User:Zacherystaylor/The Problem of the Media

The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21st Century, by Robert W. McChesney (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).

Précis of The Problem of the Media

Preface
The purpose of the book is “to shed light on how the media system works in the United States and to provide a basis for citizens to play a more active role in shaping the policies upon which that system is built” (7). The book addresses eight myths: 1) media don’t matter much (7-8); 2) media system is the “natural” outgrowth of democracy (8); 3) debates on media policy have accurately reflected public opinion (8); 4) commercial media provide the highest quality journalism possible (9); 5) news media in the U.S. have a liberal, left-wing bias (9); 6) commercial media give people what they want (9-10); 7) technologies determine the nature of media (10); 8) no alternative to the status quo will improve matters (10-11). A solution to “the problem of the media” requires “a large well-funded, structurally pluralistic, and diverse nonprofit and noncommercial media sector, as well as a more competitive commercial sector” (11). Core problems of U.S. media system: “inadequate journalism and hyper-commercialism” (11). 2003 protests a sign of hope (12). Free Press (12). This is an historical, not a lawyerly, work (13). Other members of McChesney’s “school of critical work in media studies” (14-15). Nov. 2003 National Conference on Media Reform (15).

Ch. 1: Political Problem, Political Solution
Two sorts of problems: of content, and of the structure that determines that content (16). In the U.S., grasping media’s place in the capitalist system is key (17). Media system the result of government policies; “deregulation” is misleading (19-20). Only in recent decades have media been fully integrated into U.S. capitalism (21-22). This exacerbates historic tensions with democracy (22-23). Media reform compatible with capitalism (23-24). The notion of “critical junctures” (24). Three constitutional provisions: copyright (25-26); the First Amendment (26-32); “Post Offices and Post Roads,” whose main role in the early Republic was subsidizing the press but which were subverted beginning with Western Union and the establishment of the Associated Press (33-36). Public education and libraries also forms of subsidization of the press (37-38). History of regulation of radio broadcasting 1927-1934 initiates lamentable pattern of sacrificing public interest to commercialism (38-45). FCC a captured regulatory agency (45-47). Neoliberalism attacked the notion of “public interest” restraints on corporate control of media (48-51). The 1996 Telecommunications Act as neoliberal legislation (51-52). Drafting of law “as corrupt and as antidemocratic as one could imagine” (52). Difficult disputes among massive lobbies left to FCC to decide (52-53). FCC head William Kennard’s term (54-55). Lobbyists’ largesse (55-56).

Ch. 2: Understanding U.S. Journalism I: Corporate Control and Professionalism
19th-c. U.S. journalism was partisan and ideologically diverse (58-59). Turn-of-the-century economic changes led to dependence on commercial advertising and the collapse of the independent press (59-60). This led to “a crisis for U.S. journalism” (60-63). Newspapers’ response: 1) neglect or distort coverage of crisis; 2) use First Amendment “as a bludgeon”; 3) propose self-regulation as the solution (64-66). Professional journalism is inherently elitist and anti-democratic (67-68). It privileges official sources (68-71). It avoids contextualization (71). It is easily manipulated by PR (71-72). It is subtly (or not so subtly) selective, in ways reflecting corporate bias (72-77). The 1950s-1970s golden age of professional journalism was not so golden (76-77). Since the 1980s commercial media have “attacked” professional journalism (77-81). In this climate, reliance on official sources has become “debilitating” (81-82). Analysis of spin rather than substance has fostered cynicism (82-83). Commercial interests obtain coverage through ads (83-84) or through ownership synergies (85). Trivial subjects favored (85-86). Crime and accidents are overemphasized (86-87). Working people and the poor are ignored ( 87-88). Uncritical business news is exalted (88-89). Coverage of 2001-2002 corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, etc.) exemplifies these faults (89-95). Demoralized journalists at crossroads: news or entertainment? (95-97).

Ch. 3: Understanding U.S. Journalism II: Right-Wing Criticism and Political Coverage
The claim of liberal and left-wing bias (98-99). Based on four propositions: 1) Journalists have decisive power over the news (but this is indefensible: owners control) (100-01); 2) Journalists are mostly liberal and left-wing (but this (a) conflates liberal and left thought and (b) ignores attitudes of journalists on the economy, militarism, and regulation that are more conservative and pro-business than the general public’s) (102-08); 3) Journalists use their influence to advance liberalism and leftism (but there is “scant” evidence of this) (108-09); 4) Objective journalism would present a conservative view of things (a view that demonstrates the ideological nature of the critique) (109-11). The critique of “liberal” media funded by a wealthy right-wing movement (111-12). But it disguises itself as working-class populism (112-13). Its efforts have been successful: 45% of Americans think media “too liberal” (113-14). Conservatives have “won the media battle” (115). Talk radio (116-18). Recent examples of partisan coverage (118-23). U.S. now “only formally democratic” (124-26). Media’s contribution to depoliticization of society; spending on political ads (126-32). News media, as business organizations, are complicit in maintaining the status quo (132-34). Illustration: 2000 elections (134-36).

Ch. 4: The Age of Hyper-Commercialism
The nature of advertising: necessary propaganda in “monopolistic competition” (138-43). Its objectionable features (143-44). Consider “how the media are incorporated into the nation’s broader advertising and marketing system. . . the product created by commercial media is. . . the audience, which is then sold to advertisers” (145). In “hyper-commercialism,” the distinction between media and commerecialism ceases to exist (145). Flood of advertising (145-46). Product placement (147-53). Examples of the “new paradigm for media and commercialism” that is being formulated (153-58). New frontiers of commercialism (158-61). Guerilla marketing (161-62). Children as target (162-65). Hyper-commercialism not wanted by public (165). Effects: “a profound cynicism and materialism, both cancerous for public life” (166). Pace James Twitchell et al., this cannot foster democracy in the sense of informed self-government (167-68). But “there is nothing natural about advertising” (168). The consumer movement contested it in the late 1920s and 1930s (169-70). Regulation, though weak, is accepted (170-71). Neoliberalism seeks to extend First Amendment to commercial speech (171-72). Because it’s unpopular, advertising is the commercial media system’s Achilles’ heel (173-74).

Ch. 5: The Market über Alles
Competition is mitigated in monopolistic/oligopolistic markets due to high barriers to entry; firms can push prices up (176-77). Major media markets “are almost all classic oligopolies” (178). E.g. cable TV (179). The drive toward vertical integration (180-81). Three-tiered structure of U.S. media system: First tier ― TimeWarner, Viacom, News Corporation, Sony, GE, Bertelsmann, Disney, Comcast (annual revenues $15-40 billion); second tier ― Cox, New York Times, Gannet, Clear Channel, etc. ($3-15 billion); third tier ― thousands of others (182-83). Conglomerations’ synergies create merchandising opportunities (183-84). Conglomeration spurs further concentration (185-86). The first tier cooperates as much as competes (186-89). The peculiar nature of media content: most are “non-rivalrous public goods” with high “‘first-copy’ costs” with unpredictable cost-revenue relations and whos markets are shaped by networks (189-92). “Tension between creative talent and corporate media structures is built into the system” (192-98). Claims that media are giving people what they want are half-truths (198-202). Consumer choice is an inadequate mechanism to address social concerns (202). Externalities abound, affecting, for example, children, and journalism (202-05). Rebuttal of Tyler Cowen’s In Praise of Commercial Culture (1998) and Benjamin M. Compaine’s challenge to claims of media concentration (205-09).

Ch. 6: Media Policies and Media Reform
Technocentric appreciations of media lose sight of their dependence on explicit policies (211-12). E.g. digital broadcasting was shaped by “the corrupt drafting of the 1996 Telecommunications Act” (213-14), in TV (214-15) and radio (215). Attention to policy questions is urgently needed (216-17). The claim that “the Internet will set us free” is a ruse deflecting attention from crucial policy choices ahead (217-21). New technologies undermine music, film, advertising (222-24). The corporate form of media prevailed “because the powerful commercial interests were able to have their way with policy makers” (224-26). In media, this has produced oligopolistic markets; PR and self-regulation have parried social critiques (226-29). Policies on media ownership tend to be formed by special interests (229): broadcast ownership (230-32); copyright (232-35); antitrust law (235-40). U.S. has never had a free-market media system; it has always depended on public subsidies (240). Public service broadcasting was invented as such a subsidized form of media in the early 20th century (241-42). In the U.S., it is now in crisis (242-48). Call for reinvigorated, noncommercial public service media (248-51).

Ch. 7: The Uprising of 2003
Marginality of critical media studies in 1980s & 1990s (252-54). Mounting concern about media in 1990s (255). Battle for low-power FM radio (LPFM) (256-58). FCC review of media ownership regulations mandated by law every two years (258-59). FCC chair Michael Powell, an enthusiastic neoliberal, in favor of extending “full First Amendment rights” to commercial broadcasters (259-60). Other commissioners; Michael Capps opposes further concentration (260-62). Emergence of opposition (262-64). Controversy grows (264-67). Powell’s weak arguments for lifting restrictions (268-73). Public opposition in spring 2003 (273-79). Antiwar movement (279-80) and conservatives, esp. William Safire (280-81) generated interest (281-83). Powell pushes through new relaxed rules anyway on June 2, 2003, in 3-2 FCC vote (283-86). But Senate Commerce Committee opposes (286-88). Complex legislative and judicial struggle bodes well (288-95). Challenge ahead is to harness this energy to create a “critical juncture” for media reform (295-97).