User talk:154.126.11.50

the state of Vietnam origins
I'm uncertain about the other information since I need to do more research, but I think the other user's writings on the origins of the State of Vietnam is very accurate based on the reliable sources he/she cites.

When we accuse someone of forcing a POV, is he/she really forcing a POV, or are we forcing our POVs by removing all that information? Are we seeing things we don't like and therefore want to remove everything, not realising that we might also be unconsciously forcing our own POVs? I think it's important that we examine our own biases too - what the user say could be legitimate and necessary. And it's necessary that we have other POVs too.

So, I investigated some of the sources he/she cited, and I find them to be reliable. This a website that was cited about the origins of the State of Vietnam:

https://www.vietnamwar50th.com/1945-1964_the_road_to_war/Bao-Dai-Solution-and-the-First-Ha-Long-Bay-Agreement/

"In 1947, French military operations in Indochina reach an impasse. The French realize that as Ho Chi Minh flounders in his search for international support, he runs the risk of undermining his government’s authority and legitimacy at home and abroad. They work to undermine that legitimacy in Vietnam, positing a different Vietnamese nationalist leader as an alternative to the Viet Minh: former emperor Bao Dai.

France rationalizes that Bao Dai is less openly hostile to French interests but still able to gain support from anti-Communist nationalist sects in Vietnam. If the Viet Minh refuse to negotiate, France believes it can recast the struggle from one of colonial domination to a Vietnamese civil war between communists and anti-Communists, with France on the anti-Communist side. It is a political move calculated to garner U.S. support, using anticommunism to mollify U.S. reluctance to aid a colonial power. Framing the war in terms of Vietnamese independence makes United States support for France more viable. With the First Ha Long Bay Agreement on December 7, 1947, a vague French promise for Vietnamese independence, Bao Dai associates himself with a French-sponsored nationalist movement."

This next one is from Cold War Mandarin by Seth Jacobs (2006):

"Diem proved even less effective at swaying Bao Dai, who told him that he was inclined to accept the terms proffered by Paris, terms under which Vietnam would enjoy only limited independence. In an effort to stiffen his former boss's spine, Diem invited several leading Vietnamese nationalists to Saigon, where they formed a "Congress of Notables" and insisted on being included in any negotiations between Bao Dai and the French. Paris rejected such demands. When Bao Dai signed an agreement that gave France control of the Republic of Vietnam's finances, military forces, and foreign policy, Diem washed his hands of the entire business and returned to his brother's house.

The government established by Bao Dai and the French lacked credibility and ran into trouble at once. Bao Dai was so ashamed of what he had agreed to that he ran away to Europe to avoid being held to his commitment. The French managed to entice him back to Vietnam long enough to witness the signing of an accord between French high commissioner Emile Bollaert and the new South Vietnamese premier, Nguyen Van Xuan, a French citizen who barely spoke Vietnamese. This duty completed, Bao Dai fled again for the nightclubs of Europe, aware of how odious he had become in the eyes of Vietnamese patriots. Xuan admitted to his French sponsors that he did not believe the government he headed would succeed. When Xuan's forecast appeared to be coming true, with the Viet Minh attracting thousands offresh recruits and anticommunist nationalists refusing to support the new regime in the south, the French took another step toward granting Vietnam self- rule in their "Bao Dai solution" of 1949.

The emperor signed another treaty, this time with French president Vin- cent Auriol at the Elysee Palace in Paris, in which the French agreed to "independence" for a "State of Vietnam" that Bao Dai would lead. Accord- ing to the Elysee Agreement, France pledged to recognize Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union and support its application for membership in the United Nations. This looked impressive on paper, but France never carried out its promised concessions, and even if it had Vietnam would have enjoyed nothing approaching independence. According to the terms of the Elysee Agreement, Paris retained control of Vietnam's military, financial, and diplomatic affairs. The Elysee Agreement proved less effective in attracting support in Vietnam than in persuading the Truman administra- tion to subsidize France's war against the Viet Minh. Washington could now pretend that the conflict in Indochina was no longer a colonial struggle, and that the United States was not betraying its anticolonial principles by siding with the French. Diem was not fooled by such logic-chopping. He knew the State of Viet- nam was a sham and that French economic and political primacy remained unchanged. When Bao Dai, in an effort to lend his new regime a degree of legitimacy, renounced the title "emperor" in favor of "chief of state" and invited Diem to be his premier, Diem declined. Indeed, while Nguyen Ton Hoan and other nationalists decided to serve in the Bao Dai regime, reason- ing that it might evolve into a more independent government, Diem made one of the most daring gestures of his career. He published a manifesto in two Saigon newspapers that argued for the creation of a new movement, aligned neither with the French nor the Viet Minh, that would force Paris to make greater concessions on the extent of Vietnamese self-government. He called for a "social revolution," for "reforms that are sweeping" to enable all Vietnamese "to live in a manner befitting the dignity of a man who is truly free." But the manifesto failed to provoke any widespread demand for reform, and Diem again joined the ranks of the attentistes, or "fence-sitters," waiting for a government of real sovereignty that he could serve with a clear conscience."

The following excerpt is from Dereliction of Duty by H. R. McMaster

“The French, meanwhile, attempted to counter Ho’s popularity and curry favor with the United States by creating a veneer of independence for Vietnam under Emperor Bao Dai’s puppet government. Contrasts between the emperor and his competitor to the north were striking. Ho seemed to personify Vietnam’s experience with French colonialism. His time in the West had left a deep impression on him, yet he retained his native identity and peasant appearance. He had studied and appropriated the ideas that had sparked revolutions in America and France in the eighteenth century as well as in Russia in 1917. Ho’s reputation as a learned ascetic devoted to the Vietnamese people contrasted with Bao Dai’s opulent affectations, philandering, and record of collaboration with the French and Japanese. Indeed, pro-French intentions were obvious. Bao Dai himself remarked: “What they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution. Although some American officials predicted that the regime would collapse, Washington recognized Bao Dai’s government in 1950 and began actively supporting the French in the war against the Vietminh. The outbreak of the Korean War in June highlighted the importance of containing Communism in Asia; American military and economic aid for the French increased.”

So, I think the description on the origins of the State of Vietnam is accurate. I'll write a new one. Sumpoim (talk) 07:28, 13 July 2023 (UTC)


 * I also think it's very reasonable to include Lansdale and the CIA's important role in consolidating Diem's power, as it was pointed out. It's surprisingly left out here. Of course, l'll need to go through it again. Sumpoim (talk) 08:03, 13 July 2023 (UTC)