User:Yoitsjebbush/Mutual assured destruction

Intro

However, many have argued that mutually assured destruction is unable to deter unconventional war that could later escalate. Emerging domains of cyber-espionage, proxy-state conflict, and high-speed missiles threaten to circumvent MAD as a deterrent strategy

Brennan came up with this term ironically, to argue that holding weapons capable of destroying society was irrational.

History/Post-Cold War

While MAD has become less applicable for the US and Russia, it has been argued as a factor behind Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, diplomats have warned that Japan may be pressured to nuclearize by the presence of North Korean nuclear weapons. The ability to launch a nuclear attack against an enemy city is a relevant deterrent strategy for these powers.

History/Late Cold War

Gorbachev himself in 1983 announced that “the continuation of the S.D.I. program will sweep the world into a new stage of the arms race and would destabilize the strategic situation.”

History/AMDs threaten

However, multiple scientific studies showed technological and logistical problems in these systems, including the inability to distinguish between real and decoy weapons.

Terrorism

The threat of foreign and domestic nuclear terrorist threats has been a criticism of MAD as a defensive strategy. Deterrent strategies are ineffective against those who attack without regard for their life.

Space Weapons

Strategic analysts have criticized the doctrine of MAD for its inability to respond to the proliferation of space weaponry. First, military space systems have unequal dependence across countries. This means that less-dependent countries may find it beneficial to attack a more-dependent country’s space weapons, which complicates deterrence. This is especially true for countries like North Korea which have extensive ballistic missiles that could strike space-based systems. Even across countries with similar dependence, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) have the ability to remove the command and control of nuclear weapons. This encourages crisis-instability and pre-emptive nuclear-disabling strikes. Third, there is a risk of asymmetrical challengers. Countries that fall behind in space weapon advancement may turn to using chemical or biological weapons. This may  heighten the risk of escalation, bypassing any deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.

Entanglements

Cold-war bipolarity no longer is applicable to the global power balance. The complex modern alliance system makes allies and enemies tied to one another. Thus, action by one country to deter another could threaten the safety of a third country. “Security trilemmas” could increase tension during mundane acts of cooperation, complicating MAD.

Emerging Hypersonic Weapons

Hypersonic ballistic or cruise missiles threaten the retaliatory backbone of mutually assured destruction. The high precision and speed of these weapons may allow for the development of “decapitory” strikes that remove the ability of another nation to have a nuclear response. In addition, the secretive nature of these weapon’s development can make deterrence more asymmetrical.

Failure to Retaliate

If it was known that a country’s leader would not resort to nuclear retaliation, adversaries may be emboldened. Edward Teller, a member of the Manhattan Project, echoed these concerns as early as 1985 when he said that “The MAD policy as a deterrent is totally ineffective if it becomes known that in case of attack, we would not retaliate against the aggressor.”

Other evidence of this comes from the Soviet minister of defense, Dmitriy Ustinov, who wrote that "A clear appreciation by the Soviet leadership of what a war under contemporary conditions would mean for mankind determines the active position of the USSR." The Soviet doctrine, although being seen as primarily offensive by Western analysts, fully rejected the possibility of a "limited" nuclear war by 1975.

= Mutually Assured Destruction (Work Below Done by BigBird5528) (DO NOT DELETE) =

Theory of Mutual Assured Destruction

When nuclear warfare between the United States and Soviet Union started to become a reality, theorists began to think that mutual assured destruction would be sufficient enough to deter the other side from launching a nuclear weapon. Kenneth Waltz, an American scientist, believed that nuclear forces were in fact useful, but even more useful in the fact that they deterred other nuclear threats from using them, based on mutually assured destruction. The theory of mutually assured destruction being a safe deterence continued even farther with the thought that nuclear weapons intended on being used for the winning of a war, were unpractical, and even considered too dangerous and risky. Even with the Cold War ending in 1991, about 30 years ago, deterrence from mutually assured destruction is still said to be the safest course to avoid nuclear warfare.

How Mutually Assured Destruction was Seen During the Cold War

As the United States continued to build and place their nuclear weapons during the Cold War, it became clear to United States officials that there was no defense against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. This led to the dismantle of defense systems, both civil and antiballistic. The United States began to discontinue the deployment of nuclear forces in the 1950s, starting in Europe and the Middle East. By the 1960s and 1970s, the United States began to withdraw these nuclear forces.

The United States withdrawing nuclear forces from Europe and the Middle East actually had a deference affect on the Soviet Union, showing that the United States knew using nuclear weapons would mean their own demise as well due to mutually assured destruction. "The Soviet Union inevitably would recognize it and see the pointlessness of building ever-larger nuclear forces, not just for strategic operations but also for tactical and theater operations.

Paranoia Concerning Mutually Assured Destruction During the Cold War

While many United States officials recognized that there were was no legitimate was to counter Soviet Union nuclear weapons except to deter, there were those in power in the United States that were not satisfied with just the ability to deter to keep the United States safe. Perhaps the most influential and important of these officials was the United States Navy, who did not want to leave the nation's existence in the hands of "logic", specifically the Soviet Union's leadership and mutual hostage taking between the two super powers.

In the 1960s, the United States Navy looked to counter Soviet Union nuclear weapons by covertly pursuing "anti-submarine warfare". This was a massive success for the United States Navy, as they "achieved operational dominance over Soviet submarines," starting in the 1960s, and continued this dominance throughout the 1970s and 1980s to try and keep Soviet nuclear weapons out of open waters. This constant attack on Soviet submarines put lots of pressure on the Soviet Union. In fact, when Soviet submarines would fall back to Soviet waters, the United States would follow and continue their attacks; constantly putting Soviet submarines at risk.