User talk:Harlan wilkerson/Jordan Recognition

Background
The British Mandate had included the states of Transjordan and Palestine. See Boundaries Delimitation: Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Yitzhak Gil-Har, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 68-81 ; and Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, US State Department (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) pp 650-652

Transjordan was treated as an integral part of a joint British mandate while the UN considered the question of Palestine. Jordan was a state with an Arab majority that only emerged after the termination of the British Mandate on May 15 1948. The name was changed on January 21, 1949 as a result of a union between portions of Arab Palestine and Transjordan.

The Anglo-American treaty, also known as the Palestine Mandate Convention, permitted the US to delay any unilateral British action to terminate the mandate. The earlier proclamation of the independence of Syria and Lebanon had said "the independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon will not affect the juridical situation as it results from the Mandate Act. Indeed, this situation could be changed only with the agreement of the Council of the League of Nations, with the consent of the Government of the United States, a signatory of the Franco-American Convention of April 4, 1924". See Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1941. The British Commonwealth; the Near East and Africa Volume III (1941), pages 809-810; and Statement of General de Gaulle of November 29, 1941, concerning the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963) 680-681

In 1946 Transjordan applied for membership in the United Nations. The President of the Security Council, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Poland, said that Transjordan was part of a joint Mandate. He denied that the Mandate had been legally terminated and asserted the rights and obligations of the United Nations. He mentioned that US Secretary of State Byrnes had spoken out against premature recognition of Transjordan, and he added that the application should not be considered until the question of Palestine as a whole was addressed. See Minutes of the 57th Session of the Security Council, S/PV.57 pages 100-101 (pdf file pgs 3-4 of 52) and Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Reports, Volume 37, Cambridge University Press, 1968, ISBN: 0521463823, page 496 The application for membership was not approved. At the 1947 Pentagon Conference, the US advised the UK it was withholding recognition of Transjordan pending a decision on the Palestine question by the United Nations. See Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The Near East and Africa, Volume V, Page 603

At the 1947 Pentagon Conference, the U.S. advised Great Britain it was withholding recognition of Transjordan pending a decision on the Palestine question by the United Nations. See Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The Near East and Africa, Volume V, Page 603

High Commissioner Herbert Samuel insisted that Maan and Aqaba be annexed to Transjordan during the Hedjaz-Nejd war in June of 1925. Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: the Imperial Oasis, By Clive Leatherdale Routledge, 1983, ISBN 0714632201, page 39 The 1928 Citizenship Law made everyone living in the territory prior to 1924 a citizen, because the originary date [based upon the Treaty of Lausanne] was 1923. See Anderson, Betty Signe, Nationalist voices in Jordan: the street and the state, University of Texas Press, 2005, ISBN 0292706251, page 41 On 19 November 1947 Chaim Weizmann told President Truman that it was imperative that the Negev and the port at Aqaba be included in the Jewish State. See Snetsinger John, "Truman, the Jewish vote, and the creation of Israel", Hoover Institute Press, 1974, ISBN: 0817933913 pages 60-61

During the General Assembly deliberations on Palestine, there were proposals to incorporate part of the territory of Transjordan into the Jewish state. A few days before the November 29, 1947 decision on partition, U.S. Secretary of State Marshall noted frequent references had been made by the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine regarding the desirability of the Jewish State having both the Negev and the Port of Aqaba. See Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The Near East and Africa Volume V, page 1255

The UN Security Council Truce Commission said Transjordan was ready for direct negotiations under the guise of cease-fire talks that both sides would consider permanent without saying so publicly. Moshe Dayan replied that the Provisional Government of Israel was ready to negotiate armistice and peace either publicly or secretly.

Express and Implied Recognition

 * Great Britain recognized the annexation of the West Bank on a de jure basis, and the de facto authority of Jordan over East Jerusalem pending a final status determination. See British House of Commons, Jordan and Israel (Government Decision), HC Deb 27 April 1950 vol 474 cc1137-41
 * Sanford Silverburg's cites an article by Yehuda Blum that relied on another article written by Julius Stone. He says they are the source of the frequently repeated claim that only two states, Great Britain and Pakistan, recognized the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. Silverburg casts some doubt on the reliability of the claim with respect to Pakistan's recognition. See Silverburg, Sanford R., Pakistan and the West Bank: A Research Note, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 261-263
 * In December of 1948 the mayors of almost all Palestine towns held by the Arabs met in Jericho and declared Abdullah King of Arab Palestine The government of Transjordan announced that any constitutional changes resulting from the incorporation of Palestine would be made at the same time as the setting of the date for the proclamation of Abdullah as the ruler of the joint kingdom. See the The Palestine Post, December 14, 1948, page 1, "Jericho Declaration"; "Current biography yearbook", H. W. Wilson Co., 1949, page 5, Abdullah ibn Hussein; Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2, US State Department (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) pages 1163-68; and "Written Statement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" submitted to the Internartional Court of Justice, para 2.19, page 18 of 229
 * In December of 1948 the Secretary of State authorized the US Consul in Amman to advise King Abdullah and the officials of Transjordan that the US accepted the principles contained in the resolutions of the Jericho Conference, and that the US viewed incorporation with Transjordan as the logical disposition of Arab Palestine. See Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume V, Part 2, Page 1706; Kadosh, Sandra Berliant, United States Policy toward the West Bank in 1948, Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3/4 (Summer - Autumn, 1984), pp. 231-252, especially 246
 * The resolutions of the Second Arab-Palestinian Congress were adopted by the Transjordanian government on December 7, 1948 and the parliament approved the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on December 13, 1948. See Whiteman, vol 2, pages 1163-68; and the Palestine Post, "Jericho Declaration" article
 * On January 21, 1949 Transjordan officially changed its name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. See Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, Vol. 4, Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, and Anthony Mango, Routledge, 3rd edition, 2004, ISBN 0-415-93924-0, page 2354
 * The United States extended de jure recognition to the Government of Transjordan and the Government of Israel on the same day, January 31, 1949. Foreign relations of the United States, 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume VI, Page 713
 * Clea Bunch said that "President Truman crafted a balanced policy between Israel and its moderate Hashemite neighbours when he simultaneously extended formal recognition to the newly created state of Israel and the Kingdom of Transjordan. These two nations were inevitably linked in the President's mind as twin emergent states: one serving the needs of the refugee Jew, the other absorbing recently displaced Palestinian Arabs. In addition, Truman was aware of the private agreements that existed between Jewish Agency leaders and King Abdullah I of Jordan. Thus, it made perfect sense to Truman to favour both states with de jure recognition." See Clea Lutz Bunch, "Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration," Canadian Journal of History 41.3 (2006)
 * When de jure recognition was finally extended to the State of Israel on January 31, 1949, Truman in a significant and symbolic jesture, announced the recognition of Transjordan on the same date. See Devine, Michael J., Watson Robert P., Wolz Robert J., Israel and the legacy of Harry S. Truman, Volume 2004, Truman State Univ Press, 2008, ISBN: 1931112800, page xiii
 * Jordan called attention to the fact that after the unification of the West Bank within Jordan's territory, Jordan concluded a considerable number of bilateral and multilateral treaties with other states. The application of those treaties extended to the entirety of Jordan including all of the West Bank: none of the other parties to those treaties made any reservation to the effect that their applicability to the West Bank was excluded. See Written Statement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Internartional Court of Justice, para 2.21 pages 18-19
 * § 204, Reporters Note 2, The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States says that "Recogni­tion of a state has been effected by express official declaration, by the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the state, by the presentation of credentials by a United States representative to the authorities of the new state, and by receiving the credentials of a diplomatic represen­tative of that state."
 * Department of State bulletin, Volume: volume 20, 1949 noted de jure recognition of the government of Jordan; that a U.S. legation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was established in Amman; and that Dr Yussef Baikal had presented credentials as "(Jordan) Minister" to the United States.
 * The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. It contains a Memorandum of Conversation, between Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs and Mr. Abdel Monem Rifai, Counselor, Jordan Legation in Washington, June 5, 1950 which documents the US recognition of the union between Arab Palestine and Transjordan. See Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V (1950), Page 921
 * The US signed several treaties with Jordan: a Technical Cooperation Agreement with Jordan that entered into force February 27, 1951 (Volume 4206 of Department of State publication Volume 2233 of Treaties, a Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement effected by an exchange of notes, signed at Amman July 10 and September 24, 1956, Volume 3663 of Treaties, and an Economic Assistance Agreement including an exchange of notes signed at Amman June 29, 1957, Volume 3869 of Treaties of the United States. None of the treaties contained any reservations regarding the West Bank.
 * Thomas Kuttner notes that de facto recognition was granted to the Jordanian regime, most clearly evidenced by the maintaining of consulates in East Jerusalem by several countries, including the United States. See Israel and the West Bank, By Thomas S. Kuttner, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1977, Volume 7; Volume 1977, edited by Yoram Dinstein, Kluwer Law International, 1989, ISBN 0-7923-0357-1,
 * Joseph Weiler said that other states had engaged in activities, statements, and resolutions that would be inconsistent with non-recognition. See Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state: a European perspective, By Joseph Weiler, Croom Helm, Ltd. 1985, ISBN 0-7099-3605-2, page 48, footnote 14
 * Joseph Massad said that the members of the Arab League granted de facto recognition and that the United States had formally recognized the annexation, except for Jerusalem. See Joseph A. Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001),ISBN 0-231-12323-X, page 229
 * The Security Council adopted Resolution 228 (1966) in which the Council observed that, "the grave Israeli Military action which took place in the southern Hebron area [of the West Bank] on 13 November 1966... constituted a large scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces of Israel" "Written Statement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" submitted to the Internartional Court of Justice, para 2.21, page 19 of 229
 * In a letter to David Ben-Gurion published by Reuters on 9 January 1968, French President De Gaulle explained that he was convinced that Israel had ignored his warnings and overstepped the bounds of moderation by taking possession of Jerusalem, and so much Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory by force of arms. See Text of de Gaulle's Answer to Letter From Ben-Gurion at Select.nytimes.com
 * During the 5th Emergency Session of the General Assembly the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin, repeatedly asserted that the West Bank was Jordanian territory. See A/PV.1526 of 19 June 1967.
 * On June 9, 1967 Foreign Minister Eban assured US Ambassador Goldberg that Israel was not seeking territorial aggrandizement and had no "colonial" aspirations. See Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, page 386, Document number 227 Secretary Rusk stressed to the Government of Israel that no settlement with Jordan would be accepted by the world community unless it gave Jordan some special position in the Old City of Jerusalem. The US also assumed Jordan would receive the bulk of the West Bank as that was regarded as Jordanian territory. See Foreign Relations of the United States Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, page 765-766, Document 411