User talk:Bob K31416/M-O

Hi Bob: If you would like to pursue an exchange of views about Carnap in this venue, I'd be glad to participate. i have presented my take on one of Carnap's papers that I find particularly clear on Talk:Meta-ontology. I understand that you applied WP:TLDR to my efforts, so you may not have any idea about my views. With respect to the points you highlight here on your User:Bob K31416/M-O so far: The bulleted points are all OK. Your summary goes astray, however, in adopting too vague a view of 'framework'. I know you are following Thomasson here, but my view is that this sentence of hers draws upon her entire discussion for a correct interpretation of her use of 'framework' and how 'everyday language' must be subjected to a re-wording of sorts on the philosopher's part to disambiguate the way it leads to a 'framework'. You will notice that Thomasson in the paragraph containing 'paper on my desk' refers several times, once in italics to within the framework, which I take as emphasis that one needs a structured environment. On p. 3 she quotes Price: “ Legitimate uses of the terms such as ‘number’ and ‘material object’ are necessarily internal, for it is conformity (more or less) to the rules of the framework in question that constitutes use.” Thomasson then says: “Internal questions, questions asked within, or using the framework, are questions that make use of the relevant terms (property terms, number terms, material object terms) according to the rules introduced .” (Underscores all mine, of course.) She goes on with Carnap: “To introduce a linguistic framework, according to Carnap, requires introducing ‘a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules’ (1950, 206). The framework of number language ‘is constructed by introducing into the language new expressions with suitable rules ’” There are many other instances where she refers to rules as an essential part of a framework, and I'd say that when she refers to 'everyday language' as a framework, like Carnap where he discusses 'paper' and 'desk', she is thinking of a context where such rules are implied, and not the vast unstructured domain of all 'ordinary language'. Again the bulleted points are fine. You have made no summary of these points. An aside: As you might realize, the examples of 'external' questions can be taken indeed as being 'external', but according to Carnap they also can be re-interpreted as 'internal' factual questions about whether or not 'numbers' and 'the thing world' are useful concepts in some practical context. Your summary here seems OK to me.
 * User:Bob_K31416/M-O
 * User:Bob_K31416/M-O
 * User:Bob_K31416/M-O
 * User:Bob_K31416/M-O

In short, Bob, I don't think we are far apart here. Some rewording of User:Bob_K31416/M-O could produce complete agreement. Brews ohare (talk) 18:31, 3 June 2013 (UTC)
 * --Bob K31416 (talk) 06:52, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
 * Hi Bob: A big improvement, I'd say. How 'everyday language' fits into this picture is not explained by Thomasson. Carnap is opaque about this too. Carnap does restrict what he means when he says 'everyday language'. He refers to: "everyday language: the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events." I think he means to limit himself when he speaks of 'everyday language' to that part of 'everyday language' that treats the location of entities in space and in time. However, later he speaks of "The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge" and still later in The system of numbers he speaks of numbers as "a system which is of a logical rather than a factual nature". These remarks suggest he has a restricted part of 'everyday language' in mind, but he doesn't do anything else to explain how it relates to a 'linguistic framework'. Brews ohare (talk) 13:57, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
 * Carnap does say this in §3: "The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)" Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
 * An aside: You might find this remark useful: "He [Carnap] asserted that many philosophical problems are indeed pseudo-problems, the outcome of a misuse of language. Some of them can be resolved when we recognize that they are not expressing matters of fact, but rather concern the choice between different linguistic frameworks...Since ordinary language is ambiguous, Carnap asserted the necessity of studying philosophical issues in artificial languages, which are governed by the rules of logic and mathematics. In such languages, he dealt with the problems of the meaning of a statement, the different interpretations of probability, the nature of explanation, and the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori, and necessary and contingent statements." Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
 * And here is another one: "According to Carnap, discussing a new kind of entity requires the construction of a linguistic framework, defined as a new set of rules governing the ways in which these entities are described and referenced. A linguistic framework is thus a way of organizing human communication about particular sets of experiences or observations." Brews ohare (talk) 17:08, 4 June 2013 (UTC)
 * And another: "Rudolph Carnap presented an anti-metaphysical approach to ontological discourse based on the pragmatic adoption or rejection of linguistic frameworks,within which meanings, definitions and truth are analytic. [...] Furthermore, language is seen to be segregated; each set of variables, the so-called linguistic frameworks, refers to a certain and distinct set of entities, to be argued for or against depending on how useful its adoption would be with regard to (but not blind adherence to) empirically motivated language. This is the anti-metaphysical claim; existence is precisely what we make of it. Statements and questions regarding the facts of existence as they are outside of any given linguistic framework are simply meaningless to Carnap, and do not feature within his process of developing a segregated model of language" Brews ohare (talk) 17:16, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

Recent version
Hi Bob: I see the discussion is evolving. Looking at this version, it begins:
 * "According to Rudolf Carnap,[1] to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms."

It goes on to say:
 * "Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?”[2]"

Now here is a question not resolved by the cited source [2]:
 * As 'everyday language' is rather unstructured, what are the 'rules' of the "linguistic framework of 'everyday language'" that make 'everyday language' into a 'linguistic framework'??

I would hold that this comment by Carnap applies:
 * “The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.)”

I'd take this as suggesting although 'paper' and 'desk' occur in 'everyday language' their use in a 'framework' is going to be a distillation or abstraction of the everyday usage that is subject to 'new rules'.

For example, the content of the statement “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” could be taken as a formulation of "Does the preposition 'on' apply to the observed relation between 'desk' and 'paper' as required by the framework that applies to the location of objects in my office?" The gratuitous introduction of the property 'white' into the sentence simply obfuscates the point by requiring an even more complex linguistic framework that includes rules and definitions for attributing colors besides those for positions. Brews ohare (talk) 17:43, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

A possible rephrasing of the 'paper' 'desk' example that acknowledges the concept of rules is:
 * "For example, a linguistic framework based upon 'everyday language' that describes the location of objects in an office allows formulation of the internal factual question, “Is there a piece of paper on my desk?”, to be answered by observing whether the preposition 'on' describes the location of the paper correctly within the rules of the framework.[2]"

Brews ohare (talk) 18:10, 4 June 2013 (UTC)

Second sentence
The second sentence reads:
 * "In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions."

That is not exactly the same thing Carnap says. He says:
 * "And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions."

You may notice that Carnap is distinguishing between two types of existence questions. He is not limiting internal questions to being only existence questions. For example, within the framework of geometry "Is a square a rectangle" is an internal question, but has nothing to do with questions of existence, but is about how the rules and definitions of the framework work.

The fundamental distinction is that internal questions are posed within a framework and are answered using the rules and definitions of the framework, while external questions are those that are posed outside a framework. Likewise, internal factual question can be asked like "Is this door a square or a rectangle?" This question is an internal question because it is answered by interpreting it as asking: "Within the framework of Euclidean geometry, does the shape of this door correspond more closely to the concept of a square or to that of a rectangle?" Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

The second sentence could read:
 * "Questions that are answerable from within a framework, using its definitions and rules, are called internal questions, and may be either logical in nature, or factual."

Brews ohare (talk) 14:47, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

There is a focus upon existence questions in much of the work about Carnap because these are the type of question most debated, being at the root of Carnap's dismissal of 'ontology', which is, of course, all about "What exists ?". Brews ohare (talk) 15:06, 5 June 2013 (UTC)