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THE FOUNDATION OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY IN SOLIDARITY

Max Scheler’s concept of genuine solidarity entails the primordiality of co-responsibility of the individual person and the collective individual person ultimately towards God. This notion is rooted also in his idea of person. For Scheler, “the essence of person is found in his spiritual being and activity rooted both in the individual reality (individual person and in membership in a community.” Essentially, co-responsibility makes solidarity possible. In the ontological view, parts and the whole are connected. Scheler sees this as necessary element for their reciprocity. For instance, subject and predicate in a sentence are necessary in order to have a complete thought and meaning in the subject and predicate are reciprocal. It entails a meaningful thought for a sentence. Moreover, the fundamental nature of genuine solidarity is the co-responsibility of the entire members of society. This fundamental nature of co-responsibility in Scheler’s concept of genuine solidarity is immanent. Because the nucleus of genuine solidarity is, described as an enhancement of the value of the human person and the nature of this solidarity is to value the human person. The description of genuine solidarity required the conception of the entire members of society towards each other, which has its depthness. This depthness in the responsibility of the entire members in the connection of the function of their co-responsibility is towards God. Furthermore, this depthness can be noticed in participation, moral standard and the possibility and necessity of solidarity in society.

A. Participation It is clear in Scheler’s notion of genuine solidarity that there will be participation among the entire members of the encompassing person in the highest form of human togetherness. This significance can be notice in the co-responsibility of the entire members towards each other. Moreover, this participation is necessary for the realization of values in the moral cosmos. Essentially, the participation of man towards each other is a necessary element of a human person. Nevertheless, their participation can be viewed further in understanding the term of individual person and collective person. 1. Individual Person The individual person is the concrete acting subject. This individual person is in action to the singular world and in singular acts. This is the active content of a private experience for-oneself. This is an individual experience of one’s personhood of man. In other words, individual person refers to the personal function or acts of individual human person. 2. The Collective Person The collective person is in actual collective content of all experience that takes the form of living with another. However, there is also a concrete acting subject in a collective person. The world of a collective person is the collective world. Specifically, “collective person is the center of experiencing in the endless totality of living with another called the social unit.” Accordingly, the collective person is not a sum of the individual person but an aspect of the individual person. Directly, person as collective refers to his/her being social. The participation of the two entities was clearly manifested in the finite person as the encompassing person of the highest form of human togetherness. Consequently, this participation neglects the principle of individualism. Although, Scheler claimed in the personalistic solidarity that the value of person is highly esteemed this does not conform to the concept of individualism because the individual and the collective person are both equal in the ethical point of view. Thus, every finite person is both collective and individual. The participation of these entities in genuine solidarity is mutual. There is an essential co-responsibility in its individual acts and collective acts in their participation in societal affairs. In further demonstration, the individual and collective function of a person must be co-responsible for his or her own welfare and also on the welfare of other person in society. In other words, the individual must not only care for his individual world but also care for his collective world. This means that in doing their responsibility to oneself and another is mutual in supporting the development of the person and the common good.

B. Moral Standard Co-responsibility of the entire members of society in the encompassing person is directed towards the person of person, God. In this notion, the moral standard of the unrepresentative/personalistic solidarity is also rooted. Implicitly, in genuine solidarity the moral standard is to value the human person. Moreover, it signifies that in Scheler’s concept there will be an accountability of the entire members of society before God in genuine solidarity. Perhaps this is his moral solidarity “that any individual person is co responsible for other individual’s deeds.” Eventually, this moral standard has its depthness. This moral solidarity further states that every person is not only responsible for his own individual acts but also originally “coresponsible” for all acts of other. In genuine solidarity the entire members is liable to every social and individual acts, which is the moral standard of co-responsibility in society in the personalistic solidarity. Co-responsibility to someone and for someone is different. The co-responsibility to someone is ultimate since both the individual and the entire members in society of the personalistic solidarity are both responsible to God. The co-responsibility in society for someone states is “in collective person every individual and the collective person are self-responsible (= responsibility for oneself), and at the same time every individual is also co-responsible for the collective person (and for every individual in it), just as the collective person is co-responsible for it’s of each members.” This moral standard of co-responsibility in personalistic solidarity signifies the value preference that is ethically scaled. In co-responsibility, the moral dimension of solidarity in society is linked in the value preference of one’s society. For instance, the community unites to pay higher value to a musical concert and neglects the problem of poverty, which cause many people to starve, is a manifestation of wrong value preference. In this corresponsive act of unity that paid higher value to the musical concert (entertainment) even if there is problem about starvation, the co-responsibility in their solidarity is guilty on preferring a lower value. Thus, the moral standard of genuine solidarity entails that each and every member is coresponsible in the collective guilt and collective merit of a community towards God. It demonstrates that in the moral standard of solidarity the participation of co-responsibility in solidarity can possibly increase or decrease in society if the value preference will be lower. To clarify with the reference, the moral standard of genuine solidarity in co-responsibility, Scheler wants to accrue the accountability of the entire members in the value preference of one’s community. Directly, co-responsibility is the participation of the entire members in solidaristic value preferences.

C. Possibility and Necessity of Solidarity Genuine solidarity, is characterize as unrepresentative/personalistic solidarity. Discovering that characteristic of genuine solidarity, it is called unrepresentative/personalistic because their nature is to hold high esteem the value of the human person. This is noteworthy in genuine solidarity where in the possibility of the human person is possible because it is unrepresentative/personalistic. Moreover, it is possible because “the person’s individual uniqueness does not necessarily subvert the unity of the social group since every individual member can find particular location within the social whole that suits his unique personality structure.” This union or participation between the individual and the social group is co-responsible to each other in terms of assessment to the value of the human person. This assessment on the value of the human person is further demonstrated in Scheler’s personalism, which states that: As a member of always individual and in itself unequal realm of free 	spiritual persons, a realm that is in itself also unequal in value, the person is 	therefore in all respects above the state and, we may add, above law.

In biblical sense, man is not made for Sabbath but Sabbath for man. Thus, institution in genuine solidarity is highly responsible to the value of the human person. The individual freedom also is exercise and very much respected. Thus, their participation is complete realization. The participation that occurs in genuine solidarity is not relevant to the principle of individualism but offers a more profound possibility for the entire members. Because individualism is very much opposed to the communal affairs while solidarity by Max Scheler promotes communal affairs which very much value the unity of the human person in their desire towards development. It states above that the value feeling of the encompassing person where genuine solidarity corresponds and it links to the higher value, everyone in this highest type of human togetherness has its equal opportunity to attain the value of the holy. Therefore, there is equality in their process of development and social justice is clear in this notion. Now, the corresponding value of genuine solidarity is higher and since it is higher the five characteristics of higher value is revealed. These are indivisible, enduring, less dependent, depth in satisfaction and less relative to the other values. Those characteristics are attainable for all. They are not subjective. Thus, in genuine solidarity everyone has possible opportunity to attain the value of the holy because there is co-responsibility in the participation of genuine solidarity. In solidarity, two elements make it necessary. The "essential reciprocity and reciprocal valueness of all morally relevant comportment in non-formal proposition" is the first element. Second is "the corresponding non-formal proposition concerning the essential nexus of the basic social acts." The first element signifies a reciprocal mediation of non-formal proposition in two ways, the direct and indirect reciprocity of realizing a value. Scheler views a person, as acting with others, in this sense every act of person is possible to its reciprocity. The non-formal performance of a person in a community entails an effect and counter-effect. For instance, an individual person who realizes a higher value which influence the enhancement of the whole value of the community is considered as direct. Indirect is the community helps enhances the individual towards the realization of higher value. This reciprocal event of acts towards value is an element of necessity in solidarity. The reciprocal realization of values is for involvement of the entire community. This reciprocal involvement is not a subjective or egoistic realizing of value but for the good of all. The second element is "the corresponding non-formal proposition concerning the essential nexus of the basic types of social acts." This notion is further demonstrated in Scheler's understanding of social acts as act that find their possible fulfillment only in a possible community. Moreover, this concept is shaped by understanding the life of Robinson Crusoe. According to Scheler, Crusoe solitary life resembles the principle of solidarity because Crusoe has "consciousness of" a societal reality. Even if the "consciousness of" Crusoe about societal reality is not valid or fulfilled his yearning and concern about reality it signifies that he transcendentally yearns to be with other person, it is a principle that he still possesses an intentional consciousness towards societal reality.

Solidarity of Max Scheler
MAX SCHELER'S CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY

Max Scheler's concept of solidarity can be seen in his social analysis. The social analysis of Max Scheler distinguishes four social forms of human togetherness. These types of social unit or human relationship describe the nature of their solidarity in connection to their concern towards values and the function of their sympathetic response towards the individual and the collective individual person in society. The value preference and the sympathetic response of these four social units are the basic validation of Max Scheler about an ideal solidarity in society. Scheler distinguishes four sympathetic responses in society in the book, “The Nature of Sympathy” in which he demonstrated the four solidaristic functions of feelings and emotion.

A. The Four Forms of Human Togetherness The four forms of human togetherness are the terms used by Manfred S. Frings in narrating the four social units of Scheler. These four forms are mass, the life-community, society and the encompassing person. In the book, “Formalism” Scheler explains the nature or characteristic of these four social relationships together with their solidaristic function. Solidaristic function is an analysis of the nature of their unity. It includes in the analysis the motion of their value preference. In understanding their value preference, it involves the perquisite of their union in relevance to the value preference of the group. 1. Mass The mass is a relationship characterized as animal behavior, the herd. The relationship of this form of human togetherness is driven by psychic contagion. Psychic contagion is the nature of their function towards each other. Psychic contagion is a high reaction of feelings that exempt the power on intelligence. In a strict sense, the behavior of the people in this level of sociality is like a beast. The people's affair in the mass society is considered as herd because the movement of expression in societal affair of the Mass is irrational. They just only express their reaction on certain stimuli that strike their feeling without validating it through an intellectual process. Since it is a matter of feelings, the relationship of the Mass is not much affiliated to an interpersonal lasting relationship. For Scheler, feeling is passive or receptive and reactive. As a consequent possibility to that psychic characteristic of mass society is the annihilation of the value of the human person. There is possible objectification of the human person in that nature because their participation towards the other person is involuntary without understanding the other person as other. However, no one is responsible in the action or participation because it is not a thoughtful unity. Their participation in unity is just an infection of their feeling. Infection of their feeling means that they are driven by purely an emotive identification. An emotive identification can be further demonstrated as a mere sympathetic response. There are two possible extreme cases in the psychic contagion nature present in many people of emotive identification. “There are two possible occurrences in emotive identification: (1) either a human being's self merges with that of another (2) or a human being absorbs another's self wholly into his own.” The unity of the mass has no co-responsibility and self-responsibility of the individual in the community because their psychic contagion is devoid of the understanding of the other. Their action of participation in society is just an 'infection' of their feelings. Their solidarity is by contagion. However, their unity has not gone astray because by nature, their solidarity is by contagion. By contagion, there is a little or no mutual understanding of each individual in the community. What again unites them is their emotive identification to a certain stimuli that strike their feelings.

2. The Life-Community

In this social unit, there is already an existence of natural understanding between the individual and the community, which is opposite to the mass social unit. The mass is characterized as solidarity by contagion which is devoid of the understanding of the other. On the other hand, the existence of mutual understanding in life-community signifies that their relationship is better against the mass social unit mentioned above. The implication of mutual understanding in the life-community variously exists in family, clan, tribes, caste, home communities and people in non-political sense. This mutual understanding of the other in life-community is a just recognition of an individual as a mere member of community. Since the individual mutual understanding of the other in life-community is just a membership their human togetherness is not a mature kind of relationship. It is not mature because it is not fully an absolutely an understanding of the other. Moreover, the individual understanding of the individuality of the human person in life-community is fastened attachment of the individual and the community. It means that one cannot act without the whole consent of the community. Meaning the individuality of the human person must conform in a strict sense to the ideals of the community. Directly, individual freedom is not properly exircise in the life-community. It is purely communal affairs that is being highly regarded not the value of the human person. The life-community has three social characteristics: “(1) the self becomes different from the other in the child’s experience (2) the giveness of the other becomes distinct from the stream of psychic contagion. Once a mass is dissolved; (3) There occurs a natural understanding in the life communal experience among its members.” Directly, these characteristics are just a communal joint-feeling. This communal joint-feeling is truly identical. The individual as a member is co-experiencing with the other in community's tradition. The members in life-community are parts of the whole only insofar as they represent an office, rank or any other positional value in the social structure that is rooted in the tradition of the community. Scheler characterized this nature as “representative solidarity” because another individual can represent the other individual according to their law. The law that organizes their communal expression is tradition, such for instance, as in the caste system.

3. Society This social human togetherness is a relationship of collective personality. In this social unit there is an existence of relationship of life-communities with other life-communities because it is said that society cannot exist without life-community (though there can be a life-community without society). Since this social unit is an existence of collective personality coming from different forms of life-community their nature of relationship is in the form of association. The unity in this social unit involves the association of different forms of life-communities and their individual interests were lifted up to be a common ground in their association. Scheler states this nature as solidarity by interest. The unity of this relationship is determined on the condition of the common interest of the individual. The unity is under the influence of the common interest that they satisfied. Society is an obvious contrast to the nature of the mass and life-community since it is systematic, and its characteristic of function is grounded on the common interest of the individual person. The mass social unit is characterized as solidarity by contagion. The life-community is determined as organic solidarity since their participation is particularly on the kinship law and tradition. The latter (society) is determined by some action of specific condition of interest to the individual person. Society is characterized by solidarity by interest designates a context that the individual members are fully aware of their goal and purpose. Their actions are guided by their common interest. The individual is fully aware of his self-responsibility to the common interest of the whole individual in society. Directly they are mutual to their interest but in an artificial intellectual process. Thus, this form of sociality is founded on the communal interests of the individual human person in the community without giving enough significance to the true aspect of the individuality of the human person e.g. the personal dignity and respect for the self.

4. The Encompassing Person This type of human relationship incorporates the three forms of human togetherness mentioned above; the mass, the life-community and society.

This type of human relationships embraces the three natures of solidarity. Max Scheler describes this kind of relationship as unrepresentative solidarity or personalistic solidarity. His further description on this quintessential type of social solidarity is: the unity of independent, spiritual, and individual single persons "in" an 	independent, spiritual, and individual collective person. We assert that this unity, 	and it 	alone, is the nucleus and total novelty of the true and ancient Christian 	idea of 	community, and that this Christian idea represents, so to speak, the 	historical 	discovery of this unity.

The assertion of this form of human togetherness as true and ancient Christian idea of community demonstrate the ideal character of their relationship that it is an holistic approach of societal solidarity. Perhaps, before dealing with the ideal character of this kind of relationship, it is necessary to examine first the nature of the solidaristic relationship of this social unit. The encompassing person refers not to collective person but also an individual person; in like manner each encompassing person possesses an individuality of its own. Therefore, it is unrepresentative solidarity. This means that the responsibility of every individual is not just a representation like in the life-community but the individual and the collective individual person in society is co-responsive to each other. It changes from a principle of representable solidarity into one unrepresentable 	solidarity: the individual person is coresponsible for all other individual persons 	"in" the collective person not only as the representative of an office, a rank, or any 	other positional value in the social structure, but also, indeed, first of all, as a unique 	personal individual and as the bearer of an individual conscience in the sense 	define above.

This co-responsibility is unrepresentative. Unrepresentative solidarity is the proposition that each individual and social person has a unique value in society. Moreover, it is in contrast to representative solidarity. In this type of solidarity the individual is not in conformity to the ideals of life-community in a strict sense. In unrepresentative solidarity the co-responsibility between the individual members of the community and the collective person of the community is a matter of giving a realization to their own value. It is not just giving a realization of their own value but also enhancing the values of the others in the community. Directly, in this type of relationship the community and the individual realized a higher value and enhance it for the good of all without any personal interest because it is an unrepresentative type of solidarity.

B. The Four Forms of Solidaristic Value Preference In this analysis, the exposition of the possible value preference in the four forms of human togetherness will examine the solidaristic nature of their sympathy towards the four hierarchies of values in Schler's axiology. For Scheler, values are not products of social structure but the realization of values are mediated through the social structure. Furthermore, Scheler views man's heart as ordered counterpart to the cosmos of values. So it is clear and certain that values can be noticed in the four forms of human togetherness. In dealing with the different forms of human togetherness, it will include in understanding, the nature of their solidaristic feeling and their sympathetic response towards each other in their relationship. In the exposition about their nature of solidaristic response, it will include in the examination of their feelings towards each other. Since according to Scheler, the giveness of value can be felt. Although values are not identified with feelings but by nature of their solidaristic response to different forms of human togetherness it is certain that in their relationship values will be realized. Values cannot be identified with feelings because values have existence of their own. On the other hand, man's heart acts to the call of value while realization of value is mediates through the social structure. So again, it is certain the value preference of four forms of human togetherness can be notice.

1. Values for Pleasure and Utility These values are products of or are given to sensible feelings. The value for pleasure refers to what is agreeable and disagreeable to the sensible feelings while values for utility refer to what is useful and not useful. Utility values are pragmatic values. They are given in feelings of self-preservation and of subliminal anticipations for success in practical activities. Accordingly, these values are divisible to the value preference of the people because they have relation to the sensible feelings, which have many variations. These variations in sensible feelings cause the values of pleasure and utility to be varied also in the lives of many people. These values are relative to the value preference of the people in their different environment. For instance, in pathological cases, pleasure is strictly different among ordinary people. The feeling-state of these values is strictly physical. So it is characterized as physical feeling-state. This state is described as exclusively for the physical aspect. Feeling-state means it refers to content and feelings on the function of the reception of this content. For instance, pain is a state of feeling. A feeling of the feeling of pain is a feeling-state. This nature of physical feeling-state is subject to willful removal because the value preference is divisible and strictly localized in bodily sensation. In connection to this nature, of feeling and feeling-state of values for pleasure and utility this characteristic is united to the solidarity by contagion. The mass, the first kind of human togetherness is characterized as solidarity by contagion because their relationship between the individual and the collective individual person is mediated by "infection" of their feelings toward a value preference. Moreover, this infection of feelings is described as involuntary.

This involuntary acts of the mass is distinguished as the ‘herds’ of resentiment - laden men flocking together more and more, thinking that their herd mentality is a substitute for the previously denied objective goodness. No one is responsible in the acts of the mass because their feelings and feeling-state to the value preference is devoid of their will and understanding. They do not value the human person. They just value the pleasure and utility of their physical aspect.

2. Vital Values The modes of vital values are contained in the values of vital feelings. A value of vital feelings corresponds to what is noble and vulgar. In this value, the general well-being of the individual and the community was obtained in this value. The vital feeling-state of this value includes those of health, vitality, aging, weakness and the feeling of approaching death. In harmony, with this kind of value is the concept of Nietzche that recognized vital value as the true essence of life. Vital values have two aspects that their nature is linked to the organic type of solidarity. The two aspects of vital values are: a)they can be felt within one's organism, (b) they can be felt as appearance of external objects. Many of the former we share in animals. The latter are felt only by humans.

In those nature and aspects of vital values they are linked to the characteristic of organic solidarity. The relationship of the individual and the community in the life-community is characterized as organic solidarity. Their nature of relationship is described as organic solidarity because their togetherness is based on kinship. This kind of relationship is described also as representative solidarity because the individual members of the community can be represented by another member of the community. In this nature of solidarity the individual person is recognized as long as they can express their individuality in the community. Moreover, this type of solidarity values the thing-values. Accordingly, the life-community's values, i.e., both the values which it experiences as the same (especially in the natural language or its dialects) and the values of which it is the bearer, belong to the class of thing-values [Sachwerte], not to the class of personal values.

Thing-values are material goods (goods of enjoyment and utility), vital goods (e.g. all economic goods) directly the values of representative solidarity (life-community) are purely for physical enhancement. The movement of their solidarity clings to what is good for their physical aspects or needs.

3. Spiritual Values Spiritual values are described as independent of the body and environment. This nature is manifested to the spiritual feelings and spiritual acts of preferring, loving and hating. Definitely this value is different from the vital values because this value immediately corresponds to the non-material aspects of the human person. These non-material aspects can be reflected in the three main groups of spiritual values: a) the values of the beautiful and the ugly or category in the realm of aesthetic; b) the value of justice and injustice; and c) the value of cognition of truth in the sphere of philosophy. This nature of spiritual value is apparent in the solidarity of interest or in the third level of human togetherness, the society. Accordingly, the relationship among members in society, their association is grounded by their common interest. The linked of this association presupposes the three main kinds of spiritual values. The concentration of their common interest lies significantly in the three main kinds of spiritual values. The heart of their solidarity is on regarding spiritual values as dimension for their common interest or unity in general. They give significanse to the ideals of spiritual values in connection to their common interest.

4.Values of Holiness This is the highest value among all ranks of values mentioned above. This is the highest value becauses it correspond to absolute values. The absolute values are those independent to the esence of physical life and sensibilty. There are five characteristics when to consider higher values: “(1) value is higher if it is enduring. A value is higher if it possesses the 'ability-to-exist-through time; (2) the value is higher if it is indivisible. For instance, spiritual values of knowledge and beauty and the values of the holy can be shared by a multitude, unlike the values of the vital and utility where they give significance to the value of economic and material goods. These kinds of values are divisible only in a certain people; (3) value is higher if it is less dependent on other values. For instance, the values of pleasure is dependent on the vital values because vital values coressponds to the well-being or on the physical and sensibility of the body; (4) the value is higher if it is in a depth of satisfaction. The value of pleasure (lust) is not in a depth on satisfying a desire for joy and happiness.” Because the satisfaction in this sense refers to the inner fulfillment. A value is higher if it is less relative to the person experiencing it. The values of pleasure is relative to the sensing organism. Similary, vital value is relative to well-being. Contrastly, absolute values do not depend on the essence of sensibilty and the essence of life. The feeling-state of this value is on blissfulness and despair. The reply reaction on that feeling-state is belief and disbelief. Eventually the realization of values of the holy is on the act of genuine love. However, the act through which we originally apprehend the value of the holy is an act of a specific kind of love (whose value direction precedes and determines all pictorial representations and concepts of holy objects); that is to say, in essence the act is directed towards person, or toward something of the form of a personal being, no matter what content or what "conception" of personhood is implied. The self-value in the sphere of the values of the "holy" is therefore, by essential necessity, a value of the person.

Since genuine act of love is the realm to realize the value of the human person, then it is the path also to realize the value of holiness. This description is linked to the nature of unrepresentative solidarity or personalistic solidarity in the encompassing person of human togetherness. It states that the nature of unrepresentative silidarity give high esteem to the value of the human person. The core principle of unrepresentative solidarity is to value the human person. Similarly, this nature affixes to the authentication of the value of holiness mentioned above.

C. Genuine Solidarity In the four forms of human togetherness, Scheler states different forms of unity. The highest form is the unrepresentative solidarity or personalistic solidarity. The encompassing person in the four forms of human togetherness augmented the ideal concept of solidarity in society. Because solidarity in this form of social unit is personalistic or unrepresentative. Moreover, the value preference is higher. The solidarity in the encompassing person is genuine. Because the solidarity by contagion (mass), representative solidarity (life-community) and solidarity by interest (society) is authenticated to unrepresentative solidarity. Moreover, the unrepresentative solidarity lies the co-responsibility of the individaul person and the collective individual person in the society. The two participants are both responsible to each other. Their co-responsibility is not just in each other but in God. Nevertheless, both the collective person and the individual person are responsible to the person of persons, to God, and, indeed, in terms of self-responsibility as well as co-responsibility.

It entails in this co-responsibility the apostolic sense of responsibility. There is an apostolic sense because their immediate responsibility is in God. The apostolic sense of responsibility means that it is a ‘commited responsibility’ towards the value of every human person in humanity. For instance, the rich is responsible to the whole development of the poor and vice versa, the poor also is responsible to the growth development of the rich. Meaning, the entire humanity then is responsible among themeselves to the value of the human person. Their sense of responsibility is in God. Similarly this is posible because their value preference is higher. The characteristic of this kind of solidarity is to value the human person. Valuing the human person is mutual which means that the individual human person is not just an objective subject of valuation but encompasses the community as a whole. Valuing reforms and transforms into a real community of persons which eliminates the subject/object relationship between the self and community. In another sense, personal individuality is highly regarded in the acceptance of one’s own individual personhood as it is reflected in the eyes of others and in the embrace of the community.