User:Ykantor/Sandbox/Palestine1948- The Mufti

The Mufti


 * Levenberg
 * "It seemed that the strategy of the Mufti in organizing and preparing Arab communities for the decisive battle, while making the ordinary daily life of the Jews extremely difficult, was about to succeed. During the first three weeks of the clashes, the Arabs made numerous attacks on Jewish communications inflicting heavy losses and causing substantial damage to the economy of the Yishuv." Furthermore, obstacles to the supply of essential commodities to the Jewish population seriously affected not only the Yishuvs economy but also its morale. The Arabs concentrated their resources on trying to break the morale and economic life of the Yishuv, hoping to squeeze them before the decisive battle. " Levenberg1993p182


 * Morris 2004
 * the Mufti or his close associates appear to have tried to shift the focus of hostilities to the countryside. But the villagers were not rushing to join up (Morris 2004 p. 88, based on note 115, Arab Division, ‘In the Arab Camp’, 7 Dec. 1947...)


 * [Haifa] But Husseini agents and irregulars sporadically launched attacks on Jews, beginning on 7 December with ambushes against traffic moving through Wadi Rushmiya. From then on, there were almost daily exchanges of fire along the seam neighbourhoods, almost always initiated by Arabs. Beginning on 11 December, IZL operatives began to throw bombs at Arab crowds and buses. The first large Haganah reprisal, against the village of Balad al Sheikh, just east of Haifa, took place on 12 December (six Arabs were killed); (Morris 2004 p. 100)


 * Morris 2008
 * "In late December, Husseini reportedly sent Jerusalem NC leader Hussein al-Khalidi a letter explicitly stating that the purpose of the present violence was “to harass (and only to harass) ” the Yishuv, not full-scale assault. In January 1948, High Commissioner Cunningham assessed that “official [Palestinian] Arab policy is to stand on the defensive until aggression is ordered by the national leadership. That widespread assaults on Jews continue and are indeed increasing illustrates the comparatively feeble authority of most of [the National] Committees and of the AHC. . . . The latter is anxious to curb Arab outbreaks but probably not to stop them entirely.” During the winter, perturbed by appeals from the notables of Jaffa and Haifa, Husseini appears to have agreed to non belligerency in the towns and to have ordered a shift of the focus of hostilities from the main towns to the countryside. On 22 February, the Haifa NC ordered a “cessation of shooting, and a return of each man to his regular workplace.” It is unlikely that such an order was issued without prior AHC endorsement. Many of the Arab attacks in November 1947–January 1948 were “spontaneous” and even contrary to the mufti’s wishes. Others were  “incited” or led by Husseini agents, but in unconcerted fashion. Gradually, however, and partly because of Haganah, IZL, and LHI retaliatory attacks, the whole country—or at least the areas with Jewish concentrations of population—was set alight." ... "armed bands attacked convoys and settlements, often recruiting local militiamen to join in. Gunmen sporadically fired into Jewish neighborhoods and planted bombs. The Haganah, busy reorganizing, and wary of the British, adopted a defensive posture while occasionally retaliating against Arab traffic, villages, and urban neighborhoods. The Haganah mobilized slowly, at first hobbled by the belief—shared by much of the Yishuv104—that it merely faced a new round of “disturbances.” Only in early January did the Yishuv’s leadership wake up to the fact that the war that they had long predicted had, in fact, begun" (Morris 2008 p. 98)
 * "ARAB RESISTANCE: The Arab Higher Committee has continued to oppose the resolution of the Assembly and has refused to co-operate with the Commission. Opposition to the resolution of 29 November 1947 has taken the form of armed resistance.Morris2008p99
 * "Side by side with ambushes along the roads, the Husseini - affiliated irregulars turned to large-scale urban terrorism" (Morris 2008 p. 107)


 * Milstein
 * " The day after the UN decision, a Jew was killed on the boundary between Tel Aviv and Jaffa, Arab inmates rose up against Jewish ones in Acre prison and Jewish vehicles were stoned on roads throughout Eretz-Yisra'el.” The events of November 30, 1947, indicated that the Mufti had not changed his strategy - instigating criminals to act in his war against the Zionists - at the outset of the War of Independence. Since he had no military units, he bestowed on robbers the halo of national heroes" MilsteinSacks1997p23
 * the (Jaffa—Tel Aviv Mayors) non-aggression pact was kept. Supporters of Haji Amin in Jaffa, and ETZEL and LEHI members, however, rejected it….Palmon met … Nimer al-Hawari, … commander of all armed forces in Jaffa …. The two reached an agreement… al-Hawari called ….he had been invited to Cairo to confer with the Mufti. He sounded optimistic and thought he would get approval for the harvest season cease-fire. But he never came back… Jaffa's moderate Arab leaders restrained the volunteers loyal to the Husseini family. The volunteers,…did not dare enter Tel Aviv. Instead, they sought to capture buildings in border neighborhoods, sniped from mosque minarets at Jews and struck at buses passing through the Abu-Kabir section…. Tel Aviv Hagana …blew up buildings used as sniper positions and gang bases for shooting into Tel Aviv." MilsteinSacks1997p63
 * "on December 25, High Commissioner … Cunningham contended that the Arabs would not temper their stance even if the Jews showed restraint in their responses…."MilsteinSacks1997p173

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