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The role played by Peasants in the Liberation struggle of Zimbabwe
The struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe is a theme that has been accorded fair historiographical attention in Zimbabwean history. Scholarly attention on the war was predicated on the need to understand how the ‘under equipped’ freedom fighters had managed to paralyze the state funded Rhodesian Forces? In light of this, therefore, the widely accepted view came to be that the guerrillas (freedom fighters) established rapport with the peasants during the course of the war. However, there is an anti-thesis between nationalist and revisionist  interpretations on the role and participation of peasants in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. The nationalist historians advance a glorious interpretation of the role of peasants by arguing that there was a correlation between the guerrillas’ Maoist ideology of relying on mass support to win a war and the peasants’ grievances in the white colonial state. They justify this claim by rationalizing that the peasants had long developed a spirit of resentment prior to guerrilla infiltration in their areas, thus, when the guerrillas came, their ideas fell on fertile ground. Contrary to the glorious interpretation, revisionist historians have reasoned that, it is misleading to suggest that the peasants always supported the guerrillas out of will since such a position ignores other critical issues such as guerrilla indiscipline, local struggles in the communities and guerrilla coercion as a means for mobilizing the masses. Given these interpretations, this paper holds that whilst it is a truism that the guerrilla war thrived on the masses’ co-operation, the nationalist interpretation is less convincing in the face of the revisionist expostulation. The issue of the compatibility between guerrilla ideology and peasant grievances has been one of the most contentious in the debate over the peasants’ participation in the war. Ranger declares that prior to the coming of the war, peasants in Makoni (his case study area) and other parts of the country had developed a sense of rural nationalism as a result of the land alienation policies of the Rhodesian state. Given this scenario, he maintains that the peasants found themselves in a restricting situation where they could not militarily engage in war with the colonists because of poor resources, thus, when the guerrillas came seeking to mobilise the communities, the peasants were ready to support them as a way of fighting the state’s inequalities. Ranger’s argument was reiterated by Manungo who makes a case for peasants’ participation in the Chiweshe District basing on the roles that the peasants played during the war. In this regard, Manungo posits that peasant cooperation through logistical and information dissemination became vital to the extent that the peasants became the ‘nerves and arteries’ of the guerrillas. In other words, nationalist historians view the liberation struggle as the crescendo of peasant nationalism. Nationalist historians insist that the compatibility between guerrilla ideology and peasant grievances, coupled with an effective mobilisation technique by the guerrillas resulted in total peasant participation during the war. Manungo, for instance, states that the pungwes (all night meetings) were a vitally effective mobilisation technique which was meant to raise the political consciousness and to raise the morale of the peasantry. Further to being conscientised, nationalist historians also claim that the presence of the peasantry at the pungwes is clear testimony that they were on the same side with the guerrillas as they also sang morale boosting songs, cooked for the guerrillas as well as ‘organising’ among themselves to aid the guerrilla effort. Janice McLaughlin argues that it was the peasants’ participation that instigated the brutality of the Rhodesian Forces on the peasants in the rural areas. In the same vein, Manungo vindicates the Rhodesian Forces for, among other things, establishing Protected Villages and imposing curfews in Chiweshe as a way of cutting the ‘fish’ from the ‘water’ so that the former would starve. It has to be emphasised that above arguments suggest that the peasantry were the lynchpin of guerrilla success on the battlefront deriving their support from the need to dislodge the colonial state so that they would reclaim their lost lands. In light of the above, it has to be stressed that the revisionist interpretation does not wholesomely vindicate the nationalist standpoint but seeks to broaden the scope of inquiry. Norma Kriger, who is an arch-critic of the nationalist interpretation has postulated that, contrary to the glorious picture where peasants ‘did not merely provide food and information [but] also acted in the war’, ‘mobilisation was achieved through guerrilla coercion rather than guerrilla ideology.’   What is antithetical about the above views is that Ranger maintains that guerrilla mobilisation was embraced by the people who willingly acted in the war whilst Kriger advocates that inasmuch as it can be submitted that mobilisation was effective, a more nuanced analysis reveals that mobilisation was achieved through coercive means. It has to be reiterated that nationalist evidence is mostly based on the peasants’ interviews conducted with peasants and ex-combatants of the war. The peasantry’s provision of information, food and logistical support is used as an exemplar by nationalist historians to justify the claim that they willingly supported the war. In his autobiography, Wilfred Mhanda, an ex- Zimbabwe People’s Army commander, confesses of indiscipline among the Chaminuka Detachment which operated in the Chesa Native Purchase Area in Mt Darwin who used coercive means to gain the masses’ support. He cites one particular incident of an old man who showed great relief when he [Mhanda] and his team accepted a meal without meat. Of critical importance in Mhanda’s narrative is that it offers an insider’s view which is contrary to the nationalist interpretation. It justifies Kriger’s line of attack that; [To] infer peasant attitudes to the guerrillas from their behaviour is bound to conceal their feelings. One has to solicit their ideas about their experiences. Enduring guerrilla violence and sustained popular support cannot coexist, although guerrilla violence and mobilisation (at least in the short-term) apparently can. Indeed, peasants did not stop supporting the guerrillas during the war but one has to examine the circumstances which compelled the peasants to do so. It is instructive to indicate that most works falling under the nationalist interpretation were written in the first decade of independence or, had their researches done during the same period and publications following later. For example, Terrence Ranger’s Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe had its research begin in 1981 and published in 1985 whilst Manungo commenced the research for his PhD. Thesis in the mid 1980s and defended it in 1991. Given such a situation, where the euphoria for independence was still at its zenith, one can logically declare that the historian and the informant were influenced by the spirit of the time. This, it can be propounded, had the inevitable influence of distorting the historian’s use of evidence as the situation would not have allowed one to produce works that were detrimental to the excitement of independence. Consequently, analysis was narrowly focused on the successful execution of the Maoist ideology of guerrilla warfare which resulted in the ‘overwhelming’ response by the peasantry and overlooking critical aspects of guerrilla discipline. Furthermore, revisionist historians have argued that the class relations among the peasantry resulted in many cases where guerrillas ended up being manipulated by different classes to settle dispute. Mtisi et al succinctly hold that, Clearly, it would be misleading to portray a rosy picture of a united front of civil co-operation with freedom fighters against the Rhodesian Forces. The reality is that the ‘water’ was not always of the same colour and density, nor did it always flow in a uniform like tide. Out of personal interest, greed, jealousy, family rivals and animosities, and even as a survival tactic, peasants would often ‘sell-out out’ to either of the two sides. What emerges out of the above argument is the dynamics of cleavages among the peasantry and guerrilla violence during the struggle. In response to Manungo’s concept of guerrilla justice regarding the issue of ‘sell-outs’, Kriger vindicates the guerrillas for brutalising the peasants on the basis of their growing fear of insecurity in areas of operation after failing to establish liberated zones. In a different case study of Buhera, Mashingaidze buttresses Kriger’s view by arguing that, ‘...the guerrillas were violent to sell-outs and witches. Witches as evil people had to be expunged from society. Sell-outs on the other hand were regarded as inimical to the nationalist cause hence they had to suffer the same fate as witches.’ It should be highlighted that the above argument is typically paradoxical to the nationalist view which vindicates only the Rhodesian Forces for brutalising the peasants in their counter-insurgency operations thereby ignoring the behaviour of the guerrillas. What is notable, however, is that peasants sometimes supported the guerrillas out of fear and not will. With such a case, the nationalist argument leaves much to be desired as it does not do justice to the guerrillas’ behaviour in the warzones. Further to the issue of class struggles and guerrilla violence, revisionist historians have also engendered peasants’ participation in the liberation struggle. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, for example, has demonstrated that women were more than just zvimbwidos but suffered at the hands of guerrilla indiscipline. She cites cases of sexual abuses by the guerrillas during the pungwes as well as in military bases. Fay Chung also amplifies Nhongo-Simbanegavi’s claim by testifying that, although the guerrillas had a code of conduct which compelled them to avoid sexual relationships they frequently broke the rules by abusing women who assisted in the bases and pungwes. The aforementioned works are a direct challenge to the orthodox picture where a rapport between women and guerrillas developed with women playing the key role of zvimbwidos and parents. The methodological aspect of the feminist approach is more convincing in the face of the nationalist argument. Earlier in the paper, it has been indicated that the nationalist interpretation was marred by methodological flaws as a result of the closeness to the events. Most importantly, however, is the fact that the researchers could not access ZANU and ZAPU’s archives which contained valuable information about the war. Simbanegavi’s study can therefore be understood as having made a methodological breakthrough by using ZANLA archives. As the evidence from the archives and her interviews suggest, women [peasants] were victims of guerrilla indiscipline. By and large, it can be proclaimed that, indeed peasants played a key role in the successful execution of the guerrilla war. Be that as it may, methodological flaws, narrow focus on peasant behaviour conspicuously distorts the nationalist argument as it ends up overlooking the structural aspects of the war. The fact that revisionist historians are, among other things, cautious in their analysis of peasant participation and methodologically better placed because of the availability of archival material has broadened our understanding to the vulnerability of women during the war as well as guerrilla violence and coercion. It therefore becomes logical for one to declare that revisionist arguments are more convincing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chung F., Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe, Weaver Press, Harare, 2007. Mashingaidze T. M., The Dynamics of Zimbabwe’s Struggle for Liberation: The Case of Buhera District From 1950 to 1990, M. A. African History Thesis, Department of History, University of Zimbabwe, 2001. Manungo K. D., The Role Peasants Played in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation, With Special Emphasis on Chiweshe District, Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio University, 1991. McLaughlin J., On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Baobab Books, Harare, 1996. Mhanda W., Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter, Weaver Press, Harare, 2011. Raftopoulos B. and Mlambo A. (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, Weaver Press, Harare, 2009. Ranger T., Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study, James Currey, London, 1985. Kriger N. J., ‘The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within the Struggle’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.14 No. 2, Taylor and Francis, 1988. _________., Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. Simbanegavi J. N., For Better or Worse?: Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle, Weaver Press, Harare, 2000.