mau's plan was Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, the former paratroop commander who had fled to Cambodai in the wake of the failed 1960 coup attempt against Diem. Mau persuaded the junta to install Thi as Khanh's deputy in the I Corps. He tricked the junta into doing so by reasoning that Khanh had largely been responsible for putting down the 1960 revolt and that Thi would be an ideal mechanism for keeping Khanh in check. Privately, Mau predicted that Thi would be bridge between him in Saigon and Khanh in Hue. He was correct in thinking that the 1960 conflict would be irrelevant in the shifting of allegiances of time and that the pair would work together for their current aims. Mau recruited a second figure in the form of General Tran Thien Khiem, who was one of Khanh's fellow cadets and had worked with Mau during the November coup. Khiem had assisted Diem in putting down the 1960 plot and had since been demoted from being Chief of Staff of the ARVN to the commander of the III Corps which surrounded Saigon. Khiem readily joined the plot and controlled the 5th and 7th Divisions of the ARVN which were based in Bien Hoa and My Tho north and south of Saigon respectively. This brought the two division commanders subordinate to Khiem into the plot. Khiem, Khanh and Mau kept in touch surreptitiously on a regular basis, supplementing their forces with an assortmenet of Marine, Air Force and Special Forces officers. Another notable recruit was the chief of the Civil Guard, Duong Ngoc Lam who had recently been promoted from Colonel to General. He was under investigation by the junta for swindling military funds and was readily converted. Another was General Duong Van Duc, who had recently returned from exile in Paris and was an assisant to General Le Van Kim, the chief of the junts'a general staff.

In late December and early January, student demonstrations in South Vietnam were held against neutralism and de Gaulle. The Council of Notables, and advisory selected by the junta, had accused the provisional government of lacking a firm issue on the neutralist issue and went as far as to recommend that South Vietnam suspend diplomatic relations with France. The rumours and crisis heightened when a reputed French agent, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Dinh Lan suddenly returned to Saigon after spending several years in France. He had served in both the French and Vietnamese Army and had brought with him several million US dollars worth of South Vietnamese piasters. Lan moved into the home of one of General Kim's top aides, fuelling speculation that more French agents were arriving in the capital. Such rumours served to spread the belief that a French-sponsored neutralist deal was imminent and gave the conspirators an opportunity to act.

Duc had years of experience in France had given him a good feel of what the French might be up to and what their relations with Francophile members of the ARVN were. He used this to concoct some plausible sounding and incriminating documents for Mau. They purported to show that three prominent members of the junta: Generals Kim, Minh and Don had been bought by French agents and were on the brink of declaring South Vietnam's neutrality and sign a peace deal to end the war with the North. Don was the Minister of Defense and Minh was the President. Some of the documents were leaked to elements of the American presence in Saigon and were brought to the attention of some senior American officials.

Khanh held a number of meetings with American officers in Hue diring the first two weeks of January. In addition to routine military matters, coup discussions were also reported to have taken place. Khanh also regular flew down to Saigong to take part in plotting with his colleagues. These usually took place in the secluded house of a colonel who was a nearby province chief. Khanh began growing a small goatee, which he customarily grew when he was attempting a new project and would only shave once the job had been completed.

On January, Colonel Thi followed Khanh to the capital. The plotters and their agents met in out of the way spots around town. On the night of January 29, Mau and Khiem alerted their troops to assume their positions around Saigon. These included many of those used in the first coup:Armored cars and tankas and some elements from the 5th and 7th Divisions, two airborne battalions and on eMarine battalion and a assortment of Special Forces, Ranger and Civil Guard units. A number of American officers and embassy officials were alerted to be in their officers at two o'clock in the morning. At 0300, Khanh took over the Joint Gernal Staff Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut airport. Lodge was kept fuilly informed throughout the night.

There was no opposition and little popular enthusiasm. The apathy weas in sharp contrast to the jubilation and relief when Diem and Nhu were overthrown and shot.

Lieutenant Colonel Lan, the "French agent", was imprisoned.

"The political, economic, and social situation in the countryside still offers no promising prospect. . .There has not been one single compensation worthy of the sacrifices accepted daily by the soldiers." 234

Khanh swiftly and boldly attempted to consolidate his grip on power by announcing himself as the Head of State and as Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, replacing Minh. Minh had not been implicated in the alleged French neutralist plot. Khanh later managed to persuade Minh to remain as the nominal Head of State. This was partly the result of American pressure, who felt that Minh would be a unifying and stabilising factor in the new regime and that his cooperation would provide a degree of continuity. This did not last long as Khanh came toa ssert himself as the sole ruler of the MRC. Khanh turned out to be far more politically oriented and motivated than the previous junta, seeking the help of veteran Vietnamese politicians and technicians to create a new government infrastructure. A week after coming to power, Khanh cummoned Dr. Nguyen Ton Hoan, a Catholic who was one of the former leaders of the southern branch of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party). Hoan had been exiled in Paris for a long period but had been among the most active of the exiled, publishing a magazine and keeping up to speed with developments in Vietnam. Hoan had generated little popular following during his campaign for power in the 1940s and 1950s and was unable to form a government as Prime Minister when he returned. Khanh thereupon decided act as both Prime Minister and Chariman of the reorganised MRC which he expanded to include 17 generals and 32 further officers. Hoan was appointed as the first Deupty Prime Minister in charge of rural pacification. He was given supervision over five ministries including the Interior, Naitonal Defense and Rural Affairs and two special commissions all of which primarily engaged in consolidating the strategic hamlets of Ngo Dinh Nhu into the renamed New Rural Life Hamlets. A second Deputy Prime Ministerial post was given to Harvard trained banker-economist Nguyen Xuan Oanh had ties to but was not a Dai Viet member. Oanh was charged with managing the finance and economy of the country. Mau was the third deputy, overseeing social and cultural affairs.236-237

Khanh selected a cabinet of thirteen minsters and two Secretaries of State at Cabinet level and chose new provincial and district chiefs. He originally tried to include members of a variety of political and religious groups including representatives of the Cao Dai and Hao Hao religious sects. The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao still had remnants of their private armies intact from their dismantling by Diem in 1955. Although Khanh insisted that he had to party affiliation, the orientation of his government was toward the Dai Viet, who held many of the key posts in the government. This provoked criticism from other anti-Communist nationalists and groups that were banned under the Diem period and were seekinga greater role in the public life of South Vietnam. 237

Khanh promised that village elections that were abolished under Diem would be held as soon as feasible and that a new National Assembyl would be elected within a year. He started by abolishing the Council of Notables. Many Vietnamese and American observers consided this to be rash and premature isince election promises had been frequently broken and that the Council had at least been an effective forum for dissent.238-239

Minh resented that fact that he had been deposed by a younger man who he regarded as an upstart. Minh was also upset with the detention of his fellow generals and some of his junior officers. The junior officers were set free when Minh demanded that Khanh release them as a condition for serving the new regime. Khanh attempted to avoid the issue of the alleged plot as long as he could and then tried to revive it by claiming that French agents were attempting to assassinate him and renew attempt at neutralism. Khanh offered no evidence, only claiming that the French had paid a hitman USD1300 to kill him. 244-245

They were "inadequately aware of "their heavy responsibiltye" and of letting "their subordinates take advantage of their positions." They were allowed to remain in Da Lat under surveillance with their families.

Minh was perfunctoriky accused of misusing a small amount of money before being allowed to sit in as an advisor on the trial panel. Some tentative arrangements were made to send the generals to the United States for military study so that they could not plot while not commanding troops in battles, but this fell through.244-245