User talk:Jayron32/On positions of authority at Wikipedia

Doing nothing is not an option
The downsides of inaction are (1) the fostering of vandalism, (2) a higher level of community angst, and (3) a degradation of community trust in adminship. Tony  (talk)  04:45, 3 January 2009 (UTC)

Interesting
It's interesting that you cite James Madison but eventually come to the conclusion "Eventually, there needs to be unwatched watchmen." As you seem to have some knowledge of civics and principles of government, then I'm curious why you would reject the system of checks and balances and the notion of separation of powers favored by, to name one prominent political thinker, James Madison. Of course the point isn't to add iterations of redundant and ever-more-powerful bodies on top of each other. The idea is to create some system where groups can provide checks on other groups. (I'm just talking philosophically, and not endorsing any specific review board proposal.) --JayHenry (t) 01:30, 10 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Yep, even the politicians at the top are "watched", via journalists and thus the public. However insufficient and distortive this process may be, if you removed it, you'd soon see the difference. I believe that the notion—in its extreme form—does not relate to real life. And even most dictators have to bend to the opinions of others; it may not constitute much of a check or balance in the legalistic sense we know, but it kind of undermines that case. Tony   (talk)  02:01, 10 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I don't reject the system of checks and balances, such systems are ALREADY in place (WP:ANI, WP:AN, WP:RFC, etc. etc.) The problem is that, in a trustworthy system, there needs to be some issues that are left out of the public discourse.  For example, we accept in the U.S. that the Supreme Court may deliberate in private over cases, or that the CIA does not have to publish its sources etc. etc.  Nothing is ever fully public and fully watchable in a complex society.  It should be as open as practicable.  But we must accept that ArbCom is going to have to do things which are unreviewable by the Wikipedia public at large...
 * The deal is that when you create overly redundant systems, you cannot expect the new systems to be free from the problems of the old systems. If ArbCom is inadequate to deal with everything put upon it at Wikipedia, that is fine, but if it is only deemed inadequate because its memebers aren't trustworthy, then any NEW system will suffer from the same lack of trust.  If ArbCom is splitting its duties because the workload is too much, that's cool.  But if we are merely creating a new review body because we don't trust the members of ArbCom to do their jobs, who's to say THAT body will do its job.  --Jayron32. talk . contribs  06:35, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
 * ArbCom can't function properly, and can't deal with more than a small amount of business, because it has a ridiculous process that is both potentially unfair and an invitation to massive bloat. A quasi-judicial system needs rules for evidence and measures to minimise bloat, irrelevance, and abuse. These are not in place. I'd hate to be an arbitrator having to wade through the current rubbish that counts as "evidence".
 * That is what concerns me much more than deliberations in private. Wales came out rather too heavily against private deliberations after the most recent election, I believe. Tony   (talk)  10:51, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Yes, and I fully agree with that move. However, the creation of an identical process will suffer from the same problems.  You can't just create an entirely new group, call them something different, give them redundant powers to ArbCom, and then just expect the new group to somehow be immune to these problems.  It makes no sense.  At some point, we have to either accept that we need to trust the group in power, or believe that no group with those powers will ever be trustable.  The second position is far to scary to hold; if we seriously believed that it would make belonging to the community intolerable.  So at some point, we need to place our trust in the group.  Creating a new group, calling it a Review Board, and then giving it some or all of the powers that ArbCom has now does not solve any problems; it only creates TWO groups which have the exact same problems that you ascribe to ArbCom above.  --Jayron32. talk . contribs  12:53, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I made no mention of creating a second group parallel to ArbCom. No, I want it to reform its current process, to give the poor arbitrators a break WRT to the size, focus and clarity of hearing texts, to make it less prone to hijacking by users who want to push irrelevant agendas or to impugne parties unfairly, and to increase its ability to handle a bigger case-load with less brouhaha. Better and more evidentiary rules, and even the slight presence of a more empowered clerk or supervising arbitrator, would also make a big difference. However, AdminReview, still under construction, will be an important part of the project's capacity to maximise harmony and justice at a different, more fine-grained and narrow level. It will fill a current hole.  Tony   (talk)  14:09, 22 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I think those are all noble causes, and I support them as ideals fully. However, this new body or process that you are trying to create, what do you intend to do to stop those exact sorts of problems from infecting IT? --Jayron32. talk . contribs  18:34, 22 January 2009 (UTC)


 * No system is perfect, but the motivation is there to review and fine-tune AdminReview once it starts. The two key differences between it and the existing processes are (1) its focus on relatively narrow questions of whether a breach of admin policy has or has not occurred, and (2) strict evidentiary rules to limit bloat and the duration and complexity of the process, and to maximise the likelihood of procedural fairness. You may wish to read the FAQs; the third-party/multiple complainant issue, and the arrangements for the election of coordinators, have not been fully resolved. Another difference is that AdminReview will rely on the good faith of the parties, not muscle or the will of the crowd. It will aim to attract candidates with specific skills (see Coordinators).  Tony   (talk)  13:35, 23 January 2009 (UTC)