User talk:EditorASC/Archive 1

United Airlines Flight 859
Hi,

Nice one on entering the real cause of the above crash. I have left a comment on the articles talk page regarding this, and I would be grateful if you could go over there and respond to it. Thanks, Blood Red Sandman Open Up Your Heart  -  Receive My EviLove  07:45, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

Happy to help. I have posted the link to that accident report, as you have requested. Other comments too, at that page.

EditorASC 20:53, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Image:6308-340DisneyLandChopper-R.jpg listed for deletion
An image or media file that you uploaded or altered, Image:6308-340DisneyLandChopper-R.jpg, has been listed at Images and media for deletion. Please see the to see why this is (you may have to search for the title of the image to find its entry), if you are interested in it not being deleted. Nv8200p talk 22:48, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

=
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Thank you for that notice. Since I am pretty new at Wiki, it might help me to understand how to do it better next time, if someone can let me know why my copyright to that photo was doubted. Does the "orphan" issue mean that I shouldn't upload a photo for use at Wiki, unless I have attached it to some article? EditorASC (talk) 01:01, 14 May 2008 (UTC)
 * All images uploaded to Wikipedia should be attached to an article or they will be deleted as orphans. If you want to upload a free image that will not be used, then it should be uploaded to Wikimedia Commons.


 * I doubted the copyright on your photo because of its resolution. Typically a scanned in image will be a megabyte or two file size. At just 78 Kilobyte, the odds are good that the image was lifted off a web site somewhere. Users upload images from other web sites all the time and claim ownership when the copyright does not belong to them. -Regards Nv8200p talk 19:38, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

An Invite to join Aviation WikiProject
Thank you, Trashbag. I have signed up and will start working on the China Airlines 605 accident at Hong Kong, in 1993. (080513 EditorASC (talk) 00:52, 14 May 2008 (UTC) )

License tagging for Image:750321LAX-TCA-1975.jpg
Thanks for uploading Image:750321LAX-TCA-1975.jpg. You don't seem to have indicated the license status of the image. Wikipedia uses a set of image copyright tags to indicate this information; to add a tag to the image, select the appropriate tag from this list, click on this link, then click "Edit this page" and add the tag to the image's description. If there doesn't seem to be a suitable tag, the image is probably not appropriate for use on Wikipedia.

For help in choosing the correct tag, or for any other questions, leave a message on Media copyright questions. Thank you for your cooperation. --ImageTaggingBot (talk) 03:08, 10 June 2008 (UTC)


 * My apology; I wasn't aware of that tag list. I have added the NOAA tag, since NOAA created the chart, at the request of the FAA Administrator.  EditorASC (talk) 07:31, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

Wiki Policy as to Internet Forums that hotlink Wiki images
I would like to know if Wiki has a specific policy of acting to stop others sites from hotlinking Wiki images, in a manner that uses Wiki's bandwidth, instead of their own bandwidth?

I am a member of a MSN Groups Forum, that does that a lot with Wiki images. I have tried to persuade the management of that Forum, that using Wiki's bandwidth to display Wiki images in their Forum, is against Wiki policy. But, they refuse to stop the practice. Microsoft says a complaint has to be filed with them, before they will intervene to stop the practice. Microsoft has provided me with a link, to file such a complaint, if Wiki management desires to have that site stop their practice of hotlinking Wiki images. EditorASC (talk) 06:09, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * To the best of my knowledge there is no exact policy forbidding hotlinking, although it's somewhat annoying there would be no realistic way to enforce the rule. However, by simply displaying an image from Wikipedia without certain accompanying information may be a copyright violation; for more information about that check out Reusing Wikipedia content and more specifically the Text of the GNU Free Documentation License.
 * I'll leave the adminhelp tag in place just in case another admin more knowledgable about the subject happens to come along. Best, ~ L'Aquatique [talk  ] 06:32, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

I've closed it because I've checked and there is no policy forbidding it. Don't worry about it.--82.71.229.37 (talk) 11:12, 11 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I've re-opened it because I'm not sure you're right and I'd like input from other admins. ~ L'Aquatique [talk  ] 05:01, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The reason I asked, is because there is a Wiki page somewhere (I cannot find it now), which specifically states that hotlinking Wiki images directly from Wiki pages is against Wiki policy, and then it says please do not hotlink from Wiki. Instead, please upload the image to your own computer or server and then post it where you want, from there. I think it was a Re-user page, or something similar, but I cannot find it now.  EditorASC (talk) 10:21, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I guess you meant Commons:Reusing content outside Wikimedia#Hotlinking on Commons?  So Why  12:07, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, that is the page. Thanks for digging that one out for me. Here is the actual statement, at the bottom of that page, to which I was making reference:

"Hotlinking

This page assumes you wish to copy individual items for your use. For media files, don't hotlink. Please copy them to your own server.

Wikimedia generally does not allow 'hot spider' services, where each time someone performs a search on their site, the query is redirected to our site. Outside reusers should either copy the content one item at a time or contact the Foundation regarding a live feed (which can be arranged as a paid service)."


 * If that is Wiki policy, then it seems logical to me, that Wiki would make some kind of effort to resist being forced to waste its donated funds on the subsidizing of other websites and forums. Wiki shouldn't have to pay for the bandwidth, to post those free images elsewhere.  If there is no such policy now, I suspect there eventually will be, when the bill gets high enough to catch the attention of the ruling body.  EditorASC (talk) 20:52, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Well, I suggest you write to the appropriate people at the foundation about it, as that is most likely a legal matter that we here cannot solve. You may want to propose a policy here or on commons but even if one is created, enforcing it would still need the WMF, so I think they should be your first address to voice your concerns. Regards  So Why  07:50, 13 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Thank you for all your responses. I am just a lowly contributer, so it is not my place to suggest to the board what they should be concerned about.  If none of the Administrators care about other sites ripping off Wiki, then it makes no sense for me to be concerned about it either.  EditorASC (talk) 09:02, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Your editor assistance request
Hi. Just dropping a note here that I've replied to you on the editor assistance page. Happy editing! — Twinzor Say hi! 23:11, 27 December 2008 (UTC)

re: your post at WT:WPSPAM
I saw your post at WT:WPSPAM, and replied there. But I'll also comment here. The concerns raised aren't specific to Wikiproject:Spam; I believe that WP:ANI may be a more appropriate venue for discussions on that issue. --- Barek (talk • contribs) - 00:51, 5 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I've reposted it for you at WP:ANI. --- Barek (talk • contribs) - 01:05, 5 January 2009 (UTC)

File:561016PanAmDitches-3.jpg, File:561016PanAmDitches-4.jpg and File:561016PanAmDitches-5.jpg
Just to let you know that I recently copied the above images that you uploaded to Wikipedia over to WikiMedia Commons, the Wikimedia central media repository for all free media. The images had been tagged with the Copy to Wikimedia Commons template. Your images are now available to all Wikimedia projects at the following locations: Commons:File:561016PanAmDitches-3.jpg, Commons:File:561016PanAmDitches-4.jpg and Commons:File:561016PanAmDitches-5.jpg. The original versions of the images uploaded to Wikipedia have been tagged with WP:CSD. Cheers! --, 29 July 2024 (UTC)


 * Thanks very much for doing that. My time is quite limited right now, so I don't always get around to doing the extra, time-consuming work that can benefit all.  EditorASC (talk) 21:08, 23 March 2009 (UTC)


 * http://airlinesafety.com/editorials/DitchingOfPanAmFlight6.htm

Improving photos
Use the "Levels" control in Photoshop - you can adjust the overall contrast and brightness, as well as the color balance by choosing the R G or B channel separately. When you "save as" a jpg, you can choose the compression level - the smaller the number, the smaller the file size. If you go below level 4 or so, you can start seeing compression artifacts. Greetings, --Janke | Talk 12:35, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

Just so you know
I transferred your image to Commons and overhauled the description; the local version will soon be deleted but now the image is available to all wikis (in every language). Hopefully it's to your liking. BTW, thanks for uploading this; this is an outstanding image and something I was surprised to see offered as free use. Thanks again! ~  ωαdεstεr 16  «talkstalk» 02:43, 27 April 2009 (UTC)


 * You are most welcome, and thanks for sending it over to Commons.


 * EditorASC (talk) 09:28, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

NowCommons: File:5512-DenCtyHallChristmas.jpg
File:5512-DenCtyHallChristmas.jpg is now available on Wikimedia Commons as Commons:File:DenCtyHallChristmas1955.jpg. This is a repository of free media that can be used on all Wikimedia wikis. The image will be deleted from Wikipedia, but this doesn't mean it can't be used anymore. You can embed an image uploaded to Commons like you would an image uploaded to Wikipedia, in this case:. Note that this is an automated message to inform you about the move. This bot did not copy the image itself. --Erwin85Bot (talk) 16:17, 24 May 2009 (UTC)
 * File:6609-UAL-DC-6-NorthRampStapletonDEN.jpg is now available as Commons:File:6609-UAL-DC-6-NorthRampStapletonDEN.jpg. --Erwin85Bot (talk) 13:15, 26 August 2009 (UTC)
 * File:6209-PebbleBeachWitchTree.jpg is now available as Commons:File:6209-PebbleBeachWitchTree.jpg. --Erwin85Bot (talk) 17:41, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Request
Hi. I’m looking to add free-licensed photographs of the various season residences of MTV’s The Real World to the articles for those seasons, so I’m contacting editors that may live in or near those cities. Do you live in or near Denver, and if so, would you be able to take some high-quality pics of the Denver residence, and upload them here if I give you the location? If not, do you know anyone who can? Thanks. Nightscream (talk) 06:45, 15 July 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, I live near Redding, CA. Haven't been to Denver for almost 8 years now. EditorASC (talk) 00:54, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

List of my Photo contributions to Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-MarineLandPilotWhaleShow-Bubbles-1.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-MarineLandPilotWhale%26DolphinShow.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-MarineLandDolphinShow.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6506-MarineLand-PalosVerdesPeninsula.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6209-267YosemiteMirrorLake.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6209-248VacYosmiteTunlTree.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6209-YosemiteTunnelTree.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6209-PebbleBeachWitchTree.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6601-RedRocksTheater.JPG#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:750321LAX-TCA-1975.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Jan1966-StapletonAirportDenver.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Jan1966-StapletonAirport-SouthToNorthView.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6609-UAL-DC-6-NorthRampStapletonDEN.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DenCtyHallChristmas1955.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-PointLomaCabrilloMonument.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6308-AnaheimDisneyLand-NW_to_SE_View.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6308-DisneyLandHotelMonorailStation.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6308-DisneyLandMonoRail-ParkStation.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6308-340DisneyLandChopper-R.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6505-Disneyland%26Hotel.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6505-AngelStadiumUnderConstruction.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6506-BigSurDinosaurRock%26BixbyBridge.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6505-ShipWreck-PalosVerdesPeninsula-1965.jpg#file

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6507-ShastaLakeFull.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6212-LasVegasStrip-RivieraHotelMarquee.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6601-ArizonaGreatMeteorCrater.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6707-ArlingtonCemetaryMemorialStone-USS_Thresher.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6408-DenSkyline-BrownPalaceCosmoHotels.Jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6207-RevRobtSchullerGrdnGrvChurch.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6207-GardenGroveDriveInChurch-Choir.jpg#Licensing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6207-GardenGroveCommunityDriveInChurch.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6207-GardenGroveDriveInChurch-Interior.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6707-MilitaryFuneralProcession-ArlingtonlCemetery.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-SDHarbor.jpg#Licensing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6208-PointLomaCabrilloCommemorativePlaque.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6304-FullertonJrCollege-1.jpg

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:6304-FullertonJC-Hornet.jpg

Offer of more photos on UAL 624 Crash
"I supplied the photos in this article. If anyone is interested, I have quite a few more that I haven't uploaded that I'd be wiling to share. Let me know on my talkpage. Mrmcdonnell (talk) 01:03, 2 January 2009 (UTC)"


 * - I would like to take you up on your offer to supply more photos, that relate to the UAL 624 crash. EditorASC (talk) 23:07, 30 July 2009 (UTC)


 * - I'll have to dig them out of my old hard drive but will see what I can come up with!! Mrmcdonnell (talk) 02:47, 19 August 2009 (UTC)


 * - Once I find them, how would you like them? Zip? Mrmcdonnell (talk) 13:52, 19 August 2009 (UTC)

How about JPG form, sent to my email box? EditorASC (talk) 00:04, 20 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Let me see what I can do Mrmcdonnell (talk) 18:47, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

An exciting opportunity to get involved!
As a member of the Aviation WikiProject or one of its subprojects, you may be interested in testing your skills in the Aviation Contest! I created this contest, not to pit editor against editor, but to promote article improvement and project participation and camraderie. Hopefully you will agree with its usefulness. Sign up here, read up on the rules here, and discuss the contest here. The first round of the contest may not start until September 1st-unless a large number of editors signup and are ready to compete immediately! Since this contest is just beginning, please give feedback here, or let me know what you think on my talkpage. -  Trevor  MacInnis   contribs  00:16, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

AF447
For what purpose are you continuing this discussion, Wikipedia is for the sake of improving pages, not warring over ideas or concept. I could pick apart what you stated and show you the the friviality of your posting, but beyond this 'please find another ear that cares'. I made a statement at the very beginning that this was most likely a failure to control an unexplained descent, that there were likely precedances (and there were) and that the aircraft plopped nose first into the Atlantic, which is now supported by the BEA, in addition I also found several errors in the media reports that were either corrected (Last known coordinates) or removed from the article. I have been working on the article to prevent fringe theories from entering the article, so that the BEA report is the emphasis. There have been no other recent reports from the BEA, so that I cannot see any reason for you to bring these issues now other than to pick a fight WP:BATTLEGROUND.PB666 yap 15:39, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

You can keep this material on your own talk page, if I have a desire to respond to it I will respond to it here.--PB666 yap 15:41, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

EditorASC reply to PB666:


 * Most editors are appreciative, when another editor points out that they have posted erroneous information. That was my purpose.  If no one bothers to tell you that what you posted is not accurate, then you are likely to continue to keep posting such incorrect information.  It will not do your reputation any good, nor will it help to improve the credibility of Wikipedia, if you do not learn to accept positive critiques, so that you can improve the accuracy of your statements.  There is no "warring" hereat least not from my side.  If you view it as "warring," if another editor dares to point out when you have posted erroneous information, then you have a problem which I cannot address.


 * My positive critique was not about "ideas or concept". It was about FACTS.  Facts which you alleged to be true, but which were not true.  Sudden depressurization of airliners, does not immediately tear off the clothes of the passengers.  Nor does it create a sudden wind that always goes towards the rear of the plane.  The only time  the wind would go that direction, is if the breach in the pressure hull is at the rear.  All other times, the air will rush towards the location of the breach, which has often been in areas other than at the rear.  Your statements have  been proved wrong, in virtually every case of successful safe landings, after sudden depressurization at high altitude.


 * And, airliner cabin altitudes do not go much higher than 8,000 ft. in normal operations, yet you stated that they would be about 15,000 ft. That is clear cut factual error on your part and it is proper for me, or any other editor, to notify you that you are incorrect.


 * It would seem that any editor that wants to spend much of his time on aviation articles, would welcome critiques of his postings, when they are simply wrong. That is the way that true professionals behave.


 * As to the "why" of what you posted (that was erroneous): that is not relevant when the issue is one of factual errors on your part. It really doesn't matter why you posted erroneous information (unless it was a case of deliberate vandalism, and I have not alleged that), but the fact that you did, makes it a valid reason to notify you of those errors, so that you will not be likely to repeat them.


 * I think all Wiki editors should have the goal of improving the credibility of Wikipedia statements. That cannot be a goal fulfilled, if some editors resent it when they are corrected, after they post erroneous information.


 * If you ever find that I have posted any statements, that are factually incorrect, you are welcome to post such, along with your corrections, on this talk page. I will leave any such positive critiques on my own page, as I am not ashamed to be corrected, when it is clear that I have made a factual error posting.


 * I note that you provided the WP:BATTLEGROUND link, in your post above. I am wondering what your purpose was, in doing so?  If you will bother to read that section of Wiki Policy, you will see that I followed its guidelines to the letter, when I notified you of your factual error posts.  Here is what it says:


 * Wikipedia is not a place to hold grudges, import personal conflicts, or nurture hatred or fear. Making personal battles out of Wikipedia discussions goes directly against our policies and goals.


 * Every user is expected to interact with others civilly, calmly, and in a spirit of cooperation. Do not insult, harass, or intimidate those with whom you have a disagreement. Rather, approach the matter intelligently and engage in polite discussion. If another user behaves in an uncivil, uncooperative, or insulting manner, or even tries to harass or intimidate you, this does not give you an excuse to respond in kind. Address only the factual points brought forward, ignoring the inappropriate comments, or disregard that user entirely.EditorASC (talk) 01:35, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

-


 * On August 28, 2009, the following critique, by EditorASC, was moved from the Talk Page of PB666, at his request, to my own talk page. That is fine with me.  I have no reason to not want it to be posted on my own page. EditorASC (talk) 01:35, 29 August 2009 (UTC)


 * 1) This is a moot point since the pressure hull did not breach, as I suggested was the case. Pressure Hold versus pressure hull, I know what the difference is, I frequently and accidentally substitute words like where, were, Too, two, etc. It was a typo. In either case a pressure hull is a pressure holding device, just as a ships hull is a water displacing device. I am not a pilot, I work on computer modeling and non-normal statistics. Computer modeling is what is used in flight similation and that is my connection with flight and flight simulation, in particular how flight simulation models flight reality. In fact, I hate flying. But flight modeling is another issue, because aircraft exist in dynamic equilibrium during flight, just like allelic diversity in a population of constant size, or haplotype pairs in a randomly interbreeding population. The modeling process does not look specifically at one model but how that model handles the variables that constitute reality, including a variable known as random chance. It is not unusual for me to substitute abstract words for commonly used word, for example in the work I am reading right now the author has substituted a variable t for T, with the variable t representing all possible T. IOW he is substituting the abstract representation t for the Observed T so that he can study the probabilities of all t, when T is observed. In aircraft modeling we can substitute airspeed A (measured Airspeed) for a in which a is all possible airspeeds around the aircraft, and in which there is a variance. We can make arguments about delta a/delta t, and how they reflect in A, and finally we can ask what are the limits of the airspeed determination equipment, in terms of delta a and error. Again, this is a primary interest in the modeling and the ADIRU failure, were the outer bounds of deviation set far enough away from A such that they could handle all 'black swans'. What is important to note about modeling is that the model that I was using predicted that a nose down event of greater than 25 degress was unrecoverable in similar aircraft. The primary reason was that the dynamic forces on the wings of the aircraft was so great is became difficult for them to counteract airforces and intertia. As a consequence I predicted that these computational failures caused a nose-down event that was unrecoverable, leading to the fate of the aircraft. A nose up event into coffins corner would result in a stall, but stalls are recoverable. In addition, the precedent was for the failure of these airspeed determining equipment (another abstract phraseology you had a problem with) generally had, as a first change in aircraft was a nose-down event. In those instances where the aircraft was damage the pressure hull did not breach, it was the air-control surfaces that were damaged. Therefore we can extract pressure hull failure as the primary cause of the aircrafts. Even if we take the limit as Altitude goes to Altbarrier, as KE = MGH So that Airspeed = VoT + f(MGH) - friction, the acceleration of the aircraft at the point of impact essentially disintegrates the aircraft prior to the moment of pressure exceeding the design limits of the aircaft. Although, In one simulation the aircraft recovered but later overstressed. An alternative model, however if that were the case the aircraft would have been much further down the indicated flight path. The modeling and observation basically rule out hull failure except in 'Comet'-like scenarios.
 * 2) Because I am more familiar with limitations on some of the older aircraft I used 15,000 feet knowing that the standard is less. According to the specifications of some aircraft without passengers the limit appears to have been 15,000 feet or less. As I stated I was an aficionado of DC3-DC7 era aircraft. The DC6 was one of the first (if not the first) passenger AC rated for service above 15,000 with a FL limit of 170 made possible by cabin pressurization and a 4-pack of turbocharged Wright 'piston-prop' engines. However the difference between 15,000 feet and 17,000 feet was not enough to warrant cabin pressurization because the change in fuel economy was minor and on maxtow the aircraft would only achieve this altitude well into flight the limitation on the climb being MAP pressure. FL170 was beneficial for flying in some areas prior to widespread distribution of VOR equipment, such as SouthAmerica, SouthAsia, etc. Thus the primary reason for pressurization was probably passenger comfort well below 15,000 feet. The model interest in this aircraft is what happens to the flight dynamics of the AC when it is operated well above 17,000 feet. This is also a moot point since the pressure hull did not breach, as I suggested was the case.
 * 3) The context that I was discussing the hull rupture related to the two previous instances, CAL and JAL in which the pressure hull did rupture from the back of the plane, while it is not possible to deduce this as a cause in every instance TWA_Flight_800, as I refuted and against the claim of other. For what its worth, the rupture of a pressure hull to the extent that people are disrobed is almost certainly to be the result of an event that was catastrophic to the aircraft, there are instances, such as the Aloha_Airlines_Flight_243 where the upper sheathing of the AC, that aircraft did complete final approach and successful landing. At Flight level 240 it was in an intermediate zone between 8000 and 35,000 feet and occurred at the front of the aircraft where dynamic pressure has an effect. It should be noted that the point is moot now, since the reports of disrobing of the passengers was a misrepresentation of reality, and in fact one of the reports on the ground, that passengers died from the sudden forward decelleration of the AC went ignored on the Talk page until the BEA report.
 * 4) It is highly unusual for people reading 2 month old archives to come back and make trivial critiques, like the difference between hull and hold, between 8000 and less than 15000 feet or between a hull breach and a tail hull breach. There were a great many number mistatements made on that page so that it is curious why, after almost 3 months you have come to my talk-page to correct these minimal errors. Interesting.PB666 yap 16:31, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

--


 * Response by EditorASC (talk) 11:01, 6 September 2009 (UTC)


 * Most of what you have posted above is irrelevant to the issues I raised, which had to do with your posting information in Wiki that was simply incorrect. The problem I see, is that you have posted so much, with such great verbosity, on the subject of airliners and airliner accidents, that many other well-meaning editors of Wikipedia might assume that you are an expert on that subject matter. That might lead some to repost your statements elsewhere, in reliance upon you and your assumed (by them) expertise That is why it doesn't matter that a couple of months have transpired, since you posted those statements that were incorrect. I will respond to only a small portion of what you have posted above, because as I have said, most of it is irrelevant to the issue I raised: of posting erroneous information.


 * "This is a moot point since the pressure hull did not breach, as I suggested was the case."


 * WHAT is a moot point? That airliners maintain a cabin pressure not much higher than 8,000 ft., instead of the 15,000 ft. that you posted? That kind of erroneous information remains relevant, regardless of what happened to AF-447.


 * WHAT is a moot point? That sudden depressurization does not disrobe the passengers, as you alleged that it did? No one was disrobed by the rush of air, when that NAL DC-10 suffered explosive decompression at FL 390.  Several passengers became unconscious, owing to how fast the cabin pressure was lost, yet none were disrobed.  There have been numerous other cases of rapid depressurization at high altitude, and in every case where the plane landed safely, no passengers were ever disrobed by the sudden and powerful rush of air.  My point is simply that your post was dead wrong on that point.  Such erroneous information is not made moot by the passage of time. It was erroneous when you posted it and it remains erroneous.


 * WHAT is a moot point? That the rush of air, when the pressure hull is breached, does not always go towards the rear of the aircraft, as you alleged that it did?


 * I am talking about FACTS that transcend the one accident you were writing about. You made those erroneous statements, which are still erroneous, no matter what actually happened to AF-447.


 * That is why most of what you have written above, is IRRELEVANT to the issue of erroneous “FACTS” being posted by you. It really doesn't matter why you made those errors.  What does matter is that you should become aware of those errors, so that you will not repeat them.  That is my sole reason for calling those errors to your attention.


 * I can accept that your saying “hold” instead of “hull” was simply a case of a typo. Thanks for that clarification.


 * I think it is fine that you are an expert in computer modeling. That should help you when writing on that kind of subject matter. But again, that is irrelevant to your writing that airliners generally have a cabin pressure of about 15,000 ft., when that is not true. I did not raise any issue about computer modeling, so all that you have to say on that subject, is irrelevant to the issue that I raised.


 * Because I am more familiar with limitations on some of the older aircraft I used 15,000 feet knowing that the standard is less. According to the specifications of some aircraft without passengers the limit appears to have been 15,000 feet or less.


 * What standard is less? The statement makes no sense.


 * As I stated I was an aficionado of DC3-DC7 era aircraft. The DC6 was one of the first (if not the first) passenger AC rated for service above 15,000 with a FL limit of 170 made possible by cabin pressurization and a 4-pack of turbocharged Wright 'piston-prop' engines.


 * Where in the world do you get such erroneous information?


 * The Boeing 307 Stratoliner was the first pressurized airplane to be put into passenger service. It had a service ceiling of 26,200 ft.  The S-307 NX19901 prototype (for PAA) flew for the first time on December 31, 1938, piloted by Eddie Allen, from Boeing Field, Seattle, for a total of 42 minutes.


 * I served as a cockpit crew member on the DC-6 for almost two years, before I transitioned to jet airliners. That was a pressurized cabin aircraft and it too was not allowed to have a cabin altitude of much more than 8,000 ft. unless absolutely necessary under emergency conditions. The DC-6 could maintain a cabin altitude of no more than 5,000 ft., while flying at FL 200. The service ceiling of the DC-6 was 25,000 ft. (FL 250). I have flown it at FL 240 on numerous occasions.


 * However the difference between 15,000 feet and 17,000 feet was not enough to warrant cabin pressurization because the change in fuel economy was minor and on maxtow the aircraft would only achieve this altitude well into flight the limitation on the climb being MAP pressure. FL170 was beneficial for flying in some areas prior to widespread distribution of VOR equipment, such as SouthAmerica, SouthAsia, etc. Thus the primary reason for pressurization was probably passenger comfort well below 15,000 feet. The model interest in this aircraft is what happens to the flight dynamics of the AC when it is operated well above 17,000 feet. This is also a moot point since the pressure hull did not breach, as I suggested was the case.


 * I have no idea what you are talking about. The entire paragraph has no relevance to the issue I raisednamely that you made erroneous statements about the cabin pressure specifications of pressurized airliners.


 * The unpressurized airliners (like the DC-3) rarely flew above 10,000 ft., unless absolutely necessary, and if they did then the pilots had to don oxygen masks.


 * The reason why the use of oxygen has always been required for all humans on board an aircraft, when the cabin pressure altitude is higher than 10,000 ft., is because the brain will be increasingly starved of necessary oxygen whenever the cabin pressure altitude increases above that level. While useful consciousness can be sustained for awhile, between 10,000 and 15,000 ft., in persons that do not smoke, who are not consuming alcohol or some prescription drugs, and who are in prime physical shape, they nevertheless can end up making poor decisions, because of the reduced amount of oxygen reaching their brains. That is why airliner cabins must have a pressure altitude of not much more than 8,000 ft. That was true for the DC-6, DC-7, Lockheed Connie and all other pressurized piston-driven airliners. The supercharging of the piston engines on pressurized airliners, was for the purpose of enabling them to fly at higher altitudes, which increased their efficiency as well as enabling them to avoid a lot of bad weather. That is why those planes had to have pressurized cabins, which would not go much above 8,000 ft., regardless of how high the plane might be flying.


 * You seem to be confusing the service ceiling of an airliner, with the cabin pressure limitations. Regardless of how high a modern jetliner is certified to fly, it still is required to keep its cabin altitude not much higher than 8,000 ft. Yet, you wrote that airliner cabin pressure altitudes are around 15,000 ft., and that is simply not true. It has never been true. All pressurized airliners were designed to be able to maintain a cabin pressure altitude of not much higher than 8,000 ft, whether piston driven or jet driven. I think it is important that you know that, so you won't continue to post such erroneous information in Wikipedia. EditorASC (talk) 11:01, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Posting Erroneous Information
In Archive #4, of the AF-447 Talk Pages, PB666 posted the following statements:


 * “Let me clarify the difference, when an AC undergoes mid-air disintegration there has to be a break in the pressure hold that initiates the disintegration.”

My REPLY:

Incorrect nomenclature. The correct term is “pressure hull,” not “pressure hold.”

Also, it is not the first point of pressure hull failure that “initiates the disintegration.” Something else has to cause that first point of pressure hull failure. What ever the cause was, would be considered the “initiator.” If a bomb exploded on board, then the bomb would be the “initiator,” not the first point of pressure hull failure, which was the direct result of the pressure wave from the exploding bomb. Or, if a meteor hit the fuselage of the plane, and that caused the impact point to rupture, then the meteorite would be the “initiator.” If AF-447 went into a high dive, and began to break up because of excessive g-forces, then the initiator of the breakup would be g-forces in excess of ultimate design strength. Your statement confuses cause with effect. The “initiator” of the damage, is the cause of the damage. The first instance of damage is the effect, flowing from that cause.


 * “At 35,000 feet an AC has the pressure of less than 15,000 feet. about 3/4 to 2/3rds of an atmosphere, at 35,000 feet its is 1/3rd of an atmosphere.”

My REPLY:

A very confusing statement. What does “its is” refer to?

For your information, airliners that fly at FL 350 and above, are required to have an operating cabin pressure altitude of no higher than 8,000 ft. The flight manuals prohibit the cabin pressure from going above 10,000 ft (whether pressurized or not), unless absolutely necessary for emergency purposes.


 * “In that immediate instance as the crack first forms air rushes toward the back of the aircraft, clothes are immediately blown open and the force of the air is capable of ripping peoples clothes off close to the breach, immediately.”

My REPLY:

If the pressure hull is suddenly breached, the air will immediately rush to escape out of that area of rupture. Air will not rush towards the back of the aircraft, unless that is the location of the rupture. I am not aware of any instance, where a plane had a fuselage rupture, and eventually landed safely, where any of the passenger's clothes were ripped off. When a NAL DC-10 had an engine throw parts out, which ruptured a cabin window at FL 390, one passenger was sucked out of the plane. Some passengers lost consciousness, because of the decompression, but none had their clothes torn off. There have been quite a few other sudden decompressions at high altitude---that subsequently landed safely---but again, no one's clothes were ripped off  The photos of the passengers still sitting in the first class section of the Aloha 737, after it landed safely with the top half of the forward fuselage missing, shows all the passengers in a fully clothed condition. EditorASC (talk) 09:44, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

SmackBot
Indeed, the tags were placed in the previous edit by another editor, SB merely changed them to the preferred name and dated them. Rich Farmbrough, 17:07, 14 September 2009 (UTC).


 * Thanks much for that info. I wasn't sure how that bot worked.


 * While we are on the subject of citation tags, the situation in that particular case seems to be a rather strained application of the citation having to be entered immediately after each quotation. Since the paragraph is not very large, and there are four quotations in it, all of which come from the same article, I thought it sufficient and less pedantically ostentatious, to put only the one citation source link at the end of the paragraph.  But, the other editor insisted the same citation source had to be in that paragraph, four times.  He is technically correct, according to the citation rules pages.  However, I think maybe that rule should be relaxed a little and made a bit more flexible, to accommodate such a situation as that one. Frankly, I think the paragraph looks rather silly, the way it is now, with the same citation link number inserted 4 times, in that short paragraph.  It would make it easier for the average reader to read, if there was only one citation link number at the end of that  paragraph.  All the quotes would still be properly sourced that way.


 * So, my question is: Can rules like that be modified so as to allow for such a situation, or are they all cast in hard concrete forever? Thanks,  EditorASC (talk) 07:57, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

"Now we have to set this"
Bob, if you will, scrolling down toward the bottom of KAL 007 article, we have the "Flight timeline and transcripts", clicking on to "show" and going to 18:27:20-27, what is it that the pilots are setting?Bert Schlossberg (talk) 23:57, 8 October 2009 (UTC)


 * All three of the crew are supposed to accomplish the "immediate action" items on the loss of pressurization emergency check list, solely by memory. Then, they are supposed to get out the list in their book and ensure that each step has been complied with (that includes the immediate action memory items, plus additional items that are not required to be memorized).  It was the FE's responsibility to open the book and read that checklist.


 * One of the immediate action (memory) items on that checklist, would be to set the altitude selector to 10,000 ft. If that didn't get accomplished right away, then it might explain why they leveled off at FL 350 for a few moments, after coming back down from 38,250: The Capt's Flight Director would have commanded him to level off that way, if the altitude selector window still read 35000 (the AP had finally been disconnected by that time, so my assumption is that the Captain manually leveled off the plane at that 35,000 ft. altitude, in response to the command of his FD. That sounds weird, but after he had tried unsuccessfully to stop the initial ascent, all three of them probably became focused on trying to regain control of the plane, and not on running the first items of that emergency depressurization checklist. The Capt might have been in a rather overwhelmed state of mind, and thus automatically followed the commands of his FD, without thinking it thru right away.  I cannot think of any other way to explain that temporary level-off, once they got back to 35,000 ft., other than the Capt responding to the commands of his FD. If that was how it happened, then that would verify that the altitude selector was still set at 35000.


 * But, that didn't last very long and they began to realize they must make the rapid emergency descent and that the altitude selector had to be reset from 35000 to 10000, before the Capt would have a FD giving the proper commands, for that situation.


 * So, my speculation is that the FE was talking about having to reset that MCP ALT window to 10,000 ft, on the Mode Control Panel (MCP), so that the Capt could safely fly the descent (needs to be very rapid, but taking care not to overspeed), by following the commands of his FD.


 * On the subject of flying the plane via responding to the commands of the FD, a lot of pilots got way too reliant on that FD and when the chips were down, could not fly a plane very well without it. In fact, UAL had some FOs (especially if they had been flying the DC-10 right seat), who were not able to make the upgrade to the Capt position, because they had lost a lot of their ability to fly the plane just by reference to raw data instrumentation (no FD).


 * Since KAL pilots had one of the worst reputations in the world, for overall competency (Pan AM trained them for a period of time, and most Pan Am pilots flatly refused to deadhead on KAL), it it quite conceivable to me that the KAL007 Capt was virtually incapable of safely flying that rapid descent, without the proper commands of his FD.


 * Pretty much the same for China Airlines pilots. You will remember, that the Capt on the 747-SP that did the high dive over the Pacific, was only able to save the plane after he broke out of the overcast and then was able to see the horizon.  He could not recover from that upset, while he was still in IFR conditions.  EditorASC (talk) 13:58, 9 October 2009 (UTC)

Thank you, Bob!Bert Schlossberg (talk) 00:59, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

Bob. been thinking about the above. After the aircraft levels off at 35,000 ft. it makes a slight nose down and that is the end of the DFDR. But at 18:31 it is at 16,424 ft.(5,000 meters) altitude, at 18:33,34, it is at 16,424ft. and at 18:35 it is tracked descending from this altitude over Moneron Island. Could you fit that with some kind of reconstruction into the picture you give above?Bert Schlossberg (talk) 01:13, 6 November 2009 (UTC)


 * I am heavily handicapped without having a copy of the 1993 ICAO report. Does that report give any details as to how the Soviet radar was able to determine that exact altitude of 007, after it had apparently lost all electrical power (the logical conclusion as to why both tapes stopped at the precise same time)?  There would have been no transponder transmissions from the plane after the electrical failed, so I wonder just how the Soviets were able to say what the altitude was of the plane, long after their transponder quit transmitting?  Not saying they did not have such a capability, but I am sure curious as to how they were able to do that...


 * The Soviets said the plane was in a constant left turn, while supposedly leveling off at 16,000. That makes no sense if the pilots still had control of the plane and were still trying to carry out the emergency depressurization descent to 10,000 ft, which is what they intended to do, according to the CVR.  Also, if they did still have control of the plane, they would have proceeded straight ahead towards Japan, while making that emergency descent.  If they had enuf control to fly in a circle, while leveling off at 16,000 ft, for several minutes, then they would have had enuf control to fly on to Japan.  It would not make any sense for them to attempt to ditch, if they had enuf control of the plane to DELIBERATELY level off at 16,000 and circle at that altitude for a few minutes.


 * My best guess, is that if the plane really did spiral around at 16,000 ft. for a few minutes, that would indicate that the pilots did not have control; that they only had engine power to try and control the plane. ICAO indicated that three of the four hydraulic systems had been lost very quickly.  It may be that the 4th one had a very slow pinhole leak that took a few minutes more to deplete.  If that was the case, then all they had left was engine power, and they might had tried to control that way.  That would explain why they did not continue descent to 10,000 ft right away.  If they lost the 4th system, during their emergency descent, they may have advanced the throttles to try and lift the nose, and that would explain why they leveled off at 16,000 for a few minutes, instead of going straight to 10,000, as the emergency depressurization procedure requires.


 * It simply makes no sense at all, that they would have leveled off at 16,000 ft, while making a continuous left turn, if they had at least one hydraulic system left. Had they had just one system, they could have leveled off closer to 10,000 and continued to fly straight ahead to Japan.  But, since they did not do that, and instead circled at 16,000, then my best guess is that they were trying to gain control of the plane, using engine power only.  Which means, of course, that any kind of controlled ditching (at night), was absolutely impossible. EditorASC (talk) 10:41, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

Bob, thanks for pursuing this with me. About it not making sense to level out at 16,000 ft. if they were making in the process of making a spiral down. The evidence indicates that they began the spiral down only after they began to drop down below 16,000ft. (5,000 meters), and that was precisiely over Moneron, which was about 42 nautical miles from where they were hit. They reached 16,000 at 18:31 and left that altitude at 18:35' 1. "The original U.S. special intelligence raw data, as publicly reported in the U.S. statement to the United Nations Security Council on September 1, 1983 by U.S. Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, stated: 'At 1830 hours [after 4 minutes], the Korean aircraft was reported by radar at an altitude of 5,000 meters...

"Moreover, also on September 1, Secretary of State George Shultz also stated more fully: 'At 1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a missile and the target was destroyed. At 1830 hours [or 4 minutes later] the Korean aircraft was reported by radar 5,000 meters [16,400 feet]. At 1838 hours [12 minutes after being hit] the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screen.'"

2. Republican Staff Study/"CIA Report", pg. 43 (quoted exact, including bracketed comments and underlining) (Note: the statement of 18:30 hours was later corrected to 18:31 hours.) Concerning KAL 007's ability to level out at 5000 meters and maintain a level flight of 4 to 5 minutes, from transcripts included with the 1993 ICAO Report Information Paper No. 1, pg. 134-135: Gen. Kornukov (18:32): Tell the 23 [MiG]... afterburner. Open fire, destroy the target, then land at home base.

Lt. Col. Gerasimenko (acting commander, 41st Fighter Regiment, viewing radar): Roger

Kornukov: Altitude... What is the altitude of our fighter and the altitude of the target? Quickly. The altitude of the target and the altitude of the fighter!

...Why don't you say anything? Gerasimenko!

... Gerasimenko (18:33): Gerasimenko. Altitude of target is 5,000.

Kornukov: 5,000 already?

Gerasimenko (18:34): Affirmative, turning left, right, apparently it is descending.

3. "The last plotted radar position of the target was 18:35 hours at 5,000 meters." (ICAO 1993, pg. 53, para. 2.15.8)

4. Concerning the location of KAL 007's descent, precisely over the island of Moneron, from transcripts included with the 1993 ICAO Report: Gen. Kornukov (18:36): ...you know the range, where the target is. It is over Moneron... (ICAO, 1993, Information Paper No. 1, pg. 136.)

Lt. Col. Novoseletsky (commander, Smirykh Air Force Base) (18:39): So, the task. They say it has violated the State border again now?

Flight Controller Titovnin: Well, it is the area of Moneron, of course, over our territory.

Lt. Col. Novosletsky: Get it! Get it! Go ahead, bring in the MiG 23 (ICAO, 1993, Information Paper No. 1, pg. 90.) KAL 007 was last scene (that we have reported) descending slowly, rather than in a a plunge - as is commonly held - 18:53 - Kornukov: "What [happened] was it not destroyed?" 1853 Osipovich: "The target disappeared, but it was somehow descending slowly...either it was put out of action or it was damaged, it disappeared in the area of Moneron, no one can see it at the moment. Well, it looks as if it was put out of action." 1853 Kornukov: "Roger, good, we'll sort it out."

Bob, About the question of radar being able to track with the electrical system out, the electrical system being out deduced by the stoppage of the Black Box recordings - There ICAO gives no reason for the stoppage of black box, (and gives no indication that electrical system had failed at any point in the post detonation flight). The black box tapes stop 104 seconds after detonation of missile, but KAL 007's flight continued on for many minutes afterwards. ICAO had positively deduced that the electrical system was working after detonation by pointing to the HF broadcast to okyo after detonation and the twocie "engines normal sir". "It could not be estabished why both flight recorders simultaneously ceased to operate 104 seconds after the attack. The power cables were fed to the rear of the aircraft in raceways on opposite sides fo the fuselage, until they came together behind the two recorders." ICAO '93 Section 2.16.12, page 55 Thanks again Bert Schlossberg (talk) 22:36, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

=
====================


 * I understand all that Bert---I carefully read it all. But, the radio transmissions were BEFORE the CVR and FDR failed at the same PRECISE INSTANT.  The plane's engines have their own electrical generators to power the fuel controllers on each engine (they are actually magnetos).  So, total electrical power failure on the plane itself, would not affect the ability of the engines to continue to operate in a normal manner (though they probably could not have generated full takeoff power, without the fuel boost pumps operating).


 * There simply is no other rational explanation as to why BOTH the FDR and the CVR failed at the exact same instant, than electrical power failure to the two separate electrical buses that powered those two recorders. Under the circumstances, I can think of no reason why those two particular buses would lose their power, but other buses would continue to have power.  If the transponder still had power, and that was how all concerned were able to know the altitude of that plane from radar trackings (Japan's, the Soviet's and US Intelligence sources), then why on earth didn't they mention in the ICAO report, THAT was how the altitude determinations were made?  I cannot imagine a more glaring omission in such a report, if transponder transmissions from the plane itself, is how they were able to determine its altitudes, after the FDR failed!! If that had been the case, the presence of transponder altitude reporting on the various radar scopes (and recorded on their radar tapes), would have been proof that they still had some electrical power available.  I cannot imagine them leaving that fact out of the report, if that indeed had been the case.


 * When a UAL 727 went into the Santa Monica Bay, in January of 1969, they immediately suspected loss of all electrical power, because the plane's transponder suddenly quit transmitting its altitude and identity information. They were right.  The crash was cause by spatial disorientation of the pilots, when they lost all their flight instruments, on a dark night over black water, because all their generators failed.


 * It is obvious to me that the transponder on 007 was NOT how they made their determinations of the plane's altitude, after the FDR & CVR failed. It is obvious that there was a total electrical power failure at the time of the failure of those two recorders, which were powered from different electrical buses. If there was a reason to surmise that other buses remained powered, then why didn't ICAO give the specific reasons why they believed that?  The only logical answer is that ICAO had no reason at all to assume that the plane still had some electrical power available to some of the other buses. If the transponder was still issuing altitude reports, then it still had some electrical power.  But, if that  too ceased, after the time that BOTH the FDR and the CVR failed, then that is proof that all electrical power was lost, and that they probably only had limited time battery power for the standby attitude indicator, & the standby altimeter (which can function without power, except for a light on the gauge).  They also would have had power for the Captain's VHF com radio, but if the plane was out of range, it might not have been heard, if they had tried to use it.  In theory, the standby battery power should last at least a half an hour, so they should have been able to keep the plane upright and headed for Japan, if they still had one hydraulic system operating, even with the loss of all AC generators.


 * And, that brings up the question of WHY was all electrical power lost (with the exception of battery power for the essential instruments, one radio and essential lights)? Couldn't have been a failure of all four generators (one on each engine), so it had to have been some cause as a result of the missile damage.  Did a fire start somewhere in the fuselage?  If so, and if it got bad enuf, then that might have compelled the pilots to try and land or ditch ASAP, but as I have said repeatedly, successful ditching would have been impossible, under those circumstances.  And, the level off at 5,000 meters for almost 5 minutes doesn't seem to support the speculation that a virulent fire was raging in the fuselage.


 * It may be that the Soviets and our own Intelligence capacity had some way of determining the altitudes of that plane, as it descended, but normal ground radar that is used for ATC purposes, does not have that capability. However, that is beside the real point here.  Supposing that their statements are correct---namely that the plane descended slowly and then leveled off at 16,424 ft. for almost 5 minutes.  Why would it do that?  If they still had one functioning hydraulic system, why would they not continue straight towards Japan and descend to 10,000 ft., so that they could ensure that all on board would have enuf Oxygen to keep from causing brain damage?  What would have been the reason for leveling off at 5,000 meters (especially since they normally flew by feet, not meters)?  The only way that makes sense to me, is that they were struggling to maintain control with the use of engine thrust only.  NO HYDRAULIC control left at all.  Then, if they still had at least one hydraulic system, why would they begin to spiral to the left and descend even further?  Why would they willingly ditch, if they still had the ability to control with one remaining hyd system?


 * Trying to ditch a large airliner at night, would almost be a guarantee of certain suicide, even if you had normal functioning of all your four hydraulic systems, and a functioning radar altimeter and functioning landing lights. If the electrical had failed, it would have been impossible to know how close they were to the water (no lights and no radar altimeter), much less what the best ditching heading was, nor to be able to see the primary and secondary swells, so that the pilot could ensure the wings were level with the swells (not level with the horizon), at the moment of impact.  If they still had control with one hydraulic system, and the engines were still running, then why would they try to ditch?  Why?  No logical reason to take such a certain course to destruction, when they would have had the alternative to keep flying on to Japan, well above the altitude of the ocean.


 * To ditch successfully, so that everyone is still uninjured and so that the plane is relatively intact and will float long enuf for everyone to activated the rafts and get in them, requires some important factors to be present:


 * Daytime is almost a must, so that the pilot can see the angle of the swells. If a wing digs into one of the swells, that will cause rather severe damage to the plane.  Which is what happened to Capt. Ogg, even when he could see the swells.  His wing tip dug into the water, and that caused the plane to snap sideways, immediately breaking off the rear section of the plane.  And, he touched down at a speed of only 90 kts.  A 747 would have to be going considerably faster, even if it had been able to put out full flaps, which is extremely doubtful for KAL 007.


 * The ability to flare and hold the nose up to about 9 degrees, letting the plane do a full stall as it contacts the water, is also a must. If it cannot do that, then it is likely that it will hit nose first and that would virtually obliterate the plane in an instant.  Like hitting a brick wall.  With only one hydraulic system functioning, the ability to flare would be just about non-existent. About all the pilot could do is slow the rate of descent enuf so that the landing would be a hard one, which would still allow the landing gear to function without collapsing.  The pilot of the Pan AM 747 that lost 3 of its 4 hydraulic systems, when it hit the approach light stanchions during its takeoff at SFO, was not able to do a full flare, when he finally landed.  He could only slow the rate of descent so that he hit pretty hard and bounced and then came back down again and then swerved off of the runway.  Since he still had engines and electrical, he was able to get his flaps down (electrically), so that he could slow to a reasonable landing speed.


 * The ability to extend the flaps/slats to the full landing position is also a must. That would greatly slow the touchdown speed and also help to enable a nose-high attitude at water contact. With only one hyd system functioning, they would not have been able to extend the flaps hydraulically.  It could have been done electrically, if they had enuf time (electric backup for flap extension takes many more minutes, than if the normal, hydraulic, method is used).  But, since it appears they didn't have any electrical left, then any ditching would have had to been at a very high speed, which would ensure complete destruction of the plane, when it hit the water.


 * With no electrical, and only one hydraulic system left, they would not have tried to ditch. They would have flown on to Japan and tried to land at an airport there.  If they went into the water, it was because they had lost all control and had no choice about it.  That means a fatal crash for all.  There was no way to ditch successfully at night, without electrical (no flaps, no lights, no radar altimeter) and no way to get the flaps down (with only one hydraulic system).  And, most importantly of all:  NO REASON TO DITCH, if they still had the control, via one remaining hydraulic system.  EditorASC (talk) 05:04, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

Bob, I want to focus in more on the electical. I see that in your understanding, the failure of the electical system is most evident as the expanation why the CVR and FDR both stopped and stopped at the same second. And further, that without the electrical system to have enabled the use of flaps, a ditching on water that would be successful would be unthinkable. I see also that without the electric system, it is not evident to you how KAL 007 would have been tracked by radar. From this quote:

"If the transponder still had power, and that was how all concerned were able to know the attitude of that plane from radar trackings (Japan's, the Soviet's and US Intelligence sources), then why on earth didn't they mention in the ICAO report, THAT was how the altitude determinations were made? I cannot imagine a more glaring omission in such a report, if transponder transmissions from the plane itself, is how they were able to determine its altitudes, after the FDR failed!! If that had been the case, the presence of transponder altitude reporting on the various radar scopes (and recorded on their radar tapes), would have been proof that they still had some electrical power available. I cannot imagine them leaving that fact out of the report, if that indeed had been the case. "

I learn that you feel that the fact that ICAO does not specify (or otherwise, even mention) that it was by an active transponder that the radar trackings of KAL 007 dropping out of flight level 16,000, you think that there was no active transponder thus indicating the electrical system was out. What I say is that I don't know why mention of a working transponder is not mentioned. Nevertheless, ICAO does specifically say that radar did track KAL 007 and that beyond the time that the Black Box tapes stopped  "The last plotted radar position of the target was 18:35 hours at 5,000 meters." (ICAO 1993, pg. 53, para. 2.15.8) Further, It is clear from the military communications between Gen Kornukov and Col. Gerasimenko (some quoted above), that the Soviets were seeing on their radar screens the flight of KAL 007 from before the black box stopped working (starting at 18:27) until minutes after the black box stopped working. From personal conversation that I had with one radar man from radar station 1845 at Komsomulsk na Amura, KAL 007 was tracked by them until 1,000 above sea level until 18:38. So I have no doubt that KAL 007 was indeed tracked by radar even though transponder is not mentioned. And so, If transponder was working, there was electicity, if there was electricity, there could be flaps operable of a landing (and lights) - if there was at least one operable hydraulic system. There was, indeed, according to ICAO - system 4. which had input inot all functions including flaps.

It is clear that KAL 007 was able, after the Black Box tapes stopped (in your thoughts do to the failure of electricity) to level out at 16,424 ft., make turns (to the north), fly t at the same altitude of 16.424 for over 4 minutes, then begin a spiral descent over Moneron Island, the only land mass in the whol Tatar Straits (possibly a strong indication that the spiral descent at that location was intentional - and so indicating a measure of control). Would not this indicate that KAL 007 retained both electical and hydraulic systems power? Bert Schlossberg (talk) 06:43, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

Ground Radar Measure of Altitude of an aircraft

 * I have to disagree. I have finally found the information that I was looking for.  Namely, that certain types of radar installations (the kind that would likely be used by military intelligence installations---especially during the Cold War) can indeed measure the altitude of an aircraft, without the necessity of an interrogatable transponder on board that aircraft, which is required for the SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) systems, that are used by civilian ATC systems all over the world.  It is done by placing slant range radar dish antennas in various locations and having them tied together via computers.


 * "...consisting in part of two [or more] antennas for producing narrow fan beams which intersect in space, so that the altitude of an aircraft which flies through the two beams can be accurately determined. The radar echo which returns from the aircraft determines the slant range of the aircraft from the antennas, and the time interval between the interceptions of the two beams by the aircraft is related to the elevation angle. The true height of the aircraft above the antennas is determined from the above measurements"


 * That means that the Soviets and probably the Japanese radar systems too, could tell what the altitude of KAL007 was at any given time, even after its own transponder failed, when all electrical was lost. This statement is in the Wiki KAL007 article: "The aircraft disappeared off long range military radar at Wakkanai, Japan at a height of 1,000 feet (300 m)." Undoubtedly, that military radar had the capability of measuring the altitude of the plane, as did the Soviet military radar, in spite of the failure of the electrical system on the plane.


 * In summary:


 * Both recorders failed at precisely the same time. And, they never resumed operation after that. That indicates that at least two different electrical buses in the plane permanently lost power at that point in time.


 * The FO talked to Tokyo Radio, on HF, telling them of the decompression and that they were going to descend to 10,000 ft. (the required altitude in that emergency procedure). But, after both recorders failed, no more radio transmissions from KAL007 were received. Why not? all the pilot had to do is press his yoke switch, to tell Tokyo Radio what was happening.  But, he could not because the HF radios do not work without AC power on the respective buses.


 * ICAO, mentions nothing about the plane's transponder continuing to send ident & altitude data, after the recorders failed. If that transponder had continued to work, then the ICAO report would have said so, since that would prove that the plane had electrical power to at least some of its buses.  But, it did not, so it is rational to concluded ICAO had no evidence from the radar tapes (Japan military radar, or Soviet military radar or NSA military radar), that the transponder was still sending data, like it did before both recorders failed at the same time.


 * If an engine generator fails, then its respective bus is automatically taken over by another generator. Even if three of the four engine generators fail, all four main buses (and their sub buses too) would still be fully powered by the remaining generator.  So, both of the recorders should not have failed permanently at the same time, unless something else interfered with the proper functioning of the electrical system.  It would have to have something to do with the damage inflicted from the missile, since the engines were still operating, and for them to fly 4 to 5 minutes at 5,000 meters, those engines would still have had to been operating.


 * If all AC electrical was lost, at the time that both recorders failed, then they might have had emergency battery power available, to power the SAI, the SA, the # 1 VHF com radio and essential cockpit lights and maybe some other Capt's instruments too. If they did have that emergency battery power, then they should have been able to keep the plane upright, for at least 1/2 hour, until the batteries were depleted.  After that, at night over black water, they would pretty quickly become spatially disoriented and the plane would begin to descend in a spiral until it crashed.  That assumes, of course, that they still had one functioning hydraulic system.


 * If the # 4 hydraulic system was still working, they would only have had the right elevator, the right inboard aileron, and the lower rudder and spoilers # 5,6,7&8, and the outboard trailing flaps, as well as the leading edge slats, available. They would have had no automatic yaw damping capability, and no way to move the horizontal stabilizer.  That would prove important, if and when they were able to extend any flaps at all, because doing so requires the stabilizer to be moved, to retrim the pitch of the plane.  If they could not move the HorStab, when they extended flaps, then it would have been even more difficult to control the pitch of the plane (much greater muscle power required on the part of the pilot).  If they had no electrical, then trying to extend those outboard trailing edge flaps, via the hydraulic power of that # 4 system, might have been very difficult to do, as it might not leave enuf pressure to move the other flight controls, while those flaps were in the process of extending.


 * Even if they were able to get some flaps extended, they sill would not have had the required flare capability, without the ability to trim the HorStab and only the right elevator working. All they could have done is to reduce the rate of descent a bit, and that would mean curtains in a ditching.  And, with no electrical, then no way to know how close they were to the water.


 * If they had backup battery power, that would have only been good for about 1/2 hour. That assumes that whatever cut off the AC power, did not also interfere with those emergency battery buses too. After that, they would not have been able to keep the plane upright at night over water. They would have crashed as a result of spatial disorientation.


 * My best conjecture is that they probably did have backup battery power for awhile, after all the main AC buses (powered by the 4 engine generators) failed. That would almost have to have been the case, for them to level off and fly for five minutes at 16,424 ft.  But, then they started to descend again in a left spiral, which could well indicate they lost their battery power and could no longer keep the plane upright.  If that is what happened, then it went into the classic "graveyard spiral" until it crashed into the water, or that island.  There was no possibility of their conducting a successful ditching at night, with no electrical and only one hydraulic system operating.


 * If they had not lost all electrical, and if the one hydraulic system continued to operate, and if the engines remained operating, then there was no good reason to continue to descend below 10,000 ft and not to try to make Japan, UNLESS something else was forcing their hand---like a virulent fire in the fuselage. Once they started to descend below 10,000 ft. in a spiral, that indicates they were in the process of losing all control.


 * Sorry Bert. Wish I could find a way to offer some hope, but the facts that we know, just don't support any reasonable hope at all. EditorASC (talk) 11:13, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

Bob, from the above, I woud understand that you would not agree with the assessment of Gary Lesser, spokesman for Boeing Co. Lesser states , "As long as there is one engine running, both recorders would still operate until the plane hits the water." If Lesser is right, then there would not be reason too believe that electrical power had failed after the tapes stopped at only 104 seconds into the post detonation flight, as it is clear that there had to be at least one engine in operation to perform the over 4 minute of level flight, turn to the north, spiral descentm,etc. This would still leave as a problem, granted, why the CVR andFDR tapes stopped precisely at the same second prior to any possible crash in water, but wouldn't that bring to the fore the question of of whether or not the Soviets, who had possiossion of the tapes, had handed to the UN all the portions of the tapes that they had in their possession - especially since the portions not handed over, would have shown what the Russian Federation supplied military communication transcipts did, namely KAL 007's leveling out, level flight, etc.?

Further, in reading your last addition of response, I am struck that your points in fact do much to establish (that is, if Lessing is wrong) the reason for the cessation of tapes prior to the end of the flight - failure to the electrical system. To me, as a layman, it seems clear. Then why was it not clear and established to ICAO analysis - "It could not be established whyboth flight recorder simultaneously  ceased to operate 104 seconds after the attack." ( 2.16.12, page 55). If failure of the electrical system was evident to ICAO analysts from other considerations, or from the fact of sumltaneous cessation of recording itself, then the reason for cessation would have been "established".

But I take it that you do believe that KAL 007 could have performed its post cessation of tapes portion of its flight without electrical system operationg. Is that right?

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 * Bob, from the above, I would understand that you would not agree with the assessment of Gary Lesser, spokesman for Boeing Co. Lesser states , "As long as there is one engine running, both recorders would still operate until the plane hits the water."


 * To the contrary, I do agree with him on that. Read again, what I said above:


 * If an engine generator fails, then its respective bus is automatically taken over by another generator. Even if three of the four engine generators fail, all four main buses (and their sub buses too) would still be fully powered by the remaining generator. So, both of the recorders should not have failed permanently at the same time, unless something else interfered with the proper functioning of the electrical system.


 * But, that assumes that nothing else has gone wrong with the plane. If the shrapnel from the missile hit some electrical lines in the plane, causing the Kapton insulation to start burning and exploding, that might have led to an electrical fire that spread along some of the electrical cables until it reached junction boxes and then from there started shorting out some of the buses.  That is pure speculation, I agree, but it is a way to explain why/how both recorders failed at the precise same time, even though they were powered from different buses.


 * It would also help to explain why there was no further HF radio transmissions received from the flight, after that event (recorders failing at the precise same time). It also is reinforced by no mention, whatsoever, by anyone of continued transponders transmissions from the plane.  Put those three very important facts together, and the only way I can think of to explain why, is total electrical failure, with MAYBE the exception of the emergency battery bus.  And, that one may have failed too, before the normal time (approx ½ hour) that it would normally be expected to last.


 * This would still leave as a problem, granted, why the CVR and FDR tapes stopped precisely at the same second prior to any possible crash in water, but wouldn't that bring to the fore the question of of whether or not the Soviets, who had possession of the tapes, had handed to the UN all the portions of the tapes that they had in their possession - especially since the portions not handed over, would have shown what the Russian Federation supplied military communication transcripts did, namely KAL 007's leveling out, level flight, etc.?


 * I think that certainly is a legitimate question to ask. I am not an expert on how or if it would be possible to doctor such tapes, so that they appeared to both stop at the precise same time, without such doctoring being detectable by the super experts.  However, in absence of the contrary, I would suspect that it would be very difficult to doctor the tapes, without that being discovered by the “super experts” (my phrase).  In the absence of independent evidence that shows the tapes were in fact doctored by the Soviets (evidence which is objective and more than a mere speculation-allegation), then the best explanation (to me) is still failure of the electrical buses that powered those two recorders, especially in light of the other two facts I pointed out:  No further HF transmissions and no evidence that the transponder continued to work, following that event.   It is legitimate questions like that, which would make it all the more important for the ICAO report to say that the transponder did continue to work, after that eventbecause that would prove that at least some of the electrical buses were still powered.  And, if they were, then that might lend some credence to the idea that the Soviets had doctored the tapes.  That is why I cannot imagine why ICAO would leave out the fact that the transponder still worked after the recorders failed, IF IN FACT THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED.


 * Then why was it not clear and established to ICAO analysis - "It could not be established why both flight recorder simultaneously ceased to operate 104 seconds after the attack." ( 2.16.12, page 55). If failure of the electrical system was evident to ICAO analysts from other considerations, or from the fact of simultaneous cessation of recording itself, then the reason for cessation would have been "established".


 * Because there simply was not enuf evidence to PROVE there was an electrical failure. I do think that ICAO (again, I am handicapped by not being able to read the second report myself) could have been a bit more bold in their discussion.  Had that investigation and report been made by the NTSB, they would certainly have discussed whether or not the transponder continued to work, and why the HF was no longer used by the pilots, and why there was no evidence that the recorders ever started again.  Makes me think that ICAO, being an international body with a variety of political interest inputs, was constrained in what and how much they dared saynot unlike what we see happening all the time at the UN, when there is any effort to investigate terrorist acts of various kinds.


 * The reasons I have given, are my best explanation as to why those facts existed: 1. failure of both recorders at precisely the same time.  2.  No evidence that either one ever started up again (which would have been the case if their respective buses received power againthat DID  happen in the UAL 727 crash in Santa Monica Bay).  3.  No further HF transmissions received (when all the FO had to do was press the yoke button and say something).  4.  No evidence that the transponder continued to work after the recorders failed.  Those facts are circumstantial, so they do not PROVE, without a doubt of any kind, that most of the buses lost electrical power.  However, the loss of electrical power to the buses, at the time that the recorders failed, is the most logical and consistent explanation for all those facts combined.  Call it my “best evidence” rule:  There is no better way to explain what we know about those events.


 * I am not claiming that my conclusions are PROOF that actually happened. But, I am saying that I have not found a better way to explain the sum of the facts that we do know about.


 * That is especially true, when we try to understand why they leveled off at 16,424 ft. for almost 5 minutes, instead of continuing their descent to 10,000 ft., as they first intended. The only reason I can come up with is that they were struggling to gain or maintain control of the plane.  If they had lost all electrical, with the exception of the SAI and SA instruments, combined with the loss of three of the four hydraulic systems, they might have been compelled to slow the rate of descent and to level off prematurely, because it was so difficult under those circumstances to keep the plane from going out of control completely.  The fact that they leveled off too high and then stayed at that altitude for 5 minutes, tells me they were in real trouble, as to preventing total loss of control.  Then, the fact that they started to descend again, in a left spiral to BELOW 10,000 FT, means that they finally did lose control.  That kind of flight path would be exactly consistent with loss of all flight attitude instrumentation, over black water at night (classic spatial disorientation).  I cannot think of any reason why they would have descended to BELOW 10,000 ft., if all the engines were still operating, AND they had at least one hydraulic system still operating, AND they still had electrical power AND flight attitude instruments.  No reason at all to risk a ditching, unless they simply did not have the means to prevent it.  If that was the case, then they had lost control and it is most likely that either they lost the last hydraulic system, or they lost all attitude instrumentation, or they had a fuselage fire going that made them lose control, much in the same manner as the pilots in the SwissAir 111 accident.


 * If they still had control of the plane and there was no fire, then they WOULD NOT HAVE ELECTED TO DITCH AT NIGHT. No pilot in his right mind would try that, if he was still able to charge on towards Japan, at 10,000 ft.  Trying to ditch at night, even if everything is working properly would be almost a suicidal decision.  No pilot would willfully do that, if they had any other alternative.  If they did attempt to ditch, then it could only be because they had lost almost all control of the plane and they could not stop it from descending below 10,000 ft.


 * But I take it that you do believe that KAL 007 could have performed its post cessation of tapes portion of its flight without electrical system operating. Is that right?


 * Yes, so long as they still had one hydraulic system operating, and some flight attitude instruments operating (SAI or even the Captain's ADI), powered by the essential battery bus (or the main electrical buses, if they had not actually lost electrical power). But, only as long as those continued to function.  If they did lose electrical, and the batteries were finally depleted, so that they lost all attitude instrumentation, then they would soon lose control because of their own spatial disorientation.  Or, if the fourth hydraulic system finally failed.  Again, if those systems continued to function, and the engines continued to operate, THERE WAS NO GOOD REASON TO TRY AND DITCH.  They would have continued towards Japan at 10,000 ft.  The fact that they did not do that, means they did not have that option available.  Which means, they lost control of the plane and crashed. EditorASC (talk) 01:50, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

Thank you, Bob!Bert Schlossberg (talk) 03:03, 8 November 2009 (UTC)