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An ongoing crisis between Pakistan and India for Kashmir caused three major wars between India and Pakistan. However Pakistan, India and the U.S. claimed efforts for peace. I wanted to form an opinion as to whose claim was most reliable, which inspired me to form my research question as: To what extent has Pakistan, India and the U.S.A been a force of peace in Kashmir?

After Pakistan gained its independence it made various unilateral violent attempts in order to posses Kashmir. Since then, the U.S. has been trying to prevent war between India and Pakistan, especially after the two countries gained nuclear control through strong diplomatic tactics. The U.S. however provided arms to Pakistan in order to maintain their strategic location in Pakistan to fight the Soviet's in Afghanistan, and also to gain Pakistani support during the Cold War. India on the other hand has always been defensive against Pakistan and has minimised violence in Kashmir. India also made strong attempts to restore the traditional lifestyle of Kashmir to keep the Kashmiris content. Not only that, they also gave special constitutional autonomy to Kashmir to avoid any independent movements in Kashmir. However, Indian officials in Kashmir worsened the peace because of their corrupt attitude. Also, the fact that India denied to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir throughout history also created discomfort for Pakistan and the U.S. diplomatically.

With these facts of history, we can state that Pakistan has been a weak force of peace compared to India who never initiated any violence, but did fetter with peace through its corrupt officials and by being defensive to Pakistan's attacks. The U.S. has been the major force of peace, as it encouraged and initiated dialogue between India, Pakistan and the U.S. in order to keep peace in Kashmir.

Word Count: 297 Introduction

India, Pakistan and the US have been involved in trying to come to a solution to the Kashmir crisis since the past 58 years, though a resolution still has not been reached. The Kashmiris have been exposed to constant violence and bloodshed, something that all three parties claim to have reduced most. The following essay will assess to the extent Pakistan, India and the US have been a force of peace in Kashmir.

According to the research, Pakistan has been the biggest violator of peace in Kashmir since it initiated a couple wars and supported constant terrorist infiltration on to the Indian side of Kashmir. Although Pakistan did play a role diplomatically and politically, they always held a military stance in the background. On the contrary India has tried to minimise violence but was forced to be violent because of Pakistani infiltration. Along with that, the treatment of Kashmiris by Indian officials has also hampered the peace. On the other hand, India has been pushing to re-establish the Kashmiriyat or the traditional Kashmiri life style in order to satisfy Kashmiris. They also provided Kashmir with a different constitution with more autonomy than other Indian states in order to preserve peace in Kashmir. The US on the other hand indirectly violated peace in Kashmir by providing arms to Pakistan, but made up for it with its strong diplomatic and political forces by urging the two countries to have dialogue in order to prevent a major disastrous war.

The Extent to Which Pakistan has been a force of peace for the Kashmir crisis:

Pakistan has been a weak force for peace in solving the Kashmir crisis over the past few decades. This fact is clearly proved by the actions that Pakistan has been taking which do not show any complete and constructive involvement with the countries that are involved in the Kashmir crisis.

The peace in Kashmir was disturbed in October 1947, Pakistan supported the Pathan tribesmen to burn key places in Kashmir such as the Manohar powerhouse, kidnap and rape women, and cause chaos and destruction with the backing of its military [1]. Pakistan did not even hold any diplomatic talks with Kashmir. However, Kashmir's accession to India led Pakistan to lose out on Kashmir. Pakistan attempted to show its dominance in South East Asia when in 1949, Pakistan led its army into infiltrating India's Kashmir, which led to the first India-Pakistan war. Once again, Pakistan lost out in trying to gain Kashmir through violence, and only gained a third of Kashmir, with the rest controlled by India; the state was divided by the CFL (cease-fire line) [2].

From 1950 to 1965, Pakistan decided to bring the Kashmir issue to the international forum; however, Pakistan kept a military stance in the background. The international forum decided to hold a plebiscite in the Kashmiri valley in support of

Pakistan's argument of Kashmiris having the "right to self determination". [3] In the meantime, the U.S was equipping Pakistan militarily, since Pakistan allied with the U.S.

in the Cold War [4]. With that, the military leader Ayub Khan, in 1961 asked president John F. Kennedy to intercede with PM. Nehru, but when Pakistan noticed that they were unable to exert pressure on India, they changed their tactics again. It was obvious that Pakistan did not exert diplomatic pressure on India whole-heartedly because shortly after, they opted to send infiltrators across the border in 1965, with the mission named "operation Gibraltar". This undoubtedly resulted in another India-Pakistan war, with the outcome of India winning the war due to its military strength [5]. This meant another unilateral military attempt to end the Kashmir crisis failed, which agitated Pakistan further.

By 1977 Pakistan rebuilt its military with the support of the U.S. and reverted to martial law, and since then, they managed to recruit half a million troops, who were anti-Indian Jihadis. Pakistan's excuse to take this step was that Pakistan needed a strong military to keep in balance with India, in case India tried attacking Pakistan once more, like they had done in 1971 to free East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) [6]. Pakistan was also having more hatred against India because of the determined attempt of PM Indhira Gandhi to agree on the "Simla Accords" where the CFL was turned into the Line of Control (LoC). This created a more rigid division between India's and Pakistan's Kashmir with added security from the Indian side [7]. Since Pakistan by now had lost thrice in a one-to-one war with India, they decided to use Islamic militants as an instrument of regional influence in Kashmir. They also used the force that was used against the USSR

in Afghanistan in Kashmir for a "liberation struggle". This force was trained as the Muhajadeen by the United States during the Cold War. Many of the militants that were part of the war, were then used for combat in Kashmir [8]. Pakistan was unable to meet with success, and so in 1990 PM Nawaz Shariff tried to use an anti-Indian campaign with the backing of its military to make their acts of terrorism more effective in Kashmir [9]. Once again, the Indian side tackled the obstacles to peace set up by Pakistan well.

Pakistan lost more respect from the Indians, when in July 1999 PM Shariff met PM Vajpayee for confidence building measures because as soon as Shariff returned to Pakistan, the dishonesty of Pakistan was unveiled when Pakistani infiltrators bombed the Srinager - Leh highway A1, a crucial spot for Indian transport into Kashmir. This infiltration operation also failed due to the strong Indian military offense. The Indian parliament described this act as a stab in the back [10]. Soon, Musharaff, another military ruler of Pakistan supported "freedom fighters" in Kashmir, internationally known as terrorists after the September 11, 2001 attack on the WTC, New York [11]. In 2002 Musharaff went to India to hold bilateral talks in Agra, and was pressurised by the Indian government and the International forum to pull Islamic militants back to Pakistan, but he still did not completely adhere to those orders [12].

All of these facts make it obvious that Pakistan has been a weak force of peace in solving the Kashmir crisis since their independence. Pakistan so far, has taken no actions that clearly demonstrated complete and constructive involvement with the countries that are involved in the Kashmir crisis.

The extent to which India has been a force of peace for the Kashmir crisis:

India, the largest democracy on earth has been a strong force of peace in the whole Kashmir crisis, even though India had to combat Pakistan's violence inflicted upon Kashmir through violence itself, India maintained a high degree of stability and peace in Kashmir but failed to secure the full support of the Kashmiris in order to maintain peace completely.

In 1947, Raja Hari Singh, with the endorsement of Sheikh Abdullah signed the "Instrument of Accession", whereby Kashmir legally became a part of India. After India temporarily solved the matter, India referred the Kashmir crisis to the UN in 1948 [13]. This was a sensible and responsible act by India as a democratic nation to create peace permanently in Kashmir, but the UN asked India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, to which India refused to do so because India rightfully owned Kashmir by then. Pakistan, unhappy with India's refusal to hold a plebiscite began a war with India in 1949, to which India responded defensively and got the Pakistani army to retreat. India then granted Kashmir a new constitution and made Sheikh Abdullah the first PM. In 1952 Sheik Abdullah and Nehru agreed to let Kashmir acquire a high degree of autonomy so

that peace could be maintained in Kashmir, by preventing Muslim extremism from ruining the peace (after all Kashmir was a Muslim dominated state). Soon however, India gained some evidence that Abdullah was threatening to declare Kashmir independent, so they removed him from his post to prevent instability between Kashmir and India. Since then Muslim extremists forced Kashmiri pundits to evacuate Kashmir on the grounds that Kashmir is a Muslim state [14]. Though India is a secular nation, she tolerated such inhumane hostility in Kashmir in order to prevent from riots by Muslim extremists that could disturb peace furthermore in Kashmir. It was a shame on India to tolerate such inhumanity in its own country, as it is the largest democracy on earth.

After the India-Pakistan war in 1971 where India freed East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), PM Gandhi and Bhutto met at Simla in 1972 where Ghandi pressurised Bhutto to agree with the "Simla Accords" where the CFL was turned into the LoC [15]. This was a fair and intelligent move by India because the India-Pakistan border became more rigid in terms of security, and it was also diplomatically fair because Pakistan retained the third of Kashmir they had gained in 1949 [16].

India, after that had not been very active internationally and domestically for the Kashmir issue, which slowed down the process of peace with Pakistan and the Kashmiris. However, in 1983 the opposition council (BJP and its coalition parties) that included Jyoti Basu, I.K. Gujral, Chandrashekhar and Prakash Singh stated, "The special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir should be preserved and protected in letter and spirit." This was known as the 'Srinagar Declaration' [17]. In 1984 the Indian court ruled Kashmir as "a special place in the constitutional set up of the country" [18]. So basically this meant that India gave autonomy to Kashmir in order to ensure peace and to prevent 'independence movements' by militants there. On the contrary, the regional election commission was appointed for the state and the constitution guarantees to ensure that autonomy is preserved in Kashmir, but India dismissed elected officials and set up puppet-leaders in the name of 'national security' [19]. This way, the ordinary Kashmiris faced harassment from the Indian officials, which kept the locals unhappy and so many Kashmiris supported Islamic militants, which increased violence in Kashmir. The former Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee admitted to these mistakes and promised to start fresh initiatives based on awareness. In one of his speeches he said, "We shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region" [20]. This quote is reliable to a high-extent because Vajpayee is a person who is responsible in handling such issues. However, as it was spoken publicly, so Vajpayee's sincerity is questionable since he may have wanted to raise his popularity with that speech. The statement that India would be helpful for the whole of the South Asian region is also very doubtful, as India has not taken much interest in the terrorism at the Bangladeshi border. Nevertheless, India, since then has been encouraging the recovery of the Kashmiriyat, or the typical Kashmiri lifestyle. New Delhi and the government of Jammu and Kashmir agreed on the importance of restoring Kashmir's traditional society, pluralism and the common identity of Kashmiriyat. This move by India improved peace and stability since it satisfied the Kashmiris.

After the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC), New York, India realised that they have to deal with Kashmir with "imagination and sensitivity" to

win the support of the domestic Kashmiris and also among other international organisations and countries in order to fight terrorism without inflicting much violence in the Kashmiri valley [21]. During that time, international pressure on India to hold a plebiscite rose, but Indian denied to hold a plebiscite, instead proposed to hold a general assembly election. The UN however rejected the proposal. [22]. This move by India was not cooperative and delayed the solution to the crisis. Though, India did use strong diplomatic tactics with the US by venturing into bilateral and multilateral talks in order to attain a peaceful solution for the Kashmir crisis; which was a positive sign of prospect since it would ensure a stronger check system between the countries.

Overall India has been an effective force of peace but the only aspect that pulled down India's strive for peace in Kashmir is India's officials who harassed Kashmiris and the fact that India consistently denied to hold a plebiscite. India's effort to restore Kashmiriyat and attempt to restore the traditions of the Kashmiris is a positive stride and is a positive attempt to keep the Kashmiris satisfied. In fact, according to MORI, a research agency, 61% of the Kashmiris want Indian citizenship and 90% of the Kashmiris disapprove of violence [23]. Also, many Indian and international NGO's came up with a "Peace Movement" in Kashmir that aimed to have "an end to all violence" and have

achieved an active Kashmiri participation [24]. India therefore has been a strong force of peace compared to Pakistan.

The extent to which the United States of America has been a force of peace for the Kashmir crisis:

The US has been active in the Kashmir crisis and has been helpful to a great extent. In fact, they were the most helpful force of peace for Kashmir due to their enthusiasm in diplomatic manipulations in the Kashmir crisis.

In the late 1940s, the United States rejected any leadership role in the scheduled Security Council debates. The U.S. however worked closely with Great Britain and ensured that Kashmir did not become independent because they were afraid of Soviet exploitation [25]. This action of the U.S was rather self-centred and was not very constructive for the peace-building measures in Kashmir but instead kept everything at a stalemate. The U.S. then appointed Admiral Chester Nimitz, an officer in the U.S. naval forces who was put in charge to administer the plebiscite and tried to undermine the ongoing crisis, but no satisfactory outcome was achieved, nevertheless it was a constructive attempt for peace in Kashmir by the U.S. [26] And in 1951

to 1953 a U.S. senator Frank Graham and President Eisenhower's emissary Paul Hoffman tried to initiate reconciliation but the missions failed [27]. In 1953, the U.S. was using Cold War politics in the region and Prime Minister Nehru was convinced that the U.S. had motives in enlisting Pakistan into its evolving alliance system to "check India's power within the region" [28]. The U.S. military rapport with Pakistan gave India an excuse to evade holding a plebiscite. This move by the U.S. was not very helpful either because it encouraged the Pakistani military and also led India to distrust the U.S.

By 1963 President Kennedy's administration forced India to have bilateral talks with Pakistan after seeing India's vulnerable defence in the Indo-Chinese war. After five rounds of talks not much was achieved, as Pakistan sold two thousand square miles of disputed land to China, and the Indian government claimed that land [29]. As expected, the Indian leaders were furious and so the attempt at peace was of no use. This then led India to convincingly hammer Pakistan in the 1965 war and the Johnson administration disgusted by the war imposed an embargo against both India and Pakistan and adopted a lower profile in the subcontinent and pursued more limited policies in the region. Washington also stepped aside and allowed the USSR to convene a peace conference at Tashkent in January 1966 where once again peace was not attained [30]. Though the U.S. as unable to push a decisive solution to the crisis, their pressure on India and Pakistan helped a great deal in preserving peace in Kashmir. US permission of USSR intervention also showed signs of a collaborative stride to end the crisis.

In the 1980s the U.S. was in alliance with Pakistan in order to force the USSR out of Afghanistan, after the Soviet invasion in 1979. President Carter then ordered CIA operation Muhajadeen where Pakistan became a tool for assistance in the operation [31]. In fact, later on the Reagan administration agreed to send a multibillion military and economic package to Islamabad. Despite all this, it was surprising that Pakistan's re-emergence as a "frontline-state" in the Cold War made such little difference in the relations between New Delhi and Washington [32]. Retrospectively, the U.S. did not hamper peace in Kashmir, however in the later years, Pakistan used the U.S. military package and the Muhajadeen training to obstruct peace in Kashmir by sending its infiltrators across the LoC. On the other hand, India's boost in economy, electronics, computers and telecommunications in the 1980s removed India from the American list of "diversion risk" countries [33]. This set a foundation for increased investment and technology transfer between the two countries. This improved relations between the two countries and the scene at Kashmir was also peaceful. In 1989 Islamic militants in Kashmir openly rebelled and Pakistan supplied its military muscle and 'energy' for the 'freedom fighters' [34] which was obviously encouraged because of previous U.S. military aid to Pakistan, but the U.S. managed to prevent a major war from taking place by increasing diplomatic talks between India, Pakistan and the U.S. In the 1990s, Kashmir was an international crisis since there could have been a major war; the Bush administration alarmed at this situation sent the Deputy national Security advisor, Robert Gates to get the two governments to talk to each other, to bring about a calmer atmosphere. This move of the US greatly contributed to the peace in Kashmir by preventing a major war.

In 1998 India and Pakistan both tested Nuclear weapons, and the United Nations with the support of the U.S. put sanctions on both countries and Kashmir was in tranquillity during that time [35]. However, one year after the tests, there was a violent military clash between India and Pakistan because Pakistan sent eight hundred infiltrators across the LoC. The infiltrators had a hold over the National highway 1A (the only good road between Srinagar and Leh) with heavy artillery such as machine guns, howitzers, mortars and surface to air missiles. Pakistan then portrayed Kashmir as a "Nuclear Flashpoint" in order to get a third party mediation that would favour Islamabad [36]. The intention of Pakistan to cause heavy violence in Kashmir was obvious and India responded by surrounding the infiltrators with 30,000 troops and defeating them. According to the U.S., India on May 9th 1999 was preparing for a full-scale war and Pakistan was also prepared to battle it out [37]. Fortunately neither of them made decisive moves against each other since diplomatic talks between New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington really intensified. PM Vajpayee of India said that he was ready to do

anything to push the infiltrators behind the LoC [38]. Vajpayee and Shariff talked several times on the phone that week due to U.S. pressure to solve the issue. Pakistan refused to

take responsibility of this incident, meanwhile the Indian Foreign minister Jaswant Singh and the U.S. deputy secretary of state; Strobe Talbot agreed to deal firmly with Pakistan whilst India promised not to cross the LoC on escalated fights [39]. President Clinton in June 5-15 asked Vajpayee and Shariff to resist widening the conflict. Such measures by the United States were of extreme importance in preventing a major war between the two nuclear countries, which would disturb the peace in Kashmir heavily. As casualties increased in Kashmir, Vajpayee aide Brajesh Mishra informed the U.S. National Security advisor, Sandy Berger that India might be induced to escalate its operations in June 17.18. Concerned with this President Clinton sent commander in chief General Anthony Zinni to Islamabad from June 23-27 where he pressurised Pakistan to back off from the Indian side of the LoC [40]. Such determination from the American side for sure helped avoid another major war between India and Pakistan.

Shariff went to meet Clinton on July 4 1999 and Pakistan agreed to follow the Simla accords held in 1972 due to political pressure from the US. In July 11 Indian and Pakistani directors of General of military operations agreed to end the fighting. Indian defence minister, George Fernandez in July 17 announced the end of the Kargil war [41]. New Delhi and Washington were close to each other in the last year of Clinton's office. In fact Clinton visited India for five days and five hours in Pakistan with disagreements with Musharaf. Clinton (to the Pakistanis) said, "We cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that through dialogue" [42]. That means that the U.S. will help in "good offices" to help facilitate a settlement but will not propose solutions or invest political capital in it. This was known as the Clinton Doctrine. India's technology and economy deepened the Indo-U.S. ties. President Bush followed similar principles to Clinton. This developed the peace in all involved countries because the focus diverted from Kashmir to technology and economy, which was initiated by the U.S.

In October 2001, terrorists from Pakistan based Jaish-e-Muhammed attacked Jammu and the Kashmir assembly building in Srinagar, killing 38 people. Cross artillery duels then continued for a year between the two countries. Secretary of State to the U.S. Colin Powell and Secretary of Defence Donald Rummsfield hastened to the region in October and November respectively, to calm things down [43]. In December Jaish-e-Muhammed and Lashker-e-Taiba attacked the Indian parliament killing four people! The Indian government was outraged and deployed the Indian army on border positions. India demanded Pakistan to 'rein' the murderous act of the Jihad groups, or else India would destroy all terrorist camps in Kashmir. India mobilised five 500,000 troops across the India-Pakistan border, and Pakistan responded by placing 300,000 thousand troops on December 15th [44]. By doing this India wanted Washington to urge Islamabad to stop supporting Jihadism in Kashmir and mainland India. India bolstered anti-terrorist arguments based on Bush's doctrine after the 9/11 attacks on the WTC. New Delhi's diplomatic strategy worked out to be effective and the U.S. recognised Jaish-e-Muhammed and Lashker-e-Taiba as terrorist groups. Due to pressure on Pakistan, Musharaf made a speech banning Pakistani terrorism in January 2002. Musharaf unwillingly got 2000 militants arrested and closed 300 of its offices, although very few militants were prosecuted. Leaders of the two terrorist groups were released and terrorists attacked Kaluchak, Jammu, in May where 34 people were killed turned into a crisis again [45]. Vajpayee warned the Indian army to "prepare for a decisive battle" when Musharaf said, "If India insists on launching all-out war to attack Pakistan's support for Kashmiri militants, Pakistan is prepared to go nuclear." Washington then suddenly used high-level diplomatic activity to prevent war between the two countries. In early June, Deputy Secretary of state Richard Armitage travelled to Islamabad where he evoked a promise from Musharaf to "end cross-border infiltration permanently" [46]. Crossings declined to half from 2001 to 2002. The Indian government in October withdrew many of their troops from the Pakistani border, except for Kashmir. The Pakistani government then reciprocated by doing the same [47]. The two countries were seeking for U.S. attention to solve the crisis, and the U.S. rightfully guided the two countries without indulging too much though at the same time ensured the prevention of a major war between the two countries.

Conclusion:

The Kashmir crisis still has not been resolved and violence is still lingering in Kashmir. Pakistan persists to sending infiltrators across the LoC and India continues to fight them. Although Pakistan has attempted some diplomatic talks with India and the US, they continue to hold a military stance in the background. India's policy on Kashmir has not changed is continuing to preserve the Kashmiriyat, though the Indian officials still are harassing Kashmiris. The US is also maintaining the Clinton Doctrine [48]. Overall, Pakistan has been the least force of peace compared to India who has been a stronger force of peace, but failed to achieve total peace because of its corrupt officials and its persistent denial to hold a plebiscite. Finally, the US now is inactive with the Kashmir crisis but occasionally guides India and Pakistan diplomatically to preserve the peace.

Word Count: 3995

[1] Ganguly, Sumit, ed. The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. London: Franc Cass And Company Limited, 2003. – Page 2

[2]Buckley, Richard, ed. Understanding Global Issues: Pakistan, A state of insecurity. Understanding Global Issues Limited, 2003.

[3] Kaul, Maharaj. "Jammu & Kashmir: Self-Determination, Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession." South Asian Voice. (12 May. 2005) < http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/kashmir.html>

[4] Vanaik, Achin. "No Paradigm Shift". The Hindu. (9 April, 2005) < http://www.tni.org/archives/vanaik/paradigm.htm>

[5] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 42.

[6] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 44/45.

[7] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 97.

[8] Eriksen, Lars. "Kashmir: A history at a flashpoint." The Observer (June 9, 2002).

[9] Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the unfinished war. I.B Tauris, 2002.

[10] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 100

[11] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 104

[12] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 105

[13] Talbot, Ian, and Arnold: India and Pakistan. London: Hodder Headline, 2000.

[14] "Plight of Kashmiri Pundits". The Truth about Kashmir. (May 27, 2005) < http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/pandit.html>

[15] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 97.

[16] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 2.

[17] Mattoo, Amitabh. "Towards the peace process." (June 2, 2005) < http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/496/496%20amitabh%20mattoo.htm>

[18]The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 16.

[19] Kaul, S.N. "Dynamics of Kashmir Politics" New Delhi: Rajat. 2001. - Page 27

[20] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 16.

[21] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 15.

[22] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 95.

[23] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 25.

[24] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 26.

[25] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 94

[26] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 95

[27] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 95/96

[28] Talbot, Ian, and Arnold: India and Pakistan. London: Hodder Headline, 2000. – Page 31/32

[29] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 96

[30] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 97

[31] Talbot, Ian, and Arnold: India and Pakistan. London: Hodder Headline, 2000. – Page 126

[32] ""THE NEW ISLAMIST INTERNATIONAL" OF TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SET UP BY US HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE" Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics. (May 10, 2005) < http://www.kashmir-information.com/Afghanistan/Appendix2.html>

[33] The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect – Page 98

[34] Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the unfinished war. I.B Tauris, 2002.

[35] "Kashmir edges a step closer to peace." Guardian Unlimited. (June 6, 2005) < http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,1117482,00.html>

[36] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 100

[37] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 100/101

[38] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 101

[39] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 101

[40] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 101/102

[41] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 102

[42] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 102/103

[43] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 103

[44] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 104

[45] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 104/5

[46] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 105

[47] Question Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospect - Page 105/106

[48] Mattoo, Amitabh. "Towards the peace process."

Bibliography

Ganguly, Sumit, ed. The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. London: Franc Cass And Company Limited, 2003.

Buckley, Richard, ed. Understanding Global Issues: Pakistan, A state of insecurity. Understanding Global Issues Limited, 2003

Kaul, Maharaj. "Jammu & Kashmir: Self-Determination, Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession." South Asian Voice. (12 May. 2005) http://members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/kashmir.html

Vanaik, Achin. "No Paradigm Shift". The Hindu. (9 April, 2005) < http://www.tni.org/archives/vanaik/paradigm.htm>

Eriksen, Lars. "Kashmir: A history at a flashpoint." The Observer (June 9, 2002).

Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the unfinished war. I.B Tauris, 2002.

Talbot, Ian, and Arnold: India and Pakistan. London: Hodder Headline, 2000.

"Plight of Kashmiri Pundits". The Truth about Kashmir. (May 27, 2005) < http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/pandit.html>

Mattoo, Amitabh. "Towards the peace process." (June 2, 2005) < http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/496/496%20amitabh%20mattoo.htm>

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