User talk:Ashley kennedy3/Archive. Water politics in the Jordan River basin

Water politics in the Jordan River basin involves the issue of water politics as it applies to the Jordan River basin, an area situated in a conflict zone in the Middle East, where water resources are scarce. The headwaters for the basin are located in northern Israel, the Israeli occupied Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, which all feeds the Sea of Galilee. The Jordan River is a river that rises in the foothills of the Anti-Lebanon mountains, flows along the Great Rift Valley and discharges into the Dead Sea, travelling a distance of 251 km with a length of approximately 360 km.

Below the Sea of Galilee, which is the point at which the main tributaries enter the Jordan River Valley, the river's plain spreads to a width of approximately 15 mi. This area of terraces is known as the Ghor (or Ghawr) and is cut by wadis or rivers into towers, pinnacles and badlands. These form a maze of ravines alternating with sharp crests and rises.

From this point, the Jordan River floodplain, the Zur, is a widely winding course, which accounts for the excessive length of the river flow in comparison to the distance it traverses to reach the Dead Sea. Dams were built along the river in the Zur region, turning the former thickets of reeds, tamarisk, willows, and white poplars into irrigated fields. After flowing through the Zur, the Jordan drains into the Dead Sea through a broad, gently sloping delta.

The Jordan river basin includes:


 * The Hasbani (الحاصباني), senir (שניר), which flows from Lebanon.
 * The Banias (بانياس), hermon (חרמון), arising from a spring at Banias at the foot of Mount Hermon.
 * The Dan (דן), leddan (اللدان), whose source is also at the base of Mount Hermon.
 * derdara (دردره), or braghith (براغيث), The Iyon or Ayoun (עיון, which flows from Lebanon.

The Jordan River tributaries includes:


 * The Jalud in the Beth Shean valley
 * Yarmouk which begins in the Golan Heights and flows to the Jordan River below the Sea of Galilee.
 * Jabbok
 * Jabesh (Wadi Yabis) named after Jabesh-Gilead

Hydrography of the Jordan River
The riparian rights to the Jordan River are shared by 5 different countries: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine; although Israel as an occupying authority has refused to give up any of the water resources to the Palestinian National Authority. The Jordan River originates on the border of three countries, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, in a mountainous region. Three springs converge to make up the northern headwaters of the Jordan:
 * 1) The Hasbani River, which rises in south Lebanon and with an average annual flow of 138 million cubic meters (mcm)/yr,
 * 2) The Dan River, in Israel averaging 245 mcm/yr, and
 * 3) The Banias River from the Golan Heights, averaging also 121 mcm/yr. These streams converge six kilometres within Israel and flow south to the Sea of Galilee, wholly within Israel.

Water quality is variable in the river basin. The three tributaries of the upper Jordan (the Dan, Hasbani, and Banyas) have a low salinity of about 20 ppm. The salt comes from the saline subterranean springs. These springs pass through the beds of ancient seas and then flow into Lake Tiberias, as well as the groundwater sources that feed into the lower Jordan. The outflow of the Jordan river from Lake Tiberius is virtually blocked by Israel. The salinity of the Yarmouk River is also satisfactory, at 100 ppm. The salinity of water in Lake Tiberias ranges from 240 ppm in the upper portion of the lake (marginal for irrigation water), to 350 ppm (too high for sensitive citrus fruits) where it discharges into the Jordan River. The lower Jordan river becomes progressively more saline as it flows south, reaching twenty-five percent (250,000 ppm), when it ends in the Dead Sea which is about seven times saltier than the ocean.

As a resource for freshwater it is vital for most of the population of Palestine, Israel, Jordan also to a lesser extent with Lebanon and Syria who are able to utilise water from other sources. Although Syrian riparian rights to the Euphrates has been severely restricted by Turkey's dam building programme, a series of 21 dams and 17 hydroelectric stations built on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, in the 1980s, '90s and projected to be completed in 2010, in order to provide irrigation water and hydroelectricity to the arid area of southeastern Turkey. The CIA analysis in the 1980’s placed the Middle East on the list of possible conflict zones through water issues. The 20% of the region’s population is lacking access to adequate potable water and 35% of the population lack appropriate sanitation.

Sharing water resources involves the issue of water use, water rights, and distribution of amounts. The Palestinian National Authority wished to expand and develop the agricultural sector in the West Bank to decrease their dependency on the Israeli labour market, while Israel have prevented an increase in the irrigation of the West bank. Jordan also wishes to expand its agricultural sector so as to be able to achieve food security.

On May 21, 1997 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.

The articles establish two principles for the use of international watercourses (other than navigation): "equitable and reasonable utilization". and "the ‘due diligence’ obligation not to cause significant harm." Equitable and reasonable utilization requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
 * (a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
 * (b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
 * (c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
 * (d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;
 * (e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
 * (f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
 * (g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.

Historical background
The Syria-Lebanon-Palestine boundary was a product of the post-World War I Anglo-French partition of Ottoman Syria. British forces had advanced to a position at Tel Hazor against Turkish troops in 1918 and wished to incorporate all the sources of the Jordan River within the British controlled 'Occupied Enemy Territorial Administration' of Palestine. Due to the French inability to establish administrative control, the frontier between Syria and Palestine was fluid. Following the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and the unratified and later annulled Treaty of Sèvres, stemming from the San Remo conference, the 1920 boundary extended the British controlled area to north of the Sykes Picot line, a straight line between the mid point of the Sea of Galilee and Nahariya. In 1920 the French managed to assert authority over the Arab nationalist movement and after the Battle of Maysalun, King Faisal was deposed. The international boundary between Palestine and Syria was finally agreed by Great Britain and France in 1923 in conjunction with the Treaty of Lausanne, after Britain had been given a League of Nations mandate for Palestine in 1922. Banyas (on the Quneitra/Tyre road) was within in the French Mandate of Syria. The border was set 750 metres south of the spring.

Banias
In 1941 Australian forces occupied Banyas in the advance to the Litani during the Syria-Lebanon Campaign; Free French and Indian forces also invaded Syria in the Battle of Kissoué. Banias's fate in this period was left in a state of limbo since Syria had come under British military control. After the cessation of WWII hostilities, and at the time Syria was granted Independence (April 1946), the former mandate powers, France and Britain, bilaterally signed an agreement to pass control of Banias to the British mandate of Palestine. This was done against the expressed wishes of the Syrian government who declared France's signature to be invalid. While Syria maintained its claim on Banias in this period, it was administered from Jerusalem.

Following the 1948 Arab Israeli War, and the signing of the General Armistice Agreements in 1949, and DMZs included in the Armistice with Syria in July 1949, were "not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements." Israel claimed sovereignty over the Demilitarised zones (DMZs), on the basis that, "it was always part of the British Mandated Territory of Palestine." Moshe Dayan and Yosef Tekoah adopted a policy of Israeli control of the DMZ and water sources at the expense of Israel’s international image. The Banias spring remained under Syrian control, while the Banias River flowed through the contested Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and into Israel. With the Syrian capture of a small strtegically important hill, Givat Banias, Israel lost control of the Banias spring. Under the Johnston Plan Syria was allocated 20 MCM/yr for extraction from the Banias.

Hasbani
The Hasbani River derives most of its discharge from two springs in Lebanon, the Wazzani and the Haqzbieh, the latter being a group of springs on the uppermost Hasbani. The Hasbani runs for 25 miles in Lebanon before crossing the border and joining with the Banias and Dan Rivers at a point in northern Israel, to form the River Jordan. For about four kilometers downstream of Ghajar, the Hasbani forms the border between Lebanon and northern Israel.

The Wazzani's and the Haqzbieh's combined discharge averages 138 million m³ per year. About 20% of the Hasbani flow emerges from the Wazzani Spring at Ghajar, close to the Lebanese Israeli border, about 3 kilometers west of the base of Mount Hermon. The contribution of the spring is very important, because it is the only continuous year-round flow in the river in either Lebanon or Israel.

Utilization of water resources in the area, including the Hasbani, has been a source of conflict and was one of the factors leading to the 1967 Six-Day War. The Hasbani was included in the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, proposed in 1955 by special US envoy Eric Johnston. Under the plan, Lebanon was allocated usage of 35 million mcm annually from it.

In 2001 the Lebanese government installed a small pumping station with a 10 cm bore to extract water to supply Ghajar village. In March 2002 Lebanon also diverted part of the Hasbani to supply Wazzani village. An action that Ariel Sharon said was a "causus belli" and could lead to war.

Dan
largest tributary of the Jordan river, whose source is located at the base of Mount Hermon. Until the 1967 Six Day War, the Dan River was the only source of the river Jordan wholly within Israeli territory. Its flow provides up to 238 million cubic meters of water annually to the Hulah Valley. In 1966 this was a cause of dispute between water planners and conservationists, with the later prevailing after three years of court appeals and adjudication. The result was a conservation project of about 120 acre at the source of the river called the Tel Dan Reserve.

Huleh marshes
In 1951 the tensions in the area were raised when, in the lake Huleh area (10 km from Banias), Israel initiated a project to drain the marsh land to bring 15,000 acres into cultivation. The project caused a conflict of interests between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Arab villages in the area and drew Syrian complaints to the United Nations.

Part of the Hula marshes were re-flooded in 1994 due to the negative effects from the original drainage plan.

DMZs
On 30 March 1951 in a meeting chaired by David Ben-Gurion the Israeli government decided to assert Israeli sovereignty over the DMZs, consequently 800 inhabitants of the villages were forcibly evacuated from the DMZ. From 1951 Israel refused to attend the meetings of the Israel/Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. This refusal on the part of Israel not only constituted a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement, but also contributed to an increase of tension in the area. The Security Council itself strongly condemned the attitude of Israel, in its resolution of 18 May 1951, as being "inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement"

Under UN auspices and with encouragement from the Eisenhower administration 9 meetings took place between 15 January and 27 January 1953, to regularise administration of the 3 DMZs. At the eighth meeting Syria offered to adjust the armistice lines, and cede to Israel's 70% of the DMZ, in exchange for a return to the pre 1946 International border in the Jordan basin area, with Banias water resources returning uncontested to Syrian sovereignty. On 26 April, the Israeli cabinet met to consider the Syrian suggestions; with head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, Simha Blass, in attendance. Blass noted that while the land to be ceded to Syria was not suitable for cultivation, the Syrian map did not suit Israel’s water development plan. Blass explained that the movement of the International boundary in the area of Banias would affect Israel’s water rights.Shlaim, Avi (2000) Ibid pp 75-76 At the eighth meeting on 13 April, the Syrian delegates seemed very anxious to move forward and offered Israel around 70% of the DMZ’s. Significant results were achieved and a number of suggestions and summaries put in writing, but they required decisions by the two governments. The Israeli cabinet convened on 26 April to consider the Syrian suggestions for the division of the DMZs. Simha Blass, head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, was invited to the meeting. Dayan showed Blass the Syrian suggestions on the map. Blass told Dayan that although most of the lands that Israel was expected to relinquish were not suitable for cultivation, the map did not suit Israel’s irrigation and water development plans...Although phrased in a positive manner, this decision appears to have killed the negotiations. It involved changes to the preliminary accord and new conditions that made it difficult to go forward. At the last two meetings, on 4 and 27 May Israel presented its new conditions. These were rejected by Syria, and the negotiations ended without agreement...That a set of proposals that had the support of the political and military elite was emasculated because it did not satisfy the requirements of a water expert seems surprising. it suggests lack of leadership and lack of statesmanship on Ben Gurion's part when it came to the crunch. In the final analysis, it was Israel's insistence on exclusive and unfettered rights over the lakes and the Jordan river that seems to have upset the apple cart. An opportunity for an agreement with a major adversary existed and was allowed to slip away. Yet the fact that the negotiations came so close to success is in it self significant because it shows that, contrary to popular Israeli perceptions, Syria was capable of behaving in a practical, pragmatic and constructive fashion. There was definitely someone to talk to on the other side. The Israeli cabinet rejected the Syrian proposals but decided to continue the negotiations by making changes to the accord and placing conditions on the Syrian proposals. The Israeli conditions took into account Blass’s position over water rights and Syria rejected the Israeli counter offer.

Israel carried out a policy of ethnically cleasing the DMZ and forcing the remaining Palestinian citizens of Israel to supply the IDF with agricultural produce at lower than market prices producing poverty. This has been noted by Tom Segev where he quotes Rafi Rubinstein from Yehiam and why the Syrian had fought for the Palestinians cause.

Yarmouk
The Syrian capture of el-Hama in the Yarmouk valley denied Israel access to the Yarmouk.

Regional Projects
In the late 1930s and mid 1940s, Transjordan and the World Zionist Organization commissioned mutually exclusive competing water resource studies. The Transjordanian study, performed by Michael G. Ionides, concluded that the available water resources are not sufficient to sustain a Jewish state which would be the destination for Jewish immigration. The Zionist study, by the American engineer Walter Clay Lowdermilk, concluded that by diverting water from the Jordan basin to support agriculture and residential development in the Negev, a Jewish state supporting 4 million new immigrants would be sustainable. At the end of the 1948 Arab Israeli War with the signing of the General Armistice Agreements in 1949, both Israel and Jordan embarked on implementing their competing initiatives to utilize the water resources in the areas under their control.

Lowdermilk
The director of the US Soil Conservation Service, Walter Clay Lowdermilk, was commissioned by the Jewish Agency in Palestine to produce a report, Palestine, Land and Promise in 1944. The Lowdermilk study put forwards the proposal that Palestine would support 4 million Jewish refugees in addition to 1.8 million inhabitants already in Palestine if a water management system, modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority, was put into operation. The proposal called for irrigation of both banks of the Jordan, irrigation of the Negev and a canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea for the dual purpose of Hydroelectric generation and replacement of diverted freshwater.

In conjunction with the Lowdermilk proposals, Merkerot (the national water company for Jews in Palestine), put forward a boundary change scheme to include the headwaters of the Banias and Hasbani, also a boundary change upstream of the Yarmouk to allow for dams to be built, further that the Litani should be included within the River Jordan watershed.

McDonald plan
The McDonald plan was a proposal put forward to aid resettlement of the Palestinian refugees within Jordan.

Israeli National Water Carrier project
The first "Master Plan for Irrigation in Israel" was drafted in 1950 and approved by a Board of Consultants (of the U.S.A) on March 8, 1956. The main features of the Master Plan was the construction of the Israeli National Water Carrier (NWC), a project for the integration of all major regional projects into the Israeli national grid. Tahal – Water Planning for Israel Ltd., an Israeli public corporate body, was established in 1952, being largely responsible for planning of water development, drainage, etc., at the national level within Israel, including the NWC project which was commissioned in 1965.

In 1953, Israel began construction of a water carrier to take water from the Sea of Galilee to the populated center and agricultural south of the country, while Jordan concluded an agreement with Syria, known as the Bunger plan, to dam the Yarmouk river near Maqarin, and utilize its waters to irrigate Jordanian territory, before they could flow to the Sea of Galilee. Military clashes ensued, and US President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched ambassador Johnston to the region to work out a plan that would regulate water usage.

In September 1953, Israel unilaterally started a water diversion project within the Jordan River basin to divert water from the Jordan River at Jacob's Ford (B'not Yacov) to help irrigate the coastal Sharon Plain and eventually the Negev desert. The diversion project consisted of a nine-mile channel midway between the Huleh Marshes and Lake Galilee (Lake Tiberias) in the central DMZ to be rapidly constructed. Syria claimed that it would dry up 12,000 acres of Syrian land. The UNTSO Chief of Staff Major General Vagn Bennike of Denmark noted that the project was denying water to two Palestinian water mills, was drying up Palestinian farm land and was a substantial military benefit to Israel against Syria. The US cut off aid to Israel. The Israeli response was to increase work. UN Security Council Resolution 100 “deemed it desirable” for Israel to suspend work started on the 2nd September “pending urgent examination of the question by the Council”. Israel finally backed off by moving the intake out of the DMZ and for the next three years the US kept its economic sanctions by threatening to end aid channelled to Israel by the Foreign Operations Administration and insisting on tying the aid with Israel's behaviour. The Security Council ultimately rejected Syrian claims that the work was a violation of the Armistice Agreements and drainage works were resumed and the work was completed in 1957. This caused shelling from Syria and friction with the Eisenhower Administration; the diversion was moved to the southwest to Eshed Kinrot into the Israeli National Water Carrier project, designed by Tahal and constructed by Mekorot.United Nations University In 1955 the Unified (Johnston) Plan to develop a multilateral approach to water management failed to be ratified, which reinforced unilateral development. Nevertheless, both Jordan and Israel undertook to operate within their allocations, and two major successful projects were undertaken: the Israeli National Water Carrier and Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal.... Design of the East Ghor canal was begun by Jordan in 1957. It was intended as the first section of a much more ambitious plan known as the Greater Yarmouk project. Additional sections included (1) construction of two Dams on the Yarmouk (Mukheiba and Maqarin) for storage and hydroelectricity, (2) construction of a 47-km West Ghor canal, together with a siphon across the Jordan River near wadi Faria to connect it with the East Ghor Canal, (3) construction of seven dams to utilise seasonal flow on side wadis flowing into the Jordan, and (4) construction of pumping stations, lateral canals, and flood protection and drainage facilities. In the original Greater Yarmouk project the East Ghor Canal was scheduled to provide only 25% of the total irrigation scheme.... Construction of the Canal began in 1959. By 1961 its first section was completed; sections two and three, down Wadi Zarqa, were in service by June 1966. Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters. Two options were considered: either the diversion of the Hasbani to the Litani and the diversion of the Banias to the Yarmouk, or the diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk. The latter was chosen, with the diverted waters to be stored behind the Mukhaiba dam.... The Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion Project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to the estimates completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one ninth of Israel's annual water budget. Murakami, Masahiro (1995) Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies, ISBN 92-808-0858-3 pp.295-297

Plan for the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region
In 1955 US ambassador Eric Johnston negotiated for the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region. The starting point, for what became known as the 'Johnston Plan', was the 'Main Plan'; a report commissioned by United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) performed by the American consultant Charles T. Main for the development of water resource to aid refugee resettlement and published just days before Johnston's appointment. Both the Main Plan and the subsequent Johnston Plan employed the same principles used by the Tennessee Valley Authority, to optimize the usage of an entire river basin as a single unit 'in the best interests of the area.'. The Johnston plan was approved by technical water committees of all the regional riparian countries – Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Though the plan was un-ratified by Israel and rejected by the Arab Higher Committee, Jordan undertook to abide by their allocations under the plan. Israel, after the US linked the Johnston plan to aid, also agreed to accept the allocation provisions.


 * except for the above withdrwals
 * *the waters of the Yarmouk River will be available for the unconditional use of the Kingdom of the [sic] Jordan
 * ** and the waters of the Jordan River will be for unconditional use of Israel.

Greater Yarmouk project
The Greater Yarmouk project comprised of the East Ghor Main Canal (the King Abdullah Canal, KAC) two storage dams on the Yarmouk (one at Maqarin and the other at wadi Khalid) and the West Ghor Canal.

On 4 June 1953 Jordan and Syria concluded a bilateral plan to store surface water at Maqarin, so as to be able to utilise the water resources of the Yarmouk river in the Yarmouk-Jordan valley plan, funded through the Technical Cooperation Agency of the United States of America, the UNRWA and Jordan.

The East Ghor canal was completed in 1966 and the Maqarin was competed in 2006 as the Al Wehdah Dam, the west Ghor project was never built, due to Israel's occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan River during the Six-day war.

The East Ghor canal was built as the main agricultural improvement in Jordan to aid the incorporation of the economically active Palestinian refugees into Jordanian society.

In 1969 Israel became suspicious that Jordan is diverting the Yarmouk to an extent greater than the Johnston plan and carried out AIF raids and shelled the newly-built Canal. Israel responded with punitive raids into Jordan, in an attempt to force King Hussein of Jordan to rein in the PLO. The canal was the target of at least 4 of these raids, and was virtually knocked out of commission. The United states intervened to resolve the conflict, and the canal was repaired after Hussien undertook to stop PLO activity in the area.

The canal's length has been increased to 100Km and has the capacity to irrigate 22,00 hectares. Increased demand for water in Jordan's municipal areas has led to the construction of a pipeline from the canal to Amman, diverting 45 mcm annually for residential and industrial use.

Headwater Diversion Plan
First summit of Arab Heads of State was convened in Cairo between January 13-17 1964, called by Nasser the Egyptian president, to discuss a common policy to confront Israel's national water carrier project which was nearing completion. The second Arab League summit conference voted on a plan which would have circumvent and frustrated it. The Arab and North African states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters rather than the use of direct military intervention. The heads of State of the Arab League considered two options:


 * 1) The diversion of the Hasbani to the Litani combined with the diversion of the Banias to the Yarmouk,
 * 2) The diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.

The Arab league plan selected was for the Hasbani and Banias waters to be diverted to Mukhaiba and stored.

After the 2nd Arab summit conference in Cairo of January 1964 (with the backing of all 13 Arab League members), Syria in a joint project with Lebanon and Jordan, started the development of the water resources of Banias for a canal along the slopes of the Golan toward the Yarmouk River. While Lebanon was to construct a canal form the Hasbani River to Banias and complete the scheme. The diversion consisted of:-


 * 1) Diversion of tributaries in Lebanon.
 * A The upper Hasbani- the excavation of a canal from the Hasbani springs in the hasbaya region and a canal from the wadi Shab’a for carrying water to the kawkaba tunnels and from there to the Litani River. (This project would transport 40-60 million cubic metres of water annually).
 * B. The Middle hasbani-two diversion points-the first in the hasbani riverbed; the second in wadi Sarid. The Hasbani and Sarid would flow in a canal to the Banias and from there to the Yarmuk. According to the plan, 20-30 million cubic metres of water would flow annually to Syria (if Lebanon did not divert the hasbani’s floodwater to the Litani, the Sarid canal could transport up to 60 million cubic metres of water a year).
 * C. The Wazani Spring in the Lower Hasbani Riverbed-this would include an irrigation canal (carrying 16 million cubic metres of water a year) for local use in Lebanon; an irrigation canal in Syria (8 million cubic metres a year); and three pumping units to transport the Wanzani’s overflow to Syria via the Sarid-Banias canal at a rate of 26 million cubic metres a year.
 * 2. Diversions in Syrian territory
 * A. Diversion of the Banias-The diversion plan for the banias called for a 73 kilometre long canal to be dug 350 metres above sea level that would link the banias with the Yamuk. The canal would carry the Banias’s fixed flow plus the overflow from the hasbani (including water from the Sarid and Wazani). The Banias diversion would provide 90 million cubic metres of water for irrigation of riverine areas. The designers calculated that eighteen months would be sufficient for executing the plan. The cost was estimated at five million Pounds Sterling (including two tunnels), that is, approximately two million pounds more than the Arab plan.
 * B. The butayha Project-The Syrians feared that if the Arabs implemented their diversion plan, Israel would block the batayha Valley inhabitants, annual pumping of 22 million cubic metres from the Jordan as proposed in the Johnston plan. In order to guarantee the villagers their vital water supply, the Arab plan contained a proviso designed to incorporate primary and secondary canals from the Sea of Galilee.
 * 3. The water plans in Jordan.
 * The construction of a dam in the Kingdom of Jordan (the Mukheiba dam on the Yarmuk River) was designed to hold 200 million cubic metres of water. Work on the dam would take 30 months at a cost of ten and one quarter million Pounds Sterling. The Mukheiba Dam (and the Makarin Dam) would hurt Israel if it was incorporated into the diversion plans for the Jordan River’s northern sources, and without the Mukheiba dam all of the diverted water would flow back to the Yarmuk and return to the Jordan’s riverbed south of the Sea of galilee. Excluding this plan, the rest of the Jordan’s water projects correspond with the main parts of the Johnson Plan.

Shemesh, Moshe (2008) Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957–1967 Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 1845191889 pp 49-50 The project was to divert 20 to 30 million cubic metres of water from the river Jordan tributaries to Syria and Jordan for the development of Syria and Jordan. The Syrian construction of the Banias to Yarmouk canal got under way In 1965. Once completed, the diversion of the flow would have transported the water into a dam at Mukhaiba for use by Jordan and Syria before the waters of the Banias Stream entered Israel and the Sea of Galilee. Lebanon also started a canal to divert the waters of the Hasbani, whose source is in Lebanon, into the Banias. The Hasbani and Banias diversion works would have had the effect of reducing the capacity of Israel's carrier by about 35% and Israel's overall water supply by about 11%. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. The Finance of the project was through contributions by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This led to military intervention from Israel, first with tank and artillery fire and then, as the Syrians shifted the works further southwards, with airstrikes.

Six day War
On June 10th, 1967, the last day of the Six Day War, Golani Brigade forces quickly invaded the village of Banias where a caliphate era Syrian fort stood. Eshkol's priority on the Syrian front was control of the water sources. This action has meant that Israel utilizes all water resources for the agricultural development of the Hula Valley and Negev desert.

subsequent developments
In 1977 the then Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin asked the Israeli Water Commissioner Menachem Cantor to draw up a Map of the areas that Israel should not relinquish control of the water resources of the West Bank, the line bounding these areas is known as the Red Line and has been extended to include the Northern headwaters of the River Jordan and Golan Heights.

In 1980 Syria unilaterally started a programme of dam building along the Yarmouk.

The southern slopes of Mount Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh) as well as the Golan Heights, were unilaterally annexed by Israel in 1981.

1988 The Syrian/Jordanian agreement on development of the Yarmouk is blocked when Israel as a riparian right holder refuses to ratify the plan and the World Bank withholds funding. Israel's augments its Johnson plan allocation of 25 MCM/yr by a further 45-75 MCM/yr.

The water agreement forms a part of the broader political treaty which was signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994, and the articles relating to water in this agreement do not correspond with Jordan’s rights to water as they were originally claimed. The nature and significance of the wider 1994 treaty meant that the water aspect was forced to cede importance and priority in negotiations, giving way to areas such as borders and security in terms of armed force, which were perceived by decision-makers as being the most integral issues to the settlement. Main points from the water sharing in the Jordan/Israel Peace treaty.

Jordan being a country that borders on the Jordan has riparian rights to water from the Jordan basin and upper Jordan tributaries. Due to the water diversion projects the flow to the river Jordan has been reduced from 1,300/1,500 million cubic metres (mcm) to 250/300 mcm. Where the water quality has been further reduced as the flow of the river Jordan is made of run-off from agricultural irrigation and saline springs. Due to the water diversion projects the flow to the river Jordan has been reduced from 1,300/1,500 million cubic metres (mcm)to 250/300 mcm. Where the water quality has been further reduced as the flow of the river Jordan is made of run-off from agricultural irrigation and saline springs. Jordanian projects include separating waste water for reuse in agriculture from potable water.

Israel's subsequent developments have been mainly aimed at enlarging the main distribution system of Israel, run-off interception, reclamation of waste-water, and increasing the operational efficiency of water distribution networks. Over the year, the irrigated area within Israel has increased from 28,000 ha in 1948 to some 220,000 ha in 1997.

Problems can be seen to have emerged in 1999, when the treaty’s limitations were revealed by events concerning water shortages in the Jordan basin. A reduced supply of water to Israel due to drought meant that, in turn, Israel which is responsible for providing water to Jordan, decreased its water provisions to the country, provoking a diplomatic disagreement between the two and bringing the water component of the treaty back into question.

Israel's complaints that the reduction in water from the tributaries to the river Jordan caused by the Jordan/Syrian dam look to go unheeded due to the conflict of interest between Israel and her neighbours.