User talk:ColinHarkins1/sandbox

I'm removing all non-final product edits and additions from the sandbox to allow for easier editing. The parts of this assignment that have already been completed should be accessible in the history section. ColinHarkins1 (talk) 19:15, 24 April 2018 (UTC)Colin

Peer Review by Joseita Tesolin

1.	All of the headings that are mentioned in this draft seem to be relevant to the topic. This draft however doesn’t seem to be too developed in terms of complete sentences. The “Economic Implications” heading for example only has sources under it so it is difficult for me to tell if the information is relevant as they are just links to sources.

2.	The sentences that are written are written in a neutral and unbiased matter. The draft seems to do a good job of presenting the facts as they are.

3.	Viewpoints seem to be equally represented. There are many headings under “Types” of bid rigging which I think is good to get a well-rounded overall picture of the topic. The headings of “Economic Implications”, “Remediation” and “North America” definitely need to be developed further as there are only basic sources listed under these headings. Although the number of sources seems promising for a good representation of various sources once they are developed.

4.	The sources under “Economic Implications” do work and seem to be great academic sources for the topic. The source of “Types” of bid rigging works and is good as well. There are no sources listed under the “Remediation” section, however it does say that he has some. Maybe there could be some additional sources for the categories instead of relying entirely on one source per section.

5.	Most of the facts are supported by appropriate references. Many of the headings are however very underdeveloped so there aren’t really sources per fact given, more just a few overall sources that will be used in the section. I recommend that these headings be developed and that the sources listed so far are used to reference individual facts throughout. The sources given so far seem to be unbiased. They are largely coming from academic literature and journals which are peer-reviewed and appropriate. I also think the “North America” section definitely needs some more work as well.

6.	The information is up to date. However, there are a lot of gaps to fill in terms of the overall article. Most sections are not developed to their final form, but I understand this is a draft. As mentioned before the Remediation, North America, and Economic Implications headings need the most work, whereas the “Types” section is pretty well done so far but I feel like some of the sentences are not complete yet. I’m unsure if there are further case studies that could be added but I believe that would enhance the quality of the article as well. In the article I am writing I include a section of “Advantages” and “Consequences”, so maybe this article could benefit from those headings as well and it would be interesting to read the implications for different parties involved in bid rigging.

(Just moved this here for spacing in my sandbox)--Colin


 * Hi! I included my edits throughout the paper. Overall, I think you should use simpler terminology because at points it was confusing to understand. I like the different types of bid-rigging section but there definitely is more to be added. -Meredith Aird

Bid rigging is a form of fraud in which a commercial contract is promised beforehand to one party while other parties present bids in order to reduce suspicioon. This form of collusion is illegal in most countries. Bid rigging is also a form of price fixing and market allocation, often practiced where contracts are determined by a call for bids, for example in the case of government construction contracts.

-maybe explain what a call for bids is as well?

Bid rigging almost always results in economic harm to the agency which is seeking the bids, and to the public, who ultimately bear the costs as taxpayers or consumers.

-definitely can get rid of the bias in this

Change order abuse[edit]
•	Contractor colludes with project officials by winning a low bid then officials approve a query to change the contract resulting in a much higher bid being retroactively approved. •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-change-order-abuse/

-I find this to be a little too confusing for the general Wiki-reading audience. Also the title (“Change order abuse”) doesn’t make much sense to someone without a lot of knowledge on the subject

Bidder Exclusion[edit]
•	Project officials essentially choose their bid. -expand and clarify; are these officials government officials? Will people immediately assume this? •	Methods of Exclusion: •	Unreasonable qualification parameters being set to exclude certain firms. •	Advertising projects to select bidders or bidding markets, thereby reducing publicity of bid procurement. •	Shortening time of acceptance periods for new bids following a request. •	Purchase splitting to reduce the minimum bid amount. •	This functions as contracts are split up to reduce the actual procurement amount and keep it under a threshold value. This reduces competitive bidding and enables less oversight at the project level as bid prices drop and kickbacks can be allotted. •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-split-purchases/ •	Bundling of contracts to exclude bidders. (clarify) •	Coercion and intimidation. •	Rejection over trivial matters. (clarify as well) •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-excluding-qualified-bidders/

-I would maybe dumb-down some of your phrasing/word choice; I think simplifying the methods section would be better suited for the general public and for people who know less about the topic

Leaking of Bid Information[edit]
•	Requires a relationship of some degree between the project officials and a bidder as the bidder is handed information to gain an unfair advantage. This allows for the informed bidder to gain an upper hand usually. •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-leaking-of-bid-information/

Bid Manipulation[edit]
•	Another method for officials to choose the bidder of their choice but after receipt of bids.

-Simplify? Receipt of bids?

•	Methods include either changing bid parameters, evaluation processes, or other activities to effectively select the bidder of choice. -these methods seem sort of redundant since you created a long list of methods of exclusion already •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-bid-manipulation/

Rigged Specifications[edit]
•	Allows more bidder exclusion by either tailoring requests to individual bidders or creating a vague criterion to reasonably choose a preferred bidder. •	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-rigged-specifications/

Unbalanced bidding[edit]
•	High bid prices for commencing phases of development and low prices for later stages. Effectively increases flow of funds for the bidding firm. •	Bidders cite high prices for items, intending to raise the number of units and purchase them at a competitive rate while simultaneously skimming profits from the artificially high bid price. •	Bidders give low quotes for non-necessary items (knowledge gained through collusion or experience) to disadvantage other firms as their bid amount is more competitive. Also works against new firms.

-Again, I would just phrase things in simpler terms.

•	http://guide.iacrc.org/potential-scheme-unbalanced-bidding/

Unjustified Sole Source Awards[edit]
•	Contracts are awarded with little regard to competition. Can be performed either blatantly, by falsifying bids, or by price splitting. •	http://guide.iacrc.org/unjustified-sole-source-awards/

-I would clarify what the title meant by "sole source." I think you could probably just change the title of this section to some that is more simple and clear.

Economic Implications[edit]
(prices up, bid price falls with more firms, less frequent collusion with more firms in market, prices rise with more repeated collusion.)

Sources for this:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016517659390095T https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1012568509136.pdf [Obviously this section needs more "oomph". Will look to find the cited articles for depth.] •	Froeb, Robert A. Koyak, Gregory J. Werden (1993) •	found that bid rigging significantly raised prices in the seafood industry in Philadelphia over market value in a conspiracy involving Defense Personnel Support Center, a purchaser for the Department of Defense. •	Srabana Gupta(2001) •	Citing Brannman et al. (1987)- the bid amount falls as the number of firms rises as there is more competition. •	Citing Stigler (1964)- collusion occurs less frequently in competitive markets as conspirators have more difficulty compromising. •	Gupta- bid prices increase with more repeated collusion.

-I like the reference to economists’ research on bid-rigging. I think the economics section is definitely necessary because it explains the impacts. Maybe you could just title this “Implications” so then you can add a sentence or two about the cultural/societal implications?

Remediation[edit]
[I have some sources that will add to this section and make it decent. This is the most complex part of this research. Will probably add in some country specific legislation from the following sections and clean it up a bit so that they are subheadings under "Remediation" then change the country headings to examples.] Bid rigging is an illegal practice under the criminal or competition laws of most developed countries. Depending on the jurisdiction, it is punishable by fines, imprisonment or both. Bid rigging fraud can be avoided by either side choosing to not participate in the auction. Bid rigging fraud on the bidders side can be avoided by auction houses no longer putting items up for auction and punishing the crooked bidders.

-awkward phrasing; way over simplified; I know this is the original document but I think you will definitely have to blend your writing style with the other authors; this segment is not really listing realistic ways to fix the system; they keep mentioning auction???? Very confusing (I know this is not you but I think if you could sort of fix what this person is getting at by using different terms it might be helpful to talk about the conceptual/simple ways to avoid bid rigging on both the bidder and the supplier side.

Bid rigging fraud by auction houses can be resisted by bidders who no longer bid, punishing crooked auction houses. An efficient free market auction where each side understands the terms and conditions, where deception is kept to a minimum, will result in a fair transaction price where willing buyers meet willing sellers. The temptation for one side to rig the bids for tremendous personal gain is always present. A solution is for each member to examine the auction for bid-rigging, and to make peers aware of any deceptions, so the offending party is punished with a lower payout as the other end of the transaction decides to go elsewhere.

-Are you going to talk about specific cases of bid-rigging and the legislation outlawing it in every region? Maybe you create a segment titled “Notable Bid-Rigging Scandals” and another section outlining legislation from all regions of the world (i.e. North America, Asia, etc) and steps toward remedying the issue. I feel that the selection of countries mentioned on the original page was extremely random. Maybe split up by region?

North America (split into “United States” and "Rest of N.A." or possibly finish out a Canada section)[edit]
•	Srabana Gupta cont. •	[Citing Froeb (1994)]- In the US, despite the private sector being much larger than the government sector, two thirds of all bid rigging and price fixing cases occur within the government sector. [Need good examples still. Probably will find multiple and describe most briefly because this isn't that complicated of a crime. The struggle is proving it.] [Notes: The citations for the initial article suck. I'll fill in gaps where I can throughout the process of editing but I want to ask Prof. Balan about fact-checking and citing where failures already exist as to not waste my time. :) ]

Further Reading[edit]
Chantale LaCasse- economic decision making and investigation into bid rigging. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2555995.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1f65bcc4ed41798defd3dbff2e1d61ea Robert H. Porter, J. Douglas Zona - examination of cartel activity in transportation contracts. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2138774.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A692cad962ccaae49ece35046b6fd4651

-I think I would also include a part specifically addressing government and government officials involvement with bid-rigging. That seems important to differentiate between bid rigging in the public and private sphere.

Manuel Balan Review
This is a good outline of what you will develop, but it is definitely more an outline than a draft. That limits a bit the comments I can provide at this point. Just be careful with the tone as you write up the article. Also, careful with the format of sources and citations. Comments by both Meredith and Joseita are on point. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Manuelbalan (talk • contribs) 15:30, 26 March 2018 (UTC)