User talk:Jazacarias

Frome : saifullah Khan chairmen "Pushton Action community" Subject : To removed the Durand line & Pushtuns should decided that "in a free referendum if they wish to stay in Pakistan, to create a new and independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan." I requested to the Uited Nations High commissioner for Human Rights, that " Durand line is the key problem es of centrals Asia,with out slowing the Durand line issues that's in possible to peace in a Centrals Asia,in epically in Afghanistan & NWFP(North-West Frontier Province) and pushton Areas in Baluchistan" AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN BORDER The roots of the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict liein the past, prior tothe existence of Pakistan. In 1901, during the Vice-Royalty of Lord Curzon, the Pushtun inhabited territories under British rule were taken under separate administration – up to this time they had been a part of Punjab province. The new province was named North-West Frontier Province. Internally, North-West Frontier Province was divided into two parts: the eastern part was called the Settled Districts, while the area to the north-west was named the Tribal Areas. The Tribal Areas were divided into five Agencies – Malakand, Chaibar, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.23 In practice, this internal division meant that North-West Frontier Province had two borders – an internal one, designated by British administration, and an external one, which was the limit of British control. Generally, North-West Frontier Province was referred to as Pushtunistan. In theory, the Tribal Areas were a British protectorate although the tribes living there did not necessarily accept this dependence. What is more, the British promised to accept their independence. A British officer described this situation thus: "Although included in India, [the] Tribal Areas weren’t a part of British India."4 The tribes living in the Tribal Areas were subject to British authority through treaties and unwritten agreements, which guaranteed that they could live in peace under British authority and with Afghanistan. In return they received subsidies from Britain and the British authorities did not interfere with internal tribal problems.The tribes rebelled against British authority from time to time. These insurrections were quite often stirred, and supported, by the Afghan government.7 Maintaining peace in this territory represented quite a burden for the British treasury which by the 1920s and 30s was spending two million pounds a year for this purpose. During the Second World War Pushtunistan became very valuable for Afghanistan, Germany and Italy. The Axis states tried to win the support of Afghanistan but it declared its neutrality on 6 September 1939. The Germans had hopes of stirring up a rebellion among the tribes living on both sides of the Durand Line, counting on collaboration with Haji Mirza Ali Khan alias the Fakir of Ipi.9 However, despite German attempts at espionage they failed to achieve their goal. The only rebellion of border tribes during the Second World War was a short-term revolt of the Afridis at the end of 1939.10 Prior to the partition of India, the Afghan Government, on 3 July 1947, sent a note to Delhi and London, in which it demanded that the people living in Pushtunistan be given the right to choose their own future – to be part of Pakistan, Afghanistan or became an independent state. In August 1947 just before Partition, the Afghan Prime Minister received an assurance from the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, that the "Cultural brotherhood of Afghans and Pathans of North-West Frontier Province will be not disturbed." The Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute arose out of differing interpretations of the 1893 agreement. In Abdur Rahman Khan’s opinion, the agreement did not designate a boundary between Afghanistan and British India in the meaning of international law, but only a frontier of influence of both states. Up to his death, this was Abdur Rahman Khan’s point of view. The British point of view was similar at this time. In 1896 the Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin, wrote to G. Hamilton, Secretary of State for India: "The Durand agreement was an agreement to define the respective sphere of influence of the British Government and the Amir."12 Later British statements were also similar. In 1925, an official British Army publication, the Military Report on Afghanistan, stated that "The [Durand] line was not described in the 1893 treaty as the HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS THE BORDER DISPUTE Although included in India, [the] Tribal Areas weren’t a part of British India..the"Cultural brotherhood of Afghans and Pathans of North-West Frontier Province will be not disturbed." boundary of India, but as the eastern and southern frontiers of the Amir’s dominions and the limits of the respective sphere of influence of the two governments, the object being the extension of British authority and not that of the Indian frontier."13 Many British were, in later years, of the same opinion that the Durand Line and the administrative border between the Settled Districts and the Tribal Agencies were delineating zones of influence and responsibility – "…the tribes between the administrative border and the Durand Line were a buffer to a buffer, and the line had none of the rigidity of other international frontiers."14 The Simon Commission repeated the same point of view in 1928: "British India stops at the boundary15 of the administered area."16 All these statements made it clear that the British had no intention of annexing the territory up to the Durand Line, rather its goal was to administer this territory and treat it as a sphere of influence. Subsequent treaties between British India and Afghanistan of 1905, 1919, and 1921 did not confirm the Durand Line as an international boundary as such, but instead merely stated that the Afghans accepted the obligations of previous emirs. In consequence, the validity of the reaffirmation in later treaties depends in every case on the validity and nature of the obligations incurred in the Durand agreement of 1893, which created spheres of influence, but not an international boundary.17 One further problem complicated the situation from the point of view of international law – Point 14. The Afghan-British treaty of 1921 stated that both states had the right to repudiate the treaty within three years after a one-year notice.18 What is more, this treaty contained a supplementary letter specifically recognising Afghan interest in the trans-border tribes.19 Sometime at the end of the Second World War, the British changed their policy and officially stated that the Durand Line was an international boundary of India, a position inherited by Pakistan on its independence. Unofficially, the British themselves were not sure how to proceed in this case. Perhaps the best illustration of their confusion is a secret document, dated 28 April 1949, which stated that in the light of law, the situation was not clear as to the status of the Tribal Areas. According to this document these areas neither belonged to Pakistan nor to Afghanistan, but at the same time this new situation did not give Afghanistan any rights to extend its territory up to Tribal Areas without the approval of the latter’s population, and the same applied to Pakistan.20 Despite these doubts, British politicians publicly supported Pakistan’s point of view. On 30 June 1950 P. Noel-Becker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated in the House of Commons that: "In His Majesty’s Government opinion Pakistan is, in the light of international law, the successor of rights and duties of the former Government of India and His Majesty’s Government towards those territories, and the Durand Line is an international boundary. In the face of British policy the Afghans tried to make a deal with Pakistan. Talks were held in December 1947 in Karachi during which Afghanistan demanded that the Durand Line be scrapped. According to Najibullah Khan, the Afghan representative, Afghanistan wanted to persuade Pakistan to allow the establishment of Pushtunistan; to allow Afghanistan free access to the sea; and, to guarantee mutual neutrality in case of attack on either party. Zafarulla Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, made Pakistan’s stand on the Durand Line clear when he stated that Afghanistan had not understood the constitutional position of the provinces and that the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province had contributed in a great measure to the achievement of Pakistan. He did however, offer assurances that the Pushtuns of the frontier would enjoy equal and autonomous status within Pakistan.22 Many British were, in later years, of the same opinion that the Durand Line and the administrative border between the Settled Districts and the Tribal Agencies were delineating zones of influence and responsibility. The situation was not clear as to the status of the Tribal Areas...these areas neither belonged to Pakistan nor to Afghanistan.Afghanistan wanted to persuade Pakistan to allow the establishment of Pushtunistan. In March 1949, Governor-General Khawaja Nazimuddin of North-West Frontier Province announced, that the Province was an integral part of Pakistan. The Afghan authorities protested. They stated that people living in the North- West Frontier Province should have a chance to choose. On 26 July 1949 the Afghan National Assembly nullified all treaties signed with Great Britain including the Durand Line.23 In this instance they based their actions on Point 14 of the Afghan-British treaty of 1921, which gave both states the right to repudiate treaties. The attitudes of Afghanistan and Pakistan allowed virtually no room for dialogue. From almost the first day of Pakistan’s existence as an independent country, relations between the two states were strained. The first sign of this was a vote in the United Nations on 30 September 1947. The Afghan mission voted against Pakistan’s membership, on the grounds of Pakistan’s refusal to Hosayn Aziz, the Afghan representative in the UN at the time stated that: "We cannot recognise the North-West Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of North-West Frontier have not been given an opportunity, free from any kind of influence, to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Pakistan."24 At the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950 the situation worsened. Pakistan decided to stop Afghan trade going through Karachi and closed the border for oil products going to Afghanistan. These restrictions cut Afghanistan off from the outside world and created great difficulties in the country because of the economic dependence on imported goods, especially oil. The Soviet Union immediately took advantage of the situation and supplied Afghanistan with the most urgently needed goods.25 This led to the trade agreement, signed on 17 July 1950,26 which contained provisions for the import by Afghanistan of oil products, sugar, steel and iron goods, and the export to the Soviet Union of wool and cotton. Furthermore this trade was duty free. The volume of the trade grew swiftly, doubling over the next two years. At the same time the trade agreement gave the Soviets the means with which to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. For example, the Soviet Union successfully protested against American and Western European specialists working in Afghanistan, especially in the northern part of the country.27 In 1953 relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan improved slightly. The United States played a very important role in this improvement, connected with an American plan to build up a Middle East Defence Organisation. But cordial relations did not last long. On 27 March 1955 Pakistan decided to introduce administrative reform – the so-called "One-Unit Act", which involved the reorganisation of West Pakistan into a centralised state.28 This led to protests by Afghanistan fearing that Pushtuns in Pakistan would be assimilated into that state. This led to the so-called "flag incident",29 and in effect to the breaking off of diplomatic relations and the closing of the border between the two countries. This latter consequence was the worst, because it again cut Afghanistan off from the outside world,30 and pushed Afghanistan into the arms of the Soviet Union once more. On 28 July 1955 Afghanistan and the USSR signed a transit agreement.31 On 15-19 December 1955 Nikita Khrushchev and Niko³aj Bulganin visited Afghanistan during their trip to India and Burma. One of the effects of this visit was a US0 million loan from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan on very favourable terms, the first of many.32 Another marked effect of the breakdown in bilateral relations was a growing Afghan dependency on Russian military supplies. In July 1956 the USSR granted Afghanistan a loan of US.4 million for military purchases.33 From 1956 on Russian became the technical language of the Afghan Army and most of its armaments came from the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries. These close ties were also the result of America’s refusal to sell arms to Afghanistan.34 Soviet support in relation to the Pushtunistan case was also very important for Kabul. On 15 December 1955 Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin stated that the USSR supported the Afghan point of view and that a plebiscite should be conducted in the area where the Pushtuns live: "…The demand of Afghanistan that the population of neighbouring Pakhtunistan should be given an opportunity of freely expressing their will is justified as well ground. The people of this region have the same right of self-determination as any other people."35 ...the trade agreement gave the Russians the means with which to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. The leaders of the Soviet Union publicly stated, that: "Pushtuns should decide in a free referendum if they wish to stay in Pakistan, to create a new and independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan."36 In the late 1950s, Egyptian, Iranian, Saudi Arabian and United States mediation led to improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to the reopening of the border. It also led to many high level meetings – for example in August 1956 Pakistani President, Iskander Mirza, visited Afghanistan, and in February 1958 King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan. In May 1958 Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a transit agreement which provided for improved access for a range of imports to Afghanistan.37 Yet again however, this period of good relations did not last. There were two basic reasons for the breakdown in bilateral relations. One was the change, in 1960, in Pakistani government policy towards the Pushtun tribes. This was connected with the fact that some of these tribes disregarded state authority. A second reason was related to the fact that American U-2 aircraft were based in Pakistan and that two Pakistani aircrafts violated Afghan air space. On 18 May 1960 the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Naim, protested about this and warned that if Pakistan did not change its policy, Afghanistan would divert the Kabul River. On 13 May 1960 two Pakistani aircraft again violated Afghan air space and were forced to land in Afghanistan. Diplomatic notes were exchanged and on 17 September the pilots and aircraft were returned.38 In September 1960 some friction occurred on the border. Lashkars and detachments of the regular Afghan Army invaded some six miles into Pakistan territory, but were subsequently ejected by the Pakistani Army. Between March and May 1961 many more such border skirmishes took place.39 Continuing frictions and tensions caused the Afghan-Pakistan border to be closed once again in September 1961. During this crisis the Soviet Union gave moral support to Afghanistan. On 2-5 March 1960, Nikita Khrushchev paid a visit to Kabul, and after his return to Moscow stated, that: "…Pushtunistan always was a part of Afghanistan". A bilateral statement was also published which stated that Pushtuns in Pakistan have the right to self-determination.40 Once again the Soviet Union took advantage of Afghanistan’s difficult situation, and under Soviet pressure Afghanistan signed three agreements – in October 1961, January and April 1962,41 further strengthening the ties between the two countries. The Soviet Union went so far as to offer to finance the entire second five-year development plan, for 1960-1965, albeit with one condition attached, that Soviet advisers be placed at the highest level in all Afghan ministries. This time Prime Minister Daoud turned down the Soviet offer.42 The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was re-opened in May 1963, when the Shah of Iran mediated between the two states.43 A new agreement was made possible because of changes in the Afghan government. After 10 years as Prime Minister, Daoud lost this post. He was well known for his irreconcilable standpoint on the Pushtunistan case. For him there were only two options – Pushtunistan should be a free and independent country or should unite with Afghanistan. An improvement in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan led to the preservation of neutrality by Afghanistan during the second Indo- Pakistani conflict in Kashmir in 1965, and in 1971 when Bangladesh gained independence. A rapid deterioration in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan occurred in 1973, after Afghanistan became a republic, with Daoud as its President. He tried to convince China to support Afghanistan’s point of view in the Pushtunistan case, while at the same time Pakistan tried to convince other countries that The leaders of the Soviet Union publicly stated, that: "Pushtuns should decide in a free referendum if they wish to stay in Pakistan, to create a new and independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan."Nikita Khrushchev paid a visit to Kabul, and after his return to Moscow stated, that: "…Pushtunistan always was a part of Afghanistan." Afghanistan, in alliance with the Soviet Union and India, was going to crush Pakistan. In the winter of 1974/1975 both countries started to mobilise troops in the border area. The situation appeared to be very serious and it was commonly believed that war was imminent. But Daoud, seeing that Pakistan was ready to fight over Pushtunistan, decided that his forces were too weak and started talks with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. By the end of 1975 the situation had gradually improved. It seems that Daoud felt that Soviet influences in his country had become too strong for his liking and that he was not prepared to play the part of a Soviet puppet. Therefore, he was quite eager to reach some sort of understanding with Pakistan. Dialogue between Bhutto and Daoud was cordial and brought some benefits such as the restoration of air communications and renewed transit of consumer goods. Even the coup d’etat in Pakistan in 1977 did not disturb these positive trends in mutual relations. The new head of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq paid a visit to Afghanistan in October 1977 and met with Daoud. In turn Daoud went to Pakistan in March 1978. As a result of these visits, Daoud abandoned his vision of an independent Pushtunistan, and Zia ul-Haq offered some form of autonomy for Pushtunistan. However, due to the coup d’etat in Afghanistan in 197845 these proposals never materialised. The communist coup d’etat complicated the situation, because the new regime tried to use the Pushtunistan case as a diversion to distract Afghan public opinion. The new regime used the old arguments: "Pushtunistan’s problem should be resolved with regard to the historical facts ."46 President Hafizullah Amin47 claimed "…unity [for] all Afghans from [the] Oxus to [the] Indus."48 What is more, he stated, "We cannot leave our brothers on the opposite side of Khajbar." After he became President, Amin’s stand in respect to the Pushtunistan question became much more decisive. In his opinion Pushtunistan belonged to "Great Afghanistan". Similarly Amin’s successor Babrak Karmal50 called for the re-unification of all Pushtuns under Afghanistan’s guidance. He named the North-West Frontier Province, which had been under British colonial and its successors rule, as the "the sacred land."51 At the same time the status of Pushtunistan changed – from being territory lost to Afghanistan to a destination for emigration. Migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan increased considerably after the Soviet intervention in December 1979. Most of the emigrants found a place to live in North-West Frontier Province. For example, in Baluchistan there were 500,000, in Punjab 100,000, and in North-West Frontier Province 1.8 million refugees from Afghanistan.52 This caused many side effects, notably in demographic composition with changes to the proportion of different ethnic groups in the area and it also influenced the local economy – emigrants from Afghanistan monopolised transport in the northern part of Pakistan, and formed the largest group in the carpet industry.53 The border problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan returned to prominence during the Geneva negotiation54 following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s. The subject continued to cause discussion and controversy. The solution adopted at this time did not resolve any of the problems – the Durand Line was not confirmed as the international border between the two countries – and the questions remained open for further discussion. Article II, point 3 of the Accords arising from the negotiations stated that both countries were "to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties."55 The new regime used the old arguments:"Pushtunistan’sproblem should beresolved with regard to the historical facts." President Hafizullah Amin1 claimed "…unity [for] all Afghans from [the] Oxus to [the] Indus. What ismore, he stated,"We can not leave our brothers on the opposite side of Khajbar." After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, civil war erupted between different groups of Mujahideen. Unexpectedly, nearly all groups of Mujahideen were defeated by a new power the Taleban. What was the connection between the Taleban and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute? Pakistan hoped, among other things, that it would be easier to reach an understanding on Pushtunistan with a Taleban government. They also hoped for the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which had caused a great deal of trouble for their administration to date,56 and that the Taleban would finally acknowledge the Durand Line as the international boundary between the two states. But as it transpired they were mistaken in their hopes, despite the close ties between these two regimes, the Taleban was not ready to acknowledge the validity of the Durand Line.57 At the present time (December 2001), after the fall of the Taleban regime the question of Pushtunistan remains in limbo. The new Afghan interim government has more pressing responsibilities than the border controversy with Pakistan. First of all, there is a question of rebuilding the state, achieving peaceful reconciliation between various ethnic and tribal groups, and the creation of a new political order. The interim government is by definition shortlived, and whatever its ideas concerning Pushtunistan, it does not have scope for them. What is more, Pakistan’s friendly neutrality is vital for the success of this new government. Secondly, the recent events in Afghanistan – the struggle with al-Qaeda and the hunt for Osama bin Laden – have led to the deployment of Pakistani regular forces in the Pushtun Tribal Areas, for the first time in fifty years (certainly in such strength). In this situation it may be assumed that the Pakistani hold on Pushtunistan is strengthened. Therefore it is likely that, for time being, the whole question of Pushtunistan will be put aside. To summarise the consequences of the border dispute several points should be stressed. Firstly, every time the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was closed the Soviet Union gained an opportunity to extend its presence and interests in Afghanistan, influencing government policy, the economy and the army. This border became, metaphorically speaking, a Soviet gateway to Afghanistan. Up to the beginnings of the conflict with Pakistan, one of the main goals of Afghan policy had been to keep Soviet influences as far as possible from Afghanistan and to maintain equal distance with the two powers bordering Afghanistan. What is more, every crisis in Afghan-Pakistani relations meant further estrangement between Afghanistan and Western Europe and the United States. This in turn inhibited access to Afghanistan by specialists and technicians from international organisations and agencies such as the UNHCR and fostered the conviction in the United States and Western Europe that Afghanistan was not a stable country, resulting, it could be argued in stronger US support for Pakistan. Afghanistan’s ties with the Soviet Union were seen as a proof that the country, in theory neutral, was in fact pro-Soviet. As to the future of the dispute, it should be borne in mind that formally the question remains unsolved. It is still possible that in future, after rebuilding of the state, that Afghanistan can return to the Pushtunistan debate. It might then be used, once again, to divert Afghan public opinion from internal problems – the struggle for power between different political groups. Equally some other player might emerge who will try to use this dispute for his own goals. Sir I will be weating for youres responsed as soon, by Email. kakar_saif@yahoo.com with beast reagards Bold textPakistan's New Border Strategy saifullah Khan Saifullah khan 09:53, 14 December 2006 (UTC) The US very cautiously backs Islamabad's new deal to stand down militarily in Pakistan's restive tribal regions bordering Afghanistan and work instead toward winning the hearts and the minds of the local population. Pakistan's military president General Pervez Musharraf has embarked on a new strategy designed to chip away at the Taliban insurgency by standing down the army and seeking to win the hearts and minds of the country's North Waziristan tribal agency, which borders Afghanistan. The deal, announced earlier in September, has seen the some 80,000 Pakistani military troops deployed in North Waziristan reduce their profile and allow some local militia forces to take over the manning of some checkpoints in the area. The deal has also seen the release from custody of some tribal militants captured during the Pakistani military's recent operations in the region. Reports also say the local tribal leaders have reciprocated by pledging to lower their profile as well, and to ensure that Taliban forces do not infiltrate the border from Afghanistan. Musharraf believes that by standing down military troops and working toward reconstruction and development in the area, the tribal population - traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban - could shift its loyalties and work towards securing the border area. So far, reports say Islamabad has begun to make good on its promise to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on development and in the form of reparations for human casualties and material damage that resulted from its military operations in the country's seven semi-autonomous tribal agencies. The development money is earmarked for the creation of a "Reconstruction Opportunity Zone" across all seven agencies. Trucks full of cement and other construction materials have been seen heading for cities in Waziristan to begin reconstruction efforts. Afghan and Pakistani officials also have agreed to hold tribal gatherings on both sides of the border in an effort to boost the new hearts-and-minds deal, Reuters reported from Kabul on Wednesday. Tribal agencies welcome new deal In Wana, the capital of the South Waziristan tribal agency, the political administration seemed relieved at the new strategy, which is being viewed as a deal signed with the Taliban. An administration official told ISN Security Watch last week on condition of anonymity that "the level of tension has significantly dropped in the region [since the new deal], and we can now freely move around." "Business activity is returning to normal with a reduction of the military presence in the region," the official said. Ghazni Khan, a former Pakistani army officer who lives in a village close to the border with Afghanistan, told ISN Security Watch that the army and the tribal areas were both exhausted after a long, drawn out battle. "The local population, which was caught between traditional hospitality and sympathy for the Taliban and anti-US forces [as well as] tribal and blood relations seems to be benefiting from the truce the most," Khan said. However, Khan said he feared that intrusive US military helicopters and espionage activities could upset the truce and make the new deal a short-lived one. A Pakistani intelligence official told ISN Security Watch that there was already a marked change in the region, with pro-Taliban activity having been reduced significantly. However, it is important to keep in mind that Pakistan is keen on showing progress in the new strategy in order to maintain the backing of the US. However, one tribal elder, speaking with ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity, was skeptical, saying the deal was only "temporary." "The Pakistani army as well as the pro-Taliban elements will use the [deal] to strengthen their positions and reorganize their ranks," he said. The tribal elder said peace would remain a distant reality as long as US troops remained in Afghanistan. "The Afghans as well as their brethren in the [Pakistani] tribal areas hate any foreign army on their soil, but the Americans are the worst," he said. Still, some Pakistani officials in North Waziristan feel they are shouldering responsibilities while NATO and the Afghan government are failing to do their parts. "The Afghan side should also take its due responsibility in curbing infiltration into Pakistani territory," an official and retired general told ISN Security Watch, asking that his name be withheld. "We should not be condemned for the failures of the coalition forces or the [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai regime," he said. Karzai has long said the Taliban was running its operations from Pakistan, while Musharraf accuses Afghanistan of causing the problem by inviting a "people's war" among its marginalized Pastun tribes. The Pashtun border lands have for decades been a haven for Islamist militants, allegedly including Osama bin Laden. In the 1980s, the independent tribes welcomed foreign militants who fought against the Soviet in Afghanistan. The Taliban were largely drawn from Pashtun refugee camps along the border in the 1990s. Observers of many minds over new deal In Washington, Musharraf's new deal has been met, at least publicly, with relative praise, though in private, officials seem to be more than a little skeptical. "What he [Musharraf] is doing is entering agreements with governors in the regions of the country, in the hopes that there would be an economic vitality, there will be alternatives to violence and terror," US President George W Bush said when the deal was first announced. "We are watching this very carefully, obviously," he added. Some observers believe that Washington's public support for the deal is actually recognition that perhaps the insurgency is growing in another area of Pakistan, further south in the troubled province of Balochistan, and that military efforts are being refocused there instead. Balochistan remains extremely underdeveloped with only marginal access to education and health facilities, even in the major towns. This is despite the fact that the strategically placed energy-rich province, bordering Afghanistan and Iran, meets 40 percent of the entire country’s natural gas needs. Over the last couple of years, a renegade army, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has consistently attacked gas facilities, infrastructure and security forces. The situation took a turn for the worse when scores of rockets were fired at Musharraf’s helicopter in the Kohlu area on 14 December last year. In response, the increasingly unpopular Musharraf, who had already escaped three attempts on his life, ordered a large-scale military operation in the volatile Baloch districts. Other observers think the new deal ignores the changing face of leadership in the tribal regions. Alexis Debat, a former French counter-terrorism official, told United Press International (UPI) that the traditional structures of tribal power were increasingly being supplanted by the rule of Islamic clerics with pro-Taliban sympathies - a fact he said would make the new deal difficult to manage. Debat also said that the Taliban, al-Qaida and the "sectarian Kashmiri element" all seemed to be converging into one group, enjoying sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal regions. Still, others believe the case for convergence is not that strong, but that the Islamic parties in Pakistan's tribal regions were largely parochial, according to UPI. During an expert panel sponsored by the US-based non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations, Kathy Gannon, special correspondent for The Associated Press in South-Central Asia, told the panel it was "virtually impossible to guarantee a secure border because tribal people on either side shared ethnic group and family ties." "The heavy-handed m military approach that has dominated the strategy in both countries works against this effort and has contributed to the greater insecurity in the tribal regions. It has also resulted in the death of some valuable interlocutors and opened a space for the mullahs to be the arbiters in tribal and personal disputes. This has given them additional authority particularly in Pakistan," Gannon said. "Making allies is a difficult and complicated approach that requires a deep knowledge of the culture, an understanding of the outstanding grievances in the area, and [the ability] to go about tackling them," she said. Amin Tarzi, analyst on Afghan affairs for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), told the panel: "The recent agreement between Islamabad and North Waziristan has thus far failed to produce one of its main target outcomes: prevention of cross-border activities. If Pakistan or Afghanistan is willing to grant the tribes more authority [...] then the tribes signed agreements should be held accountable for any cross-border activities occurring under their jurisdiction." But other observers argue that some time will be needed to determine the effectiveness of the new strategy, and that development and economic progress must be allowed to be realized before the new deal is shoved aside. The Durand Line Another key problem lies in the delineation of the border itself. Afghanistan has never recognized the 2,640 km Durand Line drawn up by British colonialists in the 1890s. According to Afghans, the Durand Line robbed Afghanistan of land and it unfairly divided Pashtuns. Pakistan says the internationally recognized border is not negotiable. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations panel, Dennis Kux, senior policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, suggested that there be more of an effort to convince Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line. "To make things more palatable for the Afghans, a UN-sponsored international conference attended by Afghanistan's neighbors should pledge support for the sanctity of the country's borders. Differences over the actual location of the Durand Line - maps differ on this - could be addressed by a tripartite commission with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States or some similar arrangement," Kux said. if you have any comments about theis Actical free feal Email me by Kakar_saif@yahoo.com

pakhtoon Action committee (Action in Karachi ) Bold text
Pakhtoon Action Committee (PAC). pashton allwas fighting for oure rights. pashton is not Trriests Nation pahton is one of the peacfull nation

KARACHI: Five man was killed and dozens others, including four chidrens, were injured in clashes that erupted Friday during a strike called by the Pakhtoon Loya Jirga Action Committee (PAC). The strike was called to protest what the loya jirga has called the government's discriminatory treatment towards Pashto-speaking people in Karachi. It concerns several issues such as evictions, the government's drive to phase out pollution-causing vehicles, the prices of diesel and voters lists. The strike was widely supported by transporters who are mostly Pashto-speaking people. Ten rickshaws, seven motorcycles, five privately owned vehicles and a police chowki were torched. Youngsters burnt and damaged passing vehicles, police mobile units, the front of a bank and the office of the TPO of Gadap. According to reports, at about 7:00 a.m. a crowd from Al Asif Square and surrounding areas converged on the Super Highway with the intention of blocking it. But as the police had anticipated this would happen, a large contingent was deployed beforehand. When the mob started stoning the police, the units were temporarily forced to withdraw and the protestors successfully blocked the highway. One group of protestors set up pickets on top of the under-construction Lyari Expressway from where an exchange of fire ensued with the police down below. The protestors also threw stones and lobbed back the tear gas shells that were targeted at them. In Sultanabad's Jackson area, unidentified people fired at a petrol pump where a man named Younis Khan died. The violence affected SITE as well where workers could not make it to work at the factories and industrial units. The police said that Sohrab Goth was the worst affected. The violence ebbed for a while between Friday and Asr prayers but the Super Highway was blocked for about 12 hours. More than 120 people were detained but many of them, especially in Gulberg Town, were workers or passers-by who were not reportedly involved in the protests called by the PAC. Many of them were reportedly Punjabi- or Urdu-speaking people. Protestors fired at a rangers mobile unit that was trying to leave the scene in haste. As the shots were fired, its driver was injured, causing the vehicle to overturn at high speed, resulting in injuries to the jawans inside. Similarly, police mobile units were attacked at Al Asif Square and four policemen were injured. In Gulshan-e-Maymar, a police team was attacked and two policemen were injured. There were reports of 10 pedestrians injured even though they were not involved in the protests. "Our strike was peaceful but it turned violent when the police used teargas and fired on our people in Sohrab Goth and Sultanabad," alleged Amin Khattak, central leader of the Pakhtoon Loya Jirga, while talking to Daily Times. He confirmed that Younis Khan was killed in Sultanabad but also said that a man named Sajid Khan was killed in Sohrab Goth. Hospital sources said, however, that Sajid Khan did not die and was being treated. Khattak claimed that 100 of his workers were arrested. "Wali Muhammad, our worker, lost a kidney when the police fired on him. He was taken to Jinnah hospital, where he is still in a coma," he said. As the rumours of deaths spread, more violence broke out. "We have decided to lodge an FIR against the government officials who ordered the city police to fire on our peaceful workers," declared Khattak. Bacha Khan Chowk, Shireen Jinnah Colony, Golimar, Patel Para, Malir 15, North Nazimabad, Pahar Ganj, Orangi Town, Banaras Chowk and Frontier Colony were tense throughout the day. Public transport stayed off the roads for the most part, leaving people stranded. "We have been forced by the government to go on a strike. Several meetings have been held between us and the governor but not a single grievance has been addressed by the government," said PAC Chairman Shahi Syed who also condemned the deaths and detentions. The PAC said it would organize other protests and they wouldn't pay their taxes unless the government addressed their grievances Yes indeed, the article in question is roughly written, a typical weakness of my fellow Pathans who pride their boorishness and thus lay themselves and their otherwise valid cases and causes open to unnecessary ridicule by their enemies of lesser worth. Pakhutunwali is certainly not a religion, nor even a "culture" per se - as this writer states - no doubt being limited by vocabulary (and indeed also by intellectual indiscretion): Pakhtunwali is a primitive, tribal-cum-feudal "code of honour" customarily practised by all Afghan tribes for centuries, based on chivalry, valour, hospitality, revenge for insults large and small, taunts and challenges concerning one's person, property, relations and/or women... Pathan society is almost wholly dominated by informal and customary collective law, arbitrated by "jirga" councils of elders, but in reality remaining subject to the fittest men and tribes/coalitions; the civilised writ that the British and later their Pakistani proteges tried to impose on the refractory Pathan society may have met with some successes in various times and places, but such law remains largely on paper. The same applies to the successive 20th Century Afghan regimes centered in Kabul and their so-called attempts in this regard. Islam is also extremely dear to the Afghan heart, but is also informally and empirically treated here, so it and Pakhtunwali have merged in the common lore, and indeed agree (or so Afghans think) on almost all issues. Even then, Pakhtunwali predominates a little, as it is emotionally closer to an Afghan's sense of self and identity, which is the most precious consideration of all inhabitants of such backward looking, chaotic societies

I am looking for yours responsed with best regards

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