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The role of property rights in economic and political development
Classical economists such as Adam Smith and Karl Mark generally recognize the importance of property rights in the process of economic development, and modern mainstream economics agree with such a recognition. A widely accepted explanation is that well-enforced property rights provide incentives for individuals to participate in economic activities, such as investment, innovation and trade, which lead to a more efficient market. Property rights are also believed to lower transaction costs by providing an efficient resolution for conflicts over scarce resources. Empirically, statistical analysis using data of world economies from 1985 to 1995 shows that strong protection of property rights tends to be positively correlated to high GDP per capita.

Property rights might be closely related to the evolution of political order, due to their protections of an individual's claims on economic rents. North, Wallis and Weingast argue that the origin of property rights is to facilitate elites' rent-seeking activities. Particularly, the legal and political systems that protect elites' claims of rent revenues form the basis of the so-called "limited assess order," in which non-elites are denied access to political power and economic privileges. In a historical study of medieval England, for instance, North and Thomas find that the dramatic development of English land laws in the 13th century was a result of elites' interests to exploit rent revenues from land ownership, after a sudden rise in land price in the 12th century. In contrast, the modern "open access order," which consists of a democratic political system and a free market economy, usually features widespread, secure and impersonal property rights. Universal property rights, along with impersonal economic and political competition, downplay the role of rent-seeking and instead favor innovations and productive activities in a modern economy.

Philosophy of Humanitarian Aid
Mill's argument for humanitarian intervention, however, is not compatible with modern international law. International law after World War II establishes the principle of sovereign equality, and therefore to subject a sovereign state to outside intervention is generally considered illegal. To deal with this potential conflict between humanitarian intervention and the international legal system, there are some philosophical attempts to conciliate the two concepts and specify conditions when intervention is ethically justified. John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosophers of the twentieth century, offers his theory of humanitarian intervention based on the notion of "well-ordered society." According to Rawls, a well-ordered society should be peaceful (non-expansionist), legitimate (its citizens accept its legal system) and respect basic human rights, and the principle of non-intervention should uphold between such well-ordered societies (Rawls 37). On the other hand, expansionist or human rights violating regimes are not shielded from the international law: in grave cases such as ethnic cleansing, coercive intervention by others is legitimate (Rawls 47).

Martha Nussbaum, however, is critical of Rawls' approach. She points out that the sufferings of individuals, not those of the impersonal states, form the moral foundations of humanitarian intervention. Therefore the concept of "well-ordered society," by falsely focusing on the state rather than individuals, cannot determine whether an intervention is justified. Instead, Nussbaum proposes a more concrete standard known as human capabilities (see Capability approach). She argues that "[n]ational sovereignty should be respected, within the constraints of promoting human capabilities" (Nussbaum 316). In other words, if a state fails to provide its citizens the basic "capabilities," such as the capability to live a healthy life, then outside intervention is justified.

Some critics contend that modern philosophical arguments for humanitarian aid fail to recognize the flaws of current international law itself. International Relations scholar Martha Finnemore argues that humanitarian crises often involve conflict between the most basic principles of international law: sovereignty, human rights and self-determination. As a result, philosophical attempts to integrate all those principles into a clear ethical guideline of humanitarian intervention is deemed to be futile. Legal scholar Eric Posner also points out that countries tend to hold different views of human rights and public good, so to establish a relatively simple set of rules that reflects "shared ethics" is impractical.