User talk:Brews ohare/Dilemma

Discussion invited
This draft is intended as a vehicle for discussion.

Its definition of the dilemma itself is as the dilemma of morality one faces when one's notions of causality conflict with the intuitive notion that one has free choice over at least some of one's actions. The dilemma is a moral quandary posed by a belief that events are determined by outside agency, placing human decisions outside moral responsibility.

The 'horns of a dilemma' section explains that there is no dilemma related to choosing determined events over random events - any dilemma of that sort is an empirical matter that is settled by looking at particular theories of how events are connected.

The actual dilemma as discussed by William James and by John Martin Fischer is the dilemma of reconciling moral responsibility with either of these choices (determined or random), or (for that matter) any scientific theory connecting events that is considered to be a model governing all possible events, including decisions about one's choice of actions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 18 October 2013 (UTC)

I've stated my view of James' definition of the 'dilemma' as a dilemma over the scope of morality compared to 'laws of nature', and not as a dilemma posed by the choice between the determinism/chance 'horns' of the dilemma, a view that I believe is very clear already from the paragraph quoted from his talk titled The Dilemma of Determinism. In further support of this view, I'd point out. Among other things he says: Brews ohare (talk) 14:21, 20 October 2013 (UTC)

We also have this and from and from the same talk: Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 21 October 2013 (UTC)

In his discussion of Kant, this dilemma has been elevated beyond the issue of moral responsibility to a broader issue by : Brews ohare (talk) 13:42, 23 October 2013 (UTC)

Fischer
Let's compare the formulation presented in this article with that of Fischer. The argument presented here is:
 * The concept of determinism contradicts that of free will — the deterministic horn,


 * The concept of indeterminism also contradicts free will — the indeterministic horn,


 * and one claim of putative fact:


 * Some occurrences are governed by determinism, and all the rest by indeterminism — a putative claim of fact,


 * which statements in combination lead to the conclusion:


 * In the universe as we know it, free will does not govern any occurrences — the conclusion.

The formulation of Fischer is:


 * Casual determinism means I have to act as I do, and thus am not responsible for my actions — the deterministic horn,


 * The only meaningful alternative to causal determinism is that how I act is a matter of luck, and thus I am not responsible for my actions — the indeterministic horn,


 * and one claim, possibly of putative fact, or possibly merely a tautological proposition:


 * Either casual determinism is true, or it is false — maybe a putative claim of fact, maybe a statement of logical consistency


 * which statements in combination lead to the conclusion, which again may be a claim of fact, or a claim of logical consequence:


 * Therefore, I am not responsible for my actions — the conclusion.

If we look at Fisher's formulation it has the unfortunate features of (i) making a particular definition of determinism and responsibility (which prejudices the first premise by combining it with particular positions), (ii) defining indeterminism in two different ways in the second premise: as the opposite of determinism and as luck, and introducing a particular view of responsibility (again prejudicing the premise with what should be separate debates over the interpretation of indeterminism and responsibility) and (iii) possibly using the words 'true' and 'false' in two different senses: a logical sense (a matter of consistency in usage) in the first two statements, and either in an empirical sense in the third claim and in the conclusion (which is a matter of applying assertions to the universe), or possibly in a logical sense here as well, in which case no empirical claim is made at all, and the entire formulation is a syllogism (that is, a purely theoretical logical construction without implication for the real world). In summary, any discussion of any of the premises or the conclusion introduces multiple issues, and any argument over the structure of the argument becomes entangled simultaneously in multiple interpretations, instead of teasing out the various threads of the argument. To know how Fischer himself interprets this unsatisfactorily vague formulation of the argument, we are forced to read his lengthy discussion in detail, often going between the lines.

Although Fischer frames the matter in terms of our sense of moral responsibility (which has the merit of an extensive legal codification that removes its subjective nature from all debate), I'd suggest that the intuitive concept of 'free will' underpins this sense of moral responsibility, so Fischer's arguments apply equally to free will. Brews ohare (talk) 17:31, 8 November 2013 (UTC)

William James
In a talk titled The dilemma of determinism, William James explains the 'dilemma' involved as being the conflict between his definition of 'determinism' and the need for moral responsibility. James' idea of determinism is based upon the 'principle of causality', which he characterizes as simply a need for the sequence of events to 'manifest a deeper kind of belonging of one thing with another than a mere arbitrary juxtaposition' a goal driven by our instinctive demand for logical rationality. Likewise, moral responsibility is an instinctive demand which appears at odds with determinism because it contradicts the notion of choice.

James' purpose in this talk is to suggest that 'chance' be introduced into the discussion. He feels himself in an environment where the idea of chance is strongly opposed, and some labor is needed to defend its occurrence. "In every outwardly verifiable and practical respect, a world in which the alternatives that now actually distract your choice were decided by pure chance would be by me absolutely indistinguished from the world in which I now live." With this remark, in effect, James introduces the subject-object problem and the problem of other minds. James continues: "To yourselves, it is true, these very acts of choice, which to me are so blind, opaque and external, are the opposites of this, for you are within them and effect them. To you they appear as decisions...they appeal to no outside moment to put its stamp upon them or make them continuous with the rest of nature. Themselves it is [that is, acts of choice] rather who seem to make nature continuous; and in their strange and intense function of granting consent to to one possibility and withholding it from another, to transform an equivocal and double future [that is, a future that allows choice] into an unalterable and simple past." (p. 8).

Thus, James describes the intuitive notions behind the controversy. From a metaphysical standpoint he argues that "No part of the world, however big, can claim to control absolutely the destinies of the whole." He argues that chance does play a role, although "from any strictly theoretical point of view, the question {of whether the world is ruled by chance] is insoluble", and states the most that he can accomplish is to "deepen our theoretic sense of the difference between a world with chances in it and a deterministic world".

His conclusion is "It is entirely immaterial, in this scheme, whether the creator leave the absolute chance-possibilities to be decided by himself, each when its proper moment arrives, or whether, on the contrary, he alienates this power from himself and leaves the decision out and out to such finite creatures as we men are. The great point is that the possibilities are really here. Whether it be we who solve them or he working through us...is of small account, so long as we admit that the issue is decided nowhere else than here and now [that is, not determined by a past sequence of events]. That is what gives the palpitating reality to our moral life and makes it tingle..."

Russell
Russell's discussion of Hume contains the figure below:


 * (A) Chance &emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp; (B) Humean necessity &emsp;&emsp; (C) Metaphysical necessity
 * &emsp;No regular succession&emsp;&emsp; Regular succession&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;"Compelling" powers in objects
 * &emsp;&emsp;&emsp; ↑&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;↑&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;↑
 * &emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;Moral Realm?
 * &emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;Humean necessity and the dilemma of determinism

Russell says: "Hume is arguing that a middle path may be traveled between, on the one hand, a confused and unintelligible conception of necessity and, on the other, an erroneous belief in the existence of chance." "In the light of the above diagram, it appears evident that Hume's strategy is to reveal that the dilemma of determinism, presented as an alternative between horns A and C, is a false dilemma. What has encouraged philosophers to misconstrue the problem in this way has been their confusion about the nature of necessity as we discover it in the natural realm. According to Hume, our experience of both the natural and the moral realms makes it plain that the only genuine alternative is the middle path of Humean necessity; therefore, in this respect, our actions and our willings are on the same footing as the operations of bodies....The distinction that is crucial ... concerns the type of cause (i.e. the nature of the object that produced the action), rather than the nature of the causal relation..." Speaking for himself, Russell says: "it remains open to the libertarian to simply maintain that what is caused need not be necessitated."

One can approach Russell's own views in this matter, or his interpretation of Hume's views, as both are pertinent to a discussion of the 'dilemma of determinism'. According to Russell, Hume attacks the topic of determinism as mentioned in the 'dilemma' by analyzing 'cause' and its connection with 'compulsion', the idea being that there is a mistake in not distinguishing 'causation' from 'compulsion', and that freedom of choice is consistent with 'causation' because that does not imply 'compulsion'. Russell says he is not in agreement with Hume's arguments supporting this view, but he seems to accept the conclusion nonetheless.